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ABSTRACT 
Why and how did Saddam Hussein and the Ba'th Party maintain their authority in 
Iraq for so long in contrast to their predecessors? Based on an archival study of recently 
opened internal Ba 'th Party documents, this study argues that Hussein and the Ba 'th used 
a strategic policy ofBa'thification to trap Iraqis within an environment created by a series 
of controls that channeled their behavior into avenues supportive of the regime. With a 
monopoly over state power, Hussein and the Ba'th Party used violence and surveillance 
to eliminate enemies, monitor state and society, and engender fear. Equally important, 
the Ba 'thist State doled out benefits connected to a system of awards and official statuses 
bestowed upon Iraqis who exhibited allegiance. This combination of terror and 
enticement offered Iraqis a stark choice between opposing and supporting the regime, and 
the consequences of an individual's behavior extended to his family, providing a further 
incentive for loyalty. Additionally, Hussein and the Ba'th "organized" state and society 
by recruiting individuals into the party and its proxies and co-opting or replacing the 
leaderships of government and social institutions with loyalists. Simultaneously, Hussein 
vii 
used the Ba'th Party to take over the Iraqi state-to transform it into the Ba'thist State. 
He then utilized the Ba'thist State's resources to either obliterate and build anew existing 
civil and social institutions or reform and incorporate them into the government's legal 
and administrative frameworks. In the process, Hussein transformed these institutions' 
raisons d'etre into support for himself, the party, and the Iraqi nation: the three primary 
symbols of his regime. Finally, Hussein infused classical Ba'thist ideology with his 
personality cult to rationalize his emergence as "the Leader." Through propaganda, 
indoctrination, ritual, mass ceremonies, and myth the Ba'thist State applied the political 
ideas of this Husseini Ba 'thism to all aspects of public and private life in an attempt to 
reorient Iraqis' conceptions of what constituted a just and "natural" society to conform to 
the Ba'thist reality. Combined, the boundaries these controls placed on permissible 
action and thought forced Iraqis to subordinate their traditional loyalties to the regime, 
making them complicit in it. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
I hope that his party loyalty is stronger than his familial allegiance. 
-Saddam Hussein, on a Bacthist whose nephews joined an opposition party1 
My Honor is My Loyalty 
On March 4, 1984, the secretary of the Arab Bacth Socialist Party's (f:tizb al-bacth 
al-carabr al-:Jishtirlila) Wasit branch (fare, pl.furuc) wrote to the head of the High 
Committee for Deserters and Draft Dodgers (al-lajna al-cuzya li-l-hliribfn wa-l-
mutakhallafin) praising a citizen's act of allegiance to "the land, the nation, and the 
victorious leader, Saddam Hussein (God keep him) ... which is without precedent in 
history, even in the first Qtidisiyya."2 A partisan (na~rr, pl. :Jan~lir) from the party's 
Sacad section (shucba, pl. shu cab), the secretary wrote, tried to convince his son to turn 
himself in to his army unit after deserting.3 The son refused, so the sixty-two year-old 
1. Hizb al-Bacth al-e Arabi al-"Ishtiraki. Hizb al-Bacth a!- cArabi aP lshtiraki [in Iraq] Records, 
1968-2003. Bacth Arab Socialist Party Regional Command Collection (BRCC). Boxfiles Dataset. Hoover 
Institution Archives. "Taqrlr," mudlr cam maktab 'amlinat sirr al-qutr 'illi ri'lisat al-jumhiiriyya I sikritlr 
al-sayyid al-jumhiiriyya li-l-shu'iin al-~izbiyya, Dec. 15, 1984, 025-1-2: 42. From here on out all BRCC 
Boxfiles Dataset documents are cited individually with as much ofthe following information as possible: 
"Title of document," sender to ('ila) recipient, date, boxfile number: document pages. 
2. M. Stnick and L. Veccia Vaglieri, "al- I):adisiyya," in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., ed. P. 
Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heinrichs, in Brill Online, 
http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_ COM-0412 [accessed Oct. 13, 2010]. The original 
battle of Qadisiyya, as opposed to "Saddam's Qadisiyya" (the Iran-Iraq War), in which the prophet 
Muhammad's grandson, Hussein, a Shici patron saint, was martyred, took place in 637 A.D on the Iraqi 
plain southwest of where Kufa was later founded between the Arab Muslim invading armies and the 
Sasanian Persians. 
3. The Bacth Party had a series of membership levels. A person had to spend a specific amount of 
time at each level and demonstrate a particular skill set before he could be promoted. When a person first 
joined he did not immediately become a full member but rather a "supporter" (mu' ayyid). Above 
supporters sat "partisans" ('an:jlir, sing. na:jlr) followed by "advanced partisans" (na:jlr mutaqadam), 
"nominees" for membership (murashsha~), "members in training" (cugii mutadarrab), and, finally, "full" 
2 
bicycle repairman from Suwayra shot and killed him while he slept before turning 
himself in. "Please be apprised, and present this unrivaled, awesome example of the 
fidelity of Iraqis to the President (God keep him) so that he may consider stopping the 
legal investigations against [the father]," the secretary concluded. Hussein agreed with 
the recommendation. Writing his instructions on the letter, he pardoned the man, granted 
him a medal, and had t]:le event included in official documents and films about the Iran-
Iraq war.4 
Contrary to the Wasit branch secretary's assertion, the most remarkable thing 
about this incident was that the phenomenon of family members killing or turning each 
other in to be executed for capital crimes was common in Hussein's Iraq (a reference to 
the era of Hussein's presidency, from 1979 to 2003, as opposed to "Bacthist Iraq," which 
denotes the Ba0 th Party's entire reign, from 1968 to 2003). A 1985 report to the Ba0th 
Party's highest admi:r;listrative unit, the Office of the Party Secretariat (maktab :Jamanat 
sirr al-qu{r), describes thirty-seven "exemplary and honorable cases" (f:zalat mutamayyiza 
wa-musharrifa) where citizens informed on their family members for desertion. A 
number accompanied the detachments sent to apprehend them. One man refused to 
accept his nephew's body; another killed his brother because the brother would not turn 
or "active" members ( cu#i c iimil). Once a full member was voted into or appointed part of either a 
division, section, or branch command (qiyiida) he was referred to accordingly (e.g., "divisional member," 
cu#ifirqa). Unless specified, throughout this text the general terms "party members," "members," or 
"Bacthists" refer to anybody in the party regardless of their membership status. 
4. "Macliimiit," [Name withheld] ~amln sirr qiyiidatfurc wiisit ra~ls lajnat al-hiiribln wa-l-
mutakhallafin ~ua ra~ls al-lajna al-culyii li-l-hiiribln wa-l-mutakhallafin al-rafiq al-munii~il cAlllfasan 
Majld al-mubtaram, March 4, 1984, 021-2-3: 446; "Macliimiit," mudlr aPamn az-cam ~ilii al-rafiq sikritlr 
al-sayyid ra~ls al-jumhiiriyya li-l-shu~iin al-bizbiyya, AprilS, 1984, 021-2-3: 449-50. 
3 
himself in. 5 These incidents continued even in peacetime. In 1993, the father of a 
Special Republican Guard (al-l;aras al-jumhur'f al-khli~~) member threw his son out of 
the house because he repeatedly ran away from his unit. When the son hit him and 
attacked his mother in retaliation, the father killed him. 6 In an almost identical incident 
in 1995, a man from al-Kut tried to apprehend his son in order to turn him in but could 
not physically arrest him. Like the bicycle repairman, he presented himself to the police 
after shooting his son dead. He too received a pardon for his "act of courage." 7 
Why did these fathers kill their sons? The findings of a police report included in a 
letter from the General Security Directorate (GSD, mudiriyat al- 3amn al-clima) about the 
bicycle repairman's case found no impetus other than" ... a moral and patriotic motive. 
[The father] declined to betray the nation and the great leader, which would have polluted 
his and his family's reputation, because he decided that the defense of Iraq and his own 
dignity is the responsibility of all Iraqis. What is more, not performing this honor is a 
disgrace in and of itself. 8" Testifying in front of an investigatory commission, the father 
of the Special Republican Guard deserter similarly explained that he had to kill his son to 
5. "al-Haribiin min al-khidma al-caskariyya," 3amin sirr qiyadat tan?:im al-wasat 3i!a maktab 
3amanat sirr al-qu{r, Jan. 8, 1985, 069-1-3: 44-7. 
6. "Macliimat," mudir cam maktab 3amanat sirr al-qutr 3i!a alWan al-ri3asa, Aug. 25, 1993, 023-
4-2: 103. 
7. "Mawqifwatani," mudir cam maktab 3amanat sirr al-qutr 3i!a diwan al-ri3asa, June 7, 1995, 
030-2-4: 14. 
8. "Macliimat," mudir aPamn at-cam 3i!a al-rafiq sikritir al-sayyid ra3is al-jumhilriyya li-l-
shu3iln al-~izbiyya, AprilS, 1984, 021-2-3: 449-50. 
4 
preserve his personal and familial honor.9 When asked about the reasons for their 
actions, all of the fathers framed the issue in the same way. Whether these fathers truly 
believed what they said or not is beside the point. Their behavior indicated that their 
loyalty to the nation, the Bacth Party, and Hussein's person trumped all other bonds, even 
to their own children, and the explanations for their actions show that they equated their 
and their families' dignity with the commitment to uphold the honor of Saddam Hussein 
and the Bacth Party's regime. 
A ruling power that finds a way to manipulate its citizens' conceptions of honor 
and self-purpose to the point where they will kill their family members to prove their 
loyalty has truly succeeded in "dominating and terrorizing human beings from within."10 
These fathers did not kill or turn their sons in at gunpoint. They did not leave their sons' 
fates to the authorities. They took the initiative to themselves kill or apprehend their kin. 
Why did they feel compelled to do so? What induced their behavior and that of many 
other Iraqis in less extreme circumstances to actively support Saddam Hussein and the 
Ba cth Party? These questions lie at the heart of the system of control that Hussein and 
the Bacth constructed in Iraq, and the answers explain why they survived in power for so 
long in contrast to their predecessors. Why and how did a regime that controlled its 
citizens so thoroughly come to exist? How did it work? How did Hussein and the party 
justify it? And why did it succeed? 
\ 
9. "Maczamat," mudir ?zm maktab ~amanat sirr al-qutr ~ua diwan al-rrasa, Aug. 25, 1993, 023-
4-2: 103. 
10. Hannah Arendt, The Origins ofTotalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 
1973), 325. 
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The Nature of the Study 
To answer these questions, this study uses Saddam Hussein and the Bacth Party's 
own records found after their downfall in 2003. Specifically, it looks at a set of 
documents from the Bacth Party's central archive formerly housed at its Regional 
Command headquarters in Baghdad. Known as the "Bacth Arab Socialist Party Regional 
Command Collection" (BRCC), the Iraq Memory Foundation's (IMF) Kanan Makiya, an 
' 
Iraqi dissident and exile, discovered the archive, and for four years IMF employees began 
to explore and scan the documents at their offices in Baghdad with the intention of one 
day including them in a documentation center in Iraq. Wartime conditions, however, 
made the IMF fear for the safety of the BRCC and other documents they had collected. 
In 2006-7, the organization arranged for the United States government to transport the 
IMF's holdings to the US for scanning and safekeeping. In 2009, the IMF negotiated an 
agreement with the Hoover Institution Archives on the campus of Stanford University in 
Palo Alto, CA, to receive its collections in order to preserve and make them accessible to 
scholars until conditions in Iraq allow for their return. The Iraqi government and Hoover 
have signed a memorandum of understanding to this effect. 11 All told, the entire "Hizb 
11. The MoU is confidential, but according to Richard Sousa, the directory of the Hoover 
Institution library and archives, it states that both sides acknowledge that the IMF materials are the property 
of the Iraqi people with Hoover serving as a remote repository for them. Richard Sousa, e-mail message to 
the author, March 13, 2012. 
Taking the BRCC and its sister archives out of Iraq has engendered controversy. In 2008, the 
director of the Iraqi National Library and Archive, Saad Eskander, wrote to the Hoover Institution 
demanding the documents' return and calling the agreement between Hoover and the IMF illegal. The 
Society of American Archivists and the Association of Canadian Archivists supported him in a joint 
statement, characterizing the removal of the IMF collections from Iraq and the US government's seizure of 
millions of pages oflraqi records as "an act of pillage, which is specifically forbidden by the 1907 Hague 
Convention." For a summary of the controvery see Hugh Eakin, "Iraqi Files in US: Plunder or Rescue?" 
The New York Times, July 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/books/01hoov.html [accessed 
6 
al-Ba0 th al-0 Arabi al-"Ishtiraki in Iraq [Ba0 th Party] records, 1968-2003" collection 
consists of approximately eleven million pages in a series of datasets grouped together by 
document type and year collected. The particular segment of the BRCC that this study 
looks at--officially the "Boxfiles dataset" but referred to generically as the BRCC 
throughout-consists of 2, 764,631 digitized pages found in 6,420 boxfiles from the years 
1979 to 2003. Those years, which, curiously, correspond to Saddam Hussein's 
presidency, constitute the time period of this study. 12 
This study focuses on the BRCC files because the Regional Command (RC, al-
qiylida al-qu{riyya) was the Ba0 th Party's highest authoritative body in a one-party 
totalitarian dictatorship under Saddam Hussein. Hussein kept a close eye on everything 
that happened in Iraq down to the minutest details. The Ba0th Party served as an 
extension of his authority, using its web-like cell structure to fan out into every comer of 
the country and the farthest reaches of state and society. In a regime in which everything 
was political and no boundaries existed between the governmental and civil, or public 
and private, spheres, the Ba0 th Party became Hussein's chief political instrument. As 
March 8, 2012]. For the statement by the American and Candadian archivists associations see Society of 
American Archivists and Association of Canadian Archivists, "SAA/ACA Joint Statement on Iraqi 
Records," April22, 2008, http://www.archivists.org/statements/IraqiRecords.asp [accessed March 14, 
2012]. 
12. Hoover Institution Archives, "Register of the Hizb al-Bacth at-e Arabi al-Ishtiraki [Bacth Party] 
Records, 1968-2003," (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Archives, 2010), 
http://cdn.calisphere.org/data/13030/g3/c84j0cg3/files/c84j0cg3.pdf [accessed March 28, 2012]. There are 
a small number of files from the late 1970s. Most are from 1980 to 2003. Why the BRCC corresponds 
exactly to Saddam Hussein's term as president is a mystery. 
All of the research done for this study was conducted by the author at the Hoover Institution using 
the original Arabic documents. At the time of writing, the IMF collections remained there where access to 
their scanned pages on a computer workstation has been free and open to the public since April2010. 
7 
such, it was not as feared as the security services, as powerful as the army, or as big as 
the ministerial bureaucracy, but it oversaw all affairs of government and occasionally 
duplicated its functions. Through its own apparatus and with its proxy civil society 
associations, the Professional and Mass Organizations (PMOs, al-muna:aamiit al-
mihniyya wa-l-jamiihzriyya), it orchestrated Hussein's takeover of state and society. 
Accordingly, the BRCC contains documents about virtually every aspect oflife in 
Hussein's Iraq, and this study examines the Boxfiles dataset over other collections 
because of its comprehensive scope and focus on the most critical institution ofHussein's 
regime: the Bacth Party. 
A large portion of the BRCC archive relates directly to party affairs. Its 
documents include policy directives and regulations sent from the Party Secretariat down 
the chain-of-command to its regional bureaus (tan~zmiit, sing. tan~zm ), branches, sections, 
divisions ifuruq, sing.firqa), and cells (khaliiyii, sing. khaliya) as well as replies, reports, 
and memoranda from these units [referred to by the Bacth and this study generically as 
party "organizations" (sing. muna:aama)] filed up through the organizational hierarchyY 
13. Cells were made up of not more than twelve people in a small geographic area sometimes no 
larger than a city block or a few apartment buildings. Divisions oversaw between three and eleven cells in 
an urban neighborhood or rural town or region. Sections included two to nine divisions and supervised a 
large city area or big suburban or rural town. Branches contained at least two sections. Up until the Gulf 
War and its subsequent uprisings, branches comprised entire governorates except in Baghdad where, by 
1988, five branches existed. Over them were five regional "bureaus" that corresponded to the Baghdad 
metro area and the "northern" (shumlil), "central" (wasat, northwest of Baghdad), "Euphrates" ifurlit, 
southeastern), and "southern" (junilb) parts of the country. A sixth military bureau (al-maktab az-caskarr) 
oversaw the organizations found within the armed forces. Additionally, some organizations focused on 
specific demographics within their geographic boundaries such as students or women, often in conjunction 
with the PMOs. All of the bureaus reported to the Office ofthe Party Secretariat. See, e.g., the structure 
given in "Jadwal shawlighir malliklit al-furiic al-madaniyyafi al-maklitib al-tan{.'imiyyafi al-qutr klifa li-
ghiiyat4/12/1988," 077-3-1:251. 
8 
It also contains files related to party branches and committees within other state organs 
and civil society groups; correspondence about personnel and administrative matters both 
within the party and government bureaucracy; communications by the Party Secretariat 
with the Office of the President (dfwlin al-rf'lisa and rf'lisat al-jumhuriyya), 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC, majlis qiylidat al-thawra), the variou,s security 
services, PMOs, government ministries, and other state appendages; internal 
organizational and bureaucratic matters, including the creation, dissolution, and 
amalgamation of party units; statistics of various kinds; files on special programs and 
initiatives; ideological materials; membership files and investigations into incidents 
relating to particular individuals; and materials from the party's National Command (al-
qiylida al-qawmiyya).14 
Within this basic hierarchy, the Bacth Party changed the number of its organizations throughout 
the years. It added branches and bureaus, fused and split lower level organizations, and, in the process, 
repeatedly redrew administrative boundaries. Due to increased security concerns and population growth 
after the 1991 uprisings the party created more branches within governorates and assigned only two or 
three governorates to each bureau, increasing the number of civilian bureaus from five to twelve with two 
whole bureaus in Baghdad: al-Karkh and al-Rasafa. By 2002, each governorate had its own bureau with 
the exceptions of one for both Najaf and al-Qadisiyya and the two for Baghdad. On a nationwide basis, the 
party's fifteen total bureaus now had a combined 68 branches, 611 sections, 3,791 divisions, and 28,342 
cells for a total of32,809 party "organizations" (muna'{.!.amiit, sing. muna'{.!.ama). For all of the branches in 
2002 see: "al-~rwa~iyya al-cadadiyya li-1-jihiiz al-/:tizb"ili-cumilm al-qu{r li-J:tad ta~r"ikh 29/9/2002," 108-4-
6: 19-23. 
14. As an Arab nationalist organization, the Ba:th Party originally aimed to set up a unified 
nation-state encompassing all Arab lands. As such, its ''National" Command, which it hoped would one 
day govern the pan-Arab country, had jurisdiction over the various "Regional Commands," which ran the 
Ba'th's branches in each state. From 1966 on, however, the only two major Ba'thist branches, in Iraq and 
Syria, feuded. Each set up its own National Command, relegating to it purely propaganda and ceremonial 
functions. The Regional Commands in each state thus served as their de facto nationalleaderships with no 
authority above them. Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A 
Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Bacthists, and Free Officers 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 1085. 
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There are also a substantial number ofboxfiles that relate to state bodies. These 
include boxfiles detailing matters presented directly to Hussein and his immediate 
deputies for their decisions (usually written in pen in the margins or below the description 
of the affair in question); ministerial files, especially those from the ministries of defense, 
interior, and culture and media; records of state honors and awards meted out and taken 
away; accountings of expenditures, procurement, and other fmancial matters; 
correspondence related to those accepted into and rejected from teachers colleges, 
military, security, and police academies, and state-run religious schools; reports about 
prisoners of war (POWs), opposition groups, and criminal matters; programs and official 
slogans for national ceremonies; files about the activities of the PMOs; petitions from 
citizens to Hussein, party officials, and ministers; and boxfiles without titles or simply 
labeled "miscellaneous." Also included within the BRCC but not under consideration for 
this study are the equivalent of middle and high school registers for the entire country 
. 
collected by the security services with basic personal and political information recorded 
for each student in addition to almost four million pages of membership files. These are 
the main-although not the only-types of documents included in the BRCC.15 There 
are literally thousands of different subjects relating to political, economic, social, legal, 
historical, personal, and other matters covered within the boxfiles; an exhaustive list 
15. An initial list compiled by the author of the types of documents in the BRCC based on the 
titles· of the boxfiles turned up 239 categories. This list could, of course, be either expanded or contracted 
based upon alternative categorizations. Many ofthe initial239 categories had sub-classifications as well. 
The point is that the archive contains information on a dizzying array of subjects. 
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cannot be presented here.16 That information about so many aspects of Iraqi state, 
society, and personal life are included in the Bacth Party's archive is just one piece of 
evidence proving that the party constituted the unifying thread within the totalitarian 
sy~tem that Hussein used to control Iraq. 
In addition to the IMF collections at the Hoover Institution, the Conflict Records 
Research Center (CRRC) at the National Defense University also opened in 2010. It has 
tens of thousands of documents and thousands ofhours of audio tapes of Hussein 
discussing affairs of state with his subordinates.17 Until these archives opened, scholars 
ofBacthist Iraq, usually without access to the country let alone Bacthist officials or 
internal files, used newspaper accounts, broadcast material, Western archives, interviews 
with exiles, and official Iraqi and international statistics to paint as accurate a picture of 
the Bacthist State as possible given the resources at their disposal. Nevertheless, because 
of the distance between themselves, their sources, and their subjects, their conclusions 
could not delve beyond a certain depth with a reasonable degree of certainty. 18 That is 
why until Joseph Sassoon's recent, Saddam Hussein's Bacth Party, which draws on both 
the IMF collections and the CRRC material, most in-depth academic works about modem 
16. The best effort to-date is the incomplete annotation index compiled by the Iraq Memory 
Foundation at Hoover. 
17. For more information on the CRRC see its website: 
http://www .ndu.edulinss/index.cfin?type=section&secid=1 0 1&pageid=4. A book with many translated 
passages of the audiotapes had also just been published at the time of writing: Kevin M. Woods, David D. 
Palkki, and Mark E. Stout, eds., The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant's Regime, 1978-2001 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011 ). 
18. Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, "The Historiography of Modem Iraq," The 
American Historical Review 96 (December 1991): 1408-9. 
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Iraq based on primary sources stopped in 1958-the year the "Free Officers" overthrew 
the Hashemite Monarchy.19 As Makiya wrote in Republic of Fear, the first book to 
analyze the ch$i!acter ofBa0 thist Iraq, "Every writer on post-1968 Iraq has to work with 
severely inadequate information originating in an obsessive official attitude towards 
'national security. "'20 As a result, it was, as Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett 
lamented, " ... extremely hard to discover how Iraq is actually run on a day-to-day basis, 
how the bureaucracy functions, how essential services are maintained, and so forth."21 
Fortunately, with the opening of the Hoover records and the CRRC, these statements are 
no longer true. Not only are today's scholars ofBa0thist Iraq no longer limited by the 
nature of their sources, but those sources provide a breathtaking and unprecedented 
amount of detail in comparison to those available to their counterparts who work on other 
Arab states, and, indeed, many other autocratic regimes. 22 
19. Joseph Sassoon, Saddam Hussein's Bacth Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 20 12). Yitzhak Nakash, e.g., concludes The Shi 'is of Iraq in 1958, " ... not only 
because of the change in regime but also due to the different source material and issues that one can 
fruitfully explore thereafter." (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994, 3); Even Batatu's 
monumental, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, contains just four 
references to govermnent documents in the post-1958 period, only one collection of which has records up 
to 1970. 
20. Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998), xxxvi. 
21. Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, 
rev. ed. (London: LB. Tauris, 2001), 308. 
22. Although exceptions exist to Bruce Maddy-W eizman' s 1993 statement that "the diplomatic 
archives of the Arab states remain unavailable to historians," by and large it remains correct, especially 
from the latter half of the twentieth-century onwards when the current leaders and regimes of today' s Arab 
countries rose to power. Rashid Khalidi points out some of the exceptions to Maddy-Weizman's statement 
in his review of Maddy-Weizman' s book, The Crystallization of the Arab State System, but I would argue 
that almost all of the "exceptions" that Khalidi cites are not really based on Arab archives but rather on 
Israeli, Ottoman, and British records. All of this might change in the coming years with the successful 
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Detail about the inner-workings of Hussein's Iraq along with the nature of the 
documents' provenance as original productions of Hussein, the Bacthist State elite and its 
officials, and ordinary Iraqis in their testimonies and petitions to the regime, are the 
BRCC's greatest contributions. Together, they allow scholars to paint a more detailed, 
nuanced, and comprehensive picture of Hussein's Iraq. Although most of the BRCC 
records are written in a dry, formulaic, euphemistic bureaucratese, they permit BRCC 
readers to see exactly how Iraq was run on a day-to-day basis, how the bureaucracy 
functioned, how essential services were maintained, and how the Bacthist State interacted 
with regular citizens. As a result, it is now possible to more definitively confirm previous 
hypotheses, discard others, alter partially correct conclusions, change emphases, and, in 
many cases, add new facts to what was already known about Hussein's Iraq. What is 
more, although the veracity of single documents must always be corroborated with other 
documents or sources, instead of relying on public speeches, rumor, and media accounts 
that were, essentially, propaganda, it is possible to see on Bacth Party or presidential 
stationary, sometimes in an official or Hussein's own handwriting, the plans for the 
regime's policies with the purposes behind them stated explicitly on the page. 
"Arab Spring" revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, but thus far the amount and range of documentary 
evidence on Hussein's Iraq is unique in the Arab world. Bruce Maddy-Weizman, The Crystallization of the 
Arab State System, 1945-1954 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1993), xv; RashidKhalidi, review of 
The Crystallization of the Arab State System, 1945-1954, by Bruce Maddy-Weizman, The American 
Historical Review 100 (Feb., 1995): 198-9. 
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Republic of Fear? 
Up until now, the dominant paradigm for understanding Bacthist Iraq has been as 
a "Republic of Fear," first proposed by Kanan Makiya in his book of the same title in the 
late 1980s.23 Makiya theorized that the Bacth Party established a totalitarian regime in 
Iraq after it came to power in 1968 and in the years leading up to the Iran-Iraq War by 
instilling fear in the population through violence, the quantity and severity of which could 
only have occurred as a result of complicity by the population. As Makiya wrote, 
"Violence generates the fear that creates the complicity that constitutes the power, which 
first passed to the party and then to Saddam Husain in the form of his authority."24 Like 
Hannah Arendt, who saw "terror" as "the very essence of [totalitarianism's] form of 
government," Makiya argued that fear as a result of violence "was not incidental or 
episodic .. .it had become constitutive of the Iraqi body politic."25 Consequently, since 
Bacthist authority rested on the use of violence, once the Bacth succeeded in establishing 
its "absolutist leadership," it had to manufacture enemies so that it could continue to use 
violence to perpetuate its rule. As Makiya argued: 
Tyrannies and dictatorships resort to violence when their authority is placed in jeopardy. 
But for the Bacth, violence is no longer merely the ultimate sanction used periodically 
against a genuine opposition. The Bacth invent their enemies; violence-not the threat of 
it-is institutionalized, forever reproducing and intensifying that all-pervasive climate of 
suspicion, fear, and complicity so characteristic of their polity."26 
23. Makiya, A Republic of Fear, see note 20. 
24. Makiya, Republic of Fear, 129. 
25. Arendt, 344; Makiya, Republic of Fear, xi. Makiya's quote comes out ofthe introduction to 
the 1998 paperback edition. 
26. Makiya, Republic of Fear, 129. 
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The documents read for this study support the conclusion that Ba0 thist Iraq was 
totalitarian, but this study does not agree with a number of the other elements of the 
Republic of Fear paradigm. Most notably, the evidence presented here contradicts the 
view that violence sat at the heart of Hussein and the Ba0th's regime. Fear played a part 
in Ba0 thist Iraq, and violence had a role in creating it, but violence was not the only 
factor that produced fear. Neither was the production of fear the primary purpose behind 
the Bacth's violence; the use ofviolence was not "the very essence" ofSaddam Hussein 
and the Bacth Party's form of government. On the contrary, Hussein and the Ba0 th used 
violence for an instrumental purpose. They used it against their enemies in order to 
remove threats they perceived to their rule, the exact reason that Makiya identifies in the 
first sentence of the bloc quotation from above. Like regular tyrannies and dictatorships, 
Hussein and the Bacth frequently acted as if their authority was in jeopardy. Sometimes 
this resulted from paranoia. The fact that Hussein and the Bacth held arbitrary (although 
not absolute) power with no legal and few other checks on the use of that power to 
protect citizens they merely suspected of disloyalty meant that when they sniffed a plot, 
or when Hussein perceived that a close associate had begun to chip away at his personal 
amalgamation of power, violence was used to eliminate the threat. Even if the paranoia 
had no basis in reality, no consequences would accrue from the use of violence; it was 
better to be safe than sorry. As a result, innocent citizens and supporters succumbed to 
violence, but that does not mean that violence was constitutive of the system. Violence 
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was, rather, a byproduct of the system, which included a broad definition ofHussein and 
the Bacth Party's enemies. 
Those enemies, although at times exaggerated and perhaps entirely "invented," 
were often real. As Chapter Five demonstrates, the BRCC contains many reports of 
Bacth Party members, policemen, security service personnel, and soldiers killed or 
injured while investigating crimes, chasing down deserters, engaging with opposition 
party members, or simply guarding Bacthist State installations?7 Hussein himself 
survived a number of assassination attempts, notably in Dujayl in 1982, after which he 
meted out collective punishment to the entire town?8 In December 1996, his son cuday 
was shot and permanently disabled, an attack Amatzia Baram concluded must have been 
"at least in part an inside job."29 One of Hussein's doctors, Ala Bashir, relates that 
Hussein changed his location constantly during the 1990s "for security reasons."30 He 
would not have done so if he did not genuinely perceive threats to his person. The 
27. To cite just one example here, in 2000 the head of the Ba0th Party's Basra, Dhi Qar, and al-
Muthanna bureau reported that two "agents of the racist Persian regime" had tried to carry out separate 
suicide bombings against a section and division headquarters. Both were blocked from entering the 
buildings and detonated their explosive belts outside of them, killing one person and injuring eleven in 
total. "lfiidith 3 rtidii3 ," mas3 iil tan"{.imiit al-ba~ra wa-dhi qiir wa-1-muthannii 3 ilii al-sayyid muriifiq al-
sayyid al-ra3 iS al-qiFid (/Ja.ft.uhu allah wa-ra3 iihu) al-rafiq al-e amid riikiin cabd al-ghufiir sulaymiin, Sept. 
1, 2000, 028-1-7: 592-3. 
28. Ofra Bengio, "Iraq," in Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume 7, I 982-83, ed. Haim 
Shaked, Colin Legum, and Daniel Dishon (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1985), 564-5. 
Amatzia Baram says that in the early 1990s Hussein unearthed "one coup plot after another" by three tribes 
that he had relied up, the Jubbur, the Ubayd, and the Dulaym. Amatzia Baram, Building Toward Crisis: 
Saddam Husayn's Strategy for Survival, Policy Paper No. 47 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, 1998), 37. 
29. Baram, Building Toward Crisis, 17-18. 
30. Ala Bashir, The Insider: Trapped in Saddam 's Brutal Regime (London: Abacus, 2005), 206. 
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quantity of attacks against himself, top regime members, and Bacthist State officials 
previously reported and found in the BRCC indicates that regular Iraqis were not the only 
ones who had reason to be afraid. Even in dictatorships as powerful as Hussein's, it is 
impossible to eliminate all traces of resistance. In fact, the regime's violence created its 
own opposition. The severe consequences that accrued to Hussein's enemies-real or 
imagined-made it so that once Hussein or the Bacth Party identified them as such, 
absent their inclusion in one of Hussein's many amnesties, they had no choice but to 
actually become an adversary because the Bacthist State would hunt them down 
regardless of the facts. The Bacth did not need to invent its enemies. 
Bacthist terror did create complicity, as the Republic of Fear paradigm holds, but 
not because Iraqis "expected to be tortured under certain circumstances.''31 Rather, Iraqis 
participated in violence or countenanced it because Hussein considered anybody who did 
not demonstrate his active support an enemy; Hussein never accepted simple obedience 
as evidence ofloyalty. It was in an attempt to prove their allegiance-to demonstrate that 
one was not an opponent-that Iraqis complied. After all, if they expected to be tortured 
there was no reason to comply; regardless of what they did, they would endure violence. 
Even though some inno~ents were harmed due to the vagaries of the system, if an Iraqi 
exhibited his loyalty, not only did he expect not to be tortured, he expected to receive an 
award. 
Indeed, equally as important to the Bacth's use of terror was an established regime 
of awards, medals, honors, and statuses that brought their winners financial, professional, 
31. Makiya, Republic of Fear, xii. 
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academic, health, social, and other benefits. Hussein and the Bacth employed these in 
tandem with violence and surveillance as incentives for Iraqis to pledge their fealty. 
Iraqis called this phenomenon "tarhib wa-targhib," or "terror and enticement."32 It was 
the combination of terror and enticement that cemented many Iraqis' loyalties. Terror 
and enticement offered a stark choice: oppose the regime and face the consequences or 
support it and live a normal life. Like people everywhere, Iraqis wanted to provide for 
their families, put a roof over their heads, ensure themselves and their children good 
educational and professional opportunities, move up the social ladder, and live with 
dignity. Terror and enticement made it so that everybody had something to lose and 
something to gain if they played by the regime's rules. Ba0thistlraq was a "Republic of 
Fear," but it was not only fear ofbeing considered an enemy. It was also fear of hunger, 
homelessness, poverty, and the loss of respect and honor.33 The Bacth regime's virtually 
unchecked power over society, its willingness to use violence against its enemies, and its 
control over the resources of a centralized economy created the conditions for such an 
environment, and it exploited the leverage it had over Iraqis to encourage them to take its 
bribes. 
32. There is no exact, one word translation of targh'lb in English. A more accurate, multi-word 
translation might be "arousing an interest in" or "awakening one's desire for," both of which come from al-
Mawrid: Qiimiis 'Arab'l-'Inkl'lz'l. 7th ed. (Beirut: Dar el-Ilm Lilmalayin, 1995), 309. Baram translates the 
phrase as "tremendous terror" and "considerable enticement" in Building toward crisis, 67. Wafiq al-
Samarra0i also describes the phrase in Huttam al-Bawwaba al-Sharqiyya wa-Haqa0 iq can a!-Zaman al-
Sayr fi al-clraq: Qira' a Jadida fi Harbay al-Khalij aP Uwwla wa-1-Thaniyya (Kuwait: Sharikat Dar al-
Qubs li-1-Sahafa wa-1-Nashr, 1997), 190-5. Another way of translating the expression is "sticks and 
carrots." 
33. See Vaclav Havel, "Letter to Dr. Gustav Husak," in Vaclav Havel: Living in Truth, ed. Jan 
Vladislav, (London: Faber and Faber, 1990), 4-7, for an excellent explanation of the type offear referred to 
here. 
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Terror and enticement worked particularly well because a person's actions 
affected the fate of his extended family, and vice-versa. As a result, if for no other 
reason, an individual who cared about his kin submitted to the Ba0th's rules. Conversely, 
families had an incentive to preserve their collective welfare by policing their members. 
When a relative did cross the regime, the BRCC shows that families severed ties with 
him quickly and decisively in prominent displays of loyalty meant to reassert their 
allegiance-like the fathers who killed their sons. Especially in a society that greatly 
valued individual and communal honor-be it familial, tribal, national, or religious-
forcing Iraqis to downgrade these normally robust allegiances in favor of Hussein and the 
Bacth pressured them into committing otherwise unthinkable acts against their brethren 
on the regime's behalf. Yet, as the process ofBa0 thification persisted, these acts 
happened so frequently that over time they became common. Terror and enticement thus 
contributed to a normative environment produced by the incentives inherent in its 
rewards and punishments whereby Iraqis felt compelled to act for the benefit of the 
Leader, the party, and the nation. This kind of automatic response and individual and 
communal self-censorship was exactly what Hussein's system of control sought to imbue. 
Another problem with the Republic of Fear paradigm is that it contends that the 
Ba 0 th regime and the way it consolidated power via a series of show trials in 1969 made 
it an entirely new phenomenon in Iraqi history; that it was fundamentally different from 
its predecessors in power.34 This study shares the view that Bacthist Iraq was totalitarian 
34. Makiya, Republic of Fear, 47-58. 
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unlike its authoritarian predecessors. It traces the origins of the Bacth's totalitarianism, 
however, partly to the Iraqi history that preceded it. Although authors after the 
publication of Republic of Fear have stayed within the confmes of its general argument, 
they too haye placed the Bacthist regime within a larger historical context. Charles Tripp, 
for example, accepts the theme of violence, explaining that in the Bacthist period from 
1968 to 2003, "The emergence of Saddam Husain and his construction of a dictatorship 
demanding obedience and using violence on a scale unmatched in Iraq's history were the 
dominant themes for the politics of this period."35 Nevertheless, he portrays that violence 
and Hussein's dictatorship more generally as part of "the manifestations of a particularly 
potent narrative in the history of the Iraqi state~ one in which exclusivity, communal 
mistrust, patronage and the exemplary use of violence were the main elements, woven 
into a system of dependence on and conformity with the will of a small number of men at 
the centre in the name of social discipline and national destiny."36 Marion Farouk-
Sluglett and Peter Sluglett agree with Tripp, arguing that in the "extreme chaos and 
confusion" following the Bacth's 1968 seizure of power 
... the only thread that can be followed is the Bacth leadership's clear determination to 
stay in power this time at all costs, to smash all actual or potential opposition, to entrench 
itself in key positions, and to extend and develop the machinery ofthe party as an 
instrument of control. In broader terms, the policies actually pursued by [Ahmad Hasan] 
al-Bakr (the Bacth's leader and Iraq's first Bacthist president) in these early months do 
not indicate any startling departures from those ofthe cArifbrothers.37 
35. Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq. 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 186. 
36. Tripp, 187. 
37. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 118-19. 
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Eric Davis places the Ba0 th's violence in an even broader context reaching back 
to the late nineteenth century and, more importantly, the origins of modem Iraq as an 
emanation of British policy and its early development under the British backed 
monarchy. As a primarily Sunni institution supported by a coalition of former Ottoman 
notables, officials, landowners, and tribal shaykhs, the creation of the monarchy was an 
attempt by Great Britain to hold onto the existing ruling order so as to create stability in 
Iraq and safeguard the route to India. Whereas under the Ottomans, a larger Sunni ruling 
order prevailed throughout the empire, in the age of nation-states the Shica constituted a 
majority oflraq's citizens and the Kurds were only slightly less numerous than the 
Sunnis.38 At the same time that the British established a minority ruling order, therefore, 
they were supposedly moving Iraq toward independent, parliamentary rule under the 
mandate system. The many contradictions in this policy, which left the majority of Iraqis 
out of the "democratic" political process, became manifest over time in a culture of 
violence. Iraq's political institutions did not work and thus political struggles took place 
outside of them through pure power plays. During the monarchy a few assassinations 
occurred but most politicians lived to fight another day. With the violent deaths of the 
royal family and their civilian ally, Nuri al-Said, however, in 1958, Iraqi politics took on 
a life or death quality. As Davis writes, the tendency toward "authoritarian rule" in Iraq 
is a product of the country's 
38. Gabriel Baer, Population and Society in the Arab East, trans. Hanna Szoke (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 105-8; David Pool, "From Elite to Class: The Transformation of Iraqi Political 
Leadership," in The Integration of Modern Iraq, ed. Abbas Kelidar (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 63-87. 
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... turbulent process of nation building. It is a consequence of the inability of Iraq's 
ethnic groups to transcend a particular historical configuration of power in which sectors 
ofthe Sunni Arab minority have dominated the state and have been unwilling to share 
political power, particularly with the country's Shici majority. Political repression is 
meant to prevent the issues of political participation and definition of political community 
from being placed on the nation's political agenda. Historically, the lack of trust among 
Iraq's ethnic groups has been due in large measure to a dearth of institutions, economic, 
political, and cultural, through which these groups could develop meaningful social 
intercourse. 39 
As the next section will show in greater detail, the historical predicament in which the 
Bacth found itself paralleled that faced by Hafez al-Asad in Syria. Lisa Wedeen 
describes this situation in the Syrian case as the "conflicting imperatives of state- and 
nation-building (sic), between exclusive practices to consolidate political power and 
enforce the regime's dominance, and inclusive policies to generate collective, national 
identification." This was one factor that facilitated the emergence of totalitarianism in 
Iraq and a strong authoritarianism with some totalitarian elements in Bacthist Syria.40 
39. Davis, 12. 
40. Despite many similarities with its Ba0thist cousin in Iraq under Hussein, Ba0 thist Syria under 
Asad was not entirely totalitarian. Although Asad participated actively in the Ba0 th Party leadership and its 
apparatus played a critical role in his government, he emerged as Syria's ruler out of the Air Force and as 
Defense Minister; when he overthrew Salah al-Jadid in a 1970 power struggle between the two leaders it 
marked the military's victory over the party apparatus, which was al-Jadid's power base. As a result, the 
military always played "the pivotal role in the leadership of the Syrian state," according to Raymond 
Hinnebusch, not the party. In contrast, although the Ba0 th Party in Iraq took power in conjunction with 
three high-ranking military officers, it moved quickly to purge them and establish its control over the armed 
forces. The Ba0 th Party in Iraq, and especially Saddam Hussein, who never served in the military, was 
always suspicious of the army. For a regime to be totalitarian, the party must predominate. While Syria 
maintained a recognizable civil society, the Iraqi Ba0th eliminated all un-official civil associations. This 
was perhaps because Iraq benefited from oil revenues that Syria did not have, and thus Saddam Hussein, 
first as Hasan al-Bakr's deputy and then as president, could aspire to a greater degree of control than Asad 
did, a fact Lisa Wedeen finds apparent in a comparison of their two personality cults where Hussein's 
ostentation and flamboyance contrasts with Asad's less grandious claims and staid demeanor. Moreover, 
whereas Wedeen found that ''the Syrian leadership pursues symbolic strategies the effects of which are not 
to induce charisma or belief, but rather to elicit outward signs of obedience," the Ba0th Party in Iraq 
genuinely tried to create believers out of its members. Whether it really did so or not is an open question, 
but the aspiration remained. In sum, while Asad exhibited a "nontotalizing" authoritarianism, according to 
Wedeen, this study will show that the Ba0 th regime in Iraq attempted to control Iraqis at every level of their 
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Based upon historical analysis similar to Wedeen's, Davis adds to Makiya's 
theory by claiming that the Bacth's "attempt to appropriate historical memory" in order to 
sanctify its minority Sunni rule, as the monarchy used pan-Arabism to do, was as critical 
to the party's regime as its use of violence. Davis points out that "It is an axiom of 
political theory that no regime can rule for long without the consent of the governed. 
Virtually all authoritarian states, from Hitlerian Germany to Stalinist Russia, have 
conjoined a resort to violence with a strong emphasis on ideological persuasion."41 
While "state-sponsored violence needs to be an integral part of any narrative of nation 
building in modem Iraq," Davis contends, like this study, that it is not enough to 
emphasize the Bacth's use of physical violence to liquidate opponents in order to 
establish its authority and legitimacy. This is partly because Davis also takes issue with 
Makiya's contention that Bacthist leaders ever consolidated their control so completely 
that no opposition remained. On the contrary, "Even under the most oppressive regimes, 
there is always ongoing resistance by subaltern groups, even if it does not entail direct 
existence. Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary 
Syria (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 15; Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power 
and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria: Army, Party, and Peasant (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 162; 
Patrick Seal, As ad of Syria: the Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), 162-5; and Hinnebusch, Peasant and Bureaucracy in Bacthist Syria: The Political Economy of 
Rural Development (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 23-5. 
The Ba0th Party documents in the BRCC repeatedly express their desire to make believers out of 
their members and regular Iraqis alike. See, e.g., a directive from the party to its branches about how to 
police the Shici Muharram rites in 1985, which included instructions to the ministries of education, media, 
and higher education to use educational means to "build the youth in a proper way as believers in the 
principles ofthe party and the revolution." "Qarlir," sikritzr al-lajna al-tan'{.!miyya ~ua al-maklitib al-
tan"{.fmiyya fi al-qutr klifa, Dec. 31, 1985,046-5-4: 184. 
41. Eric Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 16-17. 
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challenges to the regime's prerogatives."42 Davis finds this resistance embedded in the 
historical writings of intellectuals who, while ostensibly cooperating with the Bacth, 
"subverted the state's goals by pointing to a more participatory society. "43 Achim Rohde 
makes a similar finding in his 2010 study of gender politics and art in Bacthist times, 
concluding that "even in the heydays of the regime" in the 1970s when repression and 
control was at its apogee, "ambiguities, controversies and autonomous spaces" remained 
in Iraq, keeping the spark of alternative thinking alive.44 Nonetheless, neither Davis nor 
Rohde stray far from the Republic of Fear paradigm. Davis characterizes the Bacth's 
effort to manipulate historical memory as a form of"cultural violence."45 And Rohde, 
despite claiming that the paradigm "proves only partly useful in understanding the history 
of Iraq under Saddam Husayn," admits that "the impression of absolute power fostered 
by the regime and its exceptional brutality have doubtlessly instilled constant fear in the 
Iraqi population .... "46 
A further issue with "A Republic of Fear" is that its explanatory power stops in 
1989, but, of course, Hussein's rule continued unti12003. Makiya himselffrrst made this 
point in the introduction to the 1998 edition of Republic of Fear, where he stated that 
42. Davis, 17. 
43. Davis, 22. 
44. Achim Rohde, State-Society Relations in Bacthist Iraq: Facing Dictatorship (London: 
Routledge, 2010), 119. 
45. Davis, 16. 
46. Rohde, 57-8, 159. 
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after the uprisings that enveloped the country following the Gulf War, "As Iraqis like to 
put it, hajiz al-khawfinkiser, 'the barrier of fear was broken,' in March 1991."47 Due to 
these new circumstances, "Republic of Fear ... describes a state system that no longer 
exists in post-GulfWar Iraq. The war, the uprising that followed on its heels, and seven 
terrible years of sanctions and economic privation have seen to that. Nothing in Iraq is as 
it was in the heyday of the regime's absolutism, which reached its apogee in the late 
1970s, the key period encapsulated in the book's title .... "48 IfBacthist Iraq was 
totalitarian before March 1991, therefore, it was not afterwards. Instead, Hussein 
maintained his power by encouraging Iraqis "to fear one another" by "inculcating 
sectarianism, confessionalism, and tribalism as its new instruments ofrule."49 
This argument is supported by the work of a number of scholars who fmd that 
from 1991 until the mid-1990s, the Bacth Party's influence within the Iraqi state dipped 
in favor of military men, Hussein's family, tribal shaykhs, and the regime's newfound 
religiosity. 50 This conclusion necessarily implies that the regime dropped its totalitarian 
aims because, if true, it means that the regime subordinated its political apparatus-the 
47. Makiya, Republic of Fear, xiv. 
48. Makiya, Republic of Fear, xv. 
49. Makiya, Republic of Fear, xxx-xxxi. 
50. Baram, Building Toward Crisis, 7, 37-8, 65; Ofra Bengio, "Iraq," in Middle East 
Contemporary Survey, Volume XVI, 1992, ed. Ami Ayalon (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 456; 
Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq since 1958, 307-8; Faleh A. Jabar, "Clerics, Tribes, Ideologues and 
Urban Dwellers in the South of Iraq: The Potential for Rebellion," The Adelphi Papers 354 (Jan. 2003), 
172-4; Jabar, "Shaykhs and Ideologues: Detribalization and Retribalization in Iraq, 1968-1998," Middle 
East Report 215 (Summer 2000): 31. Iraq accepted UN Resolution 986, the "oil-for-food program," in 
December 1996 and received the first shipments of food in 1997. 
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Bacth Party-to other institutions and considerations. This fmding emanates from close 
studies, most notably by Amatzia Baram, that detail the evolving (or revolving) character 
of the Iraqi political elites under al-Bakr and Hussein. 51 Baram's work is exemplary in 
explaining how Hussein manipulated his inner circle through a process of weeding out 
people who might potentially challenge him, constantly moving people in and out of 
positions of power, and in how he responded to crises within the elite that surrounded 
him, such as the defection of the Kamil brothers to Jordan in 1995.52 At the same time, 
Hussein cultivated a handful of close confidants whose fates were inextricably linked 
with his and whom he felt he could trust to carry out his most prized initiatives. 53 In 
doing so, Hussein relied on family and tribal relationships and, as Tripp stresses, a large 
patronage machine financed by oil revenues that took advantage of these "primordial" 
networks to cement his place as Iraq's dictator. 54 
There is no doubt that the creation and manipulation of this inner circle played a 
critical part in the maintenance of Hussein's regime and his further consolidation of 
power; this study does not seek to add anything to this story. That said, basing larger 
conclusions about the regime on the machinations of a small group of people at the top 
does not necessarily give an accurate picture of the wh0le. As Joseph Sassoon wrote in a 
51. Amatzia Baram, "The Ruling Political Elite in Bathi Iraq, 1968-1986: The Changing Features 
of a Collective Profile," International Journal of Middle East Studies 21 (Nov. 1989): 447-93; Baram, 
Building Toward Crisis, 7-38. 
52. Baram, Building Toward Crisis, 8-20. 
53. The most prominent of Hussein's long-time loyalists mentioned in the BRCC are c Ali Hasan 
al-Majid, Tariq c Aziz, Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, and Taha Yasin Ramadan. 
54. Tripp, 187. 
26 
review ofRohde's book (Rohde also propounds the view of party decline), "we now 
know from the archives that the Bacth Party did not weaken in the 1990s .... The 
perception of weakness, as Rohde rightly indicates when citing the reduction in the 
party's activities, was due to a general decline of state power given the destruction of war 
and the inability of the state apparatus to anticipate the uprising or crush it swiftly."55 
This study supports this general conclusion. It goes beyond this statement, however, to 
demonstrate that Hussein's "Neo-Tribalization" policies of 1991 to 1996 and the Faith 
Campaign (al-T:zamla al-"'imaniyya) of 1993, when the regime added a set of watered-
down, generic Islamic symbols and practices to its liturgy, conformed to a pattern 
stretching back to the Bacthification of the military in the late 1960s and 1970s of the 
way Hussein and the Bacth controlled social and governmental institutions and 
phenomena that threatened them, or which they wanted to exploit. 
Sassoon is the first scholar to unequivocally step outside of the Republic of Fear 
paradigm. He argues that "although terms such as authoritarian, tyrannical, and 
dictatorship are applicable to Iraq, totalitarian is not [author's emphases]."56 Sassoon's 
study is breathtaking in its scope, and he draws on a wider range of documentary 
collections than this study. In addition to the BRCC, Sassoon uses the North Iraq dataset, 
now at the Hoover Institution, and the CRRC's audio tapes. He also conducted 
interviews with some former Bacthists. Sassoon undertook his study concurrently to this 
55. Joseph Sassoon, review of State-Society Relations in Bacthist Iraq: Facing Dictatorship, by 
Achim Rohde, International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, no. 3 (Aug. 2011): 562. 
56. Sassoon, 5. 
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one. Both studies have reached many of the same conclusions independently about 
individual issues such as the importance of the rewards, or "enticements," system in 
addition to the regime's use of violence; the existence of continued organized resistance 
to the Bacth throughout its time in power, which went beyond the small acts of 
"subversion" that Davis describes in historical writings or anything possible in Rohde's 
"autonomous spaces"; the centralized power that Saddam Hussein held and his success in 
eliminating all potential rivals (this was no polycracy, as Rohde argues57); and the 
regime's virtually "egalitarian" treatment of Sunnis and Shica. A reader of Sassoon's 
study and this one will inevitably find other areas of agreement; some subjects he treats 
more thoroughly and some this study dives into more deeply. 
This study differs with Sassoon, however, in his conclusion that Bacthist Iraq was 
not totalitarian. Despite the ground breaking and extensive nature of his work, Sassoon 
lacks a theory of the whole; one is hard pressed to fmd his main thesis. He claims that 
Bacthist Iraq was "authoritarian," but he never defmes the term or explains why it is 
important to label the Bacth as such. Rather, he explains why, in his view, Bacthist Iraq 
was not totalitarian and then assumes that is sufficient to prove its authoritarianism. 
According to Sassoon, Bacthist Iraq was not totalitarian for at least six reasons: (1) it did 
not have a command economy; (2) it was involved in two major wars and several internal 
conflicts; (3) it did not enjoy the patronage of a superpower and "Thus, it had to be self-
reliant in ensuring 'coup-proofing' and needed to co-opt large segments of the population 
57. Rohde, 72. 
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to strengthen its power base."; ( 4) repression and violence did not decrease with the 
regime's longevity; (5) in contrast to Stalin's personality cult, Hussein was not a 
successful war leader; and (6) he relied significantly "on tribal, family, and kin 
associations" to inculcate loyalty unlike Stalin or Mao Zedong. 58 
Neither by historical comparison nor by definition are these characteristics of 
totalitarianism. When juxtaposed with National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union 
under Joseph Stalin, totalitarian regimes par excellence, Sassoon's argument does not 
hold up. Nazi Germany had a capitalist economy, not a centralized one like the Soviet 
Union; the absence of a centralized economy did not detract from its ability to establish 
totalitarian control. 59 The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were also involved in major 
wars; although the Soviets won, the Nazis lost. Neither enjoyed the patronage of a 
superpower; both were superpowers. In neither state did repression and violence 
decrease with the regime's longevity, although this did occur after Stalin's era in 
58. Sassoon, 5-6, 11. 
59. The only semi-serious criticism of Sassoon' s six reasons against totalitarianism is this one, as 
one of totalitarianism's major team of theorists-Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski-listed a 
"centrally directed economy" as one oftheir six ingredients for totalitarianism. No other scholar read for 
this study, however, includes the economy in their defmitions. Indeed, Nazi Germany, undoubtedly 
totalitarian if the term has any meaning, did not have a command economy but maintained a capitalist one; 
the government worked closely with big business. In comparison, it is possible to argue that the Iraqi 
government, despite its "privatization" campaigns in the late 1980s and early 1990s, held more centralized 
control over its economy than the Nazi government did. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), 9; Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction. 2nd ed. 
(Great Britain: Worth Publishers, 1998), 235. For an analysis of the Iraqi economy under the Ba0th see: 
Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 227-54; and, Isam al Khafaji, "The Parasitic Base of the 
Ba0thist Regime," in Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction (London: Committee Against Repression and 
for Democratic Rights in Iraq, CARDRI, 1989), 73-88. 
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communist Russia.60 Even though Saddam Hussein undoubtedly lost the 1991 Gulf War 
despite his claims to the contrary, the outcome of the Iran-Iraq War was more ambiguous 
with Iran only agreeing to a cease-fire after Iraq gained the upper hand.61 For his part, 
Hussein always claimed that Iraq won.62 Finally, no definition of totalitarianism read for 
this study mentions anything about tribal, family, or kin relationships as being either a 
critical factor of, or of not, totalitarian states. In fact, none of the reasons that Sassoon 
gives to prove that Hussein's Iraq was not totalitarian have a basis in commonly accepted 
explications of the term. Rather, the definitions of totalitarianism that appear in the 
literature focus on the simultaneous existence of a revolutionary party and other means of 
popular mobilization and organization, the party's attempt to monopolize political power 
by taking over the state and eliminating all other political entities, and the use of this 
monopoly of state power to exert "total" control over the population in order to transform 
society in the name of an ideology, or "political religion." To undertake this effort, 
which politicizes and destroys autonomous civil and private life, usually requires but 
does not necessarily include a strong secret police and a single leader surrounded by a 
cult.63 
60. Allen Kassof, "The Administered Society: Totalitarianism Without Terror," World Politics 16 
(July 1964): 558-575. 
61. Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), 191. 
62. The first anniversary of the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War, e.g., is referred to in one 
representative BRCC document as "the holidays of victory and peace over the Persian-Zionist enemy." 
"Taqrfr muniisabat 10 muharram wa-ziyiirat aParbacfn 20 ~afar, maktab tan;r.zm baghdad, Oct. 17, 1989, 
001-5-4: 6. 
63. See, e.g., Merle Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1958), 12; Arendt, 325, 340, 361, 364, 430; Emilio Gentile, "The Sacralisation of Politics: 
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While Sassoon tries to define Ba0 thist Iraq under Hussein as authoritarian, the 
evidence he provides describes it as totalitarian. Sassoon frequently points out the 
similarities between Hussein's regime and Joseph Stalin's, and regularly quotes the 
conclusions that Richard Overy makes in The Dictators, a comparison of Stalin and 
Adolph Hitler's governments, as a way to explain the rationale behind Hussein or the 
Bacth Party's policies.64 However, if Stalin's Russia and Hitler's Germany were not 
totalitarian, then the word is meaningless. Benito Mussolini coined the term 
"totalitarian" to describe his desire to subordinate all life in Italy to the political goals of 
the state. 65 Scholars disagree over whether or not fascist Italy really was totalitarian, but 
all agree that the Soviet Union under Stalin and Nazi Germany were, including Overy.66 
It is impossible to make repeated favorable comparisons to Stalinism and Nazism without 
concluding that Ba0 thist Iraq was totalitarian. 
Moreover, Sassoon claims that the Ba0th Party was the most important institution 
in Ba0thist Iraq, even more so than the other two "pillars" of Hussein's regime: the 
Definitions, Interpretations and Reflections on the Question of Secular Religion and Totalitarianism," 
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 1 (Summer 2000): 19-20; Peter Grieder, "In Defence of 
Totalitarianism Theory as a Tool ofHistorical Scholarship," Totalitarian Movements and Political 
Religions 8 (September-December 2007): 563-89; Juan Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 66-71; GeoffEley, "History with the Politics Left out-Again?" 
Russian Review 45 (Oct. 1986): 391-3; Friedrich and Brzezinski, 9; Heywood, 233-5. 
64. For e.g., see Sassoon, 8, 42, 277. 
65. Heywood, 233. 
66. Arendt, for example, did not believe that Mussolini tried to establish a truly totalitarian state. 
Arendt, 308-9; Overy, xxxii. 
31 
military and the bureaucracy (but not, curiously, the security services).67 The Bacth was 
a political party, and this implies that political considerations took precedence over all 
else, as in totalitarian regimes. As Peter Grieder says, "Totalitarianism is the invasion 
and occupation of society by the state- a state which has itselfbeen hijacked by and 
subjugated to one political party."68 Sassoon maintains that in relation to Bacthist 
ideology, "Similar to other authoritarian regimes, the intention was to create a 'new man' 
and a 'new society,' whereby the ideal Iraqi citizen would be a Ba0 thist, ideologically 
committed and loyal to the party's leaders.''69 But the desire to create a "new man" and a 
"new society," to transform the character of individuals and society in order to create a 
utopia is one of the definitions of a totalitarian ideology, not authoritarianism.70 Sassoon 
also states that "From cradle to grave, it is hard to find any aspect of state or society in 
which the party did not wield some influence," and that "In order to consolidate its 
control over Iraqi society, tlie Ba0 th Party reached into every aspect oflife."71 This 
desire for a revolutionary political party or dictator to gain a monopoly over political 
power and activity in a country and then to use that power to explode the boundaries 
between state and society and make all aspects of public and private life subordinated to 
67. Sasso on, 7. 
68. Grieder, 569. 
69. Sassoon, 62. 
70. Gentile, "The Sacralisation of Politics," 19; Havel, "Letter to Dr. Gustav Husak," 14; Czeslaw 
Milosz, The Captive Mind. Trans. Jane Zielonko (New York: Octagon Books, 1981), 75, 77. 
71. Sassoon, 9, 38. 
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political goals is part of the above definition of totalitarianism. Indeed, a totalitarian 
government is precisely one that stakes a "total claim" on its population and then seeks to 
rule through its people by mobilizing them behind its policies instead of over them by 
trying to repress the populace with force so as to keep it out of politics in favor of a ruling 
elite, as in authoritarianism.72 To call Hussein's Iraq "authoritarian" by the definitions 
Sassoon does misunderstands totalitarianism and, thus, the fundamental rationale behind 
the Bacth regime's policies. Although Sassoon ably, and rightly, takes Iraqi 
historiography beyond a "Republic of Fear," he does not provide a satisfactory 
replacement. That replacement can be found in Saddam Hussein and the Bacth Party's 
version of totalitarianism: Ba cthification. 
Ba cthification 
Based upon a close reading of the Bacth Party's own internal documents, this 
study offers a new paradigm for understanding Bacthist Iraq under Saddam Hussein, one 
that applies throughout Hussein's presidency and which the Bacth themselves laid out 
explicitly. According to a 1988 Bacth Party "workplan" (khitat carnal), the author of 
which is unknown, "The Bacthification of society (tab crth al-mujtamac) means spreading 
the thought, values, and principles of the party in, society and incorporating them into the 
daily behavior of its citizens." 73 This passage sums up the strategy that Hussein and the 
72. Eley, 390; Grieder, 570. 
73. "Mashriic khitat camalli-tansiq bayna al-muna'{.?.amlit al-l;tizbiyya wa-l-jamlihiriyyafimajlil 
tabcith al-mujtamac," 025-5-5: 476-97. Even though the document itself contains no date, it is found in a 
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Bacth employed to maintain their authority and ensure the continuation of their rule by 
attempting to create a foundation of popular support within society-to, essentially, 
transform Iraqi society into Bacthist society. Hussein and the Bacth mobilized Iraqis 
behind their policies by forcing their citizens to outwardly adopt their world view and to 
act accordingly. They did this by putting in place a series of controls-ideology, 
organization, terror, and enticement-that produced an environment which channeled 
Iraqis' behavior into avenues supportive of their regime. These controls overlapped and 
reinforced one another. Combined, the boundaries they placed on permissible action and 
thought trapped Iraqis into subordinating their traditional loyalties to the three primary 
symbols of Hussein's rule: himself as the indispensable leader of~e country, the Bacth 
Party and the principles of its July 17-30, 1968, revolution, and the Arab and Iraqi 
nations. Bacthist ideology as it developed under Saddam Hussein fused these three 
symbols-referred to together as the "Bacthist Trinity" in this study-into one 
representation oflraqi patriotism and national identity; each represented the other so that 
pledging allegiance to one demonstrated an Iraqi's loyalty to all. Conversely, attacking 
Hussein's person or the Bacth Party equated to "national treason."74 When Iraqis acted as 
if they accepted this normative framework and the Husseini Bacthist reality that 
enveloped them, they buttressed the authority of Hussein and the Bacth's regime. As a 
result, the system implicated them and they became complicit in it. In this way, the 
boxfile labeled as from 1988 which contains records from 1987 and 1988 in a more-or-less chronological 
fashion. This document was found within the 1988 section of records. 
74. 025-5-5: 476-97. 
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actions and outwardly expressed beliefs that Husssein and the Bacth Party's system of 
controls forced Iraqis to exhibit bridged the logical and real gap that existed between 
Hussein and the party's attempt to create a homogenous, inclusive nation-state organized 
around a common purpose and sense of identity that enjoyed popular legitimacy but 
simultaneously enshrined their exclusive minority rule over a heterogeneous population. 
Bacthification constituted a particularly Iraqi form of totalitarianism, one that 
emerged within the context oflraqi history and culture but also exhibited traits of a 
general regime type comparable to other totalitarian governments. By explaining why 
Hussein and the Bacth used Bacthification and how they implemented it, this study will 
both explain the aspects ofBacthification that made it different from other 
totalitarianisms while also highlighting similarities. In doing so, this study arrives at a 
general definition of totalitarianism that is not static. The definition is applicable across 
differing historical contexts. It allows for the fact that while totalitarianism sought total 
control as part of a utopian vision, and that Bacthist Iraq achieved a high degree of 
authority over virtually every aspect of its citizens' lives, it was never perfectly 
absolutist. By defining totalitarianism as an aspiration, as GeoffEley put it, and, as this 
study adds, a strategy of rule instead or an achievement, the definition allows for 
imperfection while nevertheless recognizing a regime's modus operandi. 
It is one thing to aspire to an extreme form of political power; it is another to 
implement the strategy required to realize that aspiration. At the same time that 
historians use the term totalitarian, they must also explain how well a regime executed its 
strategy in different times and places. From 1979 until the Gulf War, and again in the 
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late 1990s until 2003, Hussein, using the Ba 0th Party as his chief instrument of mass 
mobilization and control, achieved a high degree of power over his citizens. This control 
dipped after the 1991 Gulf War until the UN's oil-for-food program began to replenish 
his coffers in 1997, but Hussein never changed his ruling strategy, and the BRCC 
documents show that by the time an outside power dethroned him in 2003, he had 
reconsolidated his internal control and was as strong as ever. The exception to this 
statement was the Kurdish territories where in its creation of an "autonomous region" 
(mantaqat al-/:tukm al-dhatr) it is questionable if the Ba0 th truly ever sought total control. 
Regardless, the Ba0 th never achieved it with much of Iraqi Kurdistan falling completely 
out of its hands after the Gulf War. 
The decision by Hussein and the Ba0 th to pursue a totalitarian strategy of rule 
derived from a confluence of historical, pragmatic, and ideological factors. During 
Ottoman times, when central governmental control rarely extended into the countryside, 
tribal solidarities and mores played an important purpose in securing for families and 
clans mutual protection and a normative code of conduct in an otherwise anarchic 
environment. Sunni Islamic religion, culture, and political institutions acted as a unifying 
social force throughout the empire. With the Ottoman cover gone, leaving Iraq's 
heterogeneous factions to vie for political power and its concomitant economic spoils and 
social prestige, tribal, religious, regional, national, and other solidarities that existed 
either on a smaller or larger scale than the size of the territory included in the Iraqi 
nation-state proved divisive. This was especially so given that from Iraq's first "native" 
government founded under the British Mandate in November 1920 until Hussein fell in 
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March 2003, the ruling elite consisted mostly of Sunnis, a minority in what was 
ostensibly a constitutional monarchy and then a republic. During the Ba0 thist 'era, the top 
leadership in Hussein's regime came from a handful of Sunni tribes from the Tikrit area, 
his family, and a few loyal Ba0 thist associates. Hussein's government rested on a slim 
social foundation, and although he always kept a token Shici and Kurd or two in his 
cabinet, the Ba0 thist elite was not proportionally representative of the Iraqi population. 
The Ba0 th's leaders, moreover, evinced a tendency to keep the spoils of their political 
power to themselves and their families, clans, and tribes. In the 1970s, as oil revenues 
rose and the Ba0 th could finance both its patronage networks and a new social safety net, 
it was possible to both retain a ruling party elite and satisfy the desires of much of the 
population. With the onset of the Iran-Iraq War, however, which placed unprecedented 
demands on Iraqis to maintain the war effort, and with the country beginning to backslide 
economically, it left little reason for Hussein and the Ba0 th's citizens to continue to put 
up with the strict controls placed on their political, economic, civil, social, and personal 
freedoms. This was especially so as the group ofBa0 thist elites and their patronage 
networks did not share the same wartime burdens as the rest of the population and 
continued to enrich themselves at the country's expense. The Ba0th's rulers always 
claimed to rule on behalf of all Iraqis, but their actions belied that claim. As a result, a 
wide gap emerged between Ba0 thist rhetoric and reality. The need to square this circle-
to preserve the minority ruling order and simultaneously justify it on the basis of popular 
consent-is the historical context in which Hussein and the Ba0th's totalitarianism arose. 
Looking back at modem Iraqi history, all of Iraq's rulers have faced this dilemma to 
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varying degrees, as Eric Davis points out. What made the Ba0 th totalitarian was the 
strategy it used to try to overcome this predicament in contrast to its predecessors. 
Whereas under the monarchy, the ruling elites kept the rest of society out of politics to 
maintain their control, the Ba0 th's leaders attempted to politicize all oftheir citizens, to 
transform state and society so that Iraqis would naturally support their ruling order. 
This pragmatic concern of the Ba0 th's ruling elite dovetailed with its ideological 
claims. The Ba0 th considered itself a "vanguard" (tazrca) and "leading" (al-IJizb al-qa:Jid) 
party that derived its legitimacy from the ability to advance the welfare and popular 
support of"the people" (al-shacb) or "the masses" (al-jamflh'fr).75 As Hussein put it, 
"The relationship between the party and the masses is a living dialectical relationship, for 
the party without the masses remains merely an elite, and the masses without the party 
remain merely raw material and a broken capacity (taqa mucattala) led astray amidst the 
turmoil of the daily progress of events."76 Like the Ba0th's relationship with the Iraqi 
state, Ba0 thist ideology held that the masses needed the party to give them direction, and 
the party needed the masses to supply it with members, fight in its wars, partake in its 
rituals, and otherwise support its initiatives. Whether sincere, coerced, or elicited, mass 
support justified the Ba0thist State's entire totalitarian strategy because its fundamental 
rationale for using such strict control was to advance the people's welfare. The Bacth 
claimed the right to take over society in order to improve it. It had to prove, therefore, 
75. "al-Taqrzr al-thaqiifi," mas~uz al-lajna al-thaqiifiya al-markaziyya ~ua qiyiidat maktab tan'{.'lm 
baghdad, Aug. 6, 1984, 041-1-5: 
76. "Miidhii nacmal wa kayfa nacmal," Sept. 23, 1995, 025-1-7: 40. 
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that the people felt their welfare was in fact being improved. This is why the Bacth did 
not content itself with authoritarian means, with simply subduing its citizens, and, 
accordingly, why it did not tolerate their neutrality. Instead, the Bacth spent considerable 
effort mobilizing its citizenry to participate in its rituals, wars, and initiatives, and it 
expected citizens to exhibit their active support in these venues. It is also why the Ba0 th, 
like other totalitarian regimes in history, often referred to itself as "democratic" and 
insisted on carrying out elections, plebiscites, erecting a National Assembly, and 
promulgating laws and regulations to legitimize its policies even though Bacthist rule in 
reality constituted the antithesis of democracy, the elections and the national and local 
assemblies it erected were shams, and the rule of law was a fa<;ade. The purpose behind a 
1995 plebiscite Cistiftii:J) on Hussein's presidency, for example, despite the outcome 
being assured, was its value as a demonstration of popular support for the Ba0 thist 
Trinity. "The plebiscite," the director of the Party Secretariat wrote to the president's 
office, "proved that the Iraqi people remain devoted to the original national values that 
appear throughout its bright history, that they are a people united during crises and are a 
large cohesive power in the face of challenges by virtue of the secure care of the party. 
They do not disagree with, nor will they give up on, their national and moral principles or 
their loyalty to the leader (God keep him).',n By carrying out the plebiscite as ritual, 
Hussein and the Bacth Party sought to bridge the gap between their rhetoric and reality by 
77. "Yawm al-za~f al-kabir," mudfr ciim maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~ilii rriisat al-jumhiiriyya-
al-sikritir, Dec. 7, 1995, 072-5-4: 323. 
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simultaneously asserting the loyalty of their citizens and demonstrating that loyalty 
through their citizens' actions, even if those actions were coerced. 
Perhaps because of the gap between the Bacth's rhetoric and reality, the 
secondary literature has largely dismissed Bacthist ideology. The literature portrays the 
thought of the Ba cth' s primary ideologue, Michel c Aflaq, as incoherent. 78 Ahmed S. 
Hashim calls Bacthist thought "a hodge-podge of pan-Arab nationalist, state capitalist, 
and socialist ideas." 79 Hanna Batatu wrote that c Aflaq' s concepts " ... do not add up to an 
entirely consistent point of view. This is not unrelated to c.Aflaq's tendency to rely more 
on feeling and 'faith' than on analysis and induction from facts. It has also to do with 
c Aflaq's language, which is akin to that of the poets and is distinguished more by its 
suggestiveness than by its logicallucidity."8° Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett similarly 
depict Bacthist ideology as "couched in extremely wide and vague terms," and as lacking 
"both an analytical framework and clearly defined objectives. As a result, the mere 
reiteration of pious nostrums about, for example, 'Arab unity,' was and occasionally still 
is thought sufficient to confirm the generally erroneous impression that Ba 'thist parties or 
governments were or are actually working actively towards this end."81 
78. In Iraq Since 1958, Marion-Farouk Sluglett and Peter Sluglett criticize Majid Khadduri for 
tending "to discuss the events of [1968-72] in terms of military-civilian rivalry, as if the Bacth had a 
coherent set of ideological principles" (my italics, 334, footnote 76). 
79. Ahmed S. Hashim, "Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq: The Quest for 
Legitimacy and Power," Middle East Journal 57 (Winter 2003): 15. 
80. Batatu, 730. 
81. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 109. 
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Bacthist ideology under Hussein too receives short shrift. 82 The Slugletts believe 
that Bacthist ideology was always simply a theoretical cover for self-serving action. 
Accordingly, they put quotations around the word "ideology" when referring to Hussein's 
use ofBacthist slogans, arguing that it is "absurd" to consider Hussein's rise in 
ideological terms instead of through the lens of a "highly personalized politics."83 Davis 
describes Bacthist ideology as "extremely abstract and strident and tells us little about the 
relationship of ruler to ruled. It was not taken particularly seriously by the political elite 
under Saddam, and very few Iraqis opted to read Bacthist ideological tracts."84 This view 
dovetails with Bengio's analysis that "The Bacth idiom was foreign to [Iraqis'] life 
experience and their world view. Speaking its language was usually no more than a ritual 
for them. The well-known slogans were repeated over and over again but failed to 
assume any personal significance."85 
82. Marr, 169-70; Tripp spends only one paragraph on it while discussing the report of the 
Regional Command's ninth congress in 1982 (228). 
83. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 181-2 .. 
84. Davis, 22. · 
85. Bengio, Ofra. Saddam's Word: Political Discourse in Iraq (New York: Oxford Univ~rsity 
Press, 1998), 159. Other than this statement downplaying the importance of ritual in Hussein's Iraq, which 
this study argues was critical to the regime's attempt to turn ideology into tangible practice in its effort to 
imbue a Bacthist worldview in the Iraqi population, Saddam 's Word is an exemplary study that should be 
given more prominence in the historiography because of its focus on Bacthist language and its connection 
to its actions. In fact, much of what Bengio argues based upon a meticulous reading of Iraqi newspapers, 
official Bacthist publications, the works ofBacthist ideologues, and other Arabic sources finds support in 
the BRCC. As chapter three argues, the basic thrust ofBengio's thesis is correct: ideology and language 
mattered and played integral parts through Hussein's speeches and the propaganda of the media in 
indoctrinating the populace and shaping Bacthist "political culture" through its value laden "language of 
slogans and cliches-a language of totalitarianism that has been characterized as ecriture policiere" (9). In 
this light, the conclusion that Amatzia Baram draws in his own study of the Bacth's use of a Mesopotamian 
inspired historical narrative designed to paper over the differences between Sunnis, Shica, and Kurds in 
favor of "an integrated Iraqi political community" is also correct: "When a regime with complete control of 
41 
It is true that Saddam Hussein emerged as Iraq's ruler and controlled the political 
elite surrounding him through a "highly personalized politics" and that Bacthist ideology 
served as a cover for Hussein and his ruling clique's selfish ends. That, however, was 
precisely the point. Ideology, put into practice through propaganda, indoctrination, and 
ritual, was essential to justify Hussein and the Bacth's rule because it provided a logical 
and moral consistency to what, on its face, was an incoherent and immoral state of 
affairs. As such, it was central to the maintenance of Hussein and the party's power. As 
the Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci pointed out, when institutions change there 
is "a need to construct a new intellectual and moral order, that is a new type of society, 
and hence the need to develop more universal concepts and more refmed and decisive 
ideological weapons."86 Saddam Hussein's leadership cult, which the BRCC 
demonstrates was an integral element in Bacthist ideology during his rule, arose as an 
extension of this logic. When he took sole control from the Bacth Party of Iraq's reins of 
power, his leadership complex rationalized the move from "collective leadership" (al-
qiylida al-jamliciyya) of the Bacth Party under Hasan al-Bakr to making Hussein "The 
Leader" (al-qli 3 id) ofthe country.87 
the media and the educational system embarks upon a consistent long-term cultural-educational policy, its 
chances of success should not be underestimated." Amatzia Baram, Culture, History, and Ideology in the 
Formation ofBacthist Iraq, 1968-89 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 141. 
86. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (New York: 
International Publishers, 1973), 388. 
87. Bengio, Saddam 'sWord, 71. A personality cult is not essential to a regime being totalitarian. 
Instead, it characterizes a specific type of totalitarianism: totalitarian dictatorship. 
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The reverse of Gramsci' s point is also true: when a new regime with a new 
philosophy comes to power, it will seek to alter or abolish existing institutions to fit, 
safeguard, and perpetuate its rule. To paraphrase Hannah Arendt, ideology and 
organization are two sides of the same coin. 88 This need to create new institutions also 
does not inevitably lead to totalitarianism. But the particular character ofBacthist 
ideology, which as c Aflaq claimed was "a general philosophy in life" lfalsafa ciim_afi al-
l;ayiit), like a religion, allowed the Bacth Party to stake a claim to control anything it 
desired,.and Hussein's success amassing so much power into his hands and eliminating 
existential opposition gave him the ability to do so.89 As a result, Bacthification involved 
re-organizing state and society in its totality so that both the forms and content of all 
governmental, civil, social, and private institutions and relationships supported the claims 
ofBacthist ideology. Accordingly, Hussein used the Bacth Party to takeover the Iraqi 
state-to make it into the Bacthist State-and then to use the resources at the party and 
Bacthist State's disposal to incorporate social institutions and individuals into the party, 
state, and professional and mass organizations. This was done by co-opting or replacing 
top state officials and social leaders with Bacthists, through recruitment, by instituting 
bureaucratic and regulatory controls over Iraq's previously independent social institutions 
such as Iraq's tribes and religious establishments, and through laws and rules that 
controlled what would normally be private matters such as marriage. Terror and 
88. Arendt, 364. 
89. Michel 0Aflaq, "al-Haraka al-Fikriyya al-shamila," Fi Sabil al-Bacth- al-Juz3 aPAwwal, 
http://albaath.online.frN olume%20I-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baal-Vol%20 1-Ch11.htm [accessed 
on Feb. 2, 2012]. 
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enticement facilitated these goals by, in the former case, clearing the space where the 
Bacth constructed this environment of opposition and alternative views, and, in the latter, 
by providing positive incentives to support the process ofBacthification. 
Although the narrative here is necessarily top down because it aims to explain the 
actions ofHussein's regime, the process ofBacthification evolved also through the 
challenges its effort at control faced emanating up from society. Indoctrination and 
organization-the essence ofBacthism-required taking on established governmental 
and social institutions that did not necessarily want to change. The people who held 
positions of authority in these institutions or had vested interests in them and believed in 
their messages had different views about the way society ought to be ordered and chafed 
at the Bacth's intrusion into what had previously been autonomous worlds. Particularly 
given Iraq's heterogeneous population, Iraqis did not naturally go along with the Bacth's 
effort to transform state and society to fit its ideological goals and the order of power it 
wanted to enshrine in the Iraqi state and its social institutions. Together, Iraq's social 
groups and institutions contested Hussein's ideological and historical narratives. They 
offered alternative visions for Iraq's political, social, and moral orders. And they 
threatened the Bacth Party's attempt to monopolize political power and social 
organization. In so doing, they struck both literally and conceptually at Hussein's ability 
to effectively implement the plans and policies that imbued his government with 
authority and legitimacy. Only by understanding the types of pressures that society 
brought to bear on the Bacthist State and how Hussein dealt with them as part of his 
imposition of controls is it possible to obtain a more complete and nuanced understanding 
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of why Hussein's totalitarian system of control emerged as it did. As shown, the result 
was not a dogmatic or rigid approach but rather a flexible and pragmatic one that, 
although strict in its application, adapted to local conditions, recognized the value of 
carrots and cooptation in addition to sticks, and learned how to channel and navigate the 
currents ofhistory instead of trying to reverse them. Almost every element in Hussein's 
Iraq became a target ofBacthification to one degree or another. Hussein did not succeed 
in controlling each equally well; in fact, some he controlled poorly. But overall the 
system worked well enough to keep him in power longer than any othet modem Iraqi 
ruler. 
Methodology 
The sheer size, scope, complexity, and other characteristics of the BRCC produce 
a number of methodological problems that this study has tried to take into account when 
formulating its conclusions but of which the reader must nevertheless be made aware. 
First, as Merle Fainsod found in his landmark study of the Smolensk Archive, a group of 
records one-tenth the size of the BRCC's boxfiles dataset, "The array of documents in the 
Archive ramifies over so many diverse fields as inevitably to pose a serious problem of 
organization, selection, and emphasis."90 Although the documents are in paper form and 
read on a computer screen, humans produced them, and they describe their fallible and 
90. Fainsod, 5. For a view on methodological issues related to the archival "gold rush" on Joseph 
Stalin in the Soviet archives see: Kevin McDermott, "Archives, Power and the 'Cultural Turn"': 
Reflections on Stalin and Stalinism," Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 5 (Summer 2004): 5-
24. 
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sometimes mercurial actions. The records contain errors and display lapses in protocol, 
illustrate erratic application of directives and procedures, and suggest an array of 
motivations, abilities, and intentions. To quote Fainsod again, "Like a slow-motion 
camera, the documents in the Archive reveal a tale ofinfmite complexity."91 The amount 
of detail in the BRCC is so rich that there are invariably exceptions to every rule. 
Without reproducing the BRCC word-for-word it is impossible to include every 
exception with each statement of fact or analysis. -The intention here is to provide, as best 
as possible, this author's account of the why and how behind Hussein and the Ba0 th's 
system of control while mentioning significant caveats when warranted. This study is 
only the second attempt at tackling this problem, Sassoon's being the first. It will take 
many years, book-length monographs, and journal articles on narrower subJects than the 
large issues that this study and Sassoon' s have taken on until anybody will be able to do a 
true meta-analysis of them all as Overy has done in, The Dictators.92 History, in E.H. 
Carr's words, is "an unending dialogue," and this study is one of the fust sentences in 
what ought to be a very long conversation. 
Second, the BRCC is not a complete archival record of Hussein's Iraq. The 
archive does not contain files about every subject in every year, leaving time gaps in its 
information. It also has more data about some topics than others. This arises partly from 
the fact that the BRCC is the Bacth Party's central archive. Although it contains 
91. Fainsod, 447. 
92. Richard Overy, The Dictators: Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia (London: Allen Lane, 2004). 
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correspondence with and carbon copies from the ministries, the security services, the 
president's office, the PMOs, lower level Bacthist organizations, and many other 
departments, bureaus, and bqdies, the bulk of its documents either derive from or were 
sent to the Office of the Party Secretariat. The BRCC thus provides a centralized, top-
down archival view from the party's perspective, even if it contains many files written by 
local party organizations and other state organs. The vantage point from a local party 
organization or municipal archive, let alone the records of the Planning Ministry or a 
university might look different. That is not to say that an in-depth analysis of one of 
these other archives would change the conclusions presented in this study significantly, if 
at all, but they would undoubtedly provide additional detail the BRCC does not contain. 
Third, in addition to being immense, the BRCC is poorly organized and only 
partially annotated. Whether through filing error or for other reasons, it is not uncommon 
to find a document in a boxfile that is entirely unrelated to the boxfile's title. 
Furthermore, because Hussein micro-managed the country to a great degree, and because 
the Bacth Party oversaw all affairs of state and society, documents on subjects large and 
small from opposition groups to agriculture appear in boxfiles labeled as relating to the 
president's office and Bacth Party organizations, bureaus, and departments. Absent a 
virtually unlimited amount of time at the Hoover Institution, it is impossible for a 
researcher to declare with a reasonable degree of certainty that his conclusions are based 
on having read all the documents about a particular subject. Consequently, despite the 
great value of the BRCC over previously utilized sources, the above methodological 
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issues mean that scholars, this one included, must still attach a degree of provisionality to 
their fmdings. 
Other than that of Saddam Hussein and some of his top deputies, this study does 
not use the names of the Iraqis mentioned in the BRCC. The recent demise ofHussein's 
regime has made the archive available, but that also means that many of those named are 
still alive. The political situation in post-Bacthist Iraq remains fluid, and there is no 
reason to endanger anybody for reasons that might be within or beyond the imagination 
of this author. Extreme caution in this regard is therefore warranted. 
This study also makes no attempt to divine the inner beliefs or "true" feelings of 
the actors it portrays from the BRCC. As the psychologist Stanley Milgram concluded 
about his famous experiments testing obedience to authority, "subjective feelings are 
largely irrelevant to the moral issue at hand so long as they are not transformed into 
action. Political control is effected through action."93 This is a study about political 
control that extended throughout Iraqi society in its totality. Although he maintained 
many of Michel c Aflaq's theoretical principles to justify his rule, Saddam Hussein always 
urged Iraqis to put their principles into practice. He judged everybody according to their 
actions, and this study does too. 
93. Stanley Milgram, "The Dilemma of Obedience," The Phi Delta Kappan 55 (May 1974): 606. 
CHAPTER 2: the Bacth Party in Power, 1968-79 
Introduction 
The BRCC's earliest documents show that Bacthist Iraq was already totalitarian 
by the time that Saddam Hussein took over as president from Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr in 
1979.1 Bacth Party leaders employed a totalitarian strategy from the beginning of their 
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rule, but they did not establish full totalitarian control overnight. It is useful to provide an 
analysis of the Bacth's first eleven years in power, therefore, in order to explain how the 
Bacth consolidated its authority after the 1968 coup and to place the 1979 to 2003 time 
period covered by the BRCC documents into its immediate historical context. What this 
history indicates is that the character of the Bacth's regime resulted from at least three 
factors. First, as a part of Iraqi history, the Bacth Party could not extricate itself from the 
larger historical trends that developed within modem Iraqi politics. On the contrary, the 
Bacth Party's leaders succeeded in taking power as a result of studying the traits that 
characterized Iraqi politics and their own failure to consolidate their authority after 
participating in the 1963 coup that overthrew c Abd al-Karim Qasim. They then applied 
1. There is at least one boxfile from 1978 (031-3-4) in the BRCC labeled as containing records 
related to the Ba0th Party's professional associations (al-maktab al-mihnr:). There are also a handful of 
boxfiles from 1979. See, e.g., boxfile 044-2-1 that has information about internal security officers from 
1979, and a boxfile labeled "1979 Mr. President" (1979 al-sayyid al-ra'ls), which contains memoranda and 
reports handed to Saddam Hussein for his decisions or information. The latter boxfile in particular shows 
that the way Hussein did business in 1979 did not differ greatly from similar boxfiles from the end of his 
regime. Boxfile 003-1-1, labeled "Decisions ofthe Regional Command" (qarlirlit al-qiylida al-qu{riyya) is 
from 1980 but has many documents from 1979. A number of the BRCC boxfiles from the early 1980s 
have documents from the late 1970s because the years listed on the outside of the boxfiles do not always 
correlate exactly, and the origins of many of the matters dealt with in the early 1980s went back to the late 
1970s. 
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the lessons gleaned from both to master the rules of Iraq's political game and, once in 
power, to avoid the pitfalls that brought down their predecessors. Second, Hussein 
emerged as the strongman of Iraq by building up the party apparatus and security 
services, which became the two main institutional pillars of his regime. In doing so, his 
unique personal background and personality had an effect. Third, both the organizational 
structure and ideology that the Ba0 th brought with it to power lent themselves to an 
autocratic and controlling fashion of governance. Combined, these three factors set the 
stage for Iraq to move from an era of oligarchy under al-Bakr to a dictatorship under 
Hussein. 
The Weight of History 
The Ba0 th Party leadership took over in 1968 with an acute sense of Iraqi history. 
Having initially succeeded in a previous coup in 1963 only for a group of military 
officers led by c Abd al-Salam c Arif to purge them, they realized the centrality of the 
army and thus the necessity of attaining military support. The political report of the 
party's eighth regional conference, held in 1974, contains an entire chapter on the history 
of the Iraqi military and the important roles it played in sparking revolutions in 1936, 
1941, 195 8, 1963, and 1968. It says explicitly that Ba 0th Party leaders kept their 
experience from 1963 in the back of their minds when planning and executing the 1968 
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coup.2 Consequently, the Bacth built up a network within the army, taking advantage of a 
small group of mainly Sunni, Tikriti Bacthist officers, including Saddam Hussein's 
relative, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr used the Tikriti military network after 1963 to 
edge out Salah al-Sacdi's civilian faction within the Bacth's intra-party struggles in the 
mid-1960s. He then exploited his position to make non-Bacthist allies in the army who 
helped the Bacth depose c Abd al-Rahman c Arif CC Abd al-Salam's brother who took over 
after c Abd al-Salam died in a helicopter crash in 1966) on July 17, 1968.3 After the 
coup's success, the Bacthist leadership acted quickly against their officer allies. Within 
two weeks, the Bacth Party's leaders had exiled the most senior military commanders that 
assisted them.4 The Bacth refer to this period in which it pulled off two successive coups 
to take sole possession of power as the "July 17-30 revolution" (thawrat 17-30 tamiiz). 
The July 17-30 period marked only the beginning of the Bacth's effort to exert its 
authority over the military. Over the course of the next year, the party replaced the 
military's senior leadership and some 2,000 other officers with Bacthists and other 
2. Hizb al-Ba0th al-0 Arabi al-"Ishtiraki, Revolutionary Iraq, 1968-1973: The Political Report 
Adopted by the Eighth Regional Congress of the Arab Bacth Socialist Party-Iraq, January, 1974 (Baghdad: 
The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, Jan. 1974), 13-14, 57, 166. 
3. Batatu, 1089; and Amatzia Baram, "Saddam's Power Structure: The Tikritis Before During and 
After the War," The Adelphi Papers (Jan. 2003), 94-7; Marr, 117-22. Al-Bakr was one of an initial crop of 
poor, young Tikrit-area men with no other career prospects who managed to enroll in the Iraqi officer 
academy under the monarchy, taking advantage of the connections of Muhammad Mukhlis, a Tikriti who 
fought alongside King Faysal in the Great Arab Revolt and then joined his patronage network after Faysal 
became king. For a good account of the background to and failure of the 1963 coup and its aftermath, 
including the Ba0th's internal struggles and consolidation by the Sunni, Tikriti military officers, see Batatu, 
966-73, 1003-1026, 1071-1085. 
4. Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics since 1968 (Washington, DC: The 
Middle East Institute, 1978, 25-30; Tripp, 184. 
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loyalists via a series of purges, retirements, rotations, and murder. In fact, from an early 
date the party leadership showed their willingness to kill people they did not trust who 
inhabited sensitive positions. When they discovered plotters, moreover, real or imagined, 
they seized the opportunity to rid themselves of as many immediate and prospective 
enemies as possible. In June 1969, for example, Ba0th Party leaders executed two 
northern commanders for supposedly conspiring with Iran to oust the government. Seven 
months later, they sentenced over thirty current and retired officers to death for a plot 
revealed by the security services. 5 
With top military positions in Ba0 thist hands, the party consolidated its control 
over the entire organization through ideological indoctrination and surveillance by the 
party and security services. As the Ba0 th's eighth regional congress report from 1974 
claimed, the goal was to ensure "that [the military] would always be completely 
identified with the popular movement under the leadership of the Party." This made the 
military into the party's appendage, guaranteeing the Ba0th's supremacy. As such, the 
Bacth attempted to transform the military into an "ideological army" (jaysh caqlf'idi) 
under the instruction ofthe Directorate of Political Guidance (mudfriyat at-tawjih al-
siylisl), set up in 1973.6 In addition, the Ba0 th set up its own organizational apparatus 
with cells inside each army unit, as did the security and intelligence services (see Chapter 
5. Hashim, "Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq," 16-21. For more examples, see 
Batatu, 1093-4. 
6. Hizb al-Bacth, Revolutionary Iraq, 169; Bengio, Saddam's Word, 149; Hashim, "Saddam 
Hussein and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq," 22-3; Amatzia Baram, "The Future ofBa'thist Iraq: Power 
Structure, Challenges, and Prospects," in The Politics of Change in the Middle East, ed. R.B. Satloff 
(Boulder: Westview in cooperation with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993 ), 3 5. 
Four). Applying the carrot as well as the stick, the Bacth also used oil revenues 
throughout the 1970s to vastly expand and modernize the military.7 
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The steps that the Bacth took towards the military at the beginning of its rule 
revealed the basic elements ofBa0thifi.cation. When party leaders wanted to exert control 
over a state or social institution, they co-opted or eliminated and replaced its leadership 
with Ba0 thists and created an organizational or administrative connection to the party. At 
the same time, they indoctrinated the people within the institution with Bacthist ideology 
and supplied material incentives to secure their loyalty. Overall, the purpose of the above 
steps was to break the army down and then rebuild it in such a way that it would remain 
loyal to Ba0 thist policies. 
The Emergence of Sad dam Hussein 
Once the Bacth removed its officer allies, and simultaneous to its bringing the 
military to heel, internal power struggles began within the Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC), the state's top political body, and the party. In a series of assassinations, 
firings, power plays, and thwarted coup attempts (and the opportunity for suppression and 
further consolidation they presented), the Ba0 th succeeded in removing all non-party 
members or loyalists from top political and military posts. Hussein then expanded the 
RCC in 1977, including all members of the Bacth's Regional Command (RC). This fused 
7. Hashim, "Saddam Hussein and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq," 18-25. 
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the top political bodies of the state and party. 8 Within the party, the Tikritis emerged 
triumphant, and amongst them, the followers of al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein came out 
on top.9 Hussein then slowly gathered positions of power for himself, laying the 
groundwork to take over from al-Bakr. Already the unofficial head of the security 
services, in 1969 Hussein became deputy chairman of the RCC to which he added deputy 
secretary-general of the RC. In 1976, al-Bakr named him a general in the army despite 
having no military experience. 10 Then, in 1977, the RC voted to appoint him head of the 
party committee in charge oflraq's oil policy and revenues. 11 Hussein thus gained 
complete control over, or major footholds in, all oflraq's most important political and 
state institutions: the security and intelligence services, the military, the Bacth Party, and 
the oil industry. 
As Hussein gathered more and more power for himself, the kin and clan support 
base on which he could rely narrowed. By the end of the 1970s, almost all of the top 
officials in his government came from tribes-mainly the 0Albii Nli~ir (Hussein and al-
Bakr' s tribe), al- cizza, al- cubayd, and al-jubiir-whose home territories lay in the "Sunni 
triangle" emanating from Baghdad in a northwesterly direction through Salah al-Din and 
8. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 116, 163; Batatu, 1086-9; Baram, "The Ruling 
Political Elite," 447-93; Makiya, Republic of Fear, 179. Sa0 dun Ghaydan was technically never a Ba0thist, 
but as Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett note, a party circular declared him to be one shortly after 
the July 17-30 revolution. He served on the RCC from 1968-82. 
9. For good summary details of these internal intrigues see Batatu, 1093-4; Marr, 140-6, and 
Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 134-7. For a list ofthose purged from the military, Ba0th 
Party civilian ranks, and ministers since 1968, see the appendix in Makiya, Republic of Fear, 292-6. 
10. Baram, "Saddam's Power Structure," 95-6; Tripp, 215-16. 
11. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 208. 
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al-Anbar provinces between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers up to Mosul. 12 The clan and 
regional ties that persuaded Hussein to install members of these tribes also made them the 
most dangerous to him since they occupied positions of power within his regime. No 
large scale popular uprising has ever overthrown an Iraqi leader. Only internal intrigue 
and foreign powers-the British in 1941 and Americans in 2003-have caused their 
downfall. Hussein never entirely dispensed with these tribes, but each time he retired, 
shamed, or killed one of their members, he triggered vendettas against himself, 
winnowing his base further. 13 While Hussein relied on kinship for his in-built networks 
to dispense patronage in order to reinforce their loyalty, he also watched them like a 
hawk. After further rounds of purges by the end of the 1980s, the upper echelons ofhis 
regime consisted of his close family members and a group of men whom Hussein had 
known since his youth and who rose to power in his wake through the Bacth Party. They 
did not have natural power bases of their own in other institutions or society, tending to 
come from humble beginnings. They owed everything to their connection to Hussein. 
Their fates were inextricably tied to his, and it appears that Hussein trusted them. They, 
in turn, remained loyal from the beginning ofHussein's rule until its end, outlasting even 
Hussein's preference for family members in top positions.14 Their signatures appear 
12. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 120; al-Samarra"i, 187. 
13. Amatzia Baram, "Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal Policies 1991-96," 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 29 (Feb. 1997): 5-6. 
14. Hussein's family began to fall out offavor in the early to mid-1990s as arguments between 
them began to embarrass him and threatened the coherence of his inner circle, culminating in the defection 
to Jordan of two of his sons-in-law with their families. 
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repeatedly in the BRCC under the titles of various top party, state, military, and 
intelligence posts, which Hussein shuffled them in and out of depending upon necessity. 
When Hussein had~ special initiative to undertake, he usually chose one of them to lead 
it depending on the task at hand and their particular skills. 15 
The relationship between al-Bakr and Hussein, on the one hand, and their 
clientelist networks, on the other, was thus an uneasy one dependent on the former's 
ability to make the latter's continued support worthwhile, and on the latter's usefulness to 
the former. Relying on an ever thinning inner circle helped insulate al-Bakr and then 
Hussein from plots against them, but it meant the numbers of their loyal backers beyond 
the upper echelons of the regime decreased over time. Al-Bakr and Hussein 
consequently followed a two-pronged strategy to counter these phenomena, both of 
which had contributed to the downfall of previous Iraqi rulers. 
First, the 1972 nationalization of Iraq's oil industry combined with a worldwide 
price rise in the same year gave them the means to flood the tribal networks that they 
relied on the most with patronage.16 By the end of 1975, Iraq's oil revenue reached eight 
billion dollars, allowing them to hand out state contracts, business licenses, and other 
benefits that, by-and-large, kept their supporters happy and created a group of nouveau-
15. The most prominent of Hussein's long-time loyalists mentioned in the BRCC are c Ali Hasan 
al-Majid, Tariq cAziz, Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, and Taha Yasin Ramadan. 
16. Toby Dodge, "Cake Walk, Coup, or Urban Warfare: The Battle for Iraq," The Adelphi Papers 
354 (Jan. 2003): 66. 
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riche who enriched themselves on the spoils of the state. Not surprisingly, those who 
benefited were often relatives of al-Bakr and Hussein, a form of "kinship capitalism. "17 
Second, al-Bakr and Hussein used the oil money and the Bacth Party as their 
personal vehicles to dispense patronage and construct new webs of allegiance more 
broadly throughout society in order to diversify and deepen their bases of support. The 
1970s saw the Ba0 th construct a massive social welfare system. Incomes rose sharply, 
access to education and literacy improved, and medical services and consumer goods 
became more widely available. The size of the middle and working classes increased, 
and the Ba0 th should be credited with modernizing the state.18 As a result, few ordinary 
Iraqis by now used to the game of musical chairs that characterized Iraq's political 
system noticed the noose tightening around their necks. As one Iraqi explained the 
situation, "During the early and mid 1970s the majority of the population in Iraq was 
content and enjoying some economic benefits from the Bacath government. If they knew 
of atrocities, they chose to look the other way, as did many Western and regional 
governments."19 The stability and relative prosperity that Ba0thist rule brought in its first 
decade led many Iraqis to overlook the freedoms that the party curtailed. 
Simultaneously, the Bacth Party apparatus sought to establish direct links between 
the regime and its citizens and to draw Iraqis into the Ba0 th's political program. Many 
17. Jabar, "Clerics, Tribes, Ideologues and Urban Dwellers," 175. 
18. Marr, 161-8. 
19. Juman Kubba, The First Evidence: A Memoir of Life in Iraq under Saddam Hussein 
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003), 1-2. 
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purposes lay behind growing the Bacth Party organization. One was to manufacture a 
loyal network spanning across the country and within each segment of society that could 
grow larger than the limited number of people within the Ba0th's tribal and regional 
alliances. Of course, many within these tribes were also in the Ba0th Party-yet another 
connection tying them to al-Bakr and Hussein-but this opened up Iraq's entire 
population from which to recruit. Although Sunni Arabs from the Tikrit area dominated 
the Ba0th's highest leadership positions and the party kept track of the nationality, tribal, 
regional, and religious affiliations of its members, it recruited throughout the country and 
from each ethnic and sectarian group. As subsequent chapters will show, the primary 
criterion for inclusion in the Bacth Party was always loyalty, not personal background. 
The attempt to extend the Ba0th Party apparatus was thus, in part, an organizational 
response to the problems created by the heterogeneous character of Iraqi society by 
ridding it of its divisions and rallying it around the Ba0th Party's ideas and vision for a 
broader Iraqi collective identity. This is one reason why the explication of those ideas-
Ba0thist ideology-was so important and went hand in hand with the party's organization 
ofthe state and society. 
Terror complemented ideology and organization as the Bacthist government 
became increasingly totalitarian throughout the 1970s. In addition to rooting out 
opposition in the army, the Bacth worked to silence all opposing voices within the 
political arena, making Iraq a one party state. The Bacth Party's great nemesis from the 
1950s and 1960s, the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), came in for particularly harsh 
treatment. From 1968 until1974, the Ba0th toyed with the ICP, variously permitting it to 
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organize and then cracking down on it as a way to leverage the ICP for the Bacth to 
improve relations with the Soviet Union. Once the Bacth's leaders felt strong enough, 
however, they tried to eradicate the ICP in a campaign of arrests, torture, and murder, 
including the execution of twenty-one communists in 1978.20 As Chapter Five will show, 
the communists retained a minor underground presence in Iraq throughout the Bacth 
Party's tenure, but they never came close to threatening the party. 
The chief instruments of terror in Iraq were the intelligence and security services, 
which grew both in numbers and size under the Bacth in the 1970s. When the Bacth took 
control in 1968, two state security services existed: the General Security Directorate and 
the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI, mudfriyyat al-:Jistikhblirlit al-caskariyya). 
Once in power, Hussein, unofficially in charge of the intelligence establishment, opened 
up the Office of Public Relations (maktab al-calliqlit al-clima), a small, secret service. In 
1972, after Hussein felt threatened by the rise of his protege, Nazim Kazzar, as head of 
the GSD, he turned the Office of Public Relations into a parallel force called the General 
Directorate of Intelligence (GDI, mudfriyyat al-mukhlibarlit al-clima). Hussein installed 
his friend, Saadun Shakir al-e Azzawi, a member of the Bacth Party Regional Command, 
as GDI director, and placed his half-brothers Barzan and Sabcawi al-Tikriti as apprentices 
in high positions.21 In addition to these three organizations, Hussein added in 1984 what 
became the most powerful security service after he became president: the Special 
20. Tripp, 189, 200-202; Marr, 171. 
21. Al-Samarra"i, 134, 201. 
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Security Organization (SSO,jihliz al-:Jamn al-khii~~). The SSO reported directly to 
Hussein, was responsible for guarding (and spying on) top regime officials, and gradually 
took over many of the most sensitive intelligence operations once q_arried out by the 
GSD.22 Other specialized services existed too such as the Special Protection Apparatus 
{jihliz al-himliya al-khli~a), which guarded the president. It was staffed by originally 
poor fifteen and sixteen-year-old boys from Tikrit to whom Hussein gave special training 
for three years. Even though the himliya protected al-Bakr, its young men owed their 
jobs, arranged marriages, possessions, social status, and salaries to Hussein. In turn, they 
remained intensely loyal to him and kept al-Bakr under wraps, which contributed to 
allowing Hussein to gradually gain power over him.23 
The primary purposes of the security services were to protect al-Bakr and Hussein 
by rooting out plotters, and to carry out operations against their enemies, either within or 
outside the party, and at home and abroad. Without them, the Ba0 th likely never would 
have succeeded in gaining control over the military or consolidating its rule, and al-Bakr 
and Hussein would not have emerged triumphant within the Ba0 th. Like the Ba0 th party 
apparatus, the security services had agents spread throughout the military. They also had 
cells in the Ba 0 th Party and grew a network of informants that spanned the country and 
delved into every state institution, civil association, and social group. The different 
security services even spied on each other, which is perhaps how the Ba0 th learned of, 
22. Al-Samarra~i, 202-7. 
23. Baram, "Saddam's Power Structure," 94-7. 
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and thwarted, the greatest threat it faced in its early years: Kazzar's 1973 attempt to 
assassinate al-Bakr and the top Ba0 thist leadership in order to take control himself.24 
Perhaps more than any other, this coup attempt illustrated the security services' virtues 
but also their vices. Their members were generally loyal and protected al-Bakr and 
Hussein effectively, but their proximity to the top leadership made them potentially 
dangerous, as once the party sufficiently Ba0 thized the army, security service officers 
comprised the greatest coup potential. 
The rise of the power of the security services corresponded with that ofHussein 
personally. Hussein first made a name for himself within the Ba0 th for his part in the 
party's 1959 attempt to assassinate Qasim in which he supposedly extracted a stray bullet 
from his leg while escaping from the scene. In exile afterwards in Syria and then Egypt, 
Hussein returned to Iraq in 1963 during the first Ba0 thist government. According to 
Batatu, in 1964, he defended Michel c Aflaq against another party faction at the Ba0 th's 
acrimonious sixth national congress in Damascus, after which Aflaq recommended that 
he be promoted to a top party position. 25 Around this time, Hussein developed an 
internal security organization used to protect the party from enemies and "for 
assassinations of members of other political groups as well as fellow Ba 'ath Party 
members."26 Psychological profiles of Hussein point to the early loss of his father, his 
24. For a good account of the coup attempt, see Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 
160-4. 
25. Batatu, 1084-5. 
26. Mustafa Alani, "Saddam's Support Structure," in Gulf Security: Opportunities and Challenges 
for the New Generation, ed. Patrick and Toase McKnight (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2001), 
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abuse at the hands of his stepfather as a young child, and his poor origins from a small 
town near Tikrit, al-cUja, where tribal honor codes predominated, as early determinants 
of his egotistic and ruthless character.27 Drawing on these facts and his later behavior, 
one such profile diagnosed Hussein as a "malignant narcissist" because of a lack of 
conscience, "unconstrained aggression," paranoia, and delusions of grandeur.28 At the 
least, as one of Hussein's official biographers explained, "Like the vast majority of true 
leaders in history, from the moment of his self-consciousness he took it upon himself to 
confront the challenges of life by creating his own destiny."29 Because of Hussein's 
character and experience with clandestine organization, al-Bakr made Hussein his right-
hand man, and Hussein proved invaluable in helping al-Bakr take power and survive the 
Bacth's 1968 to 1973 period of consolidation. These abilities complemented al-Bakr's 
position in the military and respected leader-mediator role within the party, which 
Hussein needed as a gateway to establish his own reputation within both institutions. 30 
42. It is possible that this organization, about which little information exists, was the aforementioned 
Office of Public Relations. 
27. For accounts of Hussein's childhood see Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A 
Political Biography (New York: Grove Press, 2002), 6-15; Said K. Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The Politics 
of Revenge (New York: Bloomsbury, 2000), 9-35; Con Coughlin, Saddam: His Rise and Fall (New York: 
Harper Perennial, 2004) 1-22. 
28. Jerrold M. Post and Amatzia Baram. Saddam is Iraq: Iraq is Saddam (Maxwell Air Force 
Base, Ala.: USAF Counterproliferation Center Maxwell Air Force Base Air University, 2002), 9-12. 
29. Amir Iskandar, Saddam Husayn Munadilan wa-Mufakkiran wa-Insanan (Casablanca: Tansift, 
2000), 14. 
30. Marr, 144-6; Batatu, 1079, 1082-5; Khadduri, 71-6. 
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Hussein's humble background and emergence via the security services made his 
connection to the Ba0th Party critical to establish himself as a legitimate ruler because 
neither his origins nor his brutal methods of conspiracy contained inherently legitimizing 
elements. In a society that valued noble lineage, Hussein's was unremarkable, which is 
one of the reasons why he manufactured a family tree after he became president leading 
back to the Shi0 a' s Imam c Ali (the fourth Muslim caliph).31 The security services proved 
useful for power plays within the ruling elite, to target opposition groups, and to instill 
fear within the populace, but a regime that rested on such a thin base could not survive on 
fear and repression alone. The Ba0 th Party's organizational apparatus, moreover, needed 
a purpose beyond the sustenance of a one-man dictatorship. Ba0 thist ideology claimed as 
its main goal the establishment of a unified Arab nation in order to advance the Arab 
people. Hussein could thus not simultaneously claim to be a Ba0 thist and make the 
suppression of Iraqis the raison d'etre of his regime. For better or for worse, Hussein 
was inextricably linked to the Ba0 th Party and its message. 
Bacthist Ideology 
What was that message? Until the end of the Ba0 th's reign in Iraq, two main 
slogans adorned the party's letterhead: "unity, freedom, and socialism," and "one Arab 
nation with an eternal message" Cumma carabiyya wlif:zida dhlit rislila khlilida). "Unity," 
as the second slogan indicated, referred to Arab unity. The original Ba0 th Party 
31. Iskandar, 14-15,21. 
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constitution from the 1940s claimed the Arabs to be both a political and cultural nation 
that would naturally choose to live in one unified state if not for imperialist interference: 
. 
"Any differences existing amongst [the Arab nation's] sons are accidental and 
unimportant. They will all disappear with the awakening of the Arab consciousness." 
Loyalty to the Arab nation was the only larger identity permitted under the constitution; 
"religious, communal, tribal, racial, or regional factions" were expressly prohibited?2 
Accordingly, when the Bacth came to power it officially banned references to tribal 
affiliation within the party and made it illegal for public figures to use their tribal, 
regional, or clan names. 33 Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti, for instance, became simply 
Saddam Hussein. In reality, however, the Bacth routinely asked for all of the above 
personal details of each citizen and those of his or her wife or husband and close 
relatives. The party then kept the information in the person's file and used it for 
background checks.34 
The Ba0 th Party's definition of"freedom" differed from the Western concept of 
the protection of individual liberties as the basis for a free society. The first clause of the 
second "principle" of the constitution claimed that "Freedom of speech, freedom of 
assembly, freedom ofbelief, as well as artistic freedom, are sacred. No authority can 
32. The Bacth Party constitution can be found in Kamel Abu Jaber, The Arab Bacth Socialist 
Party: History, Ideology, and Organization (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1966), 167-74, 
quotes from 167, 170. Abu Jaber takes the constitution word for word from Sylvia Haim, Arab 
Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), 233-41. 
33. Adeed Dawisha, "'Identity' and Political Survival in Hussein's Iraq," The Middle East Journal 
53 (Autumn 1999): 563. 
34. See, e.g., two forms that were filled out about individuals, one by the SSO and one by the 
Bacth Party's Baghdad bureau, in boxfile 005-3-6: 109, 146-7. 
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diminish them." The second clause attached a caveat to these rights: "The value of the 
citizen is measured-once all opportunities have been given them (sic)-by the action 
they take to further the progress and prosperity of the Arab nation, without regard to any 
other criterion (emphasis added)."35 · In other words, a citizen of the Arab nation derives 
his or her personal value from actions intended to advance the welfare of the collective. 
Collective progress therefore trumps individual liberties, and individuals should equate 
their own well-being with the nation's. A pamphlet put out by a branch of the party in 
1995 showed that this was still the case: 
Party relationships are principle relationships on all the levels of the party. It is revealed 
through them that the party takes the individual's place, the welfare of the party takes the 
place ofthe individual's welfare, and the party's decision takes the place of personal 
opinion. The connection between speech and action, between methods and the goal, 
between thought and practice, and between the mean and the end are the most distinctive 
characteristics of the Ba cth. 36 
Accordingly, Bacthist ideologues believed that individual liberties could be sacrificed in 
the national interest. Conveniently, the national interest corresponded to "those 
individuals and associations that are in agreement with the aims of the Arab nation, i.e., 
the party."37 The Party could thus regulate individual freedoms and defme the country's 
course of development. In a one party state, that translated into the Bacth's unbridled 
authority over state and society. 
35. Abu Jaber, 167-8. Article 41, clause 2 says something similar: "The state is responsible for the 
protection of the liberty of speech, of publication, of assembly, of protest, and of the press, within the limits 
of the higher Arab national interest. It is for the state to facilitate all the mean11 and the modalities which 
tend to realize this liberty" (173). 
36. "Miidhii nacmal wa kayfa nacmal,"· Sept. 23, 1995, 025-1-7: 38. 
37. Abu Jaber, 126. 
65 
Two corollaries to this theorem extended and deepened the Bacth's claim to the 
right to control individual behavior. The first corollary posited that the bond between the 
individual and the Arab nation was sacred; nothing could abrogate it. Consequently,. if 
the welfare of the Arab nation-and, hence, the party-took priority over its citizens' 
individual lives, it followed that the individual should sacrifice himself for the sake of the 
nation. "Sacrifice for the sake of nationalism leads to heroism," c Aflaq wrote, "for he 
who sacrifices everything for his people, in defense of its past glory and future welfare, is 
more elevated in spirit and richer in his life than he who makes a sacrifice for the sake of 
one person."38 Conversely, when individual interests opposed the nation's, the Bacth had 
the moral authority to kill them. This extended not just to action but thought. A 
successful national action leads, c Aflaq believed, "to a powerful hate, a hate unto death of 
those persons who embody an idea contrary to the idea of [the nationalist] .... An inimical 
theory is not found on its own; it is embodied in individuals who must be annihilated so 
that it too may be annihilated. "39 
The second corollary gave the Bacth permission to control personal and family 
life. c Aflaq argued that nationalism is in its essence "love" for one's nation. People love 
their families, and the nation is a large clan. As the head of this clan, the Bacthist state 
consequently has the right to "protect, to develop, and to help [the family]" since it is "the 
38. Michel c Aflaq, "Nationalism and Revolution," in Arab Nationalism: An Anthology, ed. Sylvia 
Haim (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), 242-3. 
39. Haim, 70. 
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basic cell of the nation."40 This meant that the state, ruled by the party, ought to extend 
beyond the public into the private sphere--or, rather, to abolish the private sphere and 
make everything public. Normally personal decisions, therefore, became state interests. 
The Ba0th defined marriage, for example, as a "national duty." As a result, "The state 
must encourage it, facilitate it, and control it."41 
If freedom did not mean individual freedom, to what did it refer? In accord with 
the concept of the nation's collective interest as paramount, the Bacth fancied itself a 
" ... popular party. It believes that the value of the state is the outcome of the will of the 
masses from which it issues and that this value is sacred only to the extent that the masses 
have exercised their choice freely."42 Freedom in the Ba0 th's conception meant the 
collective freedom of the Arab people as a whole. For the masses to choose freely, 
however, they needed to be both physically and mentally uninhibited. In the former case, 
that required emancipation from imperialism. In the latter, it referred to the reawakening 
of Arab minds, the resurrection (the meaning of bacth) of their consciousness as a people 
able to determine their own destiny. Since Bacth Party members had already undergone 
this awakening, it was up to them to show un-enlightened Arabs what their true interests 
were-"to force them to be free."43 This definition offreedom, of course, was in 
actuality its antithesis. It was, like the fascist and National Socialist strains of European 
40. Haim, 242-3; quotes from Abu Jaber, 172. 
41.AbuJaber, 172. 
42. Abu Jaber, 169. 
43. Abu Jaber, 126. 
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nationalism that the Bacth emulated, a perversion of Rousseau's Social Contract and, in 
the historical context ofBacthist Iraq, a prescription for tyranny.44 
Like freedom, Bacthist "socialism" did not correspond exactly to the same notion 
developed by theorists such as Robert Owen, Saint-Simon, Karl Marx, and Friedrich 
Engels in Europe in the nineteenth century. On paper, it shared certain traits, such as a 
commitment to social justice, a centralized state-run economy, the nationalization of 
certain industries, the redistribution of wealth, an emphasis on workers and peasants' 
rights, and the creation of a social welfare net.45 The historical context in which 
Bacthism arose, however, differed from socialism in Europe. The Bacth remained more 
concerned, for example, about land reform than industrial workers because when the 
party came to power a significant portion of the population still toiled in the agricultural 
sector. European socialism, in contrast, developed in reaction to the plight of the 
working class in industrialized cities. The Bacth sought to overthrow the established rich 
gentry ruling class of monarchists, the families of former Ottoman officials, landowners, 
44. In The Social Contract, Rousseau says that " ... whoever refuses to obey the general will shall 
be constrained to do so by the entire body: which means nothing other than that he shall be forced to be 
free." The meaning of this sentence is the exact opposite from the intention ofc Aflaq's writings. c Aflaq 
gives the Ba0th license to impose its conception of how society should operate because it knows its 
message to be indisputably true since it results from immutable historical forces. The Ba0 th therefore must 
try to make non-sympathizers realize that it knows the truth. Rousseau, on the other hand, wants to free 
man from a state of nature and government by force. To do so, however, all men must be held accountable 
to the rules of the social contract. Rousseau's is a defense of the rule oflaw as agreed upon by society 
whereas c Aflaq makes the Ba0 th, as the source of truth, the creator oflaw with the authority to impose it 
regardless of whether Arabs accept it or not. That is the essence of tyranny. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The 
Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings. ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1997), 53. 
45. Abu Jaber, 169-72. 
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and their imperialist patrons. European socialists wanted to oust industrial capitalists.46 
Ba0thist leaders in the 1970s did institute some land reforms, erect a social services 
system, nationalize Iraq's oil industry, and create a state-run economy. They did not, 
however, dispense with capitalism or abolish private property.47 On the contrary, they 
remained committed to "maintaining and sustaining the existing capitalist economic 
order."48 The focus ofBa0 thist socialism in practice lay primarily in the desire for 
political, economic, and social justice and an end to imperialist domination over the Arab 
nation instead of transforming the relationship between workers and the means of 
production. As the party's constitution stated: "Socialism constitutes, in fact, the ideal 
social order which will allow the Arab people to realize its possibilities and to enable its 
genius to flourish, and which will ensure for the nation constant progress in its material 
and moral output."49 In other words, since the Ba0 th retained a monopoly on the right to 
interpret the national interest, which was the source of ultimate truth in the Arab nation, 
"socialism" could be whatever group of socio-economic policies the Ba0 th desired. 
Typified by this kind of statement, the vagueness of classic Ba0 thist ideology 
proved both a help and a hindrance to Ba0 thist leaders in establishing their regime. On 
the one hand, its lack of concrete prescriptions left the Bacth rudderless after its initial 
46. Heywood, 103-16. 
47. M. Farouk-Sluglett and P. Sluglett, "Iraqi Ba0thism: Nationalism, Socialism and National 
Socialism," in Saddam's Iraq, Revolution or Reaction (Avon, UK: Zed Books and CARDRI, 1986), 89-
107. 
48. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 228. 
49. Abu Jaber, 169. 
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takeover. As the 1974 congress report said, in 1968 "The Party in fact had no ready 
example to follow, linking practical application with detailed programmes. All the Party 
had was faith and a wealth of experience full oflessons and, at times, bittemess."50 On 
the other hand, Bacthist ideology's lack of specificity made it malleable and open to 
reinterpretation based on contemporary needs. Hussein claimed in the late 1970s that 
"the Ba'th Party has since its assumption of power in Iraq in the July 17-30, 1968 
Revolution, embarked on enriching its own theory. This was quite necessary to meet the 
new circumstances and needs posed by a new phase of its long course of struggle. "51 
Nonetheless, before Hussein became president the Bacth did not stray too far from its 
original message. The 197 4 report still declared its fundamental goal to be a "unified 
democratic socialist Arab state."52 Throughout its reign, the Bacth could never entirely 
dispense with its original slogans and catch-phrases; they had been too vigorously 
promoted. Once Hussein assumed the presidency and the Iran-Iraq War started, the 
framework in which the Bacth wanted Iraqis to conceive of the state and the party 
changed. The Bacth obviously hoped to benefit from this shift in focus, and it served a 
useful purpose, but by fiddling with its fundamental message the party lost some of the 
power that its original ideology held. 53 
50. Hizb al-Bacth, Revolutionary Iraq, 51. 
51. Saddam Hussein, On History, Heritage and Religion. Trans. Naji al-Hadithi (Baghdad: 
Translation & Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1981), 5. 
52. Hizb al-Bacth, Revolutionary Iraq, 194. 
53. One manifestation of this can be seen in the memoirs ofBacthists active in the party before the 
1968 revolution who then worked in its early government before being purged or fleeing the country. All 
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Conclusion 
By the time the BRCC began in 1979, the cornerstones of Saddam Hussein's 
system of control were already in place. In light of the above history, it is not hard to see 
why Bacthist Iraq under Hussein turned into the totalitarian dictatorship that it did 
considering the political culture of violence, conspiracy, patronage, and paranoia out of 
which the Bacth Party emerged; Hussein's personal proclivities; his firm grasp over the 
state's means of force and the resources to support them; and the ideology he inherited, 
which was easily interpreted in a totalitarian fashion, if that was not the original intent in 
the first place. The ideological element was not the most robust aspect, but it provided 
the overall framework and intellectual underpinnings of the entire system of control. It is 
thus a good starting place for a study of the BRCC. 
pay homage to the party's original slogans. They complain about the course the Iraqi Bacth embarked upon 
under Saddam Hussein, however, saying he betrayed true Bacthist principles. See, e.g., Khalida c Abd al-
Qahhar, Sikritirat Saddam Tatakallam (Cairo: al-Zahra0 li-1-orclam al-e Arabi, 1990; Jawad Hashim, 
Mudhakkarat Wazir clraqi maca al-Bakr wa-Saddam (Beirut: Dar al-Saqi, 2003); Fakhri Qadduri, Hakadha 
cAraftu al-Bakr wa-Saddam: Rihla 35 cAm fi Hizb al-Bacth (London: Dar al-Hikma, 2006). 
71 
CHAPTER 3: Hosseini Ba cthism 
As we have just seen, in fairly populous societies that have attained a certain level of 
civilization, ruling classes do not justify their power exclusively by de facto possession of 
it, but try to fmd a moral and .legal basis for it, representing it as the logical and necessary 
consequence of doctrines and beliefs that are generally recognized and accepted. 
-Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (Elementi Di Scienza Politica) 
Bacthist action, which the struggler puts forth and which aims to change reality for the 
sake of the values he believes in, is the sole indication that expresses the size of these 
values in the conscience. 
-[Name Withheld],from a BRCC report sent to Saddam Hussein1 
Our creed is thought, belief, and practice. 
-Saddam Hussein2 
Introduction 
When the reader opens a BRCC file, he steps into a self-contained universe where 
"normal" common sense does not apply; an environment governed by its own language, 
rituals, logic, and ethics; a place where each word and action buttresses Saddam Hussein 
and the Bacth Party's authority and assumes their legitimacy. Accordingly, the BRCC 
employs a vocabulary that is at once bureaucratic and ideological. Party slogans and 
pithy quotes from Hussein adorn the tops of all party and ministry letterhead, even in 
drafts and handwritten notes. They find their ways into party reports, administrative 
memoranda, and citizens' petitions. Certain adjectives always pare with specific nouns, 
indicating the regime's official line. Hyperbolic superlatives attach to particular Bacthist 
1. "Taqyfm," dii'irat al-shu'iin al-qiiniiniyya ra'fs al-azwiin 'ilii sayyidi al-ra'fs al-qii'id ~aftuhu 
allah, Aug. 29, 1987, 072-1-5: 503. 
2. "Taqrfr mas'iiliyya," cw# maktab tan?:fm baghdad 'ilii al-rafiq al-munii#l 'amfn sirrr al-
maktab al-mu~taram, Dec. 4, 1985, 035-2-3: 262. This quotation comes from an epigraph at the beginning 
of a report from the al-Rashid branch of the Bacth Party. 
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enterprises so that they become part of the term that symbolizes it, leaving no doubt as to 
their "greatness," regardless of their efficacy or outcome. Every piece of party 
correspondence begins with "Comradely greetings" (ta[tiyya riftiqiyya) and reminds its 
recipient to "keep struggling" ( dumtum li-l-ni~al) at the end, framing the body of the text 
and creating a physical, standardized space that orients both the writer and reader within 
the Ba0 th' s idiom. Within this highly stylized setting, freedom of expression consists of 
clever turns of phrase and creative praise for the party, leader, and nation. In fact, the 
BRCC links each of these symbols to the other, fusing them into the Ba0 th's real 
ideological trinity from 1979 to 2003 instead of its traditional "unity, freedom, and 
socialism." Loyalty to this Bacthist Trinity is cast as the overriding goal of existence, 
even to the point of self-sacrifice. Their exaltation often consumes more ink than the 
substance of the message itself. In the face of their glorification opposition seems absurd. 
The same circumscribed worldview that underlies the BRCC's literary styles and 
conventions mirrors itself in the individual and collective rituals of fealty that the archive 
describes Iraqi citizens took part in on a daily basis. These rituals were many and varied. 
School children who hoped to receive good marks in order to continue their studies, and 
Bacth Party members eager to advance their careers, took tests on Ba0thist ideology and 
Hussein's speeches.3 The same subjects were discussed at party meetings, in union 
gatherings, and in public lectures and seminars. 4 Upon their return, Iraqis who left the 
3. 040-4-7: 149. 
4. "al-Jihad ... wa-1-camal al-thawr'i- mashriic waraqat camal/:tizbiyya," maktab tanf.'im baghdad, 
Dec. 29, 1990, 051-1-2: 609. 
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country wrote intelligence reports detailing their activities and explaining the superiority 
of the Ba cthist system and its values compared to the country they visited. 5 Petitioners to 
Hussein~ the party~ and the government inevitably began and ended their requests with 
excessive fawning.6 The number of recorded oaths of loyalty written in their authors' 
blood that Hussein and the party received runs into the hundreds. On Bacthist 
anniversaries and national holidays Iraqis participated en masse in carefully orchestrated 
ceremonies, proving to the world, their compatriots, and themselves the depth of their 
loyalty by chanting slogans written by the Bacth Party and Ministry of Culture and Media 
(wizlirat al-thaqlifa wa-1-:Jicllim) for the occasion. Those who did not take part read about 
the event in newspapers, magazines, and journals, watched it on television, walked by 
banners with the official mottos while going about their daily activities, and discussed it 
in time set aside before the workday began. Like the ubiquitous posters ofHussein's 
pictures plastered throughout the country in public spaces and on the walls of businesses 
and private residences, the Bacthist ethos was ever present. The BRCC's authors placed 
every activity and thought into context. They constantly affirmed and reaffirmed that 
state and society existed to venerate and advance the interests of the Bacthist Trinity. 
The character of the BRCC's literary style, conventions~ and rituals are symptoms 
of Saddam Hussein and the Ba cth Party's attempt to abolish Iraqis' allegiances to their 
primordial loyalties and refashion them to the Bacthist State. This required reorienting 
5. Boxfiles 023-2-6 and 027-4-1, e.g., contain many such reports. 
6. See, e.g., the petition by a shaykh asking to be officially recognized as the head of his clan 
ifakhdh) in which he included an original poem praising Hussein. June 14, 2000, 049-5-7: 168-9. 
74 
their conceptions of what constituted a just and "natural" society to conform to the 
Bacthist reality. The cultural inputs that informed Iraqis' notions of societal norms-
their religious beliefs and dogmas, tribal honor codes, local customs, and historical 
heritage-therefore had to be changed or subordinated to the Bacthist Trinity. As a 
result, Hussein tried to make Bacthist ideology the sole source of Iraqi culture-to, in 
effect, transform it into Bacthist culture. By controlling culture he could manipulate the 
psychological framework that helped Iraqis make sense of the Bacthist environment 
which enveloped them. He could thus control individuals' behavior. If he controlled 
behavior he could control society, and if he controlled society he could have his cake and 
eat it too; his regime would retain its authority and elicit the consent required from the 
populace to legitimize the maintenance of its rule. The Bacthist claim to want to build a 
"newman" (al-:Jinslin al-jadid) and a "new society" (al-mujtamac al-jadid) was notjust 
ideological rhetoric designed to cover up the selfish character of the regime. 7 It was also 
the keystone that provided political, intellectual, moral, and emotional coherence to the 
other mechanisms which made up the tangible aspects of Hussein's overall system of 
control. Since the ideology that guided this effort did not derive purely from original 
Bacthist thought, because it differed in certain respects from the Bacthism practiced in 
7. "((Diriisa can al-tacbra al-jamiih'friyya)) wa-kay]lJ')'at tatw'frha," qiyiidat maktab tang.fm 
baghdad, 038-2-4: 157; "Barniimaj tanftdh'fli-takr'fs al-qiyyam wa-1-mabiidr allat'ftarJ.manuha l;tadfth al-
qii3id al-munii#l ~addiim l;tusayn (l;a.fiuhu allah) maca al-rafoq aladh'fna qalladahum shlirat al-l;tizb masli3 
yawm 3/5/1989," maktab tan?'Jm al-junub, 071-1-7: 66. 
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Syria at the same time, and because Hussein's personality cult occupied such a large role 
within it, it is referred to here as "Husseini Ba0 thism."8 
Old and New 
What did Ba0 thist ideology consist of under Saddam Hussein? The BRCC shows 
that it was made up of three broad elements. Hussein retained the language, 
catchphrases, and moral imperative of the party's founding theories as propounded by the 
Ba0 th's most prominent ideologue, Michel c Aflaq. To make Bacthist ideology his own, 
however, Hussein introduced two new concepts: his cult of personality, and the notion of 
the "application" (ta{bfq) ofBacthist ideals with an emphasis on "putting them into 
practice" (mumlirasa) and "building" (binii") a strong Ba0 thist human being, society, and 
nation in all their facets. These two additions went hand-in-hand because each 
strengthened Hussein's role within the Ba0 thist State. The first made him into the Ba0 th's 
chief prophet, giving him an exclusive insight into the monopoly on historical truth that 
underlay the party's claims to legitimacy. With this power, the second allowed him to 
interpret c Aflaq's vague principles as he wished. If ideology was the keystone of the 
Ba0 thist system, by placing himself at the center of party ideology, Hussein sat at the 
8. Davis, 200. There were always philosophical differences between the Bacth's founders as well 
as within the Iraqi and Syrian parties, so it is difficult to speak of"Bacthist ideology" as a coherent, widely 
accepted body of ideas beyond the Bacth's general slogans even within the party. Bacthism in theory and 
as practiced in Iraq and Syria were not the same exact thing. Nor within Iraq did Fuad al-Rikabi, Salah al-
Sacdi, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and Saddam Hussein interpret and apply Bacthist principles in the same 
fashion. Similarly, the Bacthism of Salah al-Jadid departed from that ofHafez al-Asad in Syria. It is 
important, therefore, to specify which Bacthism this study refers to, and to point out the similarities and 
differences between Husseini Bacthism and, especially, the original founding principles that it claimed to 
be carrying on. 
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apex of the regime where, to paraphrase Vaclav Havel, the center of power was identical 
to the center oftruth.9 Husseini Bacthism did not only give Hussein unquestionable 
authority, therefore, it made the continuance of that authority necessary to maintain the 
In 1986, the deputy head of the Bacth Party's Office of Culture and Media 
(maktab al-thaqafa wa-l-:Jiclam) sent Saddam Hussein a twenty-seven page syllabus of 
readings to be used in the "cultural" training of partisans and "supporters" (mu:Jayyidzn) 
of the party, the Bacth's two lowest levels of membership. The syllabus consisted of 
what the office considered "the basic literature of the party in addition to selected articles 
from The Arab Revolution," a party magazine. The "basic literature" came from four 
sources: the writings ofBacthist founder Michel c Aflaq, Hussein, party documents issued 
by national and regional conferences, and historical party declarations including a group 
from the 1963 Bacthist classic, Nidal al-Bacth (The Bacthist Struggle). 10 Of these, 
cAflaq's and Hussein's writings and speeches make-up almost all ofthe passages. 
Hussein approved the syllabus. It contains what under his leadership was the Bacth 
Party's intellectual cannon, produced so that its members would "understand fully the 
9. Vaclav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," in Vaclav Havel: Living in Truth, ed. Jan 
Vladislav (London: Faber and Faber, 1990), 39. 
10. Hizb al-Ba0th al-0 Arabi al-~Ishtiraki, Ni~al al-Bacth (Syria, 1963). 
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diffe~ent ideological, organizational, and political aspects that are required of a party 
comrade."11 
The nature of the syllabus illustrates the progressive yet reverential character of 
Husseini Ba0 thist ideology whereby the Ba0th sought to retain the original concepts and 
catchphrases of traditional Ba0 thism but claimed the right to further the theory and 
interpret it according to its own needs when putting Ba0 thist ideology into practice. The 
founding principles of the party, as laid out by c Aflaq, retain a prominent place in the 
more theoretical sections. His writings are the only ones contained in the parts on "The 
Character ofBa0 thist Thought," "Arab Nationalism and the Nationalist Theory," "The 
Concept of Revolution" (al-"inqilabiyya), and "The Relationship Between Unity, 
Freedom, and Socialism." Hussein's speeches and writings, in contrast, almost 
exclusively make up the more practical sections and articles. 12 Whereas an item by 
c Aflaq is the required reading for "Our Socialism versus Communist Socialism," 
Hussein's writings fill "Socialism Applied," "Theory, Strategy, and Tactics," and "Issues 
of the Revolution Applied."13 
The names given to c Aflaq and Hussein reinforce this division between past and 
present, theory and practice. Until c Aflaq' s death in 1989, he remained the secretary of 
11. "al-Barniimaj al-thaqiifi li-Pac~ii~," na~'ib mas~iil maktab al-thaqiifa wa-Piclam ~ua al-rafiq 
al-munii# ~addiim !;usayn al-mu!;taram na~ib aPamzn at-cam lil-l;izb (l;aftuhu allah), June 2, 1986, 087-
1-1: 87-114. 
12. Hussein wrote on more ethereal topics too, but he maintains a monopoly over any concept 
"applied" or put into practice. 
13. 087-1-1: 87-114. 
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the symbolic National Command. Hussein was his deputy and secretary of the more 
powerful but technically inferior Regional Command. Publicly, c Aflaq was venerated as 
"The Founding Leader" (al-qlf1zd al-mu 3 assis), giving him credit for his previous role as 
the driving force behind the party. Hussein, on the other hand, is just called "The 
Leader," (al-qa 3 id), often with one of his titles or a common Bacthist moniker attached, 
such as al-muna~il, "The Struggler." He, in other words, was the current political leader. 
Introducing these types of distinctions allowed Hussein to keep parts ofBacthist heritage 
that served his purposes but claim the right to alter others in what the regime called a 
"new stage" (mar!:zalajadzda) of the nation's development. It too gave c Aflaq esteem but 
eliminated the possibility that he or any other respected former party leader could 
challenge Hussein based on their Bacthist credentials. 
Why did Hussein retain c Aflaq and his old slogans? Why not make a clean break 
with the past? On the one hand, as the previous chapter mentioned, Hussein and the 
Bacth were inextricably tied together. Hussein did not have any natural legitimacy to rule 
based upon his own background or the means that he used to gain and hold onto power. 
He thus needed to preserve the appearance that the Husseini version of the Bacth had not 
eschewed the principles of the party's founders. Additionally, to totally dismiss the 
party's original concepts would have left no reason to maintain the Bacth Party's 
organizational apparatus, which Hussein needed to control state and society. It would 
also have deprived him of rhetorical weapons in the fight against his internal and external 
enemies. 
79 
Furthermore, even with Hussein's increasingly obvious narcissism after he 
became president, Bacthist ideals still offered a theoretical appeal to some, as explained 
by former Bacthist Diya al-Din al-Majmaci: 
The leaders of the Bacth and its ideologues promised big goals that represented the 
dreams of every upstanding (sharif) Arab. At the forefront of these were "unity" (and 
who doesn't love the unity ofthe Arabs, which would lead to their strength in the face of 
their enemies), "freedom," emancipation from imperialism (al- 3 isticmiir) and the release . 
of intellectual, cultural, and religious freedoms, and the freedom of each man in all of his 
choices, then "socialism" and the achievement of social justice, providing opportunity to 
all citizens equally.14 
Yet, after over a decade in power, the Bacth Party's broken promises left many Iraqis like 
al-Majmaci disillusioned: 
In truth, I was one of those men who was destined to be a Bacthist. .. However, after a 
number of years, I balked (waqajtu) at the many crimes the Bacth committed against the 
goals it professed (~id al- 3 ahdlij allatf yaifacuhu). It conspired against any true Arab 
solidarity or approximation of unity. [Bacthist leaders] claimed to work to free Palestine 
or the eastern front, but they increased discord ( al-fitan) and problems with their Arab 
brothers .... They announced the existence of freedom in the media by television and radio 
and newspapers, but in reality they suppressed all freedom to the point where a man 
could not reveal his true opinions and thoughts even in his house within earshot of his 
wife and children .... As for socialism (which became private under the Bacth), suffice it 
to say that the Bacth's practices made each Iraqi at the mercy of private property (al-
milkiyya) and capitalism, because the regime's cronies (zabiiniyat al-ni;iim) and the 
relatives of the tyrant and especially his family took over everything and gave the people 
a taste of ignominy .... 
Beginning in the 1970s, many Bacthist comrades began to ask themselves and 
each other: what has become of the principles, slogans, and goals of the Bacth?15 
The most important reason that Hussein reached out for the justification of authority 
inherent inc Aflaq's original theories was to bridge the gap al-Majmaci describes between 
the Bacth regime's professed beliefs and its obviously self-serving policies. This gap 
14. Diya al-Din al-Majmaci, Hurub Saddam: Shahid CAyyan li-" Ahdath Thalatha cuqud min 
Tarikh al-clriiq al-Hadith (London: Dar al-Hikma, 2006), 14. 
15. Al-Majmaci, 15-17. 
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widened under Hussein, as the purges he carried out to consolidate his power by 
eliminating potential rivals narrowed the support base at the top of his regime. As the 
leader of a movement which sought to awaken Iraqis to the historical truth of Arab 
nationalism for Iraqis' own benefit, the Bacth Party's monopoly over the right to interpret 
historical truth gave its actions legitimacy, ipso facto. Instead of conforming to its 
principles, therefore, this put the Bacth Party, for all intents and purpose, above its theory, 
making its actions its principles. As the Bacthist leadership learned when c Abd al-Salam 
c Arifpurged them in 1963, their first priority had to be the "preservation of the 
revolution" before the application of ideological principle.16 From the start of their rule 
in 1968, they saw no contradiction in pursuing pragmatic ends over purely ideological 
ones because the maintenance of their rule was a prerequisite to one day achieving their 
utopian goals. When Hussein took over the party he retained this logic, using the Bacth's 
ideological language to justify his self-preservation even if the steps required were on 
their face antithetical to the Bacth's stated ideals. 
Keeping the logic of c Aflaq's ideology allowed Hussein to cloak his actions with 
moral legitimacy. Aside from the few real psychopaths in any population, people will 
only carry out acts they would otherwise consider reprehensible on somebody else's 
behalf-or debase themselves by supporting a system that does-if they feel that they are 
acting within established norms, that their behavior falls within a reasonable ethical 
framework. Ideologies, the Italian political theorist Gaetano Mosca observed, " ... answer 
16. The phrase "preservation ofthe revolution" comes from the party's 1974 conference report 
(Hizb al-Bacth, Revolutionary Iraq, 240-1). 
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a real need in man's social nature; and this need, so universally felt, of governing and 
knowing that one is governed not on the basis of mere material or intellectual force, but 
on the basis of a moral principle, has beyond any doubt a practical and a real 
importance."17 The basis of c Aflaq's theories in historical necessity, which Hussein came 
to embody in his personality cult, provided a moral legitimization for Hussein's rule, one 
he employed to cover up the true character of his regime, and which Iraqis could also use 
to excuse themselves for their docility. In each dictatorship," Richard Overy has written 
about Stalin and Hitler's regimes, "a unique moral universe was constructed in order to 
justify and explain what appear otherwise to be the most sordid and arbitrmy of acts."18 
Husseini Bacthism provided this same kind of"moral universe" within which Iraqis could 
place their actions and consequently avoid the shame and guilt that would have normally 
accompanied the betrayal of old loyalties. To the contrary, Husseini Bacthism honored 
these actions as patriotism. Although the question is unanswerable it is nevertheless 
worth asking: how many times did Iraqis have to justify their actions to others and 
themselves on Husseini Bacthist terms before its universe began to become their own? 
17. Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (Elementi Di Scienza Politica). Trans. Hannah D. Kahn 
(New York: McGraw Hill Book Company Inc., 1939), 71. 
18. Overy, 265. 
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Saddam Hussein's Cult of Personality 
As far back as 1972, Amatzia Baram identified Hussein's effort to supplant the 
Ba0thism of c Aflaq and al-Bakr with his own. 19 From at least the mid-1970s, it became 
known both domestically and internationally "that he, rather than Hasan al-Bakr, was the 
dominant figure in the regime."20 It was thus not surprising when in July 1979, Hussein 
officially took over from al-Bakr. The way in which he did so set the tone for the 
remainder of his presidency. A closed meeting of the Ba0 th Party leadership followed 
Hussein's takeover. At the meeting, the members were shown a videotape of one RCC 
member, Muhyi c Abd al-Husain Rashid, confessing to participation in a Syrian plot to 
overthrow Hussein. He fingered a number of other Bacth Party members who were 
sitting in the audience. Upon calling their names, guards came and took them out of the 
auditorium, often while screaming Hussein's praises. Hussein then took the podium and, 
while smoking a cigar and wiping tears from his eyes, implicated others. When he 
finished, he required the remaining Ba0 th members to shoot their comrades, choosing 
relatives to kill each other and neighbors to kill neighbors. All in all, twenty-two people 
were shot, thirty-three were sentenced to prison, and thirteen were let go. Copies of the 
film of this affair were then distributed to other party members. Choking back tears, 
Hussein warned the crowd, and, in effect, the country: "He who betrays his nation 
19. Amatzia Baram, "Saddam Hussein: a Political Profile," Jerusalem Quarterly 17 (Autumn 
1980): 139. 
20. Tripp, 207. 
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(qawm), we have nothing for him except the sword.'m The nature of the purge, however, 
indicated that it was not just the Bacth Party or Arab or Iraqi nations that required Iraqis' 
allegiance; it was Hussein's person. It is not surprising, therefore, to find in the BRCC's 
earliest boxfiles from 1979 that Hussein's leadership complex, or cult of personality, 
existed in full force. 22 
The main purpose behind Hussein's leadership cult was to affirm and cement his 
untouchable, absolute authority as the sole legitimate leader oflraq, its people, and the 
Bacth Party. Hussein derived this power as the head of the Bacthist State, which itself 
supposedly existed to further the process of Arab nationalism, the outcome of which was 
the result of history taking its natural course. Hussein linked himself through the party, 
therefore, to the Arab and Iraqi nations. Hussein's person consequently became a symbol 
associated with patriotism, nationalism, and the personal and collective honor attached to 
these values under which all of Iraq's sects and ethnicities could theoretically unite. As a 
party report entitled, "A plan in order to confirm the execution of the values and 
principles that were included in the speech of the Struggler Leader Saddam Hussein (God 
save him) ... ," put it, 
[Bacthist principles and values] build the party into an edifice of struggle to be able ... to 
tackle all of the important struggling tasks because of its great historical role in the life of 
21. Quote from "Abu "Islam "Ahmad c Abd "Allah, Saddam Husayn: al-Nasha" a .. al-Tarikh.. al-
Jarima (Cairo: Bayt al-Hikma, 1990), 82; Neil MacFarquhar, "Saddam Hussein, Defiant Dictator Who 
Ruled Iraq With Violence and Fear, Dies," The New York Times, Dec. 30, 2006, • 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006112/30/worldlmiddleeast/30saddam.html?pagewanted=print [accessed Aug. 
24, 2011]; Makiya, Republic of Fear, 70-2; WalidHilli, al-'Jraq: al-Waqi'wa-"Afaq al-Mustaqbal. (Beirut: 
Dar al-Furat, 1992), 43-4. 
22. See, e.g., boxfile 040-3-6, entitled "al-Sayyid al-Ra"is." 
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the nation ("umma). They build the new society to be cohesive, homogeneous 
(mutajiinisan), productive, and civilized. They govern its movement and the 
development of its values and traditions, which the Comrade Leader Symbol Saddam 
Hussein heads with the revolutionary party that leads the march toward the best possible 
outcome for etemity.23 
This message had to be stressed constantly because, as Chapter Two showed, 
Hussein's legitimacy was inextricably tied to the party's. Like the Bacth Party did with 
its authority, Hussein posited his greatness and then rewrote history to support this claim. 
Already at the 1974 party conference, the Bacth began to provide rationalizations for 
moving beyond the unspecific nature of an idealist ideology to one that justified its 
pragmatic actions. The conference report mentioned the need "to avoid generalities ... to 
exert the greatest possible effort to formulate a realistic and clear revolutionary 
programme which would unify the will of the Party and the masses, leaving no room for 
possibly conflicting interpretations."24 The move to distinguish its own theory from 
those developed before 1968 required a new story to support its changes. This meant not 
only justifying those changes based on practical considerations but also reinterpreting 
history to bring its laws in line with the Bacth' s fresh narrative. History, like everything 
else, was a tool in the Bacth's service; its facts were subjective and could be engineered 
according to necessity. "The many schools and interpretations and great events of 
23. "Barnamaj tanfidh'lli-takrzs al-qiyam wa-1-mabadi~ ~alat'lta~manha ~adlth al-rafiq al-qa~id 
al-muna#l ~addam ~usayn (/Jaft.uhu ~allah) maca al-rafoq aladhzna quladahum sharat al-~izb masa~ yawm 
3/5/1989, maktab tan$-'lm aj-juniib, 071-1-7: 66. 
24. Hizb al-Bacth, Revolutionary Iraq, 11-12. 
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history," Hussein said in a 1977 speech, "enable every one to pick out what he likes from 
history to support his own approach. Arab history is no exception. "25 
The emergence of Hussein's personality cult went hand-in-hand with giving him a 
central role in party history. The 1974 conference report does not mention Hussein once 
other than giving his name under his picture at the beginning of the publication. 26 At the 
ninth congress in 1982, by contrast, Hussein's names and titles are mentioned perhaps 
more than any other set of words. The report puts him at the center of every event and 
development in party history. Contrary to all objective evidence, it claims that Hussein 
was the "ringleader" (al-mudabbir) and "mind" behind the revolutionary plan (al-caql al-
mukhattif). Hussein led the first tank that stormed the Republican Palace. On July 30, 
1968, he was "the true leader of the revolution" (huwa qiF'id al-thawra J:taqqan) who 
purged the Bacth's original non-party co-conspirators. By sniffing out subsequent plots, 
Hussein solved the historical problem that bedeviled previous Bacth regimes in Iraq and 
Syria: how to maintain power. Hussein thought up and carried out the plan to nationalize 
Iraq's oil industry. He solved the Kurdish issue, establishing the "autonomous region" 
(mantaqat al-J:tukm al-dhiiti). He gave birth to Iraq's nuclear strategy. He developed the 
armed forces. He established the office of propaganda and media and turned it into a 
superior cultural center. He built the internal structure of the party before and after the 
revolution, and from that time onwards thought up and initiated all of the party's 
25. Hussein, On History, 9. 
26. Hizb al-Bacth, Revolutionary Iraq, 7. 
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domestic and foreign policies.27 Whereas in a previous phase general principles sufficed, 
the report made clear that the ninth congress represented the beginning of a new phase in 
Ba0 thism, one that required more specific policies.28 Hussein provided these policies, 
and the party's way forward was now clear: "Indeed, we say with objectivity and 
sincerity that it has become entirely clear, the true face of the party and its revolutionary 
experience in the country (qufr) to the widest extent, and the experience has begun to 
move forward according to the natural path."29 That natural path always included 
Hussein eventually taking the official reins of the party. Indeed, his becoming the leader 
was a historical necessity, and the report gave him the title of"The Leader- The 
Necessity" (al-qtF'id- al-~arilra).30 The same force of history that the Ba0 th Party 
claimed for its original ideology, therefore, lay at the root of the legitimacy of Hussein's 
leadership complex. 
This same narrative that places Hussein at the center ofBacth Party and Iraqi 
history since 1968 is found in the BRCC documents throughout his presidency.31 The 
records explain Hussein's exceptional traits. He is depicted, at once, to have an uncanny 
ability to predict future events and thus create current policies to stave off potential 
27. Hizb al-Bacth al-e Arabi al-"lshtiraki, al-Taqrir al-Markazi li-1-Mu"tamar al-Qutri al-Tasi' 
(Baghdad: Dar al-Hurriya Ii-I-Taba'a, 1983), 28-40. 
28. Hizb al-Bacth, al-Taqrir al-Markazi, 40. 
29. Hizb al-Bacth, al-Taqrir al-Markazi, 9. 
30. Hizb al-Bacth, al-Taqrir al-Markazi, 28. 
31. See, e.g., a letter from a party cell member to the director of his division, which repeats many 
of these same historical assertions in a "cultural report": "Taqrlr thaqafi," [name withheld] al-khaliyya al-
"uwwla/firqut al-qucqac "ila al-rafiq mas"iil al-firqu al-mubtaram, 026-4-4: 65. 
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problems and thwart enemies. This ability makes him one of the best military leaders 
ever. In 2000, for example, a party member sent Hussein a one sentence appeal for a 
transfer to the party's Office of Students and Youth. Preceding the sentence, he wrote the 
following: 
I present my request to you sir (siyiidatakum ), asking and soliciting your noble fatherly 
kindness in order to take some of your dear time, a limited audience so as to present to 
you, into your noble hands, a modest study entitled, "A Perspective on the Characteristics 
of the Successful Leadership of the Leading Comrade Saddam Hussein," (nar.ra.fi 
kha~ii3i~ al-qiyiida al-niijif:ta li-1-ra.fiq al-qii3 id ~addiim f:tusayn) which won first place. It 
deals with the role of the Comrade Leader Saddam Hussein as one of the most 
distinguished military and historical leaders, not just on the national (qufr) but also the 
Arab and world levels. It also highlights the most distinctive personal traits of the 
Leading Comrade Saddam Hussein as a leader who, by way of his permanent presence 
and bravery, influences all critical situations (al-mawiiqif al-f:tarija). He made correct 
decisions in battles during Saddam's Glorious Qiidisiya and The Eternal Mother of All 
Battles. The Leader Symbol (al-qii3 id al-ramaz) is distinguished by rare courage, 
intelligence, leadership, a unique faculty to predict and account for current and future 
positions with a high degree of accuracy and renowned discernment, an unusual ability 
(qudra khiiriqa) at renewal and creativity in the different aspects of life, in famous 
military thought and, likewise, in ancient and modern history.32 · 
In this passage and others, Hussein is depicted as unusually brave, creative, smart, 
thoughtful, a workaholic possessing limitless energy and consumed by the need to 
advance the nation's progress and his love for the country. He gives superior advice on 
virtually every subject imaginable, from art to science, politics, economics, personal 
hygiene and health, women's affairs, and agriculture.33 No subject, large or small, 
32. A citizen petition to Saddam Hussein, June 17, 2000, 029-1-3, 118. 
33. See, e.g.: "Barniimaj carnal muqtaral;.li-tal;.w"il tawj"ihiit al-sayyid al-ra3 "is al-qii3 id ~addiim 
!;.usayn (l:zafiuhu 3 alliih wa raciihu) khiliil tara3 us siyiidatihi li-l-jalsa al-thiilitha cashr li-majlis al-wuzarii3 
fi 28/3/2000 "ilii suliik camall ta{b"iq"i," 050-5-5: 177-80; 031-2-1: 7-9; "aPJhtimiim bi-ni"{.iijat al-maquriit 
al-/:tizbiya," mudir cam maktab 3 imiinat sirr al-qufr 3 ilii al-makiitib al-tan"{."imiyafi al-qu{r kiifa, Oct. 19, 
1989,022-1-4: 28; "al-Ijad min "{.iihirat al-tadkh"in," ra3 "is azwiin al-ri"iisa 3 i!ii 3 imiinat majlis al-wuzarii3-
maktab ra3 "is aPamiina, Sept. 13,2000, 053-4-1:319-20 
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escapes his knowledge, interest, or opinion. He knows all about everything. He was 
central to what was, what is, and what will be. As another petitioner wrote, 
If men possessing noble and manly qualities are rare in history, then you, sayyidf, are one 
of those few men. But you have something on them (!aka diila calayhim). You exhibit 
these noble qualities with uncommon ease .... 
And whenever any Iraqi man or woman feels as if injustice has fallen upon them, 
they turn to you in any place and hope that you will protect them in the name of justice 
and Arabness and generosity and magnanimity and nobleness. 0' sayyidf, I found within 
myself a strength that cannot be repelled (Ia riiddin !aha) because I compose [my 
petition] and send it up with confidence and surety and true knowledge that is the source 
of my hope that extends powerfully, purely, without any imperfections. How could it be 
otherwise? Life has taught me that those naturally disposed to generosity are the first to 
do famous deeds ... Saddam Hussein, the leader of the people and the shepherd of their 
destiny, the first among the generous, and the symbol flag (al-calam al-ramz) in their 
ships.34 
Just as traditional Bacthist ideology claims for itself an unquestionable interpretation of 
historical truth, in this petition, the author too depicts Hussein as the perfection of 
humanity in history, thus possessing just qualities. Iraqis frequently sent petitions to 
Hussein when they could not find redress for wrongs committed against them through 
regular legal, party, or other channels. The phrase, "you are our refuge" (maladhna) and 
"we turn to you" (nalja:J :Jilayk) appear repeatedly in citizen petitions. In this way, 
although he was ultimately responsible for the corrupt bureaucracy that ill served Iraqis 
without personal connections in government or the party, Hussein stayed above the fray. 
He could consequently take credit for the state and party's accomplishments but also 
deny responsibility for their wrongs, chiding them when necessary and offering an outlet 
for appeal when all other avenues had been blocked. The juxtaposition of Hussein's 
justice against a corrupt state made his star shine even more. 
34. A citizen petition to Saddam Hussein, 022-1-3: 387-8. 
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The titles bestowed upon Hussein magnified his status. They mythologized his 
person and made him, literally, into the symbol of the nation, people, and party. In the 
quotations from above, the writers call him "our hope," the "symbol" of the Ba0 thist 
trinity, and the "shepherd" of Iraq and the Arab's destiny. Although the passage predates 
the event, the petitioner's term for Hussein as the "symbol flag" of Iraqis foretold the 
inscription of"God is Great" in Hussein's handwriting added to the Iraqi flag during the 
Gulf War. 35 By connecting Hussein to the nation, the party made participation in 
Hussein's cult akin to performing patriotic acts. Additionally, if titles were bestowed on 
Hussein, citizens also gave his name to their children in droves. One document from 
September 1, 2002, reported that there had been 14,148 babies named Sad dam born thus 
far that year.36 
Similarly, a convention repeated throughout all types of documents in the BRCC 
was the placing of the words "God save him and keep" (l]af~huhu allah wa raclihu) after 
each mention of Hussein's name or one of his official titles. This expression was 
reserved only for Hussein. The only other names that enjoyed similar treatment were 
those of God, the Prophet Muhammad, and the Shici Imams, each ofwhich is 
traditionally followed by a short blessing. Since Hussein is mentioned so often in the 
BRCC, the phrase becomes ingrained in the mind of a BRCC reader, so that when it does 
not appear, it raises a red flag. Indeed, one instantly wond~rs if any consequences 
35. "Tacdiz qlinun cilm al-cirliq dhz al-raqm 33 li-sanna 1986, RCC Decision #25, Jan. 22, 1991, 
168-4-1:418-19. 
36. "al-Mublidara," mudir maktab ~amanat sirr al-qutr ila anvan al-ri~asa, Sept. 1, 2002, 026-3-
3: 1. 
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accrued to the writer. This highlights the power of words and their repetition to create 
habitual behavior and conceptions. According to :>Abu Islam Ahmad c Abd :>Allah, the 
Bacth did this on purpose: 
Every citizen in Iraq understands that each movement or action that any person carries 
out-and especially the Ba0 thists among them-whatever their level, is a place of 
censorship and surveillance by his colleagues who could be his closest :friends also, 
which imposes an exaggerated caution, which is fear itself, in the behavior of the citizens. 
This makes them always in a state of calculation and review of themselves in every 
behavior or each word that they issue. That, in tum, participates in achieving the process 
of discipline between Iraqis and the sanctification of the president and the regime 
whether they intended this or not.37 
The phrase, "God save him and keep him," :> Abd :>Allah says, is a perfect example of this. 
Bacthists were supposed to repeat it whenever they said Hussein's name too, even 
amongst their immediate family.38 
Hussein's titles along with his picture and sayings are repeated ad nauseum in the 
BRCC and give the impression that the same pervasiveness and ever-presence 
characterized Iraqi society at-large. Certainly, anybody who traveled to Iraq noticed that 
pictures of Hussein hung everywhere. The BRCC contains an entire file about the 
"poster committee" (lajnat al-jadiiriyiit) within the Ministry of Culture and Media that 
was responsible for the placards of Hussein hung around the country. It includes 
information on which posters have just been revealed, asks party branches to repair, 
clean, or replace older versions, and requests that posters be put up on particular party 
37. CAbd ~Allah, 78. 
38. 0Abd ~Allah, 78. 
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and government buildings that do not already have them.39 In addition to posters, 
Hussein appeared in murals, paintings, advertisements, popu1ar movies and television 
shows, books, and in poetry.40 Hussein's sayings too appeared everywhere, including at 
the beginning of the late 1990s, on government and party letterhead.41 A considerable 
amount of cu1tural output, in other words, centered on his person. 42 
In addition to lauding Hussein's virtues, another way the Bacth furthered his 
personality cu1t was by making his person inviolate. Not heeding Hussein's word, or 
attacking him verbally in public, was considered treasonous and punishable by death.43 
There are a number of recorded instances of this in the BRCC, including a case from 
1983 in which a soldier at the war front repeatedly insu1ted Hussein in his unit, mocked 
39. 023-5-4. The boxfile is entitled, Jadiiriyiit al-rafiq al-qa~rd (l:taftuhu allah). 
40. In 2000, the Sac ad bin o Abi Waqas branch of the party, for instance, suggested putting 
"recommendations" from a speech Hussein had given recently onto posters, "Bilsturiit wa~aya al-rafiq al-
qii~id," ~amfn sirr qiyiidatfurc sac ad bin ~abfwaqii~ ~ua maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr, Sept. 19,2000, 183-
4-1: 483-501. 
41. Many ofHussein's sayings were banal or in the tradition of folk wisdom such as, "Don't get 
close to anybody who thinks you look down upon him" (la taqrab ~ilayk man ya'{.unak ta!:ztaqiruhu), on the 
Party Secretariat's letterhead. Some gave true insight into Hussein's ruling mindset and paranoia: "Put 
your enemy in front of your eyes and anticipate him, and don't let him go behind your back," also from the 
Party Secretariat's letterhead. Others offered good advice but appear perverse in the context qfHussein's 
brutality. One, printed on the top of the letterhead of the Justice Ministry, said, "I have judged and I will 
judge with impartiality (cad!). Bias does not enter into what weighs on a judgment and does not allow a 
criminal out of punishment who does not hope to reform himself." 079-5-1: 422; 028-1-7: 41, 47. 
42. For a discussion of the most potent example of this, the "Victory Arch" erected in Baghdad in 
1989, see Kanan Makiya, The Monument: Art and Vulgarity in Saddam Hussein's Iraq (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
43. Ofra Bengio, "Iraq," in Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XI, 1987, ed. !tamar 
Rabinovich and Haim Shaked (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 437. This became official law in 1986. 
Insulting Hussein's deputy, the RCC, the Bacth Party, the National Assembly, or the government in general 
could also carry the death penalty. This further illustrates the equivalence the Bacthist State tried to 
establish between Hussein's person, the state, the party, and the people. 
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the awarding of medals of bravery to a ntnnber of officers, and claimed that some of them 
took bribes from soldiers to put them in the back lines of the battle so they would have a 
better chance of survival. When he was informed of the case, Hussein ordered military 
intelligence to execute the soldier by firing squad. 44 
This kind of precedent made fraqis paranoid when it came to Hussein's 
reputation. A GSD report from 1987 told the story of an investigation into the breaking 
of a picture of Hussein in a factory. A worker there turned in the factory's technical 
director for supposedly throwing a picture of Hussein, which shattered its protective 
glass. The GSD did an investigation into the incident and found no wrongdoing; they 
concluded the picture simply dropped while the director was handing it to another worker 
so that it would not be harmed during renovations. The GSD did not recommend 
punitive action. The fact, however, that merely harming the glass covering Hussein's 
picture-not even the picture itself-prompted somebody to report the incident, and that 
the security services then fully investigated, illustrates the sensitivity the regime had to 
perceived slights to Hussein and the extreme care citizens had to take with regard to the 
Leader President. 45 
The seriousness that surrounded symbols or depictions of Hussein extended to his 
words. Whenever Hussein wrote or spoke the text immediately became required reading 
or listening. Accordingly, when Hussein gave a speech at a grand occasion or in a 
44. Sikritlr al-sayyid rac'fs al-jumhiiriya li-l-shu3 iin al-l;tizbiya 3 ila al-maktab al-caskarz, 23 April, 
1983,035-1-4: 62. The Arabic for the sentence is: "hukm aPicdam ramyan bi-1-ra:Ja:f l;tata al-mawt." 
45. " 3Ijaba," mud'fr al-3 amn a!-cam ila l;tizb al-bacth al-carab'f aPishtirak'f-maktab 3 amanat sirr 
al-qutr, Oct. 21, 1987, 038-5-4: 123. 
televised meeting of the RCC or the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Culture and 
Media subsequently printed tens or hundreds of thousands of copies of the text and 
distributed it down through the party apparatus and to the PMOs.46 As the head of the 
office of the party's southern bureau wrote to the branches under his purview in 1985, 
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The publications of the comrade leader struggler, Saddam Hussein (God save him), have 
a large intellectual role in spreading and deepening the thought of the party and its 
literature. They give reality work to be applied in the political, economic, military, and 
cultural fields. This thought has become a great lesson and a big intellectual program. 
Therefore, the following should be done: 
1. Comrades should acquire every piece of literature and publication that the Comrade 
Leader issues. 
2. The cultural committees should enrich the party libraries with these publications. 
3. The cultural committees must prepare a special program of cultural debates 
(munar.arat) to discuss the literature of the Comrade Leader. This program should 
include members of the section and division leaderships and the party organizations 
descending to the circles of partisans and supporters. 
4. The section and division leaderships should follow all of the comrades and the party 
apparatus to ensure their acquisition of these publications, and the branch leaderships 
should see to it that this occurs.47 
Even before c Aflaq died, therefore, the Bacth made clear that Hussein was the party's 
chief ideologue, and his personality cult, for all intents and purposes, became the post-
c Aflaqian extension ofBacthist ideology.48 As one party petitioner to Hussein wrote, "I 
am one of those who believe before anything that your speech .. .is the principle program 
for the ideas of our leading party and its aspirations to prove its judiciousness, the depth 
of its knowledge, and the integrity of its intentions. They are slogans that we all unite 
46. See, e.g., 025-1-7: 125; "Khitiib al-sayyid al-ra~is al-qii~id (/Jaftuhu ~allah)," wazir al-thaqiifa 
~ilii maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qu{r, March 7, 1994, 031-2-1: 1. 
47. "~I~diiriit al-rafiq al-qii~id," "amin sirr qiyiidat maktab tan'{.im al-juniib ~ilii qiyadiit al-foriic 
al-tiibica li-1-maktab, Aug. 13, 1985, 038-3-7: 286. 
48. Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett make this point in "Iraqi Bacthism," 105. 
94 
under for the sake of Iraq the great, for building it, advancing it, for its victory and its 
passage."49 
Within this atmosphere, it is not surprising that the BRCC contains many acts of 
seemingly unsolicited allegiance. In this category, a common act was the presentation of 
oaths ofloyalty to Hussein, written in their authors' blood (wathzqat cahd bi-l-damm). 
There are tens if not hundreds of references to these in the BRCC, illustrating their use as 
a frequent display ofloyalty. They come from all walks of society: students, tribal 
shaykhs, the women's federation, the artists' union, party branches, etc. 5° One, from the 
"vanguard and youth ofMaysan Province," reads like this: 
Al-Sayyidthe Leader President, knight of the Arab nation (foris al-:Jumma), the 
Honorable Struggler Saddam Hussein, 
With our blood, we write an oath ofloyalty and great love to our leader and the 
knight-of our nation, the comrade struggler Saddam Hussein, in the name of the vanguard 
and youth (!alii:Jic wa-futuwa wa shabiib) ofMaysan, confirming our allegiance (al-
bayca) and march (al-sayr) behind your leadership for the Qiidisiyya of honor and dignity 
until the fmal victory over the enemies of the impostor Khomeini. 
Congratulations to you from the depths of our hearts in the days of victories that 
your soldiers, the soldiers ofthe Qiidisiyya, have achieved in the theater of honor and 
dignity. May God give you victory and success. 51 
Often the people who sent these types of oaths simply wanted to ensure the state's good 
graces. At other times, they seemed not to be sure if they had crossed one of the regime's 
49. From a 1996 party member petition to Hussein, 119-4-8: 308-9. 
50. See, e.g., "Wathiqat cahd bi-l-damm," :Jamin sirr qiyiidat maktab tan?:im al-juniib :Jifii maktab 
:Jamiinat sirr al-qutr, Dec. 4, 1986, 022-1-5: 41; Sikritir al-sayyid ra:Jis al-jumhiiriyya li-1-shu:Jiin al-
l;zizbiyya :Jilii diwiin al-ri:Jiisa, June 29, 1985, 001-5-1: I; "Wathiqat cahd," mudir maktab :Jamiinat sirr al-
qufr :Jilii arwiin al-rrasa, Sept. 25, 1991, 021-2-5: 10. 
51. Sikritir al-sayyid ra:Jis al-jumhiiriyya li-1-shu:Jiin al-l;zizbiyya :Jilii sayyidi al-ra:Jis al-qii:Jid al-
mul;ztaram, AprillO, 1983, 044-5-1: 298. 
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blurry red lines and wanted to clarify their position to the state. Some seemingly genuine 
heartfelt acts occurred too. A woman, for instance, showed up all of a sudden in 2002 at 
the party's al-Zubayr branch headquarters and asked if she could place henna on 
Saddam's picture. When asked why, she told them that her son, who had been sick, 
vowed to do so before his death but never got the chance. After he passed away, she 
decided to carry out his wish. "Please! 0' shield and good fortune of Iraq!" (dakhllak ya 
bakht al- ciraq wa l:ztim'fhi) she reportedly cried while placing it on the picture. 52 
Not all acts of fealty were spontaneous however. "God save him and keep him" is 
only the most egregious example of how the Bacthist regime forced Iraqis to regularly 
and actively praise Hussein in their daily lives, thereby reinforcing the above 
conventions. The Bacthist requesting a transfer from above, for instance, participated in 
an essay competition about Hussein's leadership traits, which required him to brainstorm 
and regurgitate Hussein's qualities in a persuasive fashion. Similarly, an elementary 
school exam in Arabic language asked students to write about one of the follo:wing two 
subjects: 
1. "We learn, we fight, we achieve (nubdic) for the sake of the country (al-wa{an) and our 
inspiration (mulhimna), the leader Saddam Hussein (God save him and keep him). 
Express yourself about this subject and clarify in your answer the importance of 
knowledge (cilm) in our daily lives, and in protecting the country and defending our Arab 
nation." 
2. "Describe your town or village." 
In the grammar section of the same test, students had to fill in the word "the leader," 
\ 
voweled correctly, in the sentence, "The recommendations of the leader are lessons for 
r." 
52. "[Name withheld]," mudfr maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~ua alWiin al-ri~asa, 13 Aug., 2002, 
028-1-7: 131. 
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life."53 And, a "cultural" test for members of divisionalleaderships required participants 
to answer three of these questions within three hours: 
1. "Discuss the role of the comrade Leader Saddam Hussein (God save him) in facing the 
instance of the thirtieth military aggression (al-cudwiin al-caskar'f al-thaliith'fnl) in 
fighting the eternal Mother of All Battles." 
2. "Discuss the goals of the message of the comrade Leader Saddam Hussein (God save 
him) to the members ofthe council of ministers on the date (of2/12/1995), strengthening 
your answer by mentioning its basic results." 
3. "Relate the fundamental aspects for the achievement of Arab solidarity as appeared in the 
words of the comrade Leader Saddam Hussein (God save him)." 
4. "Clarify, in brief, the strategic elements to strengthen the Arab nation (li-"iqtidiir al-
watan az-carabl)."54 
These types of competitions and tests did not exist just to stroke Hussein's ego and create 
mental patterns in Iraqis' minds that reinforced Hussein's authority. They also gave them 
practical skills, for they would need to include the information they wrote on the exams 
as part of their praise for Hussein if they ever submitted a petition to him or wrote a party 
report. 
Culturalization: Husseini Bacthism Applied 
Hussein's words were not simply recorded and filed away in the libraries of 
Ba0 thist branches. As the quotations from above indicated, he emphasized that the 
principles and directives he voiced had to be "applied" (tatb'fq), "executed" (tanfidh), and 
put into practice (mumlirasa). By stressing the application of ideological principle, 
Hussein simultaneously kept c Aflaq's tradition alive and forged a new one related to his 
53. 018-5-2: 32. In Arabic, the vowels for words are generally not written in normal texts and 
must be read based upon knowledge of grammar and the pronunciation of Modem Standard Arabic. 
54. 040-4-7: 149. 
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leadership complex, maintaining the continuity between the past and present that was a 
key element in his theoretical claim to be the "necessary" outcome of history and thus a 
legitimate leader for Iraq and, eventually, the Arab nation. The emphasis on practice was 
not just insn;umental. It was a basic tenet ofHusseini Ba0 thism. Like Mao Zedong, who 
thought that "right thinking was integral to right conduct," Hussein believed in line with 
the title of a speech he gave shortly after becoming president that "By Thought and 
Practice and the Living Example, Faith is Achieved."55 It was by making the Ba0 thist 
idiom the vocabulary of public discourse, by constantly bombarding the populace with 
Ba0 thist slogans and forcing them to repeat them back, and by making life into a series of 
rites that bridged the gap between their lived reality and the party's promises, that 
Hussein sought to make Iraqis believe that Ba0 thist ideology supplied the rules they could 
follow to live normal, dignified lives, and to orient themselves in and navigate the 
Ba 0 thist system. 
For this reason, totalitarian ideologies such as Husseini Ba0 thism are often called 
"political religions" even though they do not pretend to derive their authority from the 
divine. 56 Political religions seek to instill their own principles in the cultures they rule 
55. Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform, 2nd ed. (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 62; the quotation from Hussein is from a speech he gave at the Bacth 
Party's Baghdad branch on July 28, 1979. The title of Hussein's speech in Arabic is, "Bi-1-fikr wa-1-
mumlirasa wa-1-namudhaj al-l;lay yatal;laqqaq al-~rmlin." 087-1-1: 87-114; for an extended passage that 
lays out the entire logic behind putting Hussein's words into practice see: "Barnlimaj tanfidh'f li-takr'fs al-
qiyam wa-l-mabadr ~ allat'f tac}.manuhli l;ladith al-rafiq al-qli'id al-munlic}.il ~addlim l;lusayn (l:zaft.uhu , allah) 
maca al-rafoq aladhlna quladahum shlirat al-l;lizb masli' yawm 3/5/1989," maktab tan'{.'fm al-junilb, 071-1-: 
66. 
56. The term "political religion" was coined by Eric Voegelin in Political Religions, but Emilio 
Gentile is perhaps its most recent authoritative elucidator (see "The Sacrilisation ofPolitics"). 
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within, to make them into "political cultures," not in the sense of the culture of a political 
system, but rather in making the essence of society's entire culture, political. Since 
culture is a prime determinant of behavior because it helps shape man's environment, 
controlling culture allows a totalitarian regime to control behavior and thereby elicit 
consent for its rule Without the resort to violence. As the anthropologist Clyde 
Kluckhohn said, "Culture regulates our lives at every turn. From the moment we are 
born until we die there is, whether we are conscious of it or not, constant pressure upon 
us to follow certain types ofbehavior that other men have created for us .... Mothers of 
small children know how unnaturally most of this comes to us-how little regard we 
have, until we are 'culturalized,' (emphasis added) .... "57 
The Bacth Party had its own word for "culturalization"-tathqif--and explicitly 
employed "a strategic campaign to frame (ta:J{ir) society and Bacthize (tabcith) it by 
instilling the values of the party and its principles in the masses of the people .... "58 To 
do this, Hussein employed religious and propagandistic techniques such as ritual, 
ceremony, the repetition of pictures and slogans, and the creation of an ever-present 
"panorama" of images and idiom throughout society. 59 Through Hussein and Bacth Party 
leaders' passionate and constant assertions, and as a result of the prevention of alternative 
57. Clyde Kluckhohn, Mirror for Man: The Relation of Anthropology to Modern Life (Tucson, 
AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1985), 26. 
58. "al-Taqrfr al-thaqiifi," mas'iil al-lajna al-thaqiifiyya al-markaziyya 'ilii qiyiidat maktab tanf."im 
baghdad, Aug. 6, 1984, 041-1-5: 256. 
59. Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 51-2. Havel explains how the placards and pictures of 
the leader with their ideological slogans create a "panorama" that constantly reminds those trapped within it 
of their situation. 
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ideas from filtering through from the outside, they sought to forge a Husseini Bacthist 
weltanschuung in Iraq on the individual and societal levels. If, as Hannah Arendt said, 
the basic definition of ideology is "the logic of an idea" that posits a vision for how 
society ought to operate, and if culture, in Clifford Geertz' s words, is "the informal logic 
of actual life," then Husseini Bacthism's mission was to transform the actual logic of 
culture into the ideal logic ofideology.60 The ultimate goal ofHusseini Bacthist political 
religion was to cement its hegemony by harnessing the tendencies to think, feel, believe, 
and act in particular manners that any social environment imparts to the individuals 
immersed in it-to create a Bacthist culture in Iraq. By forcing the Bacth Party and 
regular Iraqis to execute his theories and pontifications, Hussein reinforced the power 
dynamic between them. The repetitive character of their prescribed actions created 
behavioral norms, which backed up and then fused with Hussein's words to create their 
reality. The more Iraqis accepted this reality and Hussein's justifications for it, the more 
manageable their lives became in difficult circumstances, and the more easily the Bacthist 
State could control them. 
To carry out this strategy, Hussein and the Bacth created a massive indoctrination 
and propaganda-or "culturalization"-machine designed to both repeatedly reinforce its 
ideological message and the reality of life imposed by its coercive mechanisms, and to 
keep alternative worldviews from reaching Iraqi minds. The concept of "culture" 
60. Arendt, 469; Clifford Geertz, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture," 
The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays by Clifford Geertz (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973), 
17. 
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(thaqiifa) occupies a central place within party documents in the BRCC, and, as 
mentioned above, it was part of Hussein's Ba0 thification strategy to instill Bacthist values 
into Iraqi culture. The Bacth Party led this effort at indoctrinating the populace. 
Beginning at least in 1982, if not before, each Ba0 th Party branch had a "cultural 
committee" (lajna thaqi'ijiy{1) tasked with educating party members about Ba0 thist 
ideology and spreading the party's message to the masses.61 One such committee from 
the party's Baghdad branch explained the reasoning behind the Ba0 th's emphasis on 
culture in a 1984 report: 
' 
Culture in our party occupies an exceptional importance because it is one of the basic 
means to prepare the struggler Bacthist intellectually and in terms of struggle (ni4aliyyan) 
starting from the unity of the Bacth's concept of thought and practice (min wal:zdat al-fikr 
wa-1-mumarasa canda al-bacth). This unity is embodied in knowledge about and 
awareness of the thought of the party so as to arrive at absolute faith (aPfmiin al-muf[aq) 
in it. Faith is reflected in the living practice of the Bacthist struggler and in how he 
embodies these principles in the reality of the nation ("umma) by way of his change in a 
revolutionary direction. 
The party has expressed this importance in various forms and practices. All of 
them, however, express the party's special understanding for the culture of the revolution. 
That is, the party does not look at culture as mere knowledge or a defmed academic 
acquisition but looks at it as living practice that expresses the embodiment of the 
principles [of the party] in reality and in what confirms the fact that the Bacth is a 
pioneering revolutionary vanguard that leads the masses toward a new tomorrow and 
resurrects the nation's civilized qualities.62 
According to the above passage, three steps would lead to a culture ofHusseini Bacthism. 
61. After 1991, the Bacth eliminated these committees and designated the party's Office of Culture 
and Media as the primary source of cultural programming which then tasked party organizations to 
implement its directives. A ministry of the same name also existed. The two were technically separate 
offices, one for the state, the other for the party, but they carried out the same activities and served the same. 
functions. For the abolishment of the branch cultural committees and empowerment of the central office 
see: '"ilghii' al-lajiin al-thaqiifrya," mudir maktab 'amiinat sirr al-qutr 'ilii qiyiidiit al-furiic al-]Jizbtyya 
kiifa, Sept. 24, 1991, 162-1-4: 170. 
62. "al-Taqr'fr al-thaqiifi," mas'iil al-lajna al-thaqiifiyya al-markaztyya 'ilii qiyiidat maktab tan?,'fm 
baghdad, Aug. 6, 1984, 041-1-5: 255-6. 
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First, the Bacth had to indoctrinate its members. The above report offers ten 
"means of culturalization" (waslf'il al-tathqif) to do this and describes to the bureau 
leadership "the most notable" cultural activities the Baghdad party organizations had 
carried out in recent times. Suggesting the high importance the Bacth attached to 
"culture," the report claims that cultural subjects always occupied the first place on party 
meeting agendas, and every party organization convened its own cultural seminar 
(nadwa) at the end of each reporting period. 63 In order to "create a spirit of competition 
between members" and encourage "their absorption of cultural subjects" the committee 
put on a series of "cultural competitions" that pitted different party organizations at the 
same level in the Bacthist structural hierarchy against one another. A series of continuing 
education classes took place in order to strengthen and develop members' cultural 
' 
knowledge, to use the marks received for promotions and demotions, and to determine 
which partisans nominated for full membership would succeed. These classes were given 
in one of the bureau's newly opened "party preparatory schools" (madliris al-:Jicdtid al-
~izbl) where students could take classes over two semesters every year, each of which 
contained ninety lectures. To enable research into Bacthist culture and promote "self-
culturalization" (al-tathqif al-dhtitl), the committee claims to have refreshed the libraries 
at party organization headquarters with books on party thought and Iraqi and Arab 
history. This was partly in order to satisfy Hussein's directive for culture committee 
members throughout the party to present research papers and create committees to 
63. As Chapter Five will show, each party organization throughout the party apparatus had to send 
in regular reports about a variety of subjects at regular intervals. 
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produce scholarly work on Ba0 thist history and ideology. The Saddam branch of the 
bureau, moreover, ordered that all party organizations lecture their partisans and 
supporters about cultural programs; take them on field-trips to Ba0 thist museums, 
exhibits, panoramas, and the monuments of the martyr and unknown soldier; and engage 
them in producing their own posters, festivals, and exhibits. The purpose of all of these 
activities was to reinforce and deepen the cultural knowledge ofthe Ba0 thist cadres.64 
Indeed, the creation of a competent "vanguard" (Jallca) or leadership "cadre" (klidir) that 
had the knowledge and individual abilities to spread propaganda amidst and recruit from 
the populace was a prerequisite for the party's strategic culturalization plan to succeed. 65 
Second, a Ba0 thist could not simply pay lip service to party ideology. Rather, he 
had to prove his faith and serve as an example to other Ba0 thists and society by acting on 
his beliefs, by carrying Ba0thist principles into his everyday life. "The Ba0 thist and his 
family are examples in their behavior and discipline," one party slogan went. 66 One of 
the criteria that a 1989 evaluation form asked for in assessing a party member was his 
"cultural level and the extent to which he has absorbed the thought of the party" (al-
mustawii al-thaqiifiwa-madii istfciibihi li-fikr al-l:zizb).67 "Confirmation of the struggling, 
64. 041-1-5: 255-8. 
65. 041-1-5: 255-8. 
66. "Qarar," sikritfr al-lajna al-tan'{.fmiyya 'ila al-makatib al-tan'{.fmiyyafi al-qutr kafa, Dec. 31, 
1985, 046-5-4: 183-5. 
67. Mudlr cam maktab 'amanat sirr al-qutr ila al-rafiq mas'iil al-lajna al-tan'{.fmiyya, May 21, 
1989, 021-1-4: 368. 
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leading role of a true Bacthist," an internal party pamphlet published by one branch 
explained, 
is evident in his view towards all of life as an arena in which he expresses his belonging 
and his thought ... .indeed, the expression of the integrity of his Ba0thness (bacthiyatihi) 
and his commitment to struggle (ni~iilihi) lies in how he carries the party as a distinctive 
state of being (ka-IJ,ala mutamayyaza) into life. The party, for him, should not just be 
attendance at meetings after which he is transformed into another person with no 
connection to the party whose thoughts and behavior do not give expression to it.68 
Bacthism, in other words, was not meant to be a mere political program but a way oflife, 
something that inspired a Bacthist's political, economic, and social views, his artistic and 
cultural output, and the way he acted in public and private. 
The third step required transferring (naql) Husseini Ba0 thist culture from the party 
to the populace. One of the goals of an internal party study about "the mobilization of the 
masses," for instance, was 
to take an interest in implanting national (qawmiyya) and socialist concepts for the sake 
of enriching and developing the [Ba0 thist] march (mas'fra), and"to focus on the cultural 
aspect of mass mobilization activities so that the masses will absorb C'ist'fciib) the Ba0 thist 
creed completely. As a result, they will arrive at a unity of comprehension and opinion 
(mawqij) [ofBa0 thist ideology] and the kind of practical expressions that derive from 
them via the daily stances through which a citizen, in his ordering the details of daily life, 
deals with all of its sources, including that which contributes to raising the spirit of 
mobilization amongst the masses. 
Many of the initiatives that were employed by the party and mass organizations 
were with the aim to increase the effectiveness of popular mobilization and to raise it to 
the level of thwarting the extent of the [Iranian] aggression and its evil ambitions.69 
By instituting its culture, the Bacth would change its citizens' mindsets so that Iraqis 
would view their everyday activities through a Bacthist lens and act accordingly, inspired 
68. From a pamphlet entitled, "What we do and how we work" (miidhii nacamal wa-kayfa 
nacamal) put out by the al-l}amza sayyid al-shuhadii3 party branch expressing Hussein's words at a 
meeting ofthe RCC on Sept. 23, 1995,025-1-7:46. 
69. 038-2-4: 159. 
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from within to take initiative in support of the regime. What is more, once the Bacth 
made Iraqis into believers, their faith would shield them from the potentially deleterious 
effects of alternative narratives pedaled by the Bacth's enemies and bogeymen, which, 
when considered by the un-indoctrinated mind, could poke holes in the logic of the 
Ba0 thist message. In contrast, citizens who internalized the party's goals "assess other 
intellectual currents and political positions in relatiqn to the principles of the party, its 
positions, and its decisions. Indeed, deviation from [the party's principles] is national 
treason."70 That is, they consider Ba0 thist ideological tenets-partly through their 
equation with Iraqi patriotism-to be authoritative moral precepts through which they 
judge all others. Another purpose of culturalization, therefore, was as an ideological 
shield with which Iraqis would automatically reject opposition entreaties and ideas on 
principle. 
How did Hussein and the Ba0 th Party culturalize, or indoctrinate, the population? 
Writers with experience living in totalitarian regimes have remarked on the constant 
repetitiveness and zealousness with which propagandists deliver their messages and how 
this effects even foreigners living in their midst. Stephen H. Roberts, an Australian 
scholar who spent three years living in and studying National Socialist Ger:niany before 
World War II found that "It is very hard, even for a foreigner, to resist [Nazi 
propaganda's] messages, so convincingly are they delivered, because fervid partisanship 
permits an emotional intensity out of the question in a system where objective 
70. "Mashrii.c khitat camalli-tansiq bayna al-muna:aamlit al-~izbiyya wa-l-jamlihiriyyaft majiil 
tabcith al-mujtamac," 025-5-5: 476-97. 
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impartiality is sought."71 ''Not only the members of the party and the more or less 
indifferent masses," write Friedrich and Brzezinski, "but even the more or less 
determined enemies of the regime, fall prey to its insistent clamor, to the endless 
repetition ofthe same phrases and the same allegations. A general pattern of thought, 
almost a style of thinking, proves increasingly irresistible as the regime continues in 
power."72 To engender a "style of thinking" commensurate with the Bacthist worldview 
was exactly the goal ofHusseini Bacthist propaganda. Indeed, the party's propaganda 
organs delivered their ideological messages with the same "emotional intensity," 
"insistent clamor," and "endless repetition" of carefully cultivated phrases and images 
that the Nazis and Soviets did. 
In the same year that the Baghdad bureau report from above detailed the activities 
it used to indoctrinate party members, its Euphrates counterpart issued a study focused on 
propaganda entitle4, "Ways to Culturalize the Masses (Mass Mobilization)" c:'asalzb al-
tathqif al-jamlihfrz "al-tacbi:J a al-jamlihfriyya). As the title indicates, Hussein believed 
the manipulation of culture was a way to elicit popular support, and he tasked the Bacth 
Party with overseeing his regime's overall propaganda effort.' In the study, the Euphrates 
bureau describes itself partly as an "educational, cultural, and media organization," which 
aspired to advance the integration of the party and the masses through "the process of 
mobilization, indoctrination (tawcijlya), and culturalization." As a result, it focused on 
71. Stephen H. Roberts, The House That Hitler Built (New York: Gordon Press, 1975), 254. 
72. Friedrich and Brzezinski, 115. 
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ways to grab the populace's attention and emphasize basic messages in an attempt to both 
draw Iraqis into the Bacthist fold and to communicate its desires to them. The best way 
to do this, the study argued, was via media and cultural productions aimed especially at 
youth and carried out in conjunction with the PMOs. 73 Media included television, radio, 
newspapers, and videos of ideologically inspired content, especially programs featuring 
Hussein. Beyond media, the Euphrates bureau study defined "mass indoctrination and 
culturalization" to also comprise "pictures, paintings, songs, odes, caricatures, 
exhibitions, sport competitions, folklore, leaflets, posters, publications, and anything that 
leads to mass mobilization which can possibly be exploited and benefited from .... " To 
furnish the content for and skill to produce all of these items in quantities that allowed the 
party to blanket the country with them, the Bacth patronized journalists, documentary and 
movie producers, artists, writers, and poets who had to join official unions in order to 
practice their craft and which corresponded to their specialties. 74 
The language and images ofHusseini Bacthist propaganda, therefore, acted 
largely as a means of public discourse within the state, society, and between the two 
through which Hussein and the Bacth communicated with the populace, and the populace 
responded. This conversation occurred in both directions. Occasionally, society pushed 
back and the government was forced to listen, but the fact that the conversation took 
place within the Bacth's imposed idiom indicated the overwhelming power that Hussein 
73. "Diriisa raqm ((1)): "asiilfb al-tathqif al-jamiihfrf ((al-tacbi" a al-jamiihfriyya)}," qiyiidat 
maktab tanf.fm al-furiit (al-lajna al-thaqajwa}, 021-1-5: 645-9. 
74. 021-1-5: 645-9. 
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and the party held in their relationship. By forcing his citizens to use Bacthist language, 
and to repeat Bacthist slogans back to him, Hussein simultaneously compelled Iraqis to 
recognize his authority and clarified the structure of power relations in society. Indeed, 
one of the reasons Hussein took such great pains to create this kind of atmosphere was to 
constantly reaffirm his autli.ority and assert his legitimacy. The fact that Hussein did this 
so frequently shows, perhaps, that his legitimacy did not run deep. The speed with which 
Iraqis generally rushed to confirm their allegiances, however, demonstrates how 
effectively the other mechanisms of control Hussein employed buttressed his ideological 
language. 
Words act as symbols for ideas or things. In context, they also elicit particular 
emotions and attitudes, are connected to behavioral tendencies, and carry moral 
connotations. They thus help to shape culture and individual and collective psychology.75 
In Hussein's Iraq, the Bacthist idiom worked hand-in-hand with the coercive mechanisms 
the regime used to control state and society. If the latter placed material boundaries 
around the populace, the former consisted of a series of "code words" that defmed 
appropriate thought and conduct, laid out rewards for obedience, and warned of 
punishments for defiance. 76 By examining the words the regime used to describe 
something or someone, Iraqis new immediately whether it was "good" or "bad" and what 
the official line was. One of the purposes of the ideological language that characterizes 
75. C.K. Ogden and LA. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (London: Routledge, 2001), 30. 
76. Bengio, Saddam 's Word, 9; Ogden and Richards, 30, 59. 
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the BRCC, therefore, was to tell Iraqis the rules they had to follow if they wanted to 
survive and, perhaps, prosper in the Bacthist State. 
An entire book could be written on the various uses of language in the BRCC and 
the vocabulary employed from 1979 to 2003.77 On1y a few examples of the way the 
Bacth employed its code words will be examined here. One of the ways Hussein and the 
Bacth indicated a subject was a success and was to be venerated, with punishments 
coming to those who defamed it, was by placing a particular superla~ive or adjective after 
the name of the event or person. Three of the Bacth's favorite positive adjectives were 
"glorious" (mafid), "great" (ca:t.'fm), and, from one of its main slogans, "eternal" (khalid). 
Thus, the 1968 revolution was frequently referred to as "the glorious revolution," and the 
Iran-Iraq War was "Saddam's Glorious Qadisiyya" ("qadisiyyat ~addam al-maj'fda"). 
The Gulf War was called ":Jumm al-maclirik al-khalida," "The Eternal Mother of All 
Battles." One of the event's official slogans when Hussein opened the "Saddam River" 
in 1992, a huge drainage canal that he claimed was the third great river of Iraq, next to 
the Tigris and Euphrates, claimed that "With Iraq's creative minds we produced the 
eternal River Saddam."78 These phrases were repeated so often that the adjectives 
became part of the names, ingrained in the population's psyche. In doing so, they 
became doublespeak, masking the actual character of events. In the case of the Iran-Iraq 
77. Hopefully somebody will someday update Bengio's Saddam 's Word based on the archive, if 
she does not do so herself. A thorough analysis would likely find that in scouring newspapers and official 
publications, Bengio got the gist of Hussein's regime largely right, but it would inevitably add words 
prevalent in the BRCC that did not necessarily carry the same weight in the Ba0th's public sources and 
change opinions about others. 
78. A list of"Central Slogans for the Celebration of the River Saddam," 028-3-4: 2. 
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War, every Iraqi had a friend or relative at the front and knew at least one of Iraq's 
approximately 125,000 dead or 255,000 wounded. 79 For eight years, hospitals were full 
and southern residents lived in a war zone. Millions of people served on the front lines or 
in support positions. Iraqis knew the true character of the war. Yet, they were constantly 
told, and had to parrot back, the line that it was "glorious." With few to no other sources 
of information available to them to contradict this claim, and given the parameters of 
permissible discourse, it was difficult to rebut the regime's lies. The victims of a system 
that held both themselves and their families responsible for participation, Iraqis had little 
choice but to take part. Within this atmosphere, it was physically and psychologically 
healthier to accept the regime's line. 80 
A comparison between the words "experience" (tajriba) and "phenomenon" 
(r.cthira) illustrates the difference between positive and negative words, respectively, and 
how the regime used them to instantly inform the public how it viewed a particular 
subject. Within a list of"general slogans" prepared for the Prophet's 2002 birthday 
celebration, the Bacth referred to Muhammad's revelation as "the greatest experience of 
belief that our glorious nation has lived" C'acr.am tajriba :Jrmctniyya cashatha :Jummatna 
al-majfda).81 In a party report detailing the positive aspects of a plebiscite supporting 
79. Marr, 207. 
80. Milosz discusses the process by which intellectuals living behind the Iron Curtain eventually 
succumbed to their environments and begin to parrot the ideological viewpoint of the regimes under which 
they lived in The Captive Mind. 
81. "~iljtifol bi-cayd mawlid al-nabawi al-sharif," ra~is alWiin al-ri~asa ~ua ~amanat majlis al-
wuzara~, ~ilakh, April27, 2002, 063-2-4: 52. 
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Hussein in 1995, the Party Secretariat referenced the event as "the experience of the Day 
of the Big March" (tajribat yawm al-zal:if al-kablr). 82 The 1968 revolution is similarly 
caJl~d "the experience of the great July 17-30 revolution" (tajribat thawrat 17-30 tamilz 
al-ca:r,fma). The word "khibra," which also means "experience," was used in this same 
fashion. One of the way~ the Bacth claimed legitimacy for itself was by highlighting its 
Hliving expertise and experience that the leadership of the party and the revolution 
possesses, and its close interaction with reality."83 By claiming that it governed in line 
with reality, the Bacth sought to draw Iraqis' perceptions of it closer to its own theories. 
In contrast, the word "phenomenon" connoted something abnormal, a perversion 
of reality, and the Bacth frequently referred to the same subjects labeled as "phenomena" 
as "unnatural" (ghayr tabrcl).84 Hence, instead of the word "experience" attached to the 
state sanctioned celebration of the Prophet's birthday, the Bacth referred to popular Shici 
ri~~s and W ahhabism alike as elements of a general "religious phenomenon" ( al-:r,iihira 
al-diniyya) which it distinguished from true "belief' ('fmiin) or Islam.85 This distinction 
82. "Yawm al-zal;f al-kab'ir," mudfr ciim maktab 'amiinat sirr al-qu{r 'ilii ri'iisat al-jumhuriyya, 
Dec. 7, 1995, 072-5-4: 324- 5. The Ba0th used "march" here in the military sense, "to advance" or "be on 
the march." The plebiscite was called The Day of the Big March (yawm al-zal;f al-kabfr). 
83. "al-'anshita al-mutamayyaza khiliil ciim/1983," qiyiidatforc al-ta'am'im 'ilii maktab tan?:'im al-
shumiil, Feb. 26, 1984, 065-4-3: 434. 
84. See, e.g., with regard to the Ba0th's view of the Kurdish region in "Tawaqqiiciit al-maktab 
lamii sayanjam can camaliyat 'intikhiibiit al-majlis al-watan'i fi man{aqat al-J;ukm al-dhiitf," maktab tan?:'im 
al-shumiil, 031-3-5: 12; and, in relation to Shi0i rituals, "Macaliimiit," mudfr ciim maktab 'imiinat sirr al-
qu{r 'ilii al-rafiq mas'iil tan?:fmiit baghdiid-al-karkh wa-1-rafiq mas'iil tan?:'imiit baghdiid-al-ra~iifa, Dec. 
5, 1996, 046-5-4: 82. 
85. Examples ofShici rituals performed on the anniversaries of the deaths of their martyrs referred 
t9 as ~~r:P.enomenon," especially oflmam Hussein on Muharram, are "the phenomenon of the processions" 
\ 
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went back to c Aflaq, who claimed a difference "between the truth of religion and the 
appearance of religion," and that Islam was a "revolutionary movement." In this way, 
c Aflaq rhetorically removed from a religious context and placed it within the Bacthist 
idiom. The revolutionaries of the Bacth could thus best understand Islam and carry it 
forward.86 In this way, c Aflaq tried to cover up the Bacth's blasphemous subordination 
of Islam to the higher principle of Arab nationalism while rebutting the charge that the 
party was secular and thus illegitimate in a deeply religious society. It too claimed for 
itselflslam's emotional and cultural power to mobilize the Arab people while 
simultaneously drawing it under the Bacthist banner and thereby neutering it as a possible 
alternative to the party's message. This is a perfect example of how the process by which 
the original ideas of c Aflaq were reinterpreted and appropriated by Hussein who then 
applied them in a convenient and pragmatic fashion. In addition, "phenomenon" was 
used in relation to desertion from the army (:r,ahirat al-hurub ), absence and tardiness at 
party meetings (:r,iihirat al-ghiyiib wa-l-takhallufcan J:m~ur al-:Jijtimliclit al-f:lizbiyya), and 
joining the party just to accrue its benefits (:r,ahirat al-:Jintimli:J al-ma#alfi li-l-f:tizb). 
Likewise, the terrible economic conditions that Iraq suffered in the 1990s brought on "the 
(?:tihirat al-mashl), "the phenomenon ofthe banquets" (?:tihirat ~iqamat al-wala~im), and "the phenomenon 
of banner burning" (?:tihirat ~il}raq al-~itarat). 
86. Michel c Aflaq, "Nazaratna ~ua al-din," Fi Sabil al-Bacth- al-Juz~ aPAwwal, 
http://albaath.online.frN olume%20I-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baal-Vol%20 1-Ch28.htm [accessed 
on Aug. 2, 2011]. The ninth regional congress too appropriated Islam by calling it "a great revolution" 
(thawra cu?:mti). Hizb al-Bacth, al-Taqrir al-Markazi, 264-5. 
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phenomenon of beggary" (:r,iihirat al-tasawwul).87 Merely labeling an event or activity as 
an "experience" or a "phenomenon," therefore, immediately told the public how they 
should orient their mindset and actions toward it. 
If the regime used ideological language and its series of code words to 
communicate with the populace, Iraqis too, both inside and outside of the state and party 
bureaucracies, conversed with the regime. The conversation did not take place on equal 
terms. The state and party held the preponderance of power and, for the most part, it 
considered objections to its policies tantamount to treason Ultimately, however, it 
needed a certain number of citizens to do its bidding, and it had to consistently apply its 
rules with regard to rewarding and punishing them when they supported and opposed it, 
respectively. However small, Iraqis did, therefore, have a degree ofleverage against the 
Ba0 thist State. By couching their objections in Ba0 thist language and employing the 
regime's code words so that their loyalties were clear, they could push back against, or 
offer suggestions about, Hussein and the state's initiatives. While members of the 
populace rarely succeeded in significantly altering or thwarting policies decreed from on 
high, their conversations with the Ba0 thist State often did take the form of a negotiation 
instead of a dictation. 88 
87. "Mumiirasat al-mas~Uliyyafi al-mawqic aPadnii," ]Jizb al-bacth al-carab'i aPishtiriik'i-
qiyiidat maktab tan:r.'im al-shumiil, 029-2-3: 88, 92, 93; "'(:iihirat al-tasawwul," ra~'is ~amiinat majlis al-
wuzara~ ~ua wiziirat al-camal wa-l-shu~iin aPijtimiiciya-maktab al-waz'ir, May 24, 1999, 021-2-7: 233-6. 
88. Sheila Fitzpatrick, "New Perspectives on Stalinism," Russian Review 45 (Oct. 1986): 367-72. 
In a survey of Soviet scholarship, Fitzpatrick came to this same conclusion. 
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The case of a shaykh who wrote to Hussein in order to be named the official chief 
ofhis tribal clan ifakhdh) demonstrates the subtlety and ambiguity with which these 
negotiations took place. In the introduction to his letter, the shaykh left no doubt about 
his allegiances. He addressed the letter to "al-sayyid the Leader President, strength of 
Iraq the great and the leader of the glorious victory, the honorable Saddam Hussein (God 
keep you)." The shaykh consequently placed the subject matter of his request firmly 
within the parameters of the Bacth's official line about the "gloriousness" and "eternity" 
of its wars and the tacit deification of Hussein in his personality cult. The shaykh then 
included an original, laudatory poem about Hussein before getting down to business: 
... Despite my knowledge of how consumed you are by affairs of state and party, I 
apologize for taking a moment of your precious time, which is the property of noble 
Iraqis, and to engage you with a request from your loyal son who is of a family where the 
names of the great Bacth and the great Saddam Hussein bring happiness. My father 
requests that I be confirmed as the head of the albu-[name withheld] clan within the 
[name withheld] tribe in the district of Samarra0 • By God, sayyidf, I don't want to hide 
from your honorable self(maqiimukum al-karim) that I am one of your loyal sons, 
faithful to our party and leader and glorious revolution, and one of the influential men of 
clan albu-[name withheld]. I would provide good opinions (J:zusn r.ann) of our leader, our 
inspiration, and our refuge, the great Saddam Hussein, keeping in mind, sayyidf, that the 
clan of albu-[ name withheld] has a large membership, all of whom are loyal to our 
leading party. They always attend the national occasions (al-muniisabiit al-wafaniya wa-
1-qawmiya), and we would be, at the signal of the leader symbol, the great Saddam 
Hussein, sharp swords in your right hand to drive away the enemy apostates (a/- 3 acdii3 
al-miiriqin ). We ask God the exalted to save you and give you a long life and to grant 
you mighty victories.89 
In this request, the shaykh tells Hussein that, if confirmed as the head of his clan, he will 
work within it on Hussein and the party's behalf. Yet, his appeal is conditional and 
contains a veiled threat. If he is not chosen, he might work against Hussein and the Bacth 
89. A petition from a tribal shaykh to Hussein, June 14, 2000, 049-5-7: 168-9. 
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Party amongst his tribesmen~ which, as a result of their numbers and willingness to fight, 
could constitute a force Hussein would have to reckon with. If Hussein directed all the 
means at his disposal against the clan and its tribe he could probably subdue them, but 
would he want to spend the resources and forgo the clan's automatic support just to 
choose somebody else? Regardless of the answer, the shaykh asked Hussein to 
contemplate this equation. This kind of give-and-take whereby Iraqis pledged their 
loyalty in return for official backing constituted a basic agreement between the ruling 
clique and the rest of society. 
Religion, Ritual, and the Sacralization of Politics 
The Bacth Party under Hussein never claimed to be a religion, but it is impossible 
to read the BRCC and not see the parallels between Husseini Bacthism and religion's 
social and political functions, religion's traditions and concepts, and the techniques it 
employs to wrap its activities and beliefs in a sacred aura, thereby connecting its message 
to God's unquestionable authority and legitimizing the moral universe so critical to the 
Bacth's system of control. Emilio Gentile has called this process the "sacralization of 
politics." It is a key step on the path of totalitarian regimes to turn their ideologies into 
complete philosophical systems, or "political religions."90 As Chapter Four shows, this 
effort to establish Husseini Bacthism as a substitute for traditional religious functions and 
belief worked in concert with the Bacthification of Iraq's religious establishments. 
Hussein and the Bacth Party worked from multiple directions~ therefore, to 
90. Gentile, "The Sacralisation of Politics." 
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simultaneously weaken traditional religion-which in Iraq meant, primarily, Islam-and 
to replace it with their own, thereby neutralizing its threat to their totalitarian strategy and 
providing another belief system in its place. 
Perhaps the epitome of how the Bacth simultaneously downgraded religion and 
Islam but sought to retain its legitimizing functions for Arabism was the party's 
insistence on and promotion of "faith" or "belief' Czmcm) in its ideals. Words have 
"multivocalities"; they contain ambiguities and thus can mean different things to different 
people. 91 To a devout Muslim or Christian, "faith" could mean his belief in God. To a 
party member, it represented his belief in Bacthist ideology. Without mentioning 
religion, the Bacth could reference its general support of"faith" and appeal to a broad 
constituency by satisfying the primary criterion of any ruler in an Islamic culture: the 
belief in God and Muhammad's message. Consequently, the Bacth's initiative to 
reintroduce Islam back into official state sanctioned culture in the early 1990s did not 
mention Islam in its title but was called "The Faith Campaign" (al-l:zamla al-:JzmO.niyya). 
The official slogans ofthe party's celebration of the Prophet's birthday in 2002 included 
the assertion that "By choosing the Prophet Muhammad (blessings and peace be upon 
him), the Arabs were chosen as the possessors of faith and the central means (mzdan) for 
the birth of its message." Playing off another name for Muslims as "believers," the same 
slogan claims, "It is the responsibility of the fighting believers (al-mu:Jminzn al-
mujahidin) to carry [faith] to all of humanity." Similarly, on the anniversary' of the 
91. Nils B. Kvastad, "Semantics in the Methodology of the History ofldeas," Journal of the 
History of Ideas 38 (Jan.-Mar. 1977): 163. 
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Prophet's birth, the Bacth used one of its code words-"experience"-to signal its 
acceptance of Islam within the Arab nationalist framework, saying "we are inspired by 
the greatest experience of belief that our eternal nation Cummatnli) has lived." Another 
motto too made Arab nationalism equivalent to but more progressive than Islam while 
paying homage to the latter and asserting the former's primacy: "The believing, fighting 
nationalism (qawmiyya) is the new way of belief to save the Arab nation (emphasis 
added)."92 Partially by connecting it to a traditional Islamic concept, therefore, the Bacth 
made the generic quality of "faith" a proxy for commitment to its cause and linked the 
familiar belief in Islam with belief in the party's values. In this way, Iraqis did not have 
to give up the emotional and orientational satisfactions of the experience of faith, they 
just had to change its focus. If the Bacth could get enough people to make this switch, to 
see the world through its eyes, it could shift Iraqi culture into harmony with its ideals. 
If the Bacthist regime equated general religious faith-and specifically Islamic 
faith-with belief in party ideology, it also compared Hussein to the Prophet Muhammad 
and the Shici Imams through the multivocalities of the Bacthist idiom. The custom of 
adding "God save him and keep him" after each mention of Hussein's name or titles has 
already been mentioned. Additionally, the BRCC's authors use the same word in Arabic 
to refer to the traditions of the prophet Cabadith) as to describe Hussein's speeches.93 
This tacit comparison dovetails with Hussein as the primary source ofBacthist ideology. 
92. "aPi~tifol bi cayd mawlid al-nabawi al-sharif," ra'is aLWiin al-ri'iisa 'ilii 'amiinat majlis al-
wuzarii', April27, 2002, 063-2-4: 50, 52. 
93. See, e.g., Sikritfr al-sayyid ra'fs al-jumhuriyya li-1-shu'un al-~izbiyya 'illi sayyidl al-ra'fs al-
qa'id al-mu~taram, Jan. 30, 1984, 026-3-6: 133. 
--
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Other comparisons are more explicit. In a report about the events of the Shi ci holiday of 
Muharram commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the director of the Office of 
the Party Secretariat, the Bacth's highest administrative official, suggested "honoring the 
readers of the l:zusayniyylit (Shi ci religious centers) who had an exceptional role in 
making a link between the bravery of Imam Hussein (peace be upon him) and the bravery 
of his descendant (l:zafid) the Leader (God save him) who faced down the aggression of 
33 countries and achieved a victory."94 In this quotation, the director repeats the Bacthist 
canard that Hussein was related to the Shici Imams and one ofthe Sunnis' revered rightly 
guided caliphs through a genealogical line going back to Imam Hussein's father, Imam 
cAli, the fourth caliph, thus giving him both Sunni and Shici credibility.95 The 
juxtaposition of the conventional prayer for Imam Hussein ("peace be upon him"), 
moreover, with that of the Leader Hussein ("God save him") could not be starker. By 
comparing Hussein to Muslim prophets instead of deifying him, the Secretariat's director 
imbued. Hussein with the quality of prophets who are at once human and fallible but who 
also channel God's unquestionable word. This fit in with his role as interpreter of 
c Aflaq' s traditional message, creator and applier of new party principles, and the leader 
of the Bacth Party and Iraqi and Arab nations. Like Muhammad, he combined the 
leadership of Iraq's spiritual and political community in his person. 
94. "Muniisabat 10 mul:zarram," mudfr ciim maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qu{r ~ua al-rafiq al-caq'ld 
riikiin cabd al-ghafiir/muriifiq al-sayyid al-ra~'ls aj-jumhiiriyya al-mul:ztaram, July 1, 1995, 046-5-4: 299. 
95. The family tree first appeared in Iskandar, 21. 
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Husseini Bacthism, like religion, dealt with the afterlife, connecting the quality of 
death and the rites surrounding it to political considerations. It did so, first and foremost, 
' 
by providing a moral foundation and purpose in life so that a Bacthist's conscience would 
be clear for the next one. The most prominent example of this was the Bacth's cult of 
martyrdom. The Arabic word that Hussein used for "martyr," shahzd, originated in 
Islamic parlance where it refers to Muslims who die in battles with infidels. They are 
guaranteed direct passage to heaven.96 "The martyrs," Hussein said in one of his most oft 
repeated catchphrases in the BRCC, "are nobler than us all" Cakram minnajamfcan).97 
In yet another instance of using an Islamic concept for Bacthist purposes, the expression 
channeled cAflaq's original sentiment, explained in Chapter Two, that sacrificing oneself 
for the nation was the highest possible moral act in Bacthism. In Hussein's Iraq, this 
concept was used as a prod to encourage Iraqis to fight its wars against Iran and in the 
Gulf War and not to desert or dodge military service. It also ostensibly gave the families 
of martyrs solace that their martyred fathers, brothers, and sons did not die in vain. The 
Bacth further attached service to personal and familial honor, so that going to fight was 
referred to as "the honor of participation" (sharf al-muslihama). A petition from three 
tribal shaykhs, for example, prefaced their request with the tribe's credentials as, among 
other things, "having had the honor of participation in the second Qlidisiyya (the Iran-Iraq 
96. Bengio, Saddam 's Word, 156. 
97. Indeed, "the nobler than us all" is used as a euphemism for martyrs throughout the archive. 
See: "Ma1;4ar jalsat al-mu~atamar al-~intikhabi al-takmi!I li-qiyadat shucubat buldriiz," June 15,2000, 
043-1-4: 49-50. 
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War) with two hundred martyrs, martyrs in the name of your justice."98 As Chapter Five 
explores, soldiers who died in the Bacth's wars or while on a party or security service 
assignment were also considered martyrs, which brought a legal status that gave their 
families official honors and benefits. 99 
The cult of martyrdom was reinforced as a collective national duty in mass 
ceremonies on "Martyr's Day" (December 1) and in ad hoc events organized for political 
purposes. In these types of events ritual became propaganda. In 1984, the president's 
office circulated a program in advance of Martyr's Day detailing the activities that would 
take place. First, at morning prayers in both mosques and churches, the "prayer of 
absence" (~allit al-ghlf'ib) was "to be performed over the souls of the martyrs." Next, a 
group of party elites and representatives from the PMOs were to lay wreaths at the tomb 
of the unknown soldier. Then Iraq's air raid sirens would sound for five minutes of 
reflective silence. The first hour of the work and school days was then reserved for 
speeches and poetry readings "to discuss the exploits of our martyrs and their heroism in 
Saddam' s glorious Qadisiyya, their role in protecting .the land of Iraq and the honor and 
dignity of Iraqis, the loyalty to the history of the Arab nation and its civilization, and to 
act as a reminder of the shameful role of the rulers of Tehran in the execution of [Iraqi] 
prisoners [ofwar]." The members of party branches, local organizations, and the PMOs 
were then to visit martyrs' families to repeat this message, relate the regime's 
98. Citizen petition to Saddam Hussein, 041-2-1: 725. 
99. Bengio also explores the concept of martyrdom in the Ba0thist vernacular in Saddam 's Word, 
156-8. 
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condolences, and remind them of the regime's ongoing emotional and financial support. 
If there was any doubt as to the purpose of the day, the program informed the state and 
party apparatuses which carried it out that they were to stress, in contrast to the Iranians' 
evil, that "the decrees and legislation that the revolution (a euphemism for the Ba0 th) 
issued on Martyr's Day confirms its honoring of the families of martyrs." The Ministry 
of Culture and Media was instructed to cover these rituals on television, the radio, and in 
newspapers where the ministry was to offer programming related to Martyr's Day, so that 
Iraqis who did not personally participate in the rituals could still observe, listen to, or 
read about them. Amongst these programs, the newspapers were specifically told to print 
articles and investigative pieces (ta/:zq'fqlit) celebrating the act of martyrdom C'istishhlid) 
and the martyrs themselves. Art exhibitions and poetry festivals were also put on with 
works that were to include "subjects that honored martyrdom and the heroic deeds of our 
armed forces."100 
In examining the character of its activities, the Martyr's Day program had clear 
purposes. Its events acted as mourning ceremonies where Iraqis could grieve as a group, 
where they could find solace in the fact that their individual losses were part of a larger, 
necessary sacrifice on behalf of the nation and the people. Their martyrs, therefore, died 
not for a corrupt dictatorial regime but fighting for the people of Iraq; they died with 
honor. By ingraining this official narrative and supporting the emotional and financial 
needs of the martyr's families, the Bacthist State confirmed that it was on the just side of 
100. "Yawm al-shah'fd," ra~'fs dfwiin al-rrasa ~na al-wiziiriit kiifa-al-maktab al-khii~~ et. al., 
Nov. 12, 1984,035-3-4:216-17. 
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the conflict. Men could go to fight-and did not have an excuse not to-because they 
knew the Bacthist State would take care of their families if they died. What is more, the 
events identified Iran as the evil enemy bent on destroying the Arab nation, an enemy 
that, in contrast to the Bacth, treated Iraqi prisoners of war badly, even executing them. 
The rituals, programming, and slogans of Martyr's Day consequently made the moral 
framework and responsibility for the war clear. In the process, the Bacth sought to 
legitimize itself by contending that it was carrying out the obligations of a rightful ruler 
by supporting the people's welfare. Its messages were repeated constantly and 
continuously over different mediums so that nobody could fail to notice or understand 
them. When combined with the absence of other information that might contradict the 
official view, repetition gave weight to the Bacth's narrative. The speeches, moments of 
silence, art exhibitions, and mandatory hours of reflection that occurred throughout the 
country, moreover, could not have taken place without mass participation. When they 
took part, Iraqis at once signaled their allegiance and reaffirmed the Husseini Bacthist 
narrative.101 
The Bacth's careful construction of mass ceremonies revealed its knowledge for 
how powerful the effect of these ceremonies could be for internal political purposes and 
101. General discussion of the role of ritual in political ceremonies guided this analysis. See: 
Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System,' in Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion, 
ed. Michael Banton (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 28-32; Christel Lane, The Rites of Rulers: 
Ritual in Industrial Society- the Soviet Case (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 11, 24, 33, 
61, 64; Sally F. Moore and Barbara G. Myerhoff, "Introduction: Secular Ritual: Forms and Meanings," in 
Secular Ritual, ed. Sally F. Moore and Barbara G. Myerhoff (Assen/Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1977), 3-8; 
George L. Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in 
Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich (New York: Howard Fertig, 1975), 74. 
122 
external propaganda and illustrates how rituals were themselves forms of culturalization. 
Two particularly poignant and related examples from 1997 surrounding Martyr's Day 
leave no doubt that any gathering of more than a few people in Iraq had government 
sanction and was likely organized by the state down to the last detail for maximum effect. 
It showed too that the regime was willing to use normally private religious burial rites for 
its own purposes. 
In the days leading up to Martyr's Day the president's office ordered the Iraqi Red 
Crescent and domestic children's organizations to organize a funeral procession for fifty 
children in coordination with the Health Minister. The procession was to be devoid "of 
any official signs or manifestations in order to give the impression that the funeral was 
not organized by the state, just as it has been decided to call citizens to participate in the 
funeral in an indirect way."102 Apparently having noticed these seemingly spontaneous 
displays himself, "In recent days," the head of General Security wrote to the president's 
secretary for party affairs, 
... funeral processions have taken place for Iraqi child martyrs of the evil blockade. We 
have noticed the positive effect of these processions for increasing hatred amongst the 
public towards America and, similarly, its effect outside of the country as a result of the 
reactions relayed by the Arab and world media. 
Perhaps we can expand these practices to become more influential on the public 
so as to increase hatred against America and widen their effect on the personalities and 
organizations concerned with children outside of the country in order to make them a 
means of pressure and condemnation against America and its positions. 
That one of the regime's own security chiefs did not recognize, or assume, that the 
procession he originally witnessed was organized by the government wlien he himself 
102. "Tashy'fc," mudlr ciim 3 amiinat sirr al-qutr 3 ilii al-rafiq 3 amin sirr qiyiidatfurc khiilid bin al-
walfd al-mul:ztaram wa-1-ra.fiq ~amin sirr qiyiidatfurc aPac?,amiyya al-mul:ztaram, 052-1-6: 125. 
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frequently arranged similar affairs demonstrates how difficult it was, even for members 
of the regime's upper echelons, to determine fact from fiction and ritual from reality in 
Hussein's Iraq. Instead, his first thought was how the state could turn the social 
phenomenon that he thought he observed into propaganda. Accordingly, the director 
suggested that the Health Ministry collect the bodies of dead children and hoard them 
instead of giving them to their families in order to build up a critical mass of corpses for a 
mass funeral procession. The dead children, he said, should be placed in small coffms 
instead of regular, adult size ones because they had more of an effect on the observer. An 
Iraqi flag should then be wrapped around the coffins "in order to clarify that the child is a 
martyr"-the connection between martyrdom and patriotic sacrifice being so obvious by 
now that Iraqis would understand the symbolism immediately. On the cart that carried 
each coffin, he ordered a large picture of the child to be placed with his or her name and 
age written underneath in both Arabic and English. Each cart would lead a procession to 
a different mo~que or church where a funeral rite would be performed with a state or 
party representative in attendance in addition to members of Arab and Islamic diplomatic 
missions. Following the individual ceremonies, the coffins would coalesce in one large 
march toward the square in Baghdad where grand national ceremonies took place (sli~at 
al-:Ji~tifiillit). There, Hussein would preside over a ceremony where members of the 
RCC, the party, and the PMOs would lay wreaths and flowers on the coffins. An Imam 
would give a fiery speech, and then the bodies would be given over to the families. The 
crowd during the occasion would hold placards blaming America for the children's 
deaths, again in Arabic and English. The whole process would be covered live on 
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television and followed up with coverage in the newspapers and in special publications 
~esigned for international consumption.103 
A number of other "occasions" (munlisablit), as they are referred to in the BRCC, 
also served as rituals and propaganda tools. AprilS, for example, following an Iranian 
missile attack that hit the "Palace of Martyrs" school (madrasat ballit al-shuhadli3 ) in 
1988, killing tens of children, became a national day of remembrance that later turned 
into the mor~ general "Day of the Iraqi Child" (yawm al-tifl al-cirliqt) when the Ba0 th 
wanted to pressure the international community to lift its sanctions.104 Similarly, the 
Ba0 th turned the American and British bombing campaign in December 1998 into a 
yearly national celebration called "T~e Day of the Glorious Victory" (yawm al-fatiJ, al-
mubln ), using the same Arabic term that appears in Sura 48 of the Qur3 lin that refers to 
the early Muslims' taking ofMecca in 630 A.D. 105 These two occasions combined with 
the anniversaries of the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars gave the regime opportunities to 
repeatedly remind the populace that Iran and America harbored evil intentions from 
which only the Ba0 thist State could protect them, proving its necessity. The Bacth used 
the ceremonies to rhetorically tum its defeats into victories, reinforce the cult of martyrs, 
103. Mudfr aPamn al-:am 3 ilii al-sayyid sikritfr ra3 fs aj-jumhiiriyya al-mu!Jtaram, Dec. 1, 1997, 
076-1-6: 145-51. 
104. "Yawm al-!ifl al-ciriiqf," mudfr cam maktab 3 amiinat sirr al-qu{r 3 ilii qiyiidiitfuriic al-/Jizb 
kiifa, 036-3-5:293-7. 
105. "Yawm al-fatiJ al-mubfn," 3 amfn sirr qiyiidatfurc biibil 3 ilii maktab 3 amiinat sirr al-qu{r, 
Dec. 23, 1999, 029-2-2: 277-82. The translation of the term is N.J. Dawood's from his translation of the 
Qur"an. See note no. 2 on the same page for his interpretation that it might also instead refer to the 
conquest of the Jewish oasis ofK.haybar a year before the Muslims took Mecca. The Koran, Trans. N.J. 
Dawood (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 359. 
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and place Hussein at the center of the country's achievement in each case. Amongst the 
proposed slogans distributed for the 1999 Day of the Iraqi Child, for example, were, "By 
the thought and the wisdom of the leader, we guarantee the future of our children," and 
"the blockade is a witness to the imperialist hatred for the children oflraq."106 
Martyr's Day and these other o~casions were only some of the regularly occurring 
holidays, remembrances, anniversaries of historical Bacthist events, and celebrations of 
Hussein's leadership that accrued throughout his tenure. 107 Together, they defined the 
national calendar and gave public life a sense of consistency and order. Although each 
occasion had its own focus, the programs prepared for them found in the BRCC all 
conform to the same general pattern as the Martyr's Day agenda and director's proposed 
funeral procession from above. Indeed, the purpose of the occasion often seems not to 
matter. Emphases and specific meanings of particular terms changed. The Bacth at 
various times included more pan-Arab, tribal, or Islamic language and references, but the 
occasions' purposes and general messages, symbols, and myths stayed the same. 
106. 036-3-5: 295. 
107. For other examples of programs for Bacthist "occasions" see: ""1/:ztifoliit "acyiid tamiiz," 
"am'in sirr al-maktab al-markaz'ili-1-tan'{.'im al-mihn'iwa-l-shacb'i "ilii maktab "amiinat sirr al-qu{r, July 10, 
1988, 029-2-4: 349-51; "".II:ztifoliit al-na$r al-ca'{.'im," mucffr cam maktab "amiinat sirr al-qu{r "ilii al-maktab 
al-caskar'iwa-qiyadat al-furiic al-/:zizbiyya kafa, July 4, 1999, 020-1-5: 290-1; and boxfile 028-3-4: 1-24, 
which contains a number of documents about the preparations for the opening of"The River Saddam" in 
1992, a huge drainage canal dug from Baghdad to the Gulf used, among other things, to drain the marshes. 
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Conclusion 
In one sense, the national occasions were like every other ritual of loyalty that 
Iraqis had to perform in their daily lives. They relied heavily on the repetition and 
quantity of propaganda in as many areas as possible: art, poetry, sport, the media, etc. 
They harnessed the Husseini Ba0 thist vocabulary that clarified the regime's official line, 
reflected the state of political and social relations, and labeled both people and 
phenomena as good or bad. The people, as participants, then reinforced these messages 
when they actively took part. In another, however, the collective character of the 
occasions gave them a more powerful quality. The individual rituals Iraqis carried out on 
a daily basis atomized them. They became individuals attached to the Ba0 thist State, 
willing to forsake their social groups for Husseini Bacthism. At occasions, however, by 
repeating the same slogans in unison, participating in the same marches, listening to the 
same speeches, and sharing the same experiences and emotions as their fellows they 
became, at least during the ceremony, part of a unified, exclusive community with a 
shared ethos undivided by religion, sect, tribe, ethnicity, or class. In the occasions, the 
Bacth's assertions were affirmed before everybody's eyes, in public, by the masses. 
Rhetoric and reality, ideology and practice, united. By acting collectively in support of 
the regime everyone became implicated in its continuation. Like with the Bacth's "code 
words," the ceremonies defined acceptable conduct and thought. When Iraqis 
participated, they went along with the Bacth's rules and buttressed its efforts to establish 
a new reality. Similar to the logic ofHusseini Bacthist ideology, ritual trapped its 
participants in a web of Ba0 thist lies while giving them the excuse of participating in a 
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mass event to justify the dishonor of supporting the Bacth to themselves and others.108 Of 
course, that Hussein and the Ba0th felt the need to institute so many rituals into daily life 
and hold frequent mass ceremonies showed how fleeting those moments were and how 
thoroughly against the grain of objective reality and history they went. The solution, the 
BRCC suggests, was to make life into a series of rituals, to destroy as much as possible 
the time and space when Iraqis were not, in one way or another, part of a rite or otherwise 
subject to propaganda. Eventually, Hussein and the Ba0 th hoped that individuals would 
internalize the message their rituals relayed and society as a whole would come to rest on 
new traditions that, in turn, would perpetuate their rule.109 
108. For an excellent exposition ofthe excusatory aspect of totalitarian ideology see Havel, "The 
Power ofthe Powerless," 42-3. 
1 09. Moore and Myerhoff discuss ritual as a "traditionalizing instrument" that can reorganize or 
help to create new "social arrangements and existing modes of thought." Moore and Myerhoff, 5-7). 
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CHAPTER 4: Organization 
The fundamental duty of the party apparatus is to execute the decisions and instructions 
of the leadership of the party and revolution in order to set state and society in motion. 
-From a 1985 Northern Bureau study entitled, "Practicing Responsibility from the 
Lowest Position"1 
Introduction 
Despite Saddam Hussein and the Bacth Party's fervent effort to indoctrinate and 
culturalize the populace through propaganda and ritual, the BRCC contains scant 
evidence that rhetoric and rites by themselves elicited allegiance. The majority of Iraqis, 
both Bacthists and independents, expressed their fidelity in response to the more tangible 
and immediate constraints placed upon their lives. As the next chapter will show, these 
constraints included rewards and punishments, or terror and enticement, but they also 
consisted of the rules and organizational structures ofthe governmental and social 
institutions they interacted with on a daily basis and the hierarchies of authority and 
leaders that held power over them and from whom they took direction. Consequently, as 
a companion to his ideological program, Hussein used the Bacth Party to oversee the 
"organization" of every aspect of life in Iraq in order to generate popular support. 
Indeed, the BRCC' s authors use the verb "to organize" in the same way that Hannah 
Arendt does when she says that "The true goal of totalitarian propaganda is not 
1. "Mumiirasat al-mas~iiliyafi al-mawqic aPadnii," l;zizb al-bacth al-carabf aPishtiriikf- qiyiidat 
tan?.fm al-shumiil, 029-2-3: 88. "Practicing responsibility from the lowest position" was a Bacth Party 
initiative begun in the mid-1980s in which party members of organizational commands (divisions, sections, 
branches, and bureaus) would spend a period of time running the affairs of lower level organizations so as 
to impart their experience to those further down the chain of command and so higher Bacthist officials 
could get a sense of the life of the lower-level cadre. 
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persuasion but organization (emphasis added)-the 'accumulation of power without the 
possession of the means of violence. "'2 Ba0 thists who joined the party referred to 
themselves as having "been organized" (muna?,?.am): indoctrinated, placed within the 
party hierarchy, and subjected to the disciplinary constraints ofBa0 thist membership so 
as to cement-their loyalty.3 
Through the process of organization Hussein sought to monitor state and society 
for threats to his security, take political control over the Iraqi state, and then to use the 
resources at the state's disposal to construct a social foundation based in the 
organizational structure and memberships of the Ba0 th Party, the PMOs, and the 
independent social institutions they Ba0thized. This network in society would remain 
loyal because it would have a common sense of identity based in an overarching 
allegiance to the nation, the revolution, and Hussein instead of ethnicity, tribe, or sect. 
To get ahead within these newly Bacthized institutions would require, first.and foremost, 
proving one's loyalty to the Bacthist Trinity instead of traditional qualifications. When 
Hussein Ba0 thized an institution, he either obliterated and replaced it with a Ba0 thist 
version, like with civil society organizations, or he took it over and reformed it, such as 
with Iraq's education system and religious establishments, keeping its outer structure but 
changing its content. Hussein thereby assumed the mantle of the institution's legitimacy 
but modified its essential purpose to support himself as a symbol of the party and nation. 
2. Arendt, 361. 
3. See, e.g., a petition from a party member who worked in the security services. "aPirtibii! bi-1-
]J,izb," 023-2-8: 118-19. 
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In the case of governmental institutions, the Bacth integrated party members and 
its apparatus into state bodies so that the party and state intertwined. Instead of a state 
ruled by the Bacth Party, the aim was to make the government into the "Party State" 
(dawlat al-ly,izb, or, as commonly referred to here, the "'Bacthist State"4)-a totalitarian 
strategy to rule through the state instead of over it. For social institutions and individuals, 
the Bacth incorporated them directly into the party through recruitment of institutional 
leaders and citizens and by maintaining personal relationships with influential members 
of society and their families. These people and families also often had direct links to the 
Party State, and the Bacth incorporated the organizational structures of social institutions 
into the state to a lesser or greater degree, removing the space between the governmental 
and civil spheres, and between the public and private arenas. 
In control of these associations and institutions, Hussein patronized them and, in 
turn, used them to support himself and mobilize their adherents behind his initiatives. If 
the familial, tribal, civil, social, religious, national, and professional groups that a person 
4. When this study references the "Iraqi state," the "state," or the "government" it refers to the 
totality of state institutions other than the Bacth Party. The state thus consisted of the RCC, the Office of 
the President, the ministries, the security and intelligence services, the army, the National Assembly (al-
majlis al-watanl), the judiciary, and "agencies unconnected to a ministry" (al-dawli"ir ghayr al-murtabita 
bi-wizlira) such as the Atomic Energy Agency and the Iraqi Central Bank. In short, these bodies were all 
those commonly considered governmental bodies or parts of the "public sector" in any country. The 
"Husseini Bacthist State" or, for brevity's sake, ''the Ba0 thist State," in contrast, includes all of the arms of 
the Iraqi state in addition to the Bacth Party-the totality of political, legislative, exe9utive, and judicial 
institutions that Hussein had at his disposal. 
In 1999, at least, a full list of the entities included in the Bacthist State as a whole can be seen on 
the list of recipients of a letter sent by the president's office to all of the organs of the state and the Ba cth 
Party instructing them that the national commemoration of the anniversary of the 1998 American and 
British bombing campaign would take place on December 17, 1999. A more complete study of how the 
Iraqi and Bacthist states expanded apd contracted over time could be done by analyzing the lists of 
recipients and those sent carbon copies of correspondence emanating from the president's office. "Y awm 
al-fatl] al-mubln," ra"ls azwiin al-ri"iisa "ilii "imiinat majlis al-wuzarii" et. al., Dec. 13, 1999, 029-2-2, 285. 
131 
belonged to all prioritized support for the Bacthist Trinity then the person likely would 
too. In the process, Hussein would gain a loyalist and another foothold in society. 
"Organization" in this context is synonymous with "Bacthification" as a whole, as 
Hussein used ideology, terror, and enticement in order to bless and facilitate the process 
of re-organizing, or transforming, Iraqi state and society. 
Due to this complex web of party, state, and social interactions it is difficult to say 
exactly where one left off and the other began. The Bacth Party, Iraqi state, and social 
institutions were inextricably intertwined yet separate entities with Hussein at the head of 
each. The Bacth Party represented the common thread between them. It was a fourth 
"political branch" of government: an extra layer of control beyond any government's 
normal executive, legal, and judicial powers that smothered and enveloped Iraqi state and 
society in their entirety. The Bacth Party was Hussein's organ of meta-control, the 
organizational and executive companion to Husseini Bacthist ideology's "extra 
ingredient"-its assertion of total and exclusive authority based upon the moral 
imperative of its brand of Arab nationalism. 5 The tools that Hussein used to invade and 
occupy society were the Bacth Party apparatus and its sister Professional and Mass 
Organizations (PMOs) in coordination with the security services and relevant 
governmental ministries depending on the precise target ofBacthification.6 
5. I am indebted to the Iraq Memory Foundation's Hassan Mneimneh for the characterization of 
the Ba0 thParty as a form of"meta-control." The term "extra ingredient" is Emilio Gentile's, used to refer 
to that which gives a totalitarian quality to ideologies: their aspiration to total and exclusive control. 
Gentile, "The Sacralisation ofPolitics," 18-19. 
6. The "invasion and occupation of society by the state" is part of Peter Grieder's definition of 
totalitarianism. Grieder, 569. 
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Hussein organized Iraqi state and society with the Ba0 th Party in a number of 
ways. He first instructed it to create a disciplined and well organized core of party 
members able to transfer Ba0 thist principles to state and society. Hussein then installed 
Ba0 thists in government and socially influential positions, mandating that they 
exclusively occupy certain high posts from which they could oversee and influence the 
officials below them. Hussein and the party too supervised the hiring process and 
appointment ofnon-Ba0 thists, vetting them to ensure that they were "good elements" 
(sing. cun~ur jayyid) and had proper "intellectual and security-related integricy" (al-
sallima al-fikriyya wa-l-:Jamaniyya).1 At all levels of state and social institutions, 
Ba0 thists monitored and reported about the ministries, agencies, state owned enterprises, 
and social establishments in which they worked and participated. At times, the party took 
an active role in assisting the government to complete its tasks or supporting a social 
establishment. In some cases, the Ba0th set up its own parallel. capabilities that 
duplicated these institutions' functions. 
Saddam Hussein's Position in the Bacthist State 
Mirroring Husseini Ba cthist ideology, Saddam Hussein made himself into the 
organizational keystone of the Ba0 thist State. The keystone analogy works because 
Hussein sat at the top of the Ba0 thist State's organizational hierarchy, but also because he 
was not simply the top of a pyramid which could be removed and replaced with 
7. "Khittat al-qubill al-markazifi ma'Cihid al-mucallimfn," ra'fs azwan al-ri'iisa 'ila wizCirat al-
taclfm az-cazrwa-1-ba~th al-cilmflal-maktab al-kha~~. Aprill2, 1986, 088-5-3: 590-1. 
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somebody else. Like a keystone holds up an arch from its central, highest point, Hussein 
designed the structure of the Bacthist State so that if he fell it would also fall apart. 
Hussein's authority accrued from a number of sources. His personal ruthlessness, 
charisma, and firm grip over and willingness to use the security and intelligence services 
inspired fear and paranoia amidst his subordinates and the populace. His place at the 
center ofHusseini Bacthist ideology made him, rhetorically at least, the necessary leader 
of a political and social movement to advance the Arab and Iraqi nations, protect them 
from enemies, and achieve social justice. Through his access to the spoils of state, he sat 
atop not only a series of patronage networks but also the government's welfare system 
through which he parceled out jobs, benefits, and perks in exchange for support from 
family and regular citizens. What is more, through the very fact of coming out on top in 
Iraq's rough and tumble political game, by taking power and then keeping it, by imposing 
his will on state and society and vanquishing his enemies, he forced Iraqis and outsiders 
alike to respect him. 
Hussein exercised institutional legitimacy as well, which by virtue ofhis 
accumulation of governmental and political posts gave him legally untrammeled power 
over Iraq's state organs. He was president of the RCC, President of the Republic, 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and Secretary-General of the Bacth Party, 
amongst other titles. Within the framework of Iraq's 1970 "temporary" constitution, 
which remained in effect until2003, this gave Hussein personal control over the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government with the only theoretical 
check on his power the need for a majority of votes to pass laws in the RCC. In reality, 
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however, the RCC-Iraq's highest authoritative body and its chief legislative 
instrument-served as a rubberstamp for Hussein's initiatives. The BRCC shows that 
real consultation and discussion took place within it, but the only laws that passed were 
ones Hussein endorsed. For its part, the National Assembly could constitutionally 
propose laws and review those passed by the RCC, but it was not convened for the first 
time unti11980 and never exercised true power. Consequently, combined with his 
presidential prerogative to issue the regulations necessary to execute the constitution and 
the RCC's legislation, Hussein was Iraq's de facto law-giver. 
In his role as president, Hussein controlled the executive and judicial roles of 
state. Tasked with safeguarding the independence of the country from internal and 
external threats, and in his role as commander-in chief, he controlled the police, the 
security and intelligence services, and the military, giving him a monopoly over the 
state's means of force. He had the power to appoint and dismiss his deputies, ministers, 
and all other civilian and military employees as well as judges. This, along with being 
head of the RCC, allowed him to oversee the legislation that regulated the judiciary. In a 
sense, Hussein even acted as Iraq's supreme court. He often set up ad-hoc commissions 
to investigate matters brought to his attention by petition when the regular judicial system 
failed-a kind of appellate authority. 
Hussein forged the Bacthist State into a hierarchical organization with himself at 
the top of each of its institutions' chains-of-command and channels of information. He 
then made it difficult for the institutions to communicate with one another except through 
the Office of the President, so that only he had a complete picture of the Bacthist State's 
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activities. A perfect illustration of this came in Chapter Three, which related the story of 
the head of the GSD who witnessed what he thought was a genuinely spontaneous funeral 
procession for dead children organized by the government. The GSD director then 
suggested in a letter addressed to one of Hussein's secretaries that' the state take 
advantage of "popular" sentiment and organize more, similar activities, themselves made 
to look unprompted. Albeit absurd on one level, on another it proves how Hussein's 
system succeeded in isolating individuals and institutions while giving them incentives to 
act in support of his interests. The security director was kept in the dark about plans to 
organize funeral processions for propagandistic purposes carried out by other agencies 
and thus did not have contact with whatever other organizations produced them. Yet, the 
structure and incentives within Hussein's system conditioned him to see the processions 
as an opportunity to take initiative that would both further Hussein's own desires 
(creating international sentiment against UN sanctions) and that would potentially reward 
the director in some fashion for "taking responsibility" (f:zaml al-mas3 uliya) and 
"creativity" (cibdii 3 ), two qualities Hussein tried to instill in the party and state's leaders.8 
In this case, Hussein's interests, those of the security chief, and the institutional 
8. For an example of the party's extolling of"creativity" see, e.g., a series of documents exploring 
ways to increase worker productivity, 023-2-6: 3-93. The admonition to "carry responsibility" for one's 
actions and for carrying out party duties properly was a significant concept within the Bacth Party, and 
Hussein frequently harped on it. See, e.g., the admonishment by an investigatory committee into an 
incident where a party member standing accused of disparaging an official tourism policy was reminded 
that "reliability falls on the shoulders of every struggler to carry responsibility in light of the opinion of the 
Comrade Leader Saddam Hussein (God keep him) that it is assumed that we evoke always in our behavior 
and our consciousnesses and our minds his instructions about how to behave with responsibility in a spirit 
of righteousness and fidelity and feelings of responsibility." Mucffr ciim maktab 'amiinat sirr al-qutr ilii 
riiisat al-jumhiiriyya- al-sikritfr, Aug. 2, 2000,029-1-3:23-8. 
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incentives inherent in the ruling structure he set up aligned and the system worked as 
planned. 
Firewalls put in place between organizations, however, also caused inefficiencies 
and could lead to Hussein's position being less secure. This both gave Hussein 
alternative sources of information about the state underneath him and helped to root out 
opposition, but it also made them less efficient and effective in their ability to gather the 
information in the first place. In 1989, for example, Hussein ordered that information 
from the party's files should not be shared with anybody except for the Party Secretariat 
and his secretary for party affairs in the president's office. The apparent purpose of this 
directive was to prevent the intelligence services from asking individual lower-level party 
organizations directly for information about people they were investigating. Instead, the 
branch within the security service that wanted the information had to ask the directorate 
of the service to ask the Party Secretariat or Hussein's secretary for it. One of them 
would then send the request down the party chain-of-command. The party unit that had 
the requested intelligence would then pass it back up to the Secretariat and over to the 
security service where it finally arrived back down at the original branch. Needless to 
say, this could be a slow process subject to bottlenecks at the top of the state hierarchy 
where the security· service and party chains-of-command met. It also suffered from the 
general lethargy that characterized the speed at which lower level party organizations 
responded to the Party Secretariat's requests.9 Nonetheless, it allowed Hussein to 
9. The secretariat repeatedly scolded lower level Ba"thist organizations for not responding as fast 
as they were required to by party rules. Its officials also complained that they did not take enough care 
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monitor the interactions between the most powerful organizations underneath him and 
keep himself apprised of ongoing security investigations. The DMI complained about the 
1989 order, however, arguing that it hampered its ability to keep watch over individuals 
who worked in sensitive positions in the armed forces. Voicing similar reservations, the 
SSO claimed that the order made Hussein's position less secure, not more, and thus the 
two services should be exempt from the regulation.10 The BRCC does not say whether or 
not Hussein granted them exemptions. Certainly in later years members of the security 
services and the party sat on local "security committees" together and more direct 
information sharing was encouraged. This likely happened, however, not because 
Hussein felt comfortable with giving up some of his oversight but because the security 
situation in the country deteriorated so much in the 1990s that he needed to allow his 
security apparatus more freedom. The hierarchical structure on top of which Hussein sat, 
therefore, although it maintained its basic shape throughout his tenure, was not an 
unchanging edifice but rather a flexible construction with which Hussein tinkered and 
changed when necessary. Furthermore, as the above example illustrates, state institutions 
such as the security services could push back in their own ways against Hussein's 
directives. He always had the last word, but by appealing to his paranoia and desire to 
with party correspondence to maintain the integrity and secrecy of its contents. See, e.g., <'Cljtimiic," 
maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qu{r ~ua al-maktab al-caskari, qiyiidiit al-furiic al-/:tizbiyya kiifa, Jan. 4, 1993, 004-
1-4: 162-3; "~ Usliib tadiiwul al-bar'fd al-/:tizb'f," mudfr ~idiirat al-maktab al-caskar'f ~ua kiifat qiyiidiit al-
furiic al-caskariyya," April4, 1982, 034-2-1: 146-7. 
10. Mudfr ciim maktab ~imiinat sirr al-qu!r ilii al-rafiq nii~ib ~amin sirr al-qu{r al-mul:ztaram, Aug. 
30, 1989, 156-4-4: 485. 
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protect himself from internal threats from the army, the DMI and SSO tried to get their 
way in contravention to Hussein's initial wishes. 
Especially during his first decade as president, Hussein evinced a tendency to 
micro-manage. He personally approved all personnel appointments (tacayzn) and 
transfers (naql) in the party and state from mid-level positions upward. 11 At times, 
reading the BRCC files on the president's office seems like observing a local mayor 
instead of a head of state. Hussein got involved in local law enforcement, economic 
affairs, and minor corruption cases, frequently through the unofficial petition system by 
which party members and citizens could bypass regular government channels and send 
letters to him directly. Hussein then either ruled on the spot or appointed a committee to 
investigate the matter which presented its findings to him so that he could make a 
decision. 12 Via this mechanism he reviewed transfer requests from lowly party and state 
officials, exempted citizens from military service, saw to it that they received their 
11. The BRCC contains tens ofboxfiles from the president's office that contain only 
correspondence related to personnel appointments, and which seek information from the security services 
and party about the candidates for jobs so that Hussein could make a decision (see, e.g., boxfiles 026-3-7, 
071-4-2, and 091-5-4. On Hussein's appointing district heads, see 027-5-2: 407). In 1991, ;Hussein 
delegated some of his authority over party personnel to the Party Secretariat's "Organization Committee" 
(al-lajna al-tan'{.fmiyya) and regional bureaus. Until then, Hussein signed off on all party appointments 
and transfers from the district level and higher. Now, however, he gave the Organization Committee carte 
blanche to appoint members to branch-levelleaderships, move members between them, and to and from the 
offices of the regional bureaus. For their part, the regional bureaus now had the authority to themselves 
order punishments for members at the level of district leaderships and below, amongst other new powers. 
The only exception was in the Baghdad bureau and its branches where Hussein kept control over all 
transfers and appointments of officials. Indeed, he always took a special interest in the situation around the 
capital because that is where he spent most of his time and any security breach that occurred there was 
more likely to effect him. See: "Tawsfc :jalal;tiyiit," mudlr cam maktab ~ amiinat sirr al-qu.rr ~ua al-rafoq 
~umanii~ sirr al-makiitib al-tan'{.fmiyya al-mul;ttaramfn, Feb. 5, 1991,024-5-2: 86-7. 
12. There are hundreds if not thousands of examples of these investigatory committees in the 
BRCC, frequently accompanied by records of the interviews they conducted in their investigations. See, 
e.g., boxfile 028-4-6. 
139 
rightful benefits, and answered pleas when Iraqis felt themselves wronged by state or 
party officials, having exhausted all other avenues to attain justice. On May 24, 1989, 
Hussein was handed a typical memo prepared by the director of the Party Secretariat and 
his secretary for party affairs with a series of issues. One was from a Ba0 th member 
requesting the use of a house in Baghdad while he was in town on party business. 
Hussein allowed him to use one of the houses left behind by an "Iranian" deported from 
the country (see Chapter Five). Another came from a woman asking for permission to go 
to France to complete medical treatment at her own expense and then to visit her brother 
in the United Arab Emirates. Saddam wrote "agreed" in the area designated for his 
comments.' Other people wanted to meet with Hussein in person for one reason or 
another, some of which Hussein allowed and others he did not. 13 Many relatively 
unimportant items reached his desk, moreover, due to state and party officials' fears of 
making decisions that he might not like. As a consequence, they passed up anything they 
believed could conceivably get them into trouble in order to protect themselves. 
Whether Hussein tired of routine affairs or realized that he needed to allot time to 
more urgent tasks, in the wake of the Gulf War's devastation and its subsequent uprisings 
the BRCC shows that Hussein began to delegate. One 1991 document entitled, "The 
Responsibility of State Departments to Solve the Issues of Citizens," sent to the 
ministries and copied to the Bacth Party complained that 
13. Mudlr cam maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qu{r, al-sikritfr al-khii~~ li-1-shu~iin al-l;izbiyya ilii sayyidl 
al-ra~'is al-qii~id al-mu!Jtaram, May 24, 1989, 022-1-7: 152-63. 
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When [the ministries or departments unconnected to a ministry] want to shirk their 
responsibility to offer a necessary service to a citizen they fmd an excuse by informing 
him that what he wants either "conflicts with the instructions of the presidency" or that 
the matter requires approval from the Comrade Leader (God save him). This occurs even 
with incidental and simple matters which are at the heart of these departments' duties. 
As a result, Hussein ordered officials to solve citizens' problems "without informing the 
president's office," or they would be punished. The only exception to this rule was for 
citizens who petitioned Hussein seeking redress for injustices committed against them. 
Hussein kept this power as an alternative source of quasi-independent information about 
the state of the country. The petitions and meetings with citizens allowed Hussein to 
maintain a link to ordinary people and fed into the notion of himself as Iraq's benevolent 
law-giver, chief justice, and leader who responded to his people's needs. Hussein 
repeatedly expresses his desire in the BRCC for the Bacthist State to serve its citizenry, 
both because Bacthism held the improvement of the people's welfare as a central tenet, 
and because ignoring their frustrations could create a "great danger" for the regime's 
leadership. 14 
Even with all of the power he accrued, Hussein was not an absolute dictator. 
Indeed, the concept of one is "a political-science fantasy." 15 Hussein's words had the 
effect of law, the breach of which could lead to death, and his ruthlessness bred reverence 
and fear. But no man can personally oversee all affairs of state and simultaneously focus 
14. "Mas'iiliyyat dawii'ir al-dawlafi IJall qar;liiyii al-muwii{in'fn," mudir cam maktab 'amiinat sirr 
al-qu{r ilii qiyiidiit al-furiic al-/Jizbiyya kiifa, Sept. 12, 1991, 004-1-4: 259. 
15. Overy, 73. 
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on the maintenance of his political survival. 16 No ruler has perfect information about 
what is happening in his country everywhere at all times and the ability to act on it. 
Hussein had to rely on other people and institutions to help him wield the power he 
amassed. He had to delegate some of his authority. The massive party and state 
apparatus that Hussein sat atop of magnified his power by allowing him to extend it into 
the furthest comers of society, but it also posed a danger for him because, collectively, 
these individuals and institutions had leverage over him. The force that the security 
services and army used against opposition groups and to oppress his citizens could also 
be employed to assassinate him or execute a coup. The government officials that he 
relied on to carry out his orders and dispense the basic services critical to his legitimacy 
had the power to sabotage Iraq's bureaucratic machinery and infrastructure. As the 
shaykh petition from Chapter Three illustrated, even a totalitarian regime rests on an 
agreement or tacit understanding between the ruler and the ruled whereby in exchange for 
the latter's support and obedience the former offers something in return. If the state 
stopped supplying benefits to its citizenry and, more importantly, if Hussein stopped 
taking care of the officials who doled them out and the officers who protected him, it is 
an open question how long he would have survived. 
16. Ra~'fs azwiin al-ri'iisa ilii sayyidl al-ra~rs al-qii~id al-mul}taram, Jan. 14, 1987, 045-3-5: 549-
550. Already in 1986 the number of memoranda like the one discussed in the text given to Hussein to 
make decisions reached forty per day (14,038 for the year), a fourteen percent increase over the year 
before. The president's office as a whole received 347 pieces of correspondence a day (125,214 for the 
year) from other governmental bodies and sent out 267 (97,557 for the year), increases of twenty-six and 
fifteen percent, respectively. Internal memos for 1986 alone reached 26,000 compared to 20,000 in 1985. 
To deal with the increased workload, the office expanded its staff from 173 to 229 employees. The year 
1986 is the only year statistics like this could be found for this study in the BRCC. It is likely that more are 
buried somewhere else in the archive. 
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To help him maintain control over the upper echelons of government, Hussein 
cultivated a small coterie of family members, tribal relations, and long-time confidants 
whom he shuffled in and out of top positions. Over the course of his reign, however, the 
people in the first two categories especially tended to prove either unreliable or 
incompetent, became too personally ambitious for Hussein's liking, or provoked intra-
family or tribal disputes to the extent that they embarrassed Hussein or threatened the 
stability of his inner circle. As a result, he progressively narrowed this circle to the point 
where only a handful of people remained. 17 In neither quantity nor quality did this 
political elite suffice to assist Hussein in controlling the state outside of its highest posts, 
although they did act as a buffer between him and the lower levels of government as well 
as channels for patronage. Hussein therefore also had to give the employees of the state 
ministries and agencies below him enough freedom to satisfy the government's basic 
coercive, administrative, and technocratic roles while ensuring that they could not use 
their power against him. He had to make sure that, as an organizational whole, the state 
operated with a common political direction and unity of purpose while concurrently 
atomizing it institutionally and individually so that even a small clique within one or 
more organs of the government-especially the coercive organs--could not imitate what 
the "Free Officers" did to the monarchy, c Arif did to Qasim and the Bacth itself, and the 
17. For more on Hussein's ever-changing inner circle and the drama within it see: Ofra Bengio, "A 
Republican Turning Royalist? Saddam Husayn and the Dilemmas of Succession," Journal of 
Contemporary History 35 (Oct. 2000): 641-53, and her Middle East Contemporary Survey entries, 
especially 1992 and 1998; Baram, Building Toward Crisis, 7-44, and "The Ruling Political Elite"; Tripp, 
259. The BRCC also contains the internal letter that Hussein sent to the party to explain the Kamil 
brothers' situation: "Nashra ~izbiyya," ~ua al-rafoq mas'Ul'f al-tanrjh'fmiit al-~izbfyya al-mu~taram'fn, Feb. 
21, 1996, 133-1-3: 407-10. 
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Bacthist military network did to c Abd al-Rahman c Arif. Consequently, he needed an 
expansive and disciplined organization with which to oversee the state's functions, one 
institutionally loyal, ideologically committed, and with a stake in maintaining the system 
by seeing to it that the government executed his desires. Hussein found this organization 
in the Bacth Party and its civil society proxies, and with them he set out to Bacthize the 
state. 
The Party State 
The Bacthijication ofState Personnel 
In 1978, the director of the Party Secretariat sent a letter to the Bacth's top 
officials telling them that "professional responsibilities (al-mahma al-waf.ifiyya) in the 
state are party obligations before they are traditional state employment (waf.ifa 
taqlfdiyya) because working for the state is the arena in which the party's creed and its 
theory are translated into a practical, tangible reality."18 Implicit in this statement was the 
righteousness of the Bacthist cause and, as a result, the moral imperative to advance it. 
The state acted as the Bacth's primary vehicle to put its ideology into practice. One of 
the ways to harness the state's power was by installing Bacthists within it who would 
both set policies from the top that accorded with the party's goals and see to their 
execution throughout the rest of the governmental apparatus. In doing so, a party 
member performed his obligation to transfer Bacthist values into state and society. And, 
. 18. Mudfr ciim maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ilii al-qiyiidiit al-ra~asiyyafi al-qutr kiifa, March 23, 
1978, 003-1-1: 419-26. 
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in fact, many, if not most high ranking Bacthist officials held state offices concurrent to 
their party positions or transferred between the two on a regular basis. 19 
Even when the top officials of state organizations did not have to be Bacthists the 
party surrounded them with members in their administrations. A set of 1994 regulations, 
for example, required all directors of the offices of ministers and the ministers' 
secretaries-their top bureaucratic officials-to be at least full members in the party. The 
directors and secretaries in deputy ministers' offices similarly had to be at least advanced 
partisans. This kind of structure mirrored the tactic employed by Hafez al-Asad in the 
army in Bacthist Syria whereby whenever he made a Sunni a commander, an Alawite (the 
Shici sect from which Asad came) was appointed his deputy, and vice-versa.20 In non-
national security related posts in Iraq, not every official had to be a Bacthist, but there 
was no high level office that did not contain at least one Bacthist to monitor its activities. 
All positions related to national security and education beyond the rank-and-file 
army and paid informants went to Bacthists. These positions are referred to in the BRCC 
as being "locked for the party" (mughllaq li-~lilif:t al-f:tizb).21 Chapter Two detailed how 
19. A series of rules regulated party participation in government jobs, especially at the higher 
levels of both party and state. Since the BRCC is incomplete, it is unclear how long individual examples of 
these rules remained in effect and how often they changed. Nevertheless, the principle of balance 
(muwiizana) between party and state obligations held sway. As a widely distributed party pamphlet quoted 
Hussein, "A Bacthist should create a balance between his party and state activity. There is no reason to 
build success in one area at the expense of making the other defective." "Balance" mean that, e.g., if a 
Bacthist was punished in his state job he would receive an equivalent punishment in the party and vice-
versa. 025-1-7: 46; 003-1-1: 419-26. 
20. Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power, 159-60. 
21. See, e.g., Mudfr cam maktab "amiinat sirr al-qutr "ilii al-rafiq "am'fn sirr al-qutr al-mul;ztaram, 
Oct. 13, 1979, 040-3-6: 97. 
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the party first Bacthized the army after it came to power in 1968, quickly training and 
promoting party activists as officers to replace non-Ba0thists so as to ensure its control 
over the institution?2 The party similarly Ba0 thized the security and intelligence 
services, although BRCC documents from 1979 show that at this time a few independents 
remained.23 Over time, however, the party weeded them out or forced them to join its 
ranks. The inclusion of educators in addition to national security personnel shows how 
critical Hussein and the Bacth believed the indoctrination of youth and students were to 
the long-term success of their regime. 
Throughout Hussein's tenure, the party continued the Ba0 thification of the 
military, security services, and the teaching corps (hay:Jat al-tadrzsiyya, or, silk al-taclzm 
wa-1-tadrzs) by controlling the admissions to their feeder academies.24 In relation to the 
military and security service academies, no explicit directive was found for this study 
limiting admission to Bacthists, and the academies accepted independents on rare 
22. The rank-and-file of the army did not, however, have to be in the Ba0th Party. In 1998, at 
least, a larger proportion of soldiers were party members than in the general population. Statistics on the 
breakup of a military section from that year showed that, of the new sections it was to be broken into, one 
would have 37.5% independents and the other 60%. "Shatr shucba l;zizbiyya," nii'ib 'am'fn sirr al-maktab 
al-caskar'f 'ilii maktab 'amiinat sirr qiyiidat qutr al-ciriiq, Feb. 4, 1998, 027-1-4: 577. 
23. See boxfile 044-2-1:2-9, 151-7, 164-6, 167-70,255-9,261-6. 
24. Many academies fell under the term "military academies" (al-kulliyiit al-caskariyya), the 
general rubric for all national security related preparatory and officer institutes. In addition to those related 
to the security services, a document from 1990 lists "military academies" as including "the first, second, 
and third military academies" (al-kulliya al-caskariyya al-'iilii wa-l-thiiniyya wa-l-thiilitha); the Air Force 
and Naval academies; the Academy of Military Engineering; the Police Academy; the Police Preparatory 
School; the Center for Naval Training (markaz al-tadr'fb al-bal;zr'f; the Judicial Institute (al-macahad al-
qufiii'l); the Sessions for Judicial Clerics (dawriit li-kuttiib al-cudiilfiwiziirat al-cadal); and, strangely, 
appointments of stewardesses on Iraqi Airlines (tacy'fn al-mufi'ifot fi al-khutii! al-jawiyya al-ciriiqiyya). 
"$aliil;ziyiit," mudfr cam maktab 'amiinat sirr al-qufr 'ilii ri'iisat al-jumhiiriyya- al-sikrit'fr, Jan. 10, 1990, 
056-4-4:7. 
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occasions, but BRCC files about the admissions process show that being a Ba0 thist was 
usually a prerequisite for acceptance and an applicant's independence an almost certain 
guarantee of denial?5 Committees made up variously of representatives from the party, 
the PMOs, and the security services conducted extensive background checks into all of 
the applicants to the academies and were instructed to gather the necessary information 
about them that any of their files did not contain?6 Needless to say, these facts then 
effected an applicant's chance of success, either positively or negatively. The forms 
given to the GSD to complete within sixty days about applicants to "the military faculties 
and institutes or to volunteer in the armed forces" for the 2001 school year, for example, 
asked about an applicant's "political direction and party level"; "his general behavior and 
morals"; "the reputation of his family and its political orientation"; "his nationality" (e.g., 
Kurdish or Arab); the positions he and his family took in relation to the Gulf War and its 
subsequent uprisings (did they participate in the Iraqi army or the opposition?); and, 
whether or not he had a relative who "conspired against the party and the revolution." 
More positively from the regime's perspective, the form also asked if his father was a 
"Friend of'the Leader President" (see Chapter Five); if his father or a brother had been 
25. There are tens if not hundreds of files on acceptances and rejections into military academies in 
the BRCC. See, e.g., in relation to admissions into the "First Military Academy": Mudir qism al-dawriit al-
e askariyya 3 ilii al-raftq al-muniicjil al-far"iq aP awwal al-rukn c al"i ~as an al-maj"id I cucjii qiyiidat qutr al-
ciriiq I al-mushrifcalii qism al-dawriit al-caskariyya al-mu~taram, Dec. 28, 1999, 020-3-5: 21; and, with 
regard to admission into "The High Institute for Officers of the Internal Security Forces" (al-macahad al-
ciil"ili-cjubiit qiwii aPamn al-diikhill): Mudir qism al-dawriit al-caskariyya 3 ilii al-raftq cucjii qiyiidat qiitr 
al-ciriiq-al-mushrifcalii qism al-dawriit al-caskariyya al-mu~taram, Oct. 26, 1993, 056-1-4: 6-7. 
26. See, e.g., "al-Qubiilft al-kulliyiit al-caskariyya," nii3 ib 3 am"in sirr al-maktab al-caskar"i 3 ilii 
maktab 3 amiinat sirr al-qiyiida al-qutyiyya, Jan. 14, 1992, 056-4-4: 1; "l)awiibit al-qubiilfi al-jiimiciit," 
ra3 "is azwiin al-rrasa 3 i/ii al-qiyiida al-qu{riyya-maktab 3 amiinat sirr al-qutr, Oct. 17, 1985,056-4-4:29-
30. 
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martyred; if he had volunteered in the Saddam's Fedayeen militia; or if he had 
"participated in drilling the sons of the people onyawm al-nakhwa," a national occasion 
onApril18, 1998, when Bacthists gave non-members a taste of military training for 
which both received a certificate and notation in their files. 27 
Like with the military, the BRCC suggests that the Bacthification of the teaching 
corps first began shortly after the party came to power in 1968. Some of the few pre-
1979 documents in the BRCC demonstrate that after the Bacth Party came to power it 
tried to replace all university professors with Bacthists, settling for loyal independents 
where not enough Bacthists yet existed to fill all of the positions, usually in the Kurdish 
territories. One letter from 1976, refers to the replacement of communist professors at 
Suleimaniyya University with Bacthists, although the Minister of Higher Education and 
Scientific Research suggested that keeping one communist would benefit the general 
good because of his organizational and professional capabilities?8 Also in Suleimaniyya 
province, a 1978 report bemoaned the continued existence of"communist or reactionary 
elements" (al-canii~ir al-shuyftciyya :~aw al-rajaciyya) working in school administrations. 
"It is suggested," the report says, "that a plan be formed by the party leadership in the 
region and education directorates to replace these elements with elements supportive of 
27. "Jurd tuliib1," mudfr ciim maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~ilii al-rafiq mudfr aPamn al-ciim al-
mu~taram, Jan. 10,2001, 068-1-2: 97-100. 
28. Maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~ilii al-rafiq nii~ib sirr al-qutr al-mu~taram, 003-1-1: 70. 
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the party and the revolution, or independents, since our information indicates that 
Bacthists cannot occupy all administrative positions."29 
To ensure the allegiance of new teachers, the Ba0 th reserved the majority of spots 
in state teaching academies for its own members and a minority for carefully vetted, loyal 
independents. Rules for accepting applicants into the teaching academies for 1980 
stipulated that at least sixty percent of incoming students had to be Bacthists.30 
Directives issued in 1986 raised the number to eighty percent. The remaining twenty 
percent went to Bacthists who were not accepted initially and independents. For 
independents to be accepted, they had to come from a "known family" (clf'ila macarilfa), 
all of whose members supported the party. They had to have at least one family member 
of the first or second degree (see Chapter Five) who was a full party member, and their 
parents and relatives had to be native Iraqis with either "Iraqi" or "Ottoman" extraction 
listed on their identity cards. Nobody of"Iranian" extraction (al-tabaciyya aZ:-:Jfrliniyya) 
could be accepted. To prove their fealty further, independents who got in had to promise 
to join the Bacth Party during their first year of study, and they could not graduate until 
they did so.31 From at least 1986 onwards, therefore, all new teachers coming out of 
Iraq's teaching academies were Bacthists. 
29. "Taqrir," ~amin sirr al-maktab al-mihni al-markazi~ilii maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qufr, July 23, 
1978,040-3-6:472-4. 
30. Mudlr ciim maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qu{r ~ilii al-rafiq ~amin sirr al-qufr al-mul;ltaram, June 19, 
1980, 088-5-3: 603. 
31. "I)awiibit al-qubiil fi kulliyyiit al-tarbiyya wa-1-kulliyyiit wa-1-maciihid wa-P aqsiim al-
mustathnii," ra~is dlwiin al-ri'iisa 'ilii wiziirat al-taclim al-ciiliwa-1-bal;lth al-cilmilal-maktab al-khii~~. July 
27, 1986, 087-1-1: 30-1. 
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These same criteria served as prerequisites for teachers to continue in their 
profession after graduation. At any time, if teachers in some way "proved the absence of 
their loyalty to Iraq, the leader, and the principles of the glorious 17-30 July revolution," 
they could be expelled from the teaching corps. The behavior of their family members 
could also effect their jobs. Teachers with relatives in an opposition party were almost 
always transferred outside one of the two education ministries to a less sensitive post.32 
Until the regulations were relaxed in 1987, having a relative expelled from the party or 
convicted of a crime could result in a similar punishment. 33 
Even in positions less sensitive than those "locked for the party," nobody in the 
·Iraqi state, Ba0thists or non-members, could be appointed to a position or hired without 
the hiring agency checking with the party first. This was one of the most important 
political controls that Hussein and the party kept over the state. Even if a person was not 
a party member, he had to have a clean record with no past membership for himself or his 
family members in opposition political parties (especially the Dacwa or communist 
parties). He had in other ways to show too that he accepted Bacthist rule. The Ba0 th's 
influence thus reached further than the pure size of its cadre within the state. 
Two examples of the party's relationship with other state institutions not made up 
entirely ofBa0 thists-local government and the National Assembly-illustrate in more 
. 32. Bacthist Iraq had separate ministries for "Education" (wiziirat al-tarbtyya) and "Higher 
Education and Scientific Research" (wiziirat al-taclfm al-ciilfwa-l-bal;th al-cilml). 
33. See 113-3-3: 48-79, for a series of regulations enacted from 1981 to 1992 regarding teacher 
conduct and requirements that they be Bacthists or be transferred outside the teaching corps under different 
conditions. 
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detail how the party's vetting process worked. The Bacth oversaw the activities oflocal 
administrative officials in a number of ways. Each governorate in Iraq had a governor 
(muJ:taft?:) that served under the Interior Ministry. Within governorates, counties (qagac) 
with their own chief officers (qa:Jimmaqam), and in counties were a series of 
municipalities (naJ:tiya) headed by municipal directors (mudir al-naJ:tiya). To fill these 
three offices the Minister of Local Government (wazfr al-J:tukm al-maJ:talll) sent a list of 
nominees to the president's office for Hussein to choose between. To make a decision, 
Hussein used his personal knowledge of the individuals nominated and information that 
he received from the party about the candidates. 34 These officials, especially the 
governors, were frequently Bacthists themselves. Even if they were not, however, their 
day-to-day activities brought them into contact with government employees who were 
Bacthists and local Bacthist officials on joint committees that usually also included 
representatives of the security services and relevant ministries or agencies. As an RCC 
member who led the Diyala branch for a month in 1985 commented in his report, "The 
current relations between the branch leadership and the administrative apparatus are 
positive. Direct cooperation occurs between the branch leadership and the comrade 
governor (who was in this case a Bacthist), and this applies·on the county and municipal 
34. Technically, county and municipal chiefs could also be appointed, demoted, or transferred by 
decision of the Council of Ministers and by recommendation from the Interior Ministry, but Hussein as 
president controlled the ultimate decisions from both of these bodies, making the decision, in reality, his. 
See 125-5-2: 148-65 for drafts of what became the "Governorates Law" (qiiniin al-mulJ,iija'{.iit). For the 
nominating process for governors and the heads of counties and municipalities see: 148-4-1: 1-317. 
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levels as well. The comrade members of the branch participate in many official 
committees. "35 
The administrative level below municipal directors was occupied by mukhtiir'fn 
(sing., mukhtiir) assigned to each local district or neighborhood (maJ:talla).36 Mukhtiir'fn 
were not all Bacthists and fell, like their direct superiors, under the Interior Ministry's 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, Bacthists received preference in being appointed, and the 
party worked closely with them to monitor the population and as part of its stated goal to 
maintain a connection with regular people. Accordingly, a 1987 "Study on Popular 
Mobilization and How to Improve It," written by the office of the Baghdad Bureau, 
instructed the party to "choose mukhtiir'fn in the neighborhoods that are capable and have 
social influence in the area in order to increase participation in mobilization activities."37 
Other BRCC files confirm the indication in this quote that local Bacth Party organizations 
themselves usually nominated mukhtiir'fn. In a case from Baghdad in 1999, one of the 
nominees passed up to the Party Secretariat to replace a retiring mukhtiir was a non-
Bacthist. The branch found him suitable regardless, however, because "he is one of the 
35. "~lstiliim mas~iiliya ~adnii," ~am'fn sirr qiyiidatfurc dtyiilii min mawqic ~adnii ~ua maktab 
~amiinat sirr al-qutr, Nov. 18, 1985, 029-2-3: 414. 
36. A mukhtiir was paid by the government to watch and report on his immediate surroundings, be 
it the families in the apartment building he lived in, a city block, small village, or other limited area. The 
mukhtiir worked under the head of his nii~tya, or neighborhood. The position pre-dated the Bacth, but 
after 1968 the Bacth had to approve all local government appointments, including the mukhtiirs. See the 
section on "The Bacthification of State Personnel" below. 
37. "(Diriisa can al-tacbra al-jamiih'friyya) wa-kayfzyat ta{Wirhii," 038-2-4: 162. 
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good·elements (canii.~ir) and cooperates completely with the party and the security· 
services. "38 
Comparably, the Bacth Party vetted candidates for the National Assembly and 
proffered its own party lists that included independents. The Bacth did this to prove its 
democratic leanings and political inclusiveness. Any independent on or offthe party's 
slate that was allowed to run, however, had to meet a list of conditions to ensure his or 
her loyalty to the regime. A BRCC boxfile containing documents about the 1996 
National Assembly elections includes assessments of all the people who were nominated 
or nominated themselves to become candidates. The criteria that the party bureaus used 
to assess the nominees was not completely uniform (some rejected partisans because they 
were not full members, for example, while others nominated them), but overall the 
criteria were consistent, particularly with regard to independents. 
Examples of the notations in two independents' assessments-one nominated and 
one denied-provides a sense for what the party considered important. The evaluation of 
the nominated independent reads as follows: 
Independent. He was not nominated on the Leading Party's slate. He has not been 
nominated previously for membership in the National Assembly. He depends on tribal 
support (al-cashiiairiyya) and his personal relationships. He believes in God and the 
principles of the glorious 17-30 July revolution. He participated in the glorious battle of 
Saddam's Qiidisiyya through his participation in the student military camps and by 
donating blood. He is earnest and carries responsibility. His reputation and that of his 
family is good. 39 
38. "Tarshz~ mukhtiirayn," mudfr cam maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~na mu~iija'{,at 
baghdiid/shu"iin al-mukhtiirzn, May 17, 1999,042-4-5:280. 
39. From a nomination assessment form found in 115-5-1: 4. 
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The first main criterion listed here refers to the nominee's social standing. In this case, 
the nominee's reliance on his tribal background could have cut both ways. On the one 
hand, the party wanted to co-opt tribal leaders who would be loyal to the Ba0thist cause 
and enlist their tribesmen to support it. On the other, the Ba0 th looked askance at 
tribalism for ideological reasons and considered it potentially dangerous if the regime ran 
afoul of the tribe in some fashion and triggered a dispute with it.40 As a result, other 
candidates were deemed "unsuitable" for candidacy by the Ba0 th for their over-reliance 
on tribal connections, but this independent's positives seem to outweigh the possible 
issues connected to his tribal support. Most notably, his "belief' in the Ba0 th's 
legitimacy and participation in one of its wars made him a good candidate, as did the fact 
that neither he nor any of his family appear to have been convicted of crimes or 
participation in an opposition party. The Ba0th rated his personal character highly, and 
his level of education helped too; he held a master's degree in chemistry.41 
In contrast, the assessment of the second independent, a teacher, read: 
Independent not on the party list. He has not been nominated for membership in the 
National Assembly previously. He does not have social influence. Previously he was 
sentenced to three years for impersonating an officer. He is a shifty character (shakh~ 
mahziiz) that is not suitable. Therefore we do not agree to nominate him.42 
40. Baram, Building, 25-31. Although Hussein depended on tribes for support in key positions in 
his regime, he had to weather a series of tribally organized coup attempts and local revolts beginning in 
1990. 
41. 115-5-1: 4. 
42. 115-5-1: 6. 
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If the party's evaluation was accurate, nominating this independent would not have 
bought it loyalty within a chunk of society. Furthermore, the party would look 
hypocritical for supporting a criminal when it placed so much emphasis on personal 
probity. 
For all of the Ba0 th's effort to indoctrinate its members so they would act on its 
behalf in government posts, being a party member did not always trump a Ba0 thist' s 
institutional allegiance. This seems to have been the case in the military and security 
services especially, both institutions whose officers built up group solidarity by training 
together in academies, whose members relied on each other for their lives, and who were 
consumed by their jobs and had little time for party work. Each had its own internal 
regulations, uniforms, symbols, and unitary structure separate from the Ba0 th's. 
Individuals in both too had to join the party, leading, inevitably, to many signing up 
simply to satisfy this prerequisite. In 1990, with the Iran-Iraq War over and Hussein 
beginning to demobilize his forces, the director of the Party Secretariat sent the 
president's office a study detailing the numbers of officers and enlisted men who had left 
the party after finishing their military service. In total, 119,556 soldiers left the party 
completely and a further 26,251 did not officially leave but had begun to shirk their party 
obligations (al-mutasarribzn).43 The exodus was so massive that although the 
Organization Committee discussed the study and recommended that Ba0 thists meet with 
the dropouts to persuade them to remain in the party, there was an air of resignation in its 
43. "Diriisa," mudlr cam maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~ua rrasat al-jumhuriyya/sikritlr ra~rs al-
jumhilriyya li-l-shu~un al-l:zizbiyya, Aug. 31, 1990, 104-3-1:276-7. 
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directive for "party organizations to deal with the situations that can possibly be 
corrected. As for the elements that insist on not continuing in the party apparatus, we see 
no benefit from requiring them to remain since the apparatus is, fundamentally, voluntary 
struggling work."44 The military, moreover, had a long institutional and patriotic history 
that predated the Bacth's assent, and many officers chafed at the ideological and 
command and control straightjacket into whlch the party put them.45 They resented too 
the imposition ofBacthists in high positions who did not earn their stripes. Hussein 
himself never served in the military but was appointed a general under al-Bakr and gave 
himself the army's highest title of Field Marshall after becoming president. 46 For their 
part, the secrecy kept by the security services bred its own loyalty and collective identity, 
and each service spied on the others in addition to the party, which created competition 
between them. Placing Bacthists into top state posts thus helped Hussein keep control 
over the state but it did not guarantee him total authority over its two potentially most 
dangerous institutions, which is why he also used the party in other ways to watch over 
them. 
44. This mass exodus of military men after the Iran-Iraq War is one of the reasons why party 
membership numbers dipped between 1986 and 1997 (see Appendix 1, Tabl1). "Dirlisa," mudir cam 
maktab ~amlin at sirr al-qutr ~ua ri~ lis at al-jumhiiriyya/sikrit'ir ra~'is al-jumhiiriyya li-l-shu~iin al-l;lizbiyya, 
Oct. 4, 1990, 104-3-1:271. 
45. Kevin M. Woods, Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey, 
Iraqi Perspectives Project: a View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam 's Senior Leadership (Joint 
Center for Operational Analysis, 2006), 10, 46. 
46. Baram, "Saddam's Power Structure," 95-6; Baram, "The Ruling Political Elite," 466-7. 
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The Bacthification ofState Institutions 
With its members ubiquitous throughout the Iraqi government, the Ba0 th Party 
also extended its organizational apparatus into state institutions, "honeycombing" their 
hierarchical structures and implanting party committees and censors that both openly and 
covertly monitored the institutions they oversaw.47 As with the Ba0 thification of its 
leadership, the longest standing and most developed party apparatus that existed within a 
state institution was found in the military. As mentioned above, the military bureau 
existed as part of~he Ba0 th's regular organizational apparatus and reported to the Party 
Secretariat. Unlike the civilian bureaus, however, beginning at least in 1986, Hussein 
assumed the title of General Secretary of the Military Bureau, giving him a direct line to 
the bureau within the party's chain-of-command. 48 The day-to-day operations of the 
bureau secretariat were run by a director and his deputies underneath Hussein. In 1986, 
they oversaw an office staff of 287 officials working in twenty departments. The 
departments supervised everything related to military life and the armed forces from 
salaries to the officers' and enlisted men's restaurants to the commissaries and personnel 
transfers. There were also more general departments of information (qism al-maczumat), 
security (qism al-:Jamn), and political guidance (hay:Jat at-tawjih al-siylisi) as well as a 
"cultural committee" like those discussed in Chapter Two. These four departments 
47. The word "honeycombing" is borrowed from Marr, 149. 
48. That is, instead of the bureau reporting to him through the Party Secretariat or the secretary for 
party affairs in the president's office. 
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within the military secretariat appear to have been the most active in ideological 
indoctrination, surveillance, and enforcing political decisions within the military.49 
The story of a section command member who lived with a military unit in 1985 at 
the war front on the Faw peninsula illustrates the kind of oversight the party exercised 
over the armed forces. 50 The member, who was fulfilling his obligation to perform 
"cohabitation" (mitcliyisha) as a political commissar, wrote that, 
My daily activity generally focused on accompanying the commander of the area (qiiW), 
comrade [name withheld], or the deputy commander ofthe area, comrade [name 
withheld] on th_eir daily rounds and their inspection of the bases and their oversight of the 
execution of the soldiers' daily obligations ... During these rounds I would add some 
instructions after the comrades spok~ to the soldiers in order to arouse their ardor and 
deepen their awareness of the aspects of the Persian aggression against us and to clarify 
the positions of our wise leadership, steadfast against it. 51 
The member encouraged the fighters to follow practical soldiering guidelines such as 
safeguarding their weapons and wearing protective clothing, including gas masks. In an 
exasperated reproach of the conditions under which the army had to fight, he described 
the phone lines as inexcusably poor; the units in his area could rarely get in touch with 
headquarters in the rear yet still had to attain their permission to launch operations. 
Frequently the phone was broken altogether. "Is this acceptable?" he asked. "The region 
[these units] are responsible for is one of the most dangerous in this area. This is proved 
49. "Malak al-maktab al-caskari," al-rafiq calf !Jasan al-majfd al-maktab al-caskarf~ila al-rafiq 
~amfn sirr al-qiyada al-qufriya -- ~amin sirr al-maktab al-caskarf al-mul;ltaram, Oct. 1, 1986, 025-4-2: 154-
64. 
50. Although the Popular Army was a kind of party militia and parallel army to the regular army, 
party commissars exercised the same oversight and political control over regular military units. 
51. "Taqrir muciiyisha r)imn qaW al-rashid al-mutaqaddam al-jaw 191211985 -20/4/1985," al-
muqatil al-rafiq [name withheld], 040-1-6: 565. 
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by the fact that I don't know Cajhal) who is responsible for it. I leave it to whomever is 
to take the necessary measures."52 
Like its civilian brethren, the military bureau fanned out into its own branches, 
sections, divisions, and cells, which reached inside every military unit. Tables 3 and 4 in 
Appendix 2 provide a sense of how the bureau expanded and contracted over the years 
along with the size of the armed forces and the percentage of total soldiers in the party. 
Unsurprisingly, the military bureau seems to have reached its peak personnel size, if not 
organizational, in the mid-1980s during the Iran-Iraq War before decreasing to its lowest 
point in 2002. The decrease in personnel, however, was due primarily to a reduction in 
supporters and partisans as the number of full members at all levels grew to 130,103 after 
dipping to 26,415 in the inter-war years. 53 
As part of the more general process of the Bacthification of education (tabcfth al-
taczrm), which included the controls on the teaching academies mentioned above, the 
Bacth honeycombed schools like it did the military, designating party organizations to 
52. 040-1-6: 569. There are many reports in the BRCC similar to this one that give extensive 
information about the conditions on the Iraqi front during the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars. They could provide 
a fertile source of information for a history of either war from the Iraqi perspective. 
53. Military organizations also held their own meetings and filed reports showing that they were at 
least as active as their civilian counterparts. In 1988, the bureau claimed to have carried out 1,214 cultural 
sessions, 30,587 cultural discussions, and conducted 25,852 research studies. Its respective organizations 
supposedly participated in 427,500 visits to other party units, and it claimed to have 407 party libraries 
filled with ideological material and Hussein's speeches, among other statistics. 023-4-4: 263-6. 
In addition to military party organizations, a document from a 1984 boxfile entitled "The 
Organizational Structure of the Bureaus of the Military Office" records the existence of a ''National 
Security Branch Command" (qiylidatfurc aPamn al-qawmt). Records of this branch were not found in the 
other military bureau documents examined for this study, but if it existed in other years that suggests the 
party honeycombed the security services and police as well. In 1984, at least, the document lists twelve 
police divisions split evenly into two sections along with one section each for the GSD (containing five 
divisions) and the GID (seven divisions). 098-5-3: 60. 
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supervise and work within them in order to better organize, recruit, monitor, and 
indoctrinate students and teachers. At the end of 1989, the director of the Party 
Secretariat issued a set of instructions for how the party could extended its reach into the 
school system. According to his memorandum, the lower party organizations would 
establish cells within schools overseen by particularly competent divisional leaders. The 
divisions would then appoint one full member as part of a cell who would act as a full-
time Bacthist administrator within each school. This administrator was to coordinate 
with the school's representative ofthe National Union of Students and Youth oflraq (al-
:Jiti/;lid al-watan'f li-talaba wa-shabab al-cirliq), particularly with regard to activities 
planned on national occasions and celebrations, and in order to ensure the ideological 
purity of the "Thursday Word" ( kalimat yawm al-kham'fs) when the principal or other 
school official gave a sermon to the students each week. 54 Upon execution of the plan, 
teachers had to immediately join the party or else the Bacth would "take fundamental 
measures" against them in conjunction with the Education Ministry. Just as with teachers 
found to have a relative in an opposition party, this usually meant transferring them to an 
administrative position within the Education Ministry or out of it entirely. 55 In addition 
to the regular school year, party activities were to continue into summer vacation. By 
organizing schools into the party apparatus, the Secretariat's director explicitly hoped to 
achieve a "direct influence in [students'] ideological and academic construction 
54. "al-Wal;zda al-tantlmiyya," mudlr ciim maktab "amiinat sirr al-qutr "ilii al-makiitib al-
tan'{.lmiyyafi al-qutr kiifa, Dec. 21, 1989, 073-3-4: 76-78. The phrase "proper preparation" (al-"icdiid al-
sallm) has the connotation of proper ideological preparation. 
55. 073-3-4: 76-80. 
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(bintF'ihim) at the same time," "to improve the effectiveness of spreading revolutionary 
and struggling values into the souls of the students and the teaching corps," and "to 
recruit the entire school into the ranks of the party."56 
To monitor the ministries, the Bacth elected "party committees" (al-lijan al-
/:tizbiyya) made up of members employed in them. The committees were instructed to 
look out for and put a stop to or inform the party leadership about any "negative 
phenomena" present in the ministries, a phrase that could mean crime, corruption, 
inappropriate behavior, or simple inefficiency.57 In one case of a minor offense thwarted, 
a member of the party committee within the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific 
Research heard that the answers to a nationwide accounting exam had been stolen. He 
quickly rounded up some other party members to investigate and, with the help of some 
Bacthist students, obtained a copy of the stolen questions, identified the culprit, and 
arrested him. 58 
The committees also assigned members to act as "internal control officials" 
(mas:Jul al-raqaba al-dakhiliyya) in companies that fell under the purview of their 
ministries. These officials kept in regular contact wjth both the companies' directors and 
the Bacthists who worked in them. "A meeting with the director of the company 
occurred," a report from one such official reads, 
56. 073-3-4: 75-80. 
57. "al-Lajiin al-l;izbiyya," mudir ciim maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~ilii qiyiidiit al-furuc al-
l;izbiyya kiifa, Oct. 25, 1997, 042-4-6: 577. 
58. "Tasr"ib ~as~ila ~imtil;iiniyya," sikrit"ir al-lijiin al-l;izbiya ~ua maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qufr, June 
27, 2000, 042-4-6: 263-4. 
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He is one of the good, cooperative, successful elements in his work and explained that in 
the company there is cooperation between him and the comrade party members for the 
sake of improving work and safeguarding the security and integrity of the company, and, 
indeed, everything is proceeding in a natural fashion and there is not a single problem. 
As for the security situation amongst [the company's] associates, the comrades 
who work in the enterprise are acquainted with and have knowledge about the associates 
who work in the company, and no notable security situation exists. 59 
The control officials maintained an open relationship with the companies to heighten the 
awareness of the party's presence, spreading the seeds of deterrence amongst their 
directors and employees. At the same time, they used the Bacthists also employed there 
to secretly verify the directors' information and to extend their surveillance deeper into 
the workforce to uncover issues the director might not be aware of. 
Since the Bacth Party worked directly for the regime leadership to enforce its 
political dictates, it was responsible for ensuring that those dictates were carried out. 
When a state institution posed a danger to the leadership the party thus had to both 
neutralize the danger and ensure that the Bacthist State as a whole still served the 
institution's function. Likewise, when an institution fell short in its output or abilities, 
the Bacth had to pick up the slack. As the party supervised the entire government, at one 
time or another it was forced to intercede in almost every arena. Consequently, although 
the party rarely entered some areas of state while actually constructing dual or parallel 
structures of other government institutions, it kept itself apprised of the goings-on in 
every ministry and agency as much as it could, ready at all times to intervene. 
59. "Maclilmiit," mudfr cam maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~ua sikritiiriyyat al-lijiin al-]Jizbiyya, 
May 13, 2000, 042-4-6: 352. 
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Parallel Party Structures 
As with its organizational structure, the most obvious state institution the Bacth 
paralleled was the military. The Popular Army began as a party militia in 1970. At first, 
it was restricted to party members but then opened up to all citizens. A 1986 report from 
one of its installations in Baghdad explained that the Popular Army was created to act as 
"the strong arm of the party and the revolution, to defend their existence and goals, and to 
be a second army that shares the national army's missions to defend national and pan-
Arab sovereignty (al-siyada al-wataniyya wa-l-qawmiyya) against external attack."60 
The Popular Army served, in other words, as a check on the regular army to make sure it 
could not carry out a coup. Before the Iran-Iraq War it protected strategic assets, acted as 
a rural security force, guarded the frontier, and stayed in and around Baghdad to protect 
the Bacthist leadership. 61 During the war, it also served on the front lines as much to 
keep an eye on the army as to fight Iran.62 The Popular Army also allowed Bacthists to 
perform their military service without joining the regular army with its longer service 
commitment and more rigorous training. Ironically, the Popular Army proved incredibly 
unpopular. It suffered large numbers of deserters and proved a drain on the state and 
60. "Khita al-tadrfb al-camaliyyiit li-sanna 1986," qiyiidat mantaqat baghdiid li-1-jaysh al-shacbf, 
089-4-4: 128. 
61. Christine Moss Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World (Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution, 1984), 99-100. 
62. Ofra Bengio, "Iraq," in Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume Five 1980-81, ed. Haim 
Shaked, Colin Legum, and Daniel Dishon (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1982), 584-5. 
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private enterprise's resources. As a result, Hussein dissolved it in 1991.63 In contrast, the 
Republican Guard and Special Republic Guard counterbalanced the regular military more 
effectively. 64 
In non-security related areas the party rarely carried out the leadership's directives 
itself but exercised its role as political driver and administrative supervisor behind the 
regular bureaucracy. A campaign in the middle of the Iran-Iraq War, for example, as its 
adverse econo:qllc effects began to bite, saw the regime try to squeeze more productivity 
out of Iraqi workers, mostly through the Bacth's union pr9xies. In an attempt to mobilize 
and motivate the workers behind the campaign, a report to Hussein said the party, the 
unions, and the state administration had come together as "one energy" (Jiiqa wii/:tida) to 
push for its success. 65 The slogans attached to the campaign epitomized Hussein and the 
Bacth's general attempt to tie together Iraqis' patriotism with their personal honor in 
63. For an example of a report (there are many) including information about deserters from the 
Popular Army see: 026-3-6: 133. As an example of the army's drain on resources, see a report that owners 
of private companies were both firing and threatening to fire workers who volunteered for the Popular 
Army, urging them not to do so: "Tatawwuc," "am'fn sirr qiyadat maktab tanf_'fm al-shumal "ita maktab 
"amanat sirr al-quty, Sept. 26, 1990,041-3-7: 54. The RCC decision desolving the Popular Army can be 
found in 041-3-7: 60. 
64. The relationships between the Republican and Special Republican Guards and the army has 
been covered extensively in the secondary literature and nothing read in the BRCC for this study seems to 
contradict or add to what has already been written, so I will not elaborate here. Woods, et. al., 25, 27, 46, 
56, 58; Hashim, "Saddam Hussein and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq," 23-5; Alani, "Saddam's Support 
Structure," 44-5; Faleh A. Jabar, "The Iraqi Army and Anti-Army: Some Reflections on the Role of the 
Military," The Adelphi Papers 354 (Jan. 2003): 123. 
The Popular Army was not the only parallel militia Hussein set up, but it was the only one 
officially connected to the party. In 1991, Hussein also created the Jerusalem Army (jaysh al-quds), and, in 
1994, Saddam's Fedayeen (jida"iyyii saddam) was established. The BRCC contains a number of files and 
documents related to each. See also Woods et. al., 48-54. 
65. "Taqr'fr ~awl al-tacbi"a al-camaliyya bi-khu~ii~ "Tqaj~aif"ujiir al-"acmal al-"itjafzyya "ita 
sayyid'f al-ra"Ts al-qii"id al-munatjil ~addam ~usayn al-mu~taram, Feb. 7, 1984, 023-2-6: 107-114. 
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order to mobilize them behind the party and the regime's policies-in this case to raise 
production in order to support the war effort. "No good comes to he who does not add 
extra energy to his daily work quantitatively and qualitatively for the sake of the great 
Iraq," read one. "Your work is your honor, and he who does not work has no honor," 
said another. And, "All of the good workers are sons of the revolution whether they are 
Ba 0 thists or not. "66 
In addition to overseeing programs where it took an active role, the Bacth Party 
monitored the affairs of the rest of the Iraqi state from behind the scenes. It did this not 
just through its members who worked in state institutions but also by shadowing their 
activities. The BRCC contains many files, for example, that consist primarily of carbon 
copies sent directly from different ministries and the council of ministers simply to keep 
the party informed. Most' of the information about subjects such as building programs, 
agricultural and economic statistics, and amendments to existing legislation is of a 
technical or administrative nature and includes few, if any, political considerations. But 
the party needed to know about them because they all could conceivably require their 
attention in the future. The ministries and agencies too knew that the party was watching 
in one way or another and so to protect themselves it was best to document their 
activities. As each of their memoranda to the party ended: "Please be informed and take 
whatever actions you believe are appropriate. "67 
66. "aPitiir al-ciim li-khutut raj" kifli'at al-fard," ra'fs al-'iti/Jiid al-ciim li-niqiibiit al-camiil 'ilii 
al-'iti/Jiidiit al-niqiibiyyafi al-mul}iifa?:iit kiifalal-niqiibiit al-ciima kiifa, 023-2-6: 86-93. 
67. See, e.g., boxfiles 021-2-7 and033-4-7, both ofwhich are entitled "Decisions ofthe Council 
of Ministers." 
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The Ba cthification of Social Institutions 
Along with the organization of state bodies, Hussein and the party Bacthized 
Iraq's major social institutions in an attempt to usurp these institutions' legitimacies, 
power, capabilities, and the influence of their leaders amongst their networks of 
associates. Hussein and the Bacth did so by co-opting or replacing their leaders and 
bringing their appointments under party and Bacthist State supervision. At the same 
time, the Ba0th recruited amongst the institutions' memberships and took direct and 
indirect control of the administration of their organizations. In so doing, Hussein and the 
Bacth sought to eliminate or blunt the alternative conceptions of normative political and 
social order that these institutions and their leaders propagated in favor of Husseini 
Bacthism. To explain why and how this process occurred, this section will compare and 
contrast two social institutions: Iraq's tribes and its religious establishments. 
The Tribes 
Between the tribes and religion, the former served a more narrow focus in society, 
providing for their members' collective security and carrying with them individual and 
familial notions of honor and conduct that governed their personal interactions. Even 
though some tribes had clans in other countries, the tribes did not threaten Iraq's 
existence. As tribes, they did not seek a state of their own. The tribes did serve to protect 
their members from state intrusion, however, and thus clashed with the government when 
it tried to impose its policies such as taxation, military conscription, and land reform. 
Tribal identity in twentieth century Iraq was not all-encompassing. Tribesmen were 
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professionals and peasants, they lived in cities and the countryside, and members of the 
same tribe could be both Sunni and Shici. Until Hussein rehabilitated them in 1991, the 
tribes represented a backward stage of the Arabs' development in Bacthist thought. Their 
sub-state identity and tendency to have long-running feuds divided the Arab people and 
detracted from the Bacth's attempt to unite them under the common umbrella of 
nationalism. As a result, Hussein Bacthized the tribes in an attempt to take advantage of 
the pride they took in their martial and manly qualities by using them to help provide 
stability in their traditional areas and amongst their own memberships when his security 
and police forces were stretched with other tasks. Hussein entrusted the tribes with these 
tasks on the theory that once he secured their support, their honor required them to 
uphold their promises to whom they pledged allegiance. Because the bonds between 
tribes were fluid and inexact, and because tribal identities did not necessarily conflict 
with intra-national ties, nor did they always constitute an Iraqi's main conception of self, 
Hussein put less emphasis on the Bacthification of tribal structures themselves. Instead, 
he preferred to work through tribal shaykhs in order to influence their tribesmen. 
From the beginning of his reign, but particularly in the 1990s, Hussein courted 
Iraq's tribal shaykhs who, depending on their level within a tribal hierarchy, could 
oversee social networks of thousands of individuals, which the Bacth hoped to recruit into 
the party, draft into its army, and otherwise mobilize for support. As one party document 
put it, "The support of the state and at its head, al-sayyidthe president leader (God save 
him), for the heads of the tribes (ru:Jasli:J al-cashli:Jir), clans Cafkhiidh, sing.fakhdh), and 
familial notables (wujuh al-qawm) aims to assemble all possible energies in the battle of 
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righteousness that our nation fights against the nation of enmity (qawm al-cadwan)."68 
Hussein supported shaykhs in exchange for their loyalty. Beginning in the early 1990s, 
the Bacth required shaykhs to officially register with their local administrations as the 
heads of tribes and clans; starting around 1999, an "office of tribal affairs" (maktab· 
shu:>iin al-cashii:>ir) inside the president's office had to recognize them as well.69 This 
brought the shaykhs under government administration for the first time, at least as 
indicated in the BRCC. For the Bacthist State to recognize a shaykh, he had to 
demonstrate a personal record of service and show that his tribe supported the regime and 
the shaykh as its leader. To do this, many shaykhsjoined the Bacth Party, attended 
national occasions with their tribesmen, and served in the army, playing up the medals 
and honors they received as proof of their qualifications. They also had the state certify . 
the tribal elections which they won to obtain their positions. 7° Conversely, the state 
denied sanction to shaykhs whom the party or security services considered "un-
68. "LiqiFiit," mudfr ciim maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~ilii qiyiidiit al-furiic al-IJ,izbiyya, Dec. 21, 
1993, 123-4-7:425. 
69. The BRCC does not indicate exactly when shaykhs had to start registering, but references 
found for this study refer to the registration of one shaykh with a county government in 1992. 039-4-3: 
236. Beginning in 1999, files from the president's office contain tens if not hundreds of petitions from 
shaykhs throughout the country asking the tribal affairs bureau to recognize them, suggesting that they all 
had to comply with a new regulation. 
70. See, e.g., a petition from a shaykh to al-~ustiidh al-forjil mumaththil al-sayyid ra~fs 
jumhiiriyyat a/- ciriiq al-qii~id ~addiim IJ,usayn (l:zaf?.uhu allah wa raciihu) al-sayyid riikiin al-muiJ,taram, 
039-4-3: 236. 
168 
influential" (ghayr mu3aththir) and whom did not actively support the regime's initiatives 
and participate in its events.71 
The Bacthjudged the shaykhs' loyalty on their abilities to maintain law-and-order 
in their tribes' traditional areas, mobilize their tribesmen behind the Bacthist State's 
policies, and police their members. Hussein first began to work through shaykhs in the 
1980s to elicit their help in providing security in rural and border areas and around 
critical infrastructure installations such as oil wells with his other assets tied up in the war 
effort. 72 In 1991, Hussein famously met with delegations of shaykhs for the first time at 
the presidential palace, a signal that contrary to party ideology, tribes now had a place in 
the Bacth's ruling order. The breakdown of the party and local security apparatuses 
during that year's uprisings, in addition to the economic effects of the international 
embargo following the Gulf War, the dissolution of the Popular Army, and the need to 
fill the void in his security regime left by hundreds of thousands of deserters, left Hussein 
with fewer human and material resources to use to police the country. Hussein looked to 
71. E.g., "[name withheld]," mudir cam maktab ~amanat sirr al-qutr ~ita alWan al-ri'asa, May 31, 
1999, 039-2-5: 15. 
72. A 1984 security service study, for example, discussed how to arm tribes near the Syrian 
border. It suggested doing so via the heads of tribes and their clans who would give out weapons to their 
followers and then collect them when their services were no longer needed. Indeed, the BRCC contains 
whole boxfiles about the weapons it handed out to tribesmen through their shaykhs complete with the 
weapons' serial numbers and their assignees. As might have been expected, the Bacth never saw .many of 
these weapons again and although the tribes used them to help maintain security, they also committed 
crimes with them and used them in inter-tribal disputes. The tactic of distributing weapons to the tribes 
could consequently backfire. "Dirasat mawfjiic taslfl:z qism min al-casha~ir al- 0arabiyya caza al-sharft al-
l:zudiidiwa-1-taw#yyat bi-shu'nha," Dec. 29, 1984, 080-2-6: 82-5; 031-1-4. On Arab tribes used to guard 
oil wells see: "Muqtaral:z," mudir cam maktab 'amanat sirr al-qutr ~ua al-rafiq wazfr al-dakhiliyya, Nov. 5, 
1991, 059-4-6: 356. 
the shaykhs to fill that void. 73 Tribes had to register with the state too, and the tribal 
affairs department kept statistics on them, noting the number of clans in the tribe, the 
names of their shaykhs, the size of their total memberships, and the number of people 
within their "fighting force" (al-quwwa al-qutaliyya).74 In exchange for his support, 
Hussein expected the shaykhs to use the manpower at their disposal, and the BRCC 
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contains many reports about the party coordinating with them and the security services to 
track down "saboteurs," army deserters, and criminals within the tribes' own ranks.75 
In exchange for government sanction, Hussein insisted that shaykhs demonstrate 
more allegiance to the Ba0 thist Trinity than to their tribes, and to subordinate their tribal 
customs to the needs of the state. Just like with families, Hussein held the shaykhs and 
tribes responsible for turning in fellow tribesmen who committed crimes. They expected 
them to refrain from protecting their members wanted by the Ba0 thist State. And the 
party ordered them not to seek revenge for their fellows whom the government killed. 
On the contrary, Hussein encouraged shaykhs to kill their own criminal or "agent" 
tribesmen. According to Baram, this was a perversion of traditional tribal codes and a 
73. Jabar, "Shaykhs and Ideologues," 31. 
74. "Ta1ab a1-madcii [name withheld]," ~amin sirr qiyiidatfurc al-"anbiir ~ua maktab ~amiinat sirr 
al-qu{r, June 19, 1999, 045-3-6: 265-6. For an example of a table oftribal statistics see: "al-Haykal al-
tan'{.imiwa-1-quwwa a1-cumiimiyya wa-1-quwwa a1-qutii1iyya li-cashirat [name withheld]," 045-3-6: 279. 
75. In one case, communication between a section secretary and leadership member and the 
member's brother who was the shaykh of a tribe living in the marsh areas resulted in the capture of forty 
opposition movement members and deserters hiding there. Mudir maktab ~amiinat sirr a1-qufr ~ua a1-rafiq 
nii~ib ~am in sirr qiyiidat qup- a1-ciriiq al-mul:ztaram, Sept. 28, 1992, 119-2-7: 310. See also, "Muqtaral:ziit," 
mudir cam maktab ~amiinat sirr a1-qufr ~na diwiin a1-ri~iisa, Aug. 1, 1994, 102-2-3: 470. 
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reversal of the tribes' original purpose. 76 Even before 1991, three shaykhs wrote to 
Hussein after a few of their tribesman committed an offense, exhibiting the type of 
loyalty the regime expected: "We pledged to you on our souls and our possessions and 
our honor, and on everything that is dear and precious, to be faithful to the revolution and 
its great leader. If it is proved that those mentioned are the ones who committed the 
event (l:zadith), we will soon execute them ourselves.'m Additionally, the Ba0 th counted 
on the shaykhs' influence amongst their tribesmen to encourage them to volunteer in the 
military and government militias and to stop what the party considered were "mistaken" 
or "un-civilized" religious and tribal practices such as the self-mutilation common in 
popular Shici rites and shooting off guns at celebratory occasions (:r.ahirat :Jiflaq al-
ciylirlit al-nliriyya). 78 
The BRCC shows that the shaykhs did not always follow through on the strictures 
that the Bacthist State placed upon them. Security Committee reports from the mid-
1990s in particular list tribal disputes, blood feuds between tribes and state officials who 
killed or otherwise harmed a tribe member, and the protection by tribes of criminals and 
deserters, as regular occurrences which the reports' authors believed damaged local 
76. Baram claims that this practice is a perversion of normal tribal codes. ''Neo-Tribalism," 12. 
77. A petition from three shaykhs to Saddam Hussein, 041-2-1: 725. There is no date on the 
petition, but it is from a boxfile labeled, "The Presidency of the Republic 1988." 
78. "cAqd nadwa," mas~iil tan?:imiit maysiin wa-wasi! ~na maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qu{r, June 15, 
1995, 037-4-6: 169-70; "Mumiirasiit," mudir cam maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qu{r ~ua al-rafoq mas~iili al-
tan?:imiit al-l]izbiyya al-mul]taramin, March 29, 1997, 123-5-5: 212. 
security. 79 The latter offense apparently occurred with enough frequency in the Basra 
and Dhi Qar branches in the south that in 1994 the regime made the shaykhs in those 
areas sign a pledge that no deserters or dodgers existed within their tribes, and, if they 
did, the tribes would report them. 80 Yet, by making the shaykh of a tribe a state 
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sanctioned position and the Bacth's approval of shaykhs to their posts subject to tests of 
allegiance, by conditioning the legal existence of the tribe on government approval, and 
by redirecting tribal honor codes to guard the welfare of the Bacthist State instead of the 
tribe itself, Hussein at least partially transformed Iraq's tribes into Bacthist support 
networks. When Hussein called the Bacth Party "the tribe of all the tribes" in 1992, he 
did not so much "tribalize" the party as Bacthize the tribes. Even in 1994 during the 
height of Hussein's "Neo-Tribalism," a Bacth Party symposium urged its participants "to 
prioritize Bacthist principles and overcome all tribal, familial, and personal 
manifestations, and to see to the welfare of the party, first and foremost."81 
Religion 
Hussein tried to Bacthize Iraq's religious establishments more comprehensively 
than the tribes because religion was more of a threat to him and the Bacth' s authority and 
79. See, e.g., 123-4-7: 421-5. 
80. Mudlr cam maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~ua al-rafiq nii~ib ~amTn sirr qiyiidat qutr al-ciriiq, 
March26, 1994, 123-4-7:220. 
81. Baram sees Hussein's comment as evidence of the tribalization of the party instead of the 
Ba0thification of the tribes. Baram, ''Neo-Tribalism," 18. Mudlr ciim maktab ~amiinat sirr ql-qutr ~ilii al-
rafiq nii~ib ~amTn sirr qiyiidat qu{r al-ciriiq, Jan. 2, 1994, 123-4-7: 723. 
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legitimacy on a number of levels. Unlike tribal concepts and solidarities, religious 
worldviews competed directly with the Bacth's contention to provide "a general 
philosophy in life," and it carried not just a normative but a moral aspect derived from 
heavenly authority. A true believer would find it difficult to give up on fundamental 
political~ social, and spiritual principles of his faith in order to take on the Bacth's 
worldview. Like tribal identities, Iraq's religious and sectarian identities could split the 
country instead of unite it, especially considering its history of minority Sunni 
dominance. At the same time, Hussein could not show himself to be anti-religious even 
if he wanted to blunt its effects, as Islam both spiritually and culturally was too much a 
part of the identity of most Iraqis. 
Compounding these differences, Shici Islam's two holiest cities, Najafand 
Karbala, sat on Iraqi soil, as did many of its other important shrines. Along wit4 the 
Iranian city of Qom, Shicism's most authoritative leaders, the "sources of emulation" 
(mariijic al-taqlfd, sing. marjac), lived there. Unlike their Sunni counterparts, many of 
whom had been connected to the ruling authority in some fashion for centuries, the Shici 
religious leaders were independent ofthe state. Although some of them occasionally 
accepted its money in return for official support, their main source of fmancing came 
from their "emulators": Shici followers from around the world who chose one marjac and 
abided by his edicts. 82 Using these donations, these leaders also oversaw their own 
religious schools, which accepted students from many countries and competed with less 
82. A.K.S Lambton, "A Reconsideration of the Position ofthe Marja' al-Taqlid and the Religious 
Institution," Studia Islamica 20 (1964): 115-35. 
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prestigious state run academies. What is more, during the main Shici holidays 
commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, Najaf and Karbala saw crowds of 
hundreds of thousands and often millions of pilgrims from throughout the Shi ci universe. 
They tended to congregate in mass processions to different Shici shrines and engaged in 
highly emotional rituals. From the late 1960s through 1977, these turned into anti-regime 
demonstrations where the heavy hand of the Bacth Party's early policies against the Shici 
religious establishment mixed with Shicism's traditional feelings of dispossession and the 
modem Iraqi state's institutional discrimination. The marlijic and the Dacwa Party 
helped to fuel these protests. 83 The Shica are not a monolithic bloc in Iraq. Many are 
secular and evince greater loyalty to historically Arab, tribal values over religious ones, 
as the majority of Iraqi Shica converted from Sunnism only in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. 84 Hussein did not want to take any chances, however, during 
the Iran-Iraq War, when the leaders of Shici Iran's "Islamic revolution" appealed to their 
Iraqi counterparts to overthrow Hussein on religious grounds. Nor did he want the 
83. Nakash, The Shi'is, 144-5; Faleh A. Jabar, The Shicite Movement in Iraq (London: Saqi Books, 
2003), 208-13; Rodger Shanahan, "The Islamic Da0 wa Party: Past Development and Future Prospects," 
Middle East Review of International Affairs 8 (June 2004): 18; Joyce N. Wiley, The Islamic Movement of 
Iraqi Shicas (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 51-2; Hannah Batatu, "Shici Organizations in 
Iraq: Al-Dacwah al-Islamiyah, and al-Mujahidin," Shicism and Social Protest, ed. Juan R.I. Cole and Nikki 
R. Keddie (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 194; Chibli Mallat, "Religious militancy in 
contemporary Iraq: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr and the Sunni-Shia paradigm," Third World Quarterly 10 
(April1988): 724; Amatzia Baram, "Two Roads to Revolutionary Shicite Fundamentalism in Iraq," in 
Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott 
Appleby (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 557; Tripp, 216-17; and Farouk-Sluglett and 
Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 198. 
84. See note 43 on page 242. 
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Dacwa Party to establish roots amongst the majority of his population, which he counted 
on to staffhis army and fill the Bacth Party's ranks. 
As a result of all of the above factors, Hussein made the Bacthification of Iraq's 
religious establishments a priority. Hussein directed his most rigorous Bacthification 
efforts at Shici leaders and institutions but also concerned himself with weeding out 
Islamist currents amongst their Sunni counterparts. In so doing, Hussein not only tried to 
control the various elements of these establishments-their positions of authority, 
education systems, and liturgies-in order to neutralize their influence, he also attempted 
to transform them into pro-Bacthist organizations and built alternatives to compete with 
them. These alternatives, and Hussein's version oflslam generally, had a bland, generic 
quality to it. It was explicitly non-sectarian; in contrast to ethnicity, the Bacth did not 
keep statistics on sect in any document found for this study. It simply categorized Iraqis 
as "Muslim" for both Sunnis and Shica. Indeed, as with the tribes and state officials, 
Hussein cared about a religious person or cleric's loyalty and subservience to him and the 
Bacth more than his religious proclivities. Consequently, in his own pro-religious 
policies, Hussein stuck to basic Islamic symbols that Sunnis and Shica could agree upon: 
the centrality of universal Muslim faith (see Chapter Three), of the Qurcan, praise for the 
Prophet Muhammad and other commonly revered Islamic figures, and the importance of 
shrines and mosques. 
In order to bridge the sectarian divide and promote enmity toward Iran, Hussein's 
version of Islam had a strong Arab component. This allowed Hussein to portray Islam as 
a part of Arab nationalist history and thus to subsume it under Bacthist ideology, as he 
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did with tribalism, and, consequently, to justify his takeover of religious institutions. It 
proved particularly useful since many of the marajic in Najaf and Karbala whose 
influence he wanted to neutralize were originally Iranian. It too provided an excuse in 
the early 1980s to deport anybody in the majority Shici south with "Iranian origin" 
(tabaciyya 3 franiyya) on their identity cards.85 As discussed in Chapter Five, this might 
have been a cover for an anti-Shici policy, as many have argued, but the BRCC does not 
necessarily support that view. Overall, although much has been made in the secondary 
literature about the Bacth's taking on Islamic language in the 1990s and launching the 
"Faith Campaign" in 1993, the BRCC shows that these phenomena, albeit more public 
f 
expressions of support for Islam by the regime than previously, followed in the footsteps 
of its earlier strategies. 
Like with the tribes, Hussein and the Bacth Party targeted religious leaders as 
ways to influence their followers. The BRCC illustrates that unless a religious leader 
made his opposition to the regime clear from the beginning, the Bacth Party rarely first 
used violence to induce him to cooperate. Instead, a Bacthist delegation would meet with 
the leader to explain the party's position on a particular matter and ask him for his public 
support in exchange for financial or other material backing, official recognition, and 
freedom of action in the leader's apolitical activities,. These meetings, of course, also 
served as warnings that if the leader did not cooperate the Bacth would find a way to 
remove him. The Bacth worked through both Sunni and Shici men of religion to 
85. Makiya, Republic of Fear, 135-6. 
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persuade their supporters by encouraging them to appear on state television and attend 
national occasions, join the Ministry ofEndowments and Religious Affairs' "religious 
education" (i.e., propaganda) committees (lijiin al-tawciyya al-diniyya), and issue official 
rulings ifatliwii, sing.fatwii) that conformed with the Bacth Party's wishes.86 As with the 
PMOs and pan-Arab professional associations Hussein supported (see below), he 
recognized that religious support would be more effective if it came from a traditional 
source of religious leadership. 
The Bacth also took direct and indirect control over the appointment of men of 
religion to their posts and the content of their preaching. For mid-day Friday prayers, the 
main communal gathering for both Sunni and Shici Muslims during a normal week, the 
Bacth only allowed officially sanctioned preachers to deliver the weekly sermon. The 
Bacth also censored preachers' comments.87 The Bacth similarly controlled the men of 
religion who worked in the Shici l;lusayniyyiit.88 To determine whom to appoint as Friday 
86. For a fascinating account of a Ba0thist delegation's discussions with the Shici religious 
establishment's leaders in 1997 when the Ba0th asked them to issue rulings against the display of pictures 
of Shici saints in public places see: Waz'ir aP awqiif wa-l-shu~iin al-diniyya ~ua rr iisat al-jumhiiriyya-
maktab sikrit'ir majlis aPamn al-qawm'i, May 18, 1997,028-5-1: 583-5. For other examples of attempts to 
use men of religion in order to benefit from their influence in different media see: "Taqr'ir muniisabat I 0 
mu~arram wa-ziyiirat aParbac'in 20 ~afar," maktab tan?:'im baghdad, Oct. 17, 1989,001-5-4: 6-9; 
"Taqr'ir," ra~'is alWiin al-ri~iisa ~ua wiziirat aPawqiifwa-l-shu~iin al-diniyya-al-maktab al-khii~~. Sept. 9, 
1984, 046-3-6: 620; "~Jtbiic khiya," mudir cam maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qufr ~ilii qiyiidiit al-furiic al-
~izbiyya kiifa, 123-4-7: 446. 
87. "al-Muqtara~iit al-muhimma wa-l-khii~~a bi-warjca rijiil al-din wa-allat'i ~ aqurrat fi ~ijtimiic 
al-rafoq ~umanii~ sirr al-qiyiidiit al-furiic rjimn tan?:'imiit al-mu~iifa?:iit al-wasat," tan?:'imiit mu~iifa?:iit ,al-
wasat, 089-1-3: 163. 
88. See, e.g., a party report from 1983 about the Shi0 i holiday commemorating the martyrdom of 
Imam Hussein on the 1Oth of the month of Mu~arram in which it claimed that all of the readers of the story 
of Hussein were officially licensed and each praised the party, the revolution, and the leader during their 
remarks: "Muniisabat casharat mu~arram," ~am'in sirr qiyiidat maktab tan?:'im al-juniib ~ilii maktab 
~amiinat sirr al-qu.tr, Nov. 22, 1983, 023-4-7: 566-70. 
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prayer leaders and to other religious positions, the Bacth Party assessed a candidate 
according to three criteria: (1) "the integrity of his faith" (sallimat caq'fdatihi), or the 
extent to which his sermons and teachings conformed to the Bacth's version oflslam; (2) 
"his position on the revolution and the party" (mawqifuhu min al-thawra wa-l-J:zizb); and, 
(3) the degree to which he praised Hussein while giving the Friday sermon or reading the 
story of Imam Hussein in a J:zusayniyya (singular of J:zusayniyyat). 89 If a religious leader 
did not heed the Bacth's instructions, the party removed him, as it did a Baghdad 
preacher in 1986 "because he does not follow the instructions of the party to invoke our 
leader and the victory of our army over our enemies despite directing him to do so."90 
The ultimate criterion, in other words, was the man of religion's loyalty, which he 
exhibited by performing his traditional duties in a fashion supportive of Hussein's regime 
and in his willingness to take on official Bacthist State roles. 
In addition to exerting control over religious leaders, Hussein Bacthized the 
institutions they served. The strategy he employed to do this is laid out in many BRCC 
documents, but one in particular about how to exert influence over the Shici religious 
establishment provides an excellent example because of its comprehensiveness. In the 
early 1980s, the Bacth's Euphrates bureau penned a detailed study of the Shici marlijic 
and other prominent leaders, the Shici educational establishment (including the Hawza of 
Najaf and Karbala anq Shici religious students), and Shici religious doctrine, newspapers 
89. "Taqy'fm," mudfr cam ~amanat sirr al-qu{r ~ua al-rafoq ~umana' sirr qiyadat al-furiic al-
l;.izbiyya al-mul;.taram'fn, Sept. 2, 1995, 103-1-5: 374. 
90. "Kha{'fb jamic ~ ab'f ~ubayda," mas'iil maktab tan?'.fm baghdad al-lajna aP amaniyya ~na 
qiyadat maktab tan?'.fm baghdad, April19, 1986, 029-2-7: 497. 
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and publications, civil groups, mosques, and IJusayniyytit-in short, the entire Shi ci 
religious establishment. Of these elements, the steps the study prescribed to Bacthize the 
religious education system prove particularly instructive, especially considering the 
emphasis the Bacth placed on the control of education in general as part ofBacthification. 
In the early 1980s, following the Shici unrest of the 1970s and the Bacth's murder 
of the most prominent Shici marjac of the time, Muhammad Bakr al-Sadr, in 1980, the 
Bacthist leadership discussed expelling the entire Hawza to Iran.91 The Bacth Party had 
already expelled a number of the Hawza's students and teachers since it took power, and 
this decision would have been in line with that policy. Instead, according to the 
Euphrates bureau study, the regime decided "to strengthen the role of the Hawza in order 
to serve the [Bacth's] march (mas'fra) and the revolution."92 In other words, the Bacth 
would take control of the Hawza and play off of its historical and religious importance, 
making it into a tool of the regime. 
The study noted that the Hawza's strength and vibrancy derived from its student 
body which came from all over the Islamic world. It consequently focused much of its 
attention on regulating the conduct and admission of its students. The study suggested 
beginning the Bacthification of the Hawza in foreign countries (Arab states included) at 
Iraqi embassies where the students would have to attain visas to enter Iraq to study. They 
91. The term "Hawza," short for al-J;,awza al-cilmiyya, refers to the series of Shici religious 
schools connected to the mariiji" who lived in Najaf and Karbala. 
92. "Diriisa dfniyya can al-mmjaciyya, al-J;,awza al-cilmiyya, tuliib wa madiiris, al-culum al-
dfniyya, al-muqtaral;,iit," maktab tan?.fm al-furiit, 023-4-7: 20-59. This study was found in a boxfile from 
1984 but was undated and could have been written earlier. 
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would then also have to renew their residency permits (sing. :Jiqilma) in Iraq on a regular 
basis. The study consequently suggested using the visa process to gather information 
about the students and to take advantage of that information along with the need to renew 
their residency permits as leverage to make the students cooperate with the security 
services during their time at the Hawza. The study also advocated providing financial 
assistance. If at any time the foreign students refused to cooperate, the government 
would withdraw their residency permits and monetary support and deport them. Through 
this relationship the security services would force the students to parrot the Ba0 th's 
religious line; they would "influence [the foreign students] and feed them ideas of the 
Islamic religion, which is pure in its essence and far from the customary mistaken 
primitive practices. These students will be indoctrinated according to the Qur:~an."93 The 
study also suggested that the party and security services carefully select and provide 
scholarships and stipends for the Hawza' s Iraqi students who would act as agents within 
it and eventually become sympathetic Shi0 i religious leaders. As the study concluded, 
"The final result of the application of [this] plan (~'fgha) is to strengthen the existence of 
the Hawza in Iraq and its future administration by Iraqi men of religion themselves."94 In 
concert, the study suggested selecting ripe students from the Islamic law faculties of 
Iraq's universities and subjecting them to intense indoctrination in Bacthist ideology and 




Religious Affairs would then appoint these students to religious positions that it 
controlled throughout the country. The ministry would also support existing Iraqi men of 
religion, especially in Najaf and Karbala, in exchange for their attempts to influence the 
Hawza's students. Along with starving the Hawza of students, the study advocated 
taking over the Hawza's curriculum and censoring the books it assigned. Accordingly, it 
suggested removing from the Hawza' s libraries and area bookshops all texts written by 
"Persian elements" and volumes that did not conform to "the principles of the true 
religion. "95 
The Bacth regime used all of the above tactics also against Sunni Islamists such as 
Wahhabis, other Salafis, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Of the documen,ts read for this 
study, as far back as 1983 a memorandum that reached Hussein suggested that a major in 
the army should be discharged and placed in a less sensitive civilian post because of his 
Salafist leanings. Hussein agreed with the recommendation.96 Most references to Sunni 
Islamist tendencies occur beginning in 1990 when the BRCC shows that these 
movements began to gain followers. In that year, a committee consisting of high ranking 
Bacthists, the Minister of Charitable Endowments and Religious Mfairs, and the head of 
the General Security Directorate put together a plan for combating Wahhabist influences 
seeping into society. Among other measures, the committee suggested arresting the most 
prominent Wahhabi men of religion in society in order to gain more information about 
95. 023-4-7: 51-7. 
96. Sikritifr ra'fs al-jumhuriyya li-1-shu'un al-/:tizbiyya 'ila sayyidf al-ra'fs al-qa'id al-muJ:ttaram, 
May 3, 1983, 035-1-4: 96-7. 
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the movement and to send a message to other W ahhabis. In general, throughout the 
1990s, the Bacth banned Sunni Islamists' books, removed them as preachers and Imams 
when it found them, did not allow them to teach in religious schools, and disqualified 
them from entrance into the military, teaching, and other secular academies that required 
"intellectual integrity" for its entrants.97 
In addition to reforming existing institutions, the Bacth built its own religious 
schools to compete with Iraq's independent religious educational establishments. In 
1985, for example, a commission studying "the matter of treating the condition of the 
religious foundations in the country" suggested and received approval to found an 
institute to train Imams and preachers (al-:Ja:Jima wa-1-khutiba:J) in order "to treat the 
negative phenomenon of the graduates of religious faculties," which clearly did not 
conform to the Bacth's desires. The acceptance committee for the institute would be 
made up of members of the ministries of education, higher education and scientific 
research, and endowments and religious affairs in addition to a Bacth Party representative 
who would assess an applicant's "loyalty to the revolution." The institute's teachings 
would conform to the Bacth's version oflslam (see next paragraph) for the purpose of 
indoctrination, and it would accept Iraqi and non-Iraqi students from around the world in 
97. "a/-f:laraka a/-wahiibiyya," mudfr ciim maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~ua al-rafiq al-sikritlr a/-
sayyid a/-ra~'fs a/-jumhiiriyya a/-mubtaram, Aug. 21, 1990, 056-4-4: 100-2; Mudfr ciim maktab ~amiinat 
sirr a/-qutr ~ua a/-rafiq nii~ib ~am'fn sirr al-qutr al-mubtaram, Aug. 24, 1990, 056-4-4: 93; Mudfr ciim 
maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~ua al-rafiq nii~ib ~am'fn sirr al-qutr al-mubtaram, Jan. 2, 1994, 123-4-7: 721; 
'"'Imiimjiimic," Mudfr maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~ua wiziirat aPawqiifwa-l-shu~iin a/-dfniyya-maktab 
al-waz'fr, May 9, 2002,040-3-1:421. 
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order to propagate the Bacth's religious ideas at home through appointments to 
government controlled mosques and religious institutions, and abroad. 98 
This concept of not only suppressing and controlling existing Islamic teachings 
but also spreading the Bacth's religious propaganda while simultaneously combating the 
threats it perceived from Islam was the express purpose of an Islamic faculty created in 
1988. The goals for the college laid out in correspondence between the Bacth Party and 
the Ministry ofEndowments and Religious Affairs, illustrate the Bacth's general Islamic 
line. They were: 
1. To revive the original Arab and Islamic heritage. 
2. To present the chance to Muslim students from all comers of the world to get to 
know that heritage and to understand religion outside of narrow sectarianism or 
doctrine (al-madhhabiyya al-~ayyiqa). 
3. To confirm that Arab-Islamic civilization is a humane civilization that interacts 
with other world civilizations in a positive way, and that this civilization has a 
large, well-known role in building world civilization. 
4. To stop in the face of the popular [Islamic] wave that threatens the existence of 
the Arab nation, whatever its origin. 
5. To thwart the hostile K.homeinist call and plans toward the Arab nation. 
6. To create conviction amongst the students that the religious instructions deriving 
from Iran are non-religious and hostile to the Arabs and the true Islamic religion, 
and that their aim is to split the Arabs and the Muslims in the Arab nation and 
around the globe.99 
As seen here, Hussein attempted to portray himself on the side oflslam while 
concurrently denigrating his enemies. When referring to Islam, religious officials 
frequently distinguished· between their "true Islamic religion" (al-din al-:Jisllimf al-J:tanif), 
as in the sixth goal above, and what Hussein dubbed the "sectarian" (Ja:Jifi) teachings and 
98. "Wa~ifat aPamiina," ra''fs arwiin al-ri'iisa "ilii wiziirat al-'awqiifwa-1-shu'iin al-dfniyya- al-
maktab al-khii~~' 29 June 1985, 3-5-088: 608. 
99. "ai-Kulliya al-'isliimiyya al-jiimica," mudfr ciim maktab 'amiinat sirr al-qutr 'ilii al-rafiq 
wazfr al-tacl'fm al-ciil'fwa-1-ba~th al-cilmf, Aug. 11, 1988, 029-1-6: 74-77. 
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practices of the marajr and Shici Islamist preachers. Hussein similarly railed against 
"the religious extremism" (al-tatarruf al-dfnl) advocated by Sunni Salafists and 
W~abis, and the "Persian heresy" (bidcaforsiyya) of the Islamic Republic.100 Bacthist 
officials characterized all three of these "mistaken" versions of Islam as merely political 
movements backed by worldwide Zionism and imperialism dressed in Islamic garb. 
These movements~ they argued, aimed to sow the seeds of revolution by propagating their 
teachings within society until they had a large enough base of support to confront the 
government and take over the state.101 
As the goals from above indicate, Hussein nationalized Islam, relating Arabism to 
real Islam and referring to each as an essential part of the other in contrast to the political 
character of Iranian Islam. He did this in an attempt to allow the Iraqi faithful to support 
Arab nationalism, the primary ideological basis on which the Bacth regime rested, and to 
at the same time spread hatred against Iran as well. As a result, he contended that Persian 
Islam was not real Islam because any real Muslim would not fight a war against the 
Arabs given God's decision to send his message to earth and propagate it via an Arab 
prophet and the Arab people of the Arabian peninsula. In this, Hussein played to popular 
Arab stereotypes against Iranians as hostile to Arab culture and its centrality within 
Islamic history (see Chapter Five). The fact that the head of the Hawza and chiefShici 
100. See, e.g., "?.ahirat al-ta{arruf i manasik a!-cibada," cufjii qiyadat shucbat al-gharis ~am in 
sirr firqut al-tarimiyya aPuwwla, March 27, 1993, 023-4-2: 207; "Tawjlhat," mas~iil tan'{.imat baghdad al-
karkh ~ua qiyadatfuriic tan'{.imat baghdad al-karkh, May ~2, 1997, 046-5-4: 8. 
101. 023-4-2: 205. See the al-Khoei foundation website for a short biography: al-Khoei Islamic 
Institute. "Wiladatuhu wa-Hijratuhu ~ita al-Najaf," http://www.alkhoei.net/arabic/?p=page&id=10 
[accessed on Nov. 29, 2012]. 
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marjac in Iraq until his death in 1992, 0 Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, was originally from 
Iranian Azerbaijan and spoke and often taught in Persian, according to BRCC reports 
about his network, made the Ba0 th suspicious of him as an Iranian agent and gave it a 
rhetorical weapon to wield against him and the mariijic in general. The nationalization of 
Islam was the provenance of the Ba0 th's desire to Iraqize and Arabize the Hawza's 
student body, libraries, and teachers. 
A link also exists between Hussein and the Ba0 th's tribalization and anti-Iranian 
policies, as they played up manly Arab tribal values in an effort to appeal to Iraqi Shica 
who had strong tribal identities.102 Hussein and the Bacth claimed that the Iranians' 
Islamic calls attacked these values. As part of the propaganda instructions for how to 
deal with the Shi0 i rituals ofMuharram in 1983, for example, the Ba0 th's southern bureau 
told the Party Secretariat that it had directed its branches "to continuously mention that 
the elements who hate the nation (al- 0 umma), and especially the Persians, are working to 
try to distort the values of Islam and the values of Arabism and personal Arab 
characteristics in its attempt to harm the Arabs by way of harming Islam and distorting it 
(emphasis added)."103 As Chapter Three showed, Hussein brought Islam into the Ba0 thist 
idiom, attaching its loyalties to the Ba0 thist Trinity. 
The connection between Iran, foreign backed political conspiracies, and false 
Islam in Ba0 thist propaganda also gave the regime a rationale to suppress popular 
102. Nakash, The Shicis of Iraq, 45-8. 
103. 023-4-7: 566-70. 
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religious practices it did not like. 104 Shici rituals surrounding the Muharram holidays 
came in for particular attention. They included mass processions to shrines, self-
mutilation, emotional readings of the story of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the 
raising ofbanners and shouting slogans in support ofShici martyrs, providing food and 
drinks to marchers, and other rites and customs. The Bacth opposed these practices 
because, as in the 1970s, the processions had the potential to turn into protests, which the 
Bacth feared Iran and Shici opposition groups would exploit.105 The banners and slogans, 
moreover, were public displays of allegiance to sources of authority other than the 
symbols of the Bacthist Trinity. And, indeed, the Bacth noted that Shici religious leaders 
like Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr in the 1990s used generic expressions in his sermons such 
as "All of the world's oppressed will be victorious!" to tacitly speak out against the 
regime.I06 
To put a stop to these types of practices, the Bacth banned some of them and used 
force when necessary. During Shici holidays it flooded the streets with security officials 
and Bacth Party members, and the airwaves with propaganda. The regime maintained 
extensive surveillance of al-Khoei's network of supporters and sent spies on a regular 
104. See, e.g., a report about the phenomenon of Shi0 i processions from 1996 which theorized that 
they were part of an "Imperialist-Zionist" plot: "Dirasa ]Jaw/ :r.ahirat al-mashf," mas~ul tan'{.fmat 
baghdad-al-raffafa ~amfn sirr qiyadatforc ~ita maktab ~amanat sirr al-qufr, Nov. 11, 1996, 046-5-4: 89-
91. See also a report on the events ofMuharram in 1983 which claimed that the "mistaken practices" (al-
mumarasat al-kha{i' a) of the faithful had Persian roots: "aP Ijra~ at wa-1-mula]Ja'{.at wa-1-muqtara]Jat bi-
munasabiit shahr mu]Jarram," mas~ullajnat al-nishat al-watanfwa-Pamnffi qiyadat tan'{.fm baghdad ~ua 
al-rafiq al-munacjil ~amfn sirr al-maktab al-mu]Jtaram, Oct. 27, 1983,023-4-7: 584-7. 
105. 023-4-7: 566-70. 
106. "Maclumat," wazfr al-dakhiliyya/wikala ~na rrasat al-jumhiiriyya, Jan. 30, 1999, 030-3-3: 
453. 
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basis to mosques, l;.usayniyylit, and women's prayer circles to report on their activities 
and to try to steer the gatherings in what the Ba cth believed was an appropriate direction. 
Particularly during holidays, the security apparatus used taxi drivers as informants, noted 
the license plates of out of town cars that came to the religious shrine cities, and worked 
with hotels to search pilgrims' bags. The Bacth employed propaganda too, asking its 
members to personally talk to their families, relatives, friends, and tribesmen to explain 
the "un-civilized" character of popular rites. As mentioned above, it employed men of 
religion to preach the same message to their followers, and the Ministry of Culture and 
Media put on programs warning against mistaken practices and explaining proper forms 
of faith. 107 
Just as with its early anti-tribalism, the Bacth's initial anti-religious policies in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s gave way by the 1980s and 1990s to more positive religious 
language as it recognized the "popular wave" of Islamic feeling spreading throughout the 
Sunni and Shici worlds. The most prominent example of this was its number one enemy 
and neighbor: the Islamic Republic oflran. 108 As a result, instead of simply trying to 
suppress Islam, Hussein also attempted to create the Bacth's own version of it in the void 
left by the Bacthification oflraq's traditional religious establishments. The creation of 
107. 046-5-4: 89-91; For lists of the men of religion in al-Khoei's network who the regime 
considered loyal and disloyal see: "Dirosa," mudfr ciim maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~ilii al-rafiq nii~ib 
~amln sirr al-qutr, Feb. 27, 1985, 023-4-7: 64-72; Mudfr ciim maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~na al-rafiq 
nii~ib ~amln sirr qiyiidat qutr al-ciriiq, Aug. 1, 1996, 046-5-4: 120-3; 046-5-4: 8-9; 123-5-5: 213; 023-4-7: 
566-70. 
108. Aaron Faust, "The Evolution oflslam's Role under the Socialist Arab Bacth Party in Iraq," 
(master's thesis, Tel Aviv University, 2006), 24-9. 
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the Bacth's own religious institutes, the Bacthification of existing religious 
establishments, and other activities like Hussein's support for international Isl~c 
conferences in Baghdad all served to rally his own people, the Arab world, and wider 
international support for Iraq against Iran. 109 
Indeed, while simultaneously suppressing and taking control of Iraq's religious 
leaders and establishments, Hussein took on their mantle, hoping to benefit from their 
legitimacy with the people while neutering the influence of independent men of religion. 
Accordingly, although the Bacth banned distributing food to Shici marchers by the 
population during Muharram, the government itself gave out food in 1995, claiming that 
it was a gift from Hussein.110 Hussein too patronized Shici shrine cities "because [the 
patronization] has a large positive response amongst the simple people (al-busatti:J) and 
foreign pilgrims. " 111 The Bacth made Islamic holidays such as the Prophet's birthday 
into national occasions. In the 1990s, as part of the Faith Campaign, it shuttered shops 
that sold alcohol for the entire month of Ramadan and required that coffee shops, 
restaurants, and food stores be locked from sunup to sundown, among other measures 
designed to prove its Islamic credentials. 112 The content of these occasions served as 
platforms to spread Hussein's religious message that the Ba0 th, the Arab and Iraqi 
109. Faust, 63-5, 68, 70, 75, 84. 
110. "Munasabat 10 mul}arram," mucffr cam maktab 'amanat sirr al-qu{r 'ilii al-rafiq [name 
withheld] murafiq al-sayyid ra'fs al-jumhiiriyya al-mul}taram, July 1, 1995, 046-5-4: 293. 
111. 023-4-7: 20-59. 
112. See, e.g., Ra'fs aEWan al-ri'asa 'ila 'amanat majlis al-wazarii' et. al., Dec. 29, 1996, 021-1-
2:47-9. 
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nations, the leader, and now Islam were all connected, and that Muslims of all sects were 
part of the same Bacthized faith. The slogans for the Prophet's birthday in 2002, for 
example, included, "Life is a necessity for faith just as faith is necessary for life," "the 
Bacth arose out of a basic spring, from a spiritual spring that is the great Is,Iam," and "The 
principles ofhumane Islam and its values and civilized morals are the spirit of Arabism 
and the source of its perpetual renewed inspiration. "113 
Just like with the tribes, the BRCC shows that Hussein's Bacthification efforts 
toward religion did not always work. The quality of the preachers and Imams that 
graduated from state-run religious programs was not always high, which left the 
graduates with little influence in society. 114 Nonetheless, party reports about the Shici 
Muharram activities show that the regime succeeded in keeping them under control and 
even benefiting from them at times. By 1989, the practices had almost ceased 
completely, and although they saw a brief uptick in 1996 and a few other points in the 
late 1990s, they otherwise never again seriously threatened the regime as they did in the 
1970s.U5 Without a doubt, Hussein and the Bacth turned the Hawza into a shell of its 
former self. By 1988, a report shows that it had eliminated Shici religious schools 
113. "a/-' 1/:ltifol bi-cayd maw lid al-nabawi al-shar'if," ra'is diwiin al-ri' lisa 'ilii 'amlin at majlis al-
wuzarii' et.al., April27, 2002, 063-2-4: 43-52. 
114. "Biyiin ra'i," mudir ciim maktab 'amiinat sirr al-qutr 'ilii alWiin al-ri'iisa, April 6, 1985, 
023-4-7: 165-6. 
115. "Taqr'ir muniisabat 10 mu(larram wa-ziyiirat aParbac'in 20 ~afar, maktab tan'{,'im baghdad, 
Oct. 17, 1989,001-5-4: 6-9; Mudir ciim maktab 'amiinat sirr al-qu{r 'ilii al-raftq nii'ib 'am'in sirr qiyiidat 
qu{r al-ciriiq al-mu(ltaram, Aug. 14, 1995, 025-5-7: 187; "Ziyiirat al-niifmin shacbiin," mas'iil tan'{,'imiit 
mu(liija'{,atay biibil I karbalii' 'ilii maktab 'amiinat sirr al-qu{r, Dec. 30, 1996, 046-5-4: 77; "Mumiirasiit," 
mudir ciim maktab 'amiinat sirr al-qutr 'ilii al-rafoq mas'iili al-tan'{.'imiit al-/:lizbiyya al-mu(ltaram'in, March 
29, 1997, 123-5-5: 212-14. . 
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entirely from Karbala and only two were left in Najaf, down from seven and twelve, 
respectively, in 1985.116 The regime's statistics on men of religion too show that it 
succeeded in filling religious posts throughout the country with loyalists and purging 
Islamists, both Shici and Sunni. In 1995, out of 1,501 Imams only seventy, or less than 
five percent,, had any negative notations next to their names. 117 
The Bacth Party, the PMOs, and the People 
Like with the state and social institutions, Saddam Hussein used the Bacth Party 
to control society through its own direct connection~ to the citizenry and by coordinating 
with other Bacthist State organs. Each party organization carried out a range of activities 
designed to establish relationships with the individuals, families, and social groups under 
its particular geographic purview. It used these links to fertilize the ground to sow its 
ideological seeds, mobilize the populace to participate in Bacthist programs and support 
its policies, and recruit Iraqis into the party, especially those with social influence. The 
Bacth Party also managed the other entities involved in Bacthification. 
Bacthist Activities and Responsibilities 
The Bacth Party structured its internal activities to create a loyal, unified, 
committed core of party members capable of carrying out its role as the political branch 
116. "al-Madiiris al-dfniyya," mudfr cam maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~ua al-rafiq nii~ib ~am'fn 
sirr al-qutr w,a-1-rafoq ~ac¢ii~ al-lajna al-tan:r.lmiyya, March 15, 1988, 023-4-7: 88-90. 
117. "Rijiil al-dfn," 148-1-4:289-554. 
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of government. The most central Bacthist activity was the party meeting, which a 1990 
report from the Baghdad bureau stated, "forms the basic pillar of the organizational 
process with the aim of employing this activity to elevate and execute the party's 
missions precisely."118 The meeting served as the center of party life in every 
organization, a time when members discussed organizational, financial, cultural, and 
security-related issues; planned internal and public conferences, symposia, and lecture 
series; prepared for visits to other party organizations and citizen groups; coordinated 
their activities with the PMOs; delegated responsibilities to committees and individuals; 
and issued commendations and punishments. The party required regular attendance and 
participation at meetings, the quantity and quality of which was included on a member's 
regular assessment by superiors. Behavior at meetings was considered a proxy for one's 
commitment and loyalty to the Bacth, and too many absences could lead to punishment or 
even expulsion. 
The meeting was also a time when the party enforced discipline C'in~iblif). 
"Discipline in the organizational sense," according to Hussein, meant "observing the 
party system and knowing its rights and responsibilities beginning with respect for the 
right of the member and understanding [the concept of] freedom in a positive way, 
banning and refraining from accusing a member for posing his ideas, and considering the 
view of the majority the view of the party and a measure of its interest."119 "Observing 
118. "al-Jihad ... wa-z-camal al-thawr'i- mashriic waraqat camall}izbiyya," maktab tan:r.'im 
baghdad, Dec. 29, 1990,051-1-2: 609. 
119. 025-1-7: 37-8. 
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the party system" here meant abiding by the Bacth Party's numerous administrative and 
bureaucratic rules including about the timeliness in which organizations were to respond 
to correspondence, how information was to flow through the hierarchy, regulations for 
maintaining secrecy in party affairs, fmancial reporting, the qualifications required for 
certain party offices, and when it was appropriate to reward or penalize members. It also 
related to the jurisdictions ofthe Bacth's many offices, committees, and bureaus.120 
The "rights and responsibilities" of members within the system were also highly 
regulated. The Ba cth Party's marriage regulations illustrate the kinds of strictures the 
party placed on its members in both their professional and personal lives. With regard to 
the former, marriage had national security considerations. Before a Bacthist could get 
married, he had to submit his fiancee's name, profession, age, and address to his local 
party headquarters in addition to the name of her father and his profession, the names of 
her siblings, their spouses and professions, and the name of the sharica court that would 
draw up the marriage contract. He also had to provide a copy of the woman's Iraqi 
identity card. 121 A similar procedure was followed for army officers (who were always 
Bacthists) whereby military intelligence first investigated their fiancees and, if they 
uncovered something suspicious, then passed on the information and continuing inquiry 
120. See, e.g., a directive about how to circulate party mail: " 3 Uslub tadawul al-barfd al-/:lizbl," 
mudfr 3idiirat al-maktab a!-caskarf 3ilii kiifat qiyiidiit al-furuc a!-caskariyya, Apri14, 1982, 034-2-1: 146-7; 
on how much people had to pay in dues in 1978: Mudfr ciim maktab 3 amiinat sirr al-qutr 3ilii al-qiyiidiit al-
ra3siyafi al-qutr kiifa, May 28, 1978, 003-1-1: 202-3; and regulations for being appointed as a head of an 
office or a secretary: "I)awiibit tacayfn mudarii3 al-makiitib wa-1-sakritfrfn," ra3fs aiWiin al-rrasa 3ilii 
majlis al-wuzarii3, April 12, 1994, 113-3-3: 39-40. 
121. ''Ta3amfm," mudfr ciim maktab 3amiinat sirr al-qutr 3ilii al-makiitib al-tan'{.fmiyafi al-qutr 
kiifa, Nov. 14, 1983, 003-3-5: 24. 
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to the party. 122 The Ba0th required this information because it did not want its members 
to marry "agents" of foreign powers or opposition groups who could corrupt them and 
their children and possibly work from within the regime to weaken it. Accordingly, the 
BRCC includes records of many instances in which Bacthists or military officers were 
prohibited from marrying women who had relatives in the Dacwa or Communist 
parties. 123 They too could not marry foreigners. 124 Only "real" Arabs and Iraqis were 
allowed. 125 Conversely, beginning in 1985, the wives of men who deserted from the 
army, dodged military service, or defected to the Iranian side could, after six months, 
request divorces from their husbands whether they were Ba0 thists or not. In this way, a 
woman would not have to continue waiting for her husband to never return and live with 
the shame of being from a family with a deserter. Instead, she could sever her 
relationship to the dishonor, prove her loyalty, and make herself available for remarriage, 
which was the more socially acceptable position for women past a certain age. Her 
122. See, e.g., "~Amfn sirr qiyadat maktab tanf_fm aj-juniib ~ua maktab ~amanat sirr al-qup-, Feb. 
11, 1985, 002-4-4: 279. 
123. See, e.g., boxfile 022-4-4, which has tens of examples ofthis phenomenon, including: ~Amfn 
sirr qiyadat maktab tanf_fm al-juniib ~ua maktab ~amanat sirr al-qutr, Feb. 9, 1985, 022-4-4: 192; and "al-
Rafiq callJ:tasan majld mucffr cam maktab ~amanat sirr al-qutr ~ua al-rafiq ra~fs al-lajna al-tanf_fmiya al-
muJ:ttaram, Aug. 20, 1982:251-2. 
124. A 1978 letter about purging suspect elements from the party includes a directive to expel any 
member who marries a foreigner or who has a wife that is related in the first or second degree with 
"agents" of foreign intelligence agencies, embassies, or "sensitive centers of the state." Mucffr cam maktab 
~amanat sirr al-qutr ~ila al-qiyadat al-ra'siyafi al-qutr kafa, June 25, 1978, 003-1-1: 418. 
125. A directive about rules for party members to marry puts the onus on local party leaderships to 
"investigate the Arabness (curiibat) of the family of the wife and not to give agreement for members (to 
marry) families of non-Arab origins." 003-3-5: 24. 
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divorce could be reversed, however, if her husband returned within a prescribed period 
and demanded his wife back. 126 
In accord with Hussein's connection between right thought and practice, the party 
believed its members should act as examples to the rest of the populace in order to both 
spread Bacthist principles via their application and provide another justification for its 
rule through its members' ethical behavior. As a result, the reputations of the wives of 
Bacthists, or their families, had to be in good standing for them to receive permission 
from the party to marry them. One woman was declared "unsuitable" (la ya~lul:t), for 
example, because "her reputation and the reputation of her family are not good from a 
moral standpoint," and the family was "morally discredited within the area" where they 
lived. 127 As in the case of another woman, "morally discredited" or "morally 
disreputable" (sflqita khalqiyan) meant that she was not a virgin. Her mother also did not 
have a good reputation, and her father was known to gamble and drink. Additionally, she 
did not pass th~ national security test-her cousin was a prisoner of war in Iran. 128 The 
party also sometimes required members whose wives committed adultery to divorce 
them. Conversely, if a Bacthist cheated on his spouse the party punished him, sometimes 
126. RCC decision no. 1529, Dec. 21, 1985, 036-1-2: 1. 
127. " 3Am'in sirr maktab tanf.'im al-juniib 3 ilii maktab 3 amiinat sirr al-qufr, Jan. 15, 1985, 002-4-4: 
424. 
128. Mud'ir 3 amn mu~iifaf_at maysiin 3 ilii al-rafiq 3 am'in sirr qiyiidatfurc maysiin al-mu~taram, 
Jan. 23, 1985, 002-4~4: 325. 
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with expulsion. 129 As part of the nomination process to become full members, the wives 
of"supporters" were held to the same standards as the fiancees of party members. If they 
failed, their husbands did too. 130 
' 
Marriage thus acted as a proxy for loyalty. If a Bacthist was willing to break off 
his engagement to a woman the party considered unsuitable; it showed that he prioritized 
his allegiances properly. A 1983 directive said that when "un-encouraging" (ghayr 
mushajjaca) information about a proposed wife came to light the Bacthist should be asked 
to call off the marriage. If he went ahead with the marriage and consummated it, he was 
to be expelled from the party. 131 In addition to marriage, other examples of party controls 
on individual behavior included having to wear special uniforms when conducting party 
activities and the need to submit to regular physical exams to make sure that party 
members were not overweight. If so, they could be demoted.132 
129. See, e.g., "al-Rafiq (name withheld)," sakritfr al-sayyid ra~fs al-jumhiiriya li-l-shu~iin al-
/:tizbiyya 'ilii al-qiyiida al-qu{riya-maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr, Nov. 16, 1983, 027-5-2: 1-20. 
130. 003-1-1: 418. 
131. 003-3-5: 24. 
132. "Taqrfr," ~amfn sirr qiyiidat maktab tan'{.fm al-wasat ~ilii al-qiyiida al-qu{riyya- al-lajna al-
tan:{.fmiyya, Dec. 18, 1985, 029-2-3: 427. Beginning at least in 1987, the Ba0th Party weighed its members 
every six months after an initial exam. If they did not reduce their weight to an acceptable level the BRCC 
confirms that some members were docked a level in the party. By 1989, however, because there was a 
dearth of full members at the branch level, Hussein ordered that people who failed the weigh-in could 
parade before him and he would decide if they should be demoted. See boxfile 060-2-3; "Qariir," mudfr 
"iim maktab ~ amiinat sirr al-qutr ~ilii nii~ib ~ amfn sirr al-qufr, Feb. 28, 1989, 022-1-7: 243; Mudfr "am 
maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~ilii al-rafiq nii~ib ~amfn sirr al-qufr, June 18, 1989, 021-1-4: 166. 
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The Bacth Party assessed its members' observance of rules, their participation in 
activities, and their general character on a regular basis. The evaluation form for a 
section in Baghdad in 1999 asked, among other things, for the following information: 
• What is the extent to which the member manifests the principles of the party in his daily 
behavior? 
• Does he enjoy the trust and respect of his comrades and within the public circles in which 
he works? 
• What are his leadership and organizational capabilities? 
• Does he exhibit bravery in the face of adversity, and what is the extent of his ability to 
make brave decisions? 
• What is his general cultural level and the extent to which he has absorbed the thought of 
the party? 
• What activities did he carry out during the period of assessment? 
• How many people did he recruit into the party during the period of assessment? 
• What was his role in Saddam's Glorious Qiidisiyya and the Eternal Mother of All Battles 
(the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars)? 
• Did he participate in the yawm al-nakhwa occasion and the popular drills? 
• Did he receive party commendations (tashakkuriit) during the year? 
• Did he receive party punishments during the year? 
• What negatives have been recorded about him? 
The form then requested general recommendations from the member's superiors.133 As 
the questions from this assessment indicate, being a Bacthist meant undergoing constant 
tests ofloyalty. 
While party membership had its benefits, therefore, it also carried expectations 
that Ba0 thists would devote considerable time and effort to party activities and subject 
themselves to the strictures of party rules and the constant monitoring of their supervisors 
133. "'lstimarat taqylm al-sannawlmin 11111999/i-ghiiyat 31/12/1999,'' 043-1-4:282. Not all of 
the requests for information are found on the assessment form exactly as they are depicted here. The 
questions are paraphrases. I have turned some of them into questions where, for example, on the form they 
merely said, "the extent of the manifestation of principles in daily behavior." 
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and peers. 134 Many Bacthists had difficulty balancing their party obligations with other 
aspects of life: This led, at times~ to their dropping out and, at others, to the party 
showiJ:lg flexibility by relaxing its rules or mandating that meetings not occur too 
frequently, last too long, or conflict with the professional responsibilities of its 
members. 135 After all, the purpose of instilling such discipline in party members once the 
Bacth took over Iraq was so they could act on its behalf within governmental and social 
circles. 
The Bacth and Society 
Organizationally, the party acted as the Bacthist State's circulatory system starting 
with the Party Secretariat at its heart which pumped the political lifeblood out to the Iraqi 
body politic through its arterial bureaus, branches, and sections and down to its capillary 
divisions and cells. Within this general framework, the Bacth enforced its command and 
control via a fractal-like hierarchical structure whereby each lower organization looked 
134. The party carried out a lot of activities. In the Maysan branch alone between April and 
September of2001 the party organizations convened, just in the "organizational" category (al-jiinib al-
tan-(iml), a reported 14,858 meetings at all levels; 609 symposia about all aspects of party administration, 
structure, and internal regulations; 1,504 visits (ziyiiriit) to other organizations to observe their work both to 
learn from and report about them; and 683 receptions eisti{iiifot) of other organizational delegations. The 
branch organizations also supposedly recruited 2,573 people into the party, performed forty-four statistical 
surveys of the branch apparatus of all types (fa~a~ al-tantfm ), and put on 3 9 developmental sessions ( al-
dawriit al-ta{Wfriyya). This does not even include all of the activities listed under the "cultural" (al-jiinib 
al-thaqiifi), "security" (al-jiinib aPamanl), or "public" (al-jiinib al-jamiih'irl) categories. "Mii tam tanfi'[.ihi 
min al-khitta al-tan'{.'imiyya li-e lim 2000," ~am'in sirr qiyiidatfurc maysiin ilii maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr, 
Oct. 7, 2000, 037-1-3: 13-15. 
135. For regulations restricting the length and frequency of meetings by party membership level 
see: "Qariir," mudir ciim maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~ilii al-makiitib al-tan'{.'imiyyafi al-qutr kiifa, April 
11, 1984, 146-2-4: 364-6. For an example of a woman who dropped out of the party because she could not 
manage the time commitment with her professional and family obligations see: Mudir qism al-macliimiit 
wa-1-tawth'iq al-~izb'i ~ilii al-rafiq mudir ciim maktab ~ amiinat sirr al-qutr al-mu~taram, 003-3-2: 34. 
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like a smaller version of the whole with its individual secretaries, leaderships, and 
organizational, cultural, financial, security, and other committees. These leaderships and 
committees reported up the chain-of-command to their counterparts until the information 
arrived back at the Party Secretariat in the form of ever more general and comprehensive 
reports with the lower level memoranda attached so that the Ba0 thist leadership could see 
the provenance of their subordinates' conclusions.136 This structure allowed the party to 
impose centralized discipline in terms of the methods the lower-level organizations used 
and the kinds of activities they carried out. It also gave them flexibility to adapt their 
approaches to local conditions . 
. 
The Ba0 th used this organizational structure to create direct links with its citizenry 
and to gather information about the populace so as to better design its public.activities. 
As the introduction to a study about the social and economic conditions in Baghdad put 
it, 
The conditions for the party leadership's success include possessing a full conception of 
the social and economic reality ofthe area in which they work ... and with which they can 
note the nature of society under their purview through the composition of its social strata, 
the nature of the problems that it faces, the political and social tendencies found in it, and 
the role of the party organization in solving or overcoming these problems and obstacles. 
They should similarly note the nature of the political powers, if they exist, the places they 
are found, their influence, their size, and the means they use so that the [party's] desired 
plans [for the area] will be prepared precisely, which makes them respond to and able to 
treat the nature of the local human conditions.137 
136. There are hundreds of examples of these reports in the BRCC. See, e.g., a quarterly 
administrative report from the Wasit bureau from 1986: "al-Taqrzr aPidiirz al-fa#z al-~illii li-ciim 1986," 
/.zizb al-bacth al-carabz aPishtiriikz maktab tan:r.Zm al-juniib qiyiidatfurc wiisi{, 045-5-7: 23-52. 
137. "Tal}lll al-wiiqic aPijtimiiczli-madinat baghdiidwa-dawr al-tan:r.Zm al-l}izbz," maktab tan:r.Zm 
baghdad, Feb. 1989, 070-5-5: 390. 
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In fact, the party tasked its organizations with constantly updating tables of statistics 
about the nature of their geographic areas of responsibility. In at least one case, the 
organizations were supposed to literally plot these bits of information on maps, 
pinpointing the locations of the families ofBacthists, independents, martyrs, prisoners of 
war (POWs), those missing in action (MIA), "Friends of the Comrade Leader," and 
political opposition movements.138 As the above quotation indicates, party organizations 
then used this information pooled with similar facts collected by the PMOs (see below) to 
tailor their approaches to the local population for maximum effectiveness. 
Within their geographic purviews, the members of a particular party organization 
were supposed to immerse themselves in local life; as one ofHussein's oft-quoted 
sayings went: "Work where the masses are."139 This meant organizing public speeches, 
lectures, seminars, and symposia, conducting personal meetings with individual citizens 
and their families, attending local events and celebrations, and working with area officials 
to provide services. These vehicles for communication and connection between the party 
and the people served a variety of purposes. They allowed the party to keep its fmger on 
the pulse of area conditions in order to monitor them. They provided forums for the 
Bacth to spread its propaganda, indoctrinate, and explain the rationale behind its policies. 
138. Regrettably, these maps were not found for this study. It is not known whether or not they 
exist in the BRCC or other open Ba0 thist archives, if they still exist anywhere at all. The BRCC does 
include orders to create them. It is not known if any of the party organizations or PMOs (which were 
tasked with the same activity) ever did. If so, the Party Secretariat would have had a comprehensive visual 
picture oflraqi society to use for recruiting, security, and other purposes. These maps could potentially 
give a more accurate visual picture of the party's local reach within society, the population clusters it 
wanted to recruit, and the social groups by which it felt threatened. "Tanafus," mucffr cam maktab ~am an at 
sirr al-qutr ~ua al-makatib al-tan'{.'imiyyafi al-qutr kafa, Jan. 16, 1991, 024-5-2: 197. 
139. 025-1-7: 40. 
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And they gave it the opportunity to drum up support, create trust between the party and 
the people, and warn against behaviors it considered unseemly and wanted to eliminate 
within the population. The Baghdad study from above, for instance, directed party 
members to urge Iraqis to refrain from carrying on tribal relationships and dealing with 
"the other" (al-ghayr) through force. Instead, it told them to encourage citizens to forge 
"national" and person-to-person bonds and to follow existing laws and regulations to 
solve disputes. The study too suggested that Bacthists attract Cistiqtab) local notables 
and the leaders of social groups in order to increase the party's influence amongst their 
supporters. Finally, it advocated including people who might have reason to oppose the 
Bacthist State in its activities so as to block other political movements from influencing 
them. For this reason, Hussein placed special emphasis on maintaining links C'idamat al-
~illa) and taking care of the families of martyrs, POWs, and those MIA as proof that the 
Ba0 thist State would provide for those who sacrificed in its name and to prevent 
backlashes from the families. 140 With its resources, organizational apparatus, and 
connections in society, the Bacth also served as a vehicle for mass mobilization (al-
tacbr)a al-jamahfriyya). In the run-up to the Gulf War, for example, the party 
organizations put on supportive rallies and marches, encouraged party members to join 
the Popular Army and non-members the regular military, and tracked down army 
deserters and draft dodgers. 141 
140. 070-5-5: 403-4. 
141. 024-5-2: 197. 
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The Party and the Professional and Mass Organizations 
The Professional and Mass Organizations (PMOs) were ostensibly independent 
but actually Bacthist created civil organizations which had a monopoly over the segments 
of society within their purviews. Through their quasi-independent status they allowed 
the Bacth to extend its reach into a wider swath of the population than the regular party 
apparatus could by itself. They did this by focusing on particular demographics within 
the general categories of women, students and youth, workers, peasants, and 
professionals. In their capacities as unions, trade associations, and federations formed to 
advance the plight of particular population segments within the context of the Husseini 
Bacthist system, they also served as outlets to support Iraq's foreign policies and external 
propaganda. 
The regular party apparatus infiltrated society to a large degree, but the PMOs 
allowed the Bacth to make itself into a truly mass party instead of just a vanguard elite. 
The PMOs were the Iraqi version of what Stalin called "transmission belts" linking the 
Soviet Communist Party and the Russian people.142 They provided structured, organized 
associations that channeled the activities of what in other countries would have been non-
political social or professional groups in politically supportive directions. The PMOs had 
a degree of freedom to genuinely serve their members' social or professional interests, as 
examples from the General Federation of Iraqi Women (GFIW, al- ?tti/:tiid al-cam li-l-
nisii3 al-ciraq) show below. First and foremost, however, they existed-like the party-
142. Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), 256. 
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as vessels to mobilize society behind the Bacthist State's initiatives. Accordingly, the 
PMOs served as a cover for increasing the number and scope ofBacthist activities: to 
mobilize Iraqis behind Bacthist policies and programs, monitor the population, recruit for 
the party and thell}selves, expose more Iraqis to ideological indoctrination, and act as 
vehicles for internal and external propaganda. Indeed, the Bacth used the PMOs' 
ostensibly independent character as national organizations-instead of explicitly Bacthist 
ones-to prove its mass support and the willing participation of independents in its 
initiatives.143 The PMOs consequently cloaked Hussein and the Bacth with a layer of 
popular legitimacy. 
If "civil society" is defined as associations of people inhabiting a sphere distinct 
from the state and economy, then the BRCC contains no evidence that real civil society 
existed in Bacthist Iraq.144 Rather, Hussein destroyed what remained of Iraq's 
independent unions, federations, and associations, and used the Bacth Party to create new 
ones in their places. Thus the central offices of workers (maktab az-cumtil al-markazl), 
143. As, e.g., the director of the Party Secretariat wrote in a letter to Hussein in 1992: "The 
political regime that the Arab Socialist Ba"th Party led after the 17-30 July revolution gave, in its 
legislation and laws that were enacted after the revolution and in its actual practices, a prominent and active 
and leading role to the popular and unionist and associational and professional organizations in all of the 
political, economic, social, and cultural fields, and in legislating the laws. This means that hundreds of 
thousands if not millions of citizens associated with these organizations and unions and associations 
participated in all of these areas. Each ofthese organizations and unions and associations are founded on 
the bases of elections from the bottom to the top and on patterns of direct secret elections. Indeed, an 
important number of the leaderships of these organizations and unions and associations are not made up of 
members of our party." "Na~~ al-risiila allati tasallamuha al-ra~fs al-qii~id ~addiim J:tusayn min qiyiidat 
]Jizb al-bacth al-carabf al-~ishtiriikffi 9/1/1992 can qiyiidat J:tizb al-bacth al-carabf aPishtiriikf [name 
withheld] mudfr ciim maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qufr," 101-1-1: 100. 
144. For the definitions of the ''three spheres" of society, including civil society, see Caroline 
Hodges Persell, Adam Green, and Liena Gurevich, "Civil Society, Economic Distress, and Social 
Tolerance," Sociological Forum 16 (June 2001), 204-7. 
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peasants (al-maktab al-filiilfi al-markazl), professionals (al-maktab al-mihn'i al-markazl), 
and students and youth (maktab al-talaba wa-l-shabiib al-markazl) were born. By 1988, 
all four of these offices had coalesced under the Central Office of the Professional and 
Popular Bureau (al-maktab al-markaz'i li-l-tan?,'im al-mihnfwa-1-shacbl), known as the 
Central Office, which operated out of the Office of the Party Secretariat. In addition to 
these four organizations, the Central Office also oversaw the GFIW, the people's 
assemblies (majiilis al-shacb), and all professional and specialized associations, such as 
those for doctors, economists, lawyers, artists, and the like. All together, the Bacth 
referred to these various entities within the Central Office either as "Mass" or the 
aforementioned "Professional and Mass Organizations." Each PMO had branches 
throughout the nation and in other countries. 145 
One of the most important documents found for this study is entitled, "A 
W orkplan for Coordination between the Party and Mass Organizations in the Field of the 
Bacthification of Society. "146 As the title suggests, the document shows in explicit terms 
the Bacth Party's plan to remake Iraqi society in its image and that it considered the 
regular party apparatus and the PMOs chief instruments in this effort. It also 
145. The Ba0th originally created The Central Office out of the first three specialized offices listed 
in 1987. In 1988, The National Union of Students and Youth of Iraq joined them in the bureau after the 
Ba0 th abolished the Central Office for Students and Youth. At the same time, the party also gave the 
responsibility for supervising student and youth activities to regular party organizations. "Qarar," mudir 
cam maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~ila al-makiitib al-tanr.lmiyyafi al-qutr kafa, June 13, 1988, 037-3-5: 403; 
"Khilii~at camal al-maktab al-markazi munrj,hil tashkilihi wa li-}Jadd ~man," ~amin sirr al-maktab al-
markazi li-1-tanr.lm al-mihniwa-1-shacbi ~ila al-rafiq nii'ib ~amin sirr al-qutr!mas~ul al-lajna al-tan'{.imiyya 
al-mu}Jtaram, July 23, 1987, 038-2-4: 183-9. 
146. "Mashrilc khittat camalli-tansiq bayn al-munii'{.'{.amat al-}Jizbiyya wa-l-jamahiriyyafi majal 
tabcith al-mujtamac," 025-5-5: 476-97. The document contains no date or author but is from a boxflle from 
1988. Clues within the text indicate it might have emanated from the Baghdad bureau. 
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demonstrates that although partially autonomous, the PMOs were not independent 
organizations but rather Bacthist entities the party considered critical to Bacthification. 
As Appendix 1 illustrates, even in 2002 Bacthists comprised less than sixteen percent of 
Iraq's population with full members only two percent. "At the forefront of the goals of 
the process of the Bacthification of society," the workplan states in its introduction~ "are 
the spreading and popularization of the thought of the party and its values and principles, 
and transforming them into revolutionary behavior within everyday practices."147 
According to the workplan, the PMOs had a large part to play in this endeavor: "The 
Mass Organizations play an important and basic role in attracting the masses, mobilizing 
them, and investing their energies and capabilities in what strengthens their march and 
solidifies and strengthens the mass base of the party and spreads Bacthist values within 
the mediums in which they work." The PMOs were particularly well suited to do this, 
the workplan says, because 
... they represent a majority of the sectors of our people and form, in reality, advanced 
and effective fronts (wiijihiit) out of the party's indirect organizational fronts and are 
more capable of influence within the mediums which they represent.148 In light of that, it 
is necessary to ascribe a special and exceptional importance to the work of the Mass 
Organizations and to benefit from their direct influence according to their individual 
abilities in the process of recruitment and in executing the workplans of the main [party] 
organizations in the field ofthe Bacthification ofsociety ... "149 
147.025-5-5:476-97. 
148. I.e., the worker's union has a natural connection with its workers, the doctor's union with 
doctors, etc., so they might have more success with Ba0thization within these groups than the regular party 
apparatus, which is a relative outsider. 
149. 025-5-5: 476-97. 
204 
In other words, because the PMOs' focused on particular sectors of society or professions 
they could effectively carry out party activities within groups they targeted. The southern 
branch of the Office of Students and Youth, for example, described in its program for the 
1990-91 school year how it would visit local student union branches and student families, 
conduct symposia amongst students, drill them in military matters and academic skills 
over the summer, and recruit amidst students and teachers. These activities, of course, 
paralleled exactly those undertaken by regular party organizations except that they 
specifically targeted students. As such, the Office of Students and Youth altered and 
added to them when necessary so as to act more successfully within the milieu in which it 
worked. 150 The offices of peasants, workers, and professionals similarly took into 
account the conditions within the unions they oversaw. As the author of a GFIW report 
asked, "What are the mass, unionist, and professional organizations except for arms and 
bridges that link the revolution with the broad masses of the people and their wide 
popular base?"151 
Bacth Party members constituted a critical mass of the PMOs' leaderships. The 
workplan insisted that the Bacth make "the good party cadres available to lead the Mass 
Organizations, which makes [the PMOs] more able to realize the party's goals through 
150. "Khittat carrzal," 3 amin sirr maktab tan;r.im al-junub 3 i!a maktab 3 amanat sirr al-qutr, Oct. 24, 
1990, 104-1-2: 190-8. 
151. See the report entitled, "A Report on the Activities of the General Federation oflraqi Women 
for the period 1980-1983, presented to the meeting of the Council of the World Democratic Union for 
Women," attached to, Ra3 isa al-3 itil)ad a!-cam li-nisa3 al-ciraq 3 ilii al-maktab al-mihni al-markazi, Sept. 
11, 1983, 027-5-2: 462, quote 464. The entire report begins on 463. 
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their activities."152 In support of this effort, the Bacth allowed its members who normally 
split their time between it and the PMOs to occasionally leave their party positions to 
focus full-time on PMO work. The author of the workplan also suggested including a 
special paragraph in party members' regular assessments written by the office of his or 
her PMO employer. These assessments were then to be taken into account for 
promotions in the regular party. This, the author wrote, "would create an incentive to 
work in the PMOs."153 
In organizational terms, the PMOs' structural hierarchies followed that of the 
regular party apparatus. A GFIW report detailing its activities from 1980 to 1983 said 
that it had expanded into all eighteen governorates, which corresponded to regular party 
branches at the time. Within each party branch, the GFIW had a number of "union 
centers" (mariikiz :Jiti!Jiidiyya), or satellite offices totaling 1,030 with 366,210 members 
throughout the country, primarily between the ages of eighteen and fifty-nine. The 
structures ofthe other PMOs had similar administrative shapes. 154 
Within the administrative and geographic areas connected to each regular party 
branch, the workplan directed the PMOs to coordinate their activities in a "Bacthification 
Committee" (lajnat tabclth). In Baghdad, the committee included the heads of the 
Baghdad branches ofthe GFIW, the executive office ofthe National Union of Students 
and Youth oflraq, the Union ofPeasants Associations,.the Worker's Union, and the 
152. 025-5-5: 476-97. 
153. 025-5-5: 476-97. 
154. 027-5-2: 457-9. 
206 
Teacher's Union. The Bacthification Committee in each branch also served as a link 
between the party and the PMOs. The committee was to send regular reports to the 
Bacthist leadership about the PMOs' combined accomplishments. In turn, the party 
provided the committee with lists of independents who the party either failed to recruit or 
who were not eligible to join because of something in their or their relatives' past. The 
committee then distributed the lists to the individual PMOs, which were supposed to 
include the independents in their activities.155 
Like the Bacth's activities, the PMOs acted as key organs of communication, 
mobilization and indoctrination. As chapter two noted, making regular citizens 
participate in Bacthist rituals established patterns of behavior and kept them occupied 
with pro-Bacthist activities instead ofleaving them to their own devices. With active 
party members only around one percent of the population for most of Hussein's rule, the 
regular party needed extra hands to organize and execute its programs. The Central 
Office of Workers in a semi-annual report from 1995, therefore, detailed how it 
mobilized and conducted propaganda toward workers in the unions it oversaw to 
encourage them to vote in Hussein's plebiscite.156 Not above buying the public's support 
too, the workplan ordered the PMOs, and especially the GFIW, to enter Iraqis' homes to 
make sure that their material requirements were taken care of, and to dispense sums if 
necessary. In these ways, ~e PMOs were to "Create a state of awareness and mutual 
155. 025-5-5: 476-97. 
156. "al-Taqrlr al-~idiirlni!ffal-sannawl 1995," maktab al-cumiil al-markazl, 089-3-6:374. 
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understanding between the party and the masses, which will lead to the people interacting 
with the leading party so as to produce accomplishments and a favorable reception to the 
party's initiatives and its daily activity."157 
The PMOs, therefore, acted as advance teams which laid the groundwork for the 
regular party's success because of their ability to organize the population beyond the 
abilities of the regular party apparatus and as a result of their own "culturalization" 
activities. In relation to the latter, as a GFIW report from 1994 stated, "One of the 
missions of the GFIW is to prepare and execute cultural programs that aim to raise the 
cultural level of the honorable Iraqi women and implant pure Arab values, which our 
struggling party has decided should be disseminated and generalized in order to build 
Ba0 thist society, considering that our union is one of the sources of the struggling 
party. " 158 Similarly, the 1990-1 school year plan from the Office of Students and Youth 
placed at the forefront of its goals "the preparation of a revolutionary generation armed 
intellectually and practically with patriotic and [Arab] nationalist values and morals." 
This included "deepening love and loyalty to the builder of the glory of the new Iraq, al-
sayyid President Saddam Hussein," increasing the desires of students and youth "to 
defend the [Iraqi] nation and participate in building it," "firmly establishing revolutionary 
values in the souls of the students," "and achieving a revolutionary education in harmony 
157. 025-5-5: 476-97. 
158. Ra'fsa al-'itil:ziid al-ciim li-nisii' al-ciriiq 'ilii al-maktab al-mihn'f al-muwaqqur, Dec. 11, 
1994, 131-4-7:28. 
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with Bacthist values."159 Clearly, the Bacth Party considered the PMOs to be part and 
parcel of the regime's effort to promote the Bacthist Trinity institutionally and 
ideologically. 
That is not to say, however, that the PMOs did not also serve the interests of their 
memberships within the Bacthist system. BRCC files about the GFIW in particular show 
that it actively and, in many instances, successfully improved women's welfare during 
Hussein's tenure.160 A 1983 report the GFIW presented to an international women's 
union meeting in Hungary listed its initiatives with regard to increasing female 
participation in the workforce, erasing illiteracy amongst women and improving their 
health services, and securing new legislation and regulations that gave Iraqi women more 
equal rights with men. 161 
Like with state institutions, the activities normally associated with civil society 
organizations always took a backseat to political considerations. The primary goals of 
presenting a report such as the one above to an international conference was always to 
promote the regime's external propaganda instead of to share the GFIW' s experience and 
to learn from other women's organizations. Another GFIW account of a delegation that 
visited Cuba in 1988, for instance, boasted about how it had "seized the opportunity ... to 
explain the factors of the Iranian aggtession against Iraq" to their Cuban counterparts 
159. 104-1-2: 191-2. 
160. For a good discussion of gender politics and the situation of Iraqi women under Hussein and 
the Ba0th see Chapter 4, "Gender Politics inBa0 thist Iraq," in Rohde, 75-118. 
161. 027-5-2: 457-9. 
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who, they said, had never heard Iraq's side of the story.162 Similarly, the directives for 
putting on international scientific conferences held in Iraq in the 1990s required that "The 
purpose for putting on the conference or specific exhibition must be to bolster political 
relations or Iraq's economic, health, or scientific situations in light of the unjust 
embargo."163 Also for propaganda purposes, Hussein hosted the headquarters of over 
twenty Arab professional unions and associations in Baghdad, including the Arab Dental 
Federation, the Union of Arab Historians, and the Union of Arab Physicists and 
Mathematicians. 164 Hussein supported these organizations in exchange for their backing. 
Each time they held a conference or issued a statement (always pro-Iraqi, of course), it 
carried the weight of having been propagated by a regional, pan-Arab civil group instead 
of the Iraqi government. This, at least, was the party's intention, stated explicitly by the 
Central Office in a 1990 letter to the president: "Through the activity and the work of the 
Arab organizations headquartered in Baghdad in the Arab and international areas, the 
leadership of the Office of Unions identified the unions listed below, which have a big 
qualitative weight by virtue of their importance and influence on their Arab and 
international counterparts in addition to their receptiveness and reaction toward our 
162. "Taqr'fr can ziyiirat wafd aPiti!Jiid al-ciim li-nisii' al-ciriiq 'iliijumhiiriyyat kiibii al-
'ishtiriikiyya li-l-fitra !Jlin 5/6wa li-ghliyat 1216/88," al-'iti!Jiid al-ciim li-nisii' al-ciriiq, 029-2-4:20-34, 
quote29. 
163. "Dawiibi! 'iqiimat al-mu'atamariit al-cilmiyya wa-l-maciirit;l al-nawciyya," 049-5-7: 296-8. 
164. See, e.g., the letters of support from Arab organizations in 029-2-6: 670-834. 
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patriotic and national issues .... " 165 Just like their domestic counterparts, the pan-Arab 
organizations that Hussein hosted provided a mirage of objective approval and legitimacy 
for his government's actions. For both internal and external propaganda purposes, the 
Bacth understood that the apparent source of its support from both the PMOs and the pan-
Arab organizations mattered when judging that support's validity, and thus it was better 
for these organizations to appear to back the Ba cth of their own volition instead of as a 
result of the Bacth's·blatant coercion. 
Recruitment 
The most direct way for the Bacth and the PMOs to integrate Iraqis into the 
Bacthist State was by recruiting them into the party or enlisting their active support 
within one of the PMOs' many unions and trade associations. The Bacth Party saw the 
success of its recruitment ( al-kasb) as an indication of its broader ability to serve the 
people and gain their respect and legitimacy. As a 1990 northern bureau report 
explained, "The subject of party recruitment remains, always, one of the main subjects in 
the life of the party and a yardstick ofthe verity of its relationship with the masses, on the 
one hand, and the organizational ability of the party to exert a positive influence on these 
masses and influence them organizationally, on the other hand."166 The party graded its 
members on the number of people they recruited into the party within each evaluation 
165. "ai-Muna:aamiit al-carabiyya allati maqarrhii baghdad," ~am in sirr al-maktab al-markazi li-
1-tan'{.im al-mihniwa-1-shacb;:~ua diwiin al-ri'iisa, April22, 1990,029-2-6:452-4. 
166. 076-2-4: 49-50. 
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period as part of their regular assessments and as a general measure of a Bacthist's 
commitment.167 The emphasis on quantity, however, frequently conflicted with its desire 
to recruit only quality individuals, a fact bemoaned in many party reports.168 
A "keep your friends close but your enemies closer" attitude characterized the 
Ba0 th and PMOs' strategy toward recruitment. As extensions of the Bacth, the workplan 
from above states that the PMOs should "identify the good and suitable elements for 
party recruitment in order to work on them and include them in the party apparatus."169 
At the same time, each PMO branch was to categorize its independents according to their 
suitability for different types of non-party work, be it in the party affiliated ''National 
Activism" units (al-nishat al-watanl) in the Kurdish territories, the people's councils, or 
one of the PMOs. For those people not suited to work as Ba0 thists or in the PMOs, the 
workplan told the PMOs to nonetheless "frame (ta:Jtfr) and include (~amm)" them in its 
programs "in order to stir up their consciousness." They were to "Identify and subdue 
(taf:zjfm) the elements that have previous connections to political movements or who have 
relatives that were executed or were members of opposition movements so as to monitor 
(ra~d) their activity and prevent any opposition force (jiha) from moving in on them, and 
to place them within the atmosphere of the party to make them feel assurance and 
167. The party believed that the act of recruiting was one way to "deepen the belief of the Ba0 thist 
in [party] principles." Sikritlr al-sayyid al-ra3 ls al-jumhiiriyya li-l-shu3 iin al-/Jizbiyya 3 ilii sayyidi al-ra'ls 
al-qii"id al-mu1Jtaram, March 26, 1983, 023-2-8: 28. 
168. See, e.g., 029-2-3: 95. In the case of women recruits see: "Diriisa," 3 amln sirr qiyiidat 
maktab tan?,lm al-shumii[ 3 i/ii maktab 3 amiinat sirr al-qu{r, March 24, 1990, 028-3-6: 607, 609. 
169. 025-5-5: 476-97. 
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trust."170 Recruitment, in other words, was a direct application ofBacthist ideology. 
Even if the PMOs did not include Iraqis as members in their organizations, they were still 
to subject the targets of their attention to intense propaganda in the hope of forming or 
reorienting their political views in support of the Bacth and to protect them from 
alternatives. They would do this, as c Aflaq believed, by manipulating the "atmosphere" 
in which they lived so that the only stimuli they experienced pointed the way in a Bacthist 
direction. This would occur through personal ties and frequent visits by the PMO 
leadership to these individuals and by eliciting or coercing them to participate in the 
PMOs' activities. 
The Bacth attempted to recruit Iraqis from all segments of society, but it focused 
especially on a few groups, men and women included, that could help it expand its 
influence further, consolidate its already gotten gains, and keep an eye on (and hopefully 
convert) potential enemies. Capturing the children of the party cadre, for example, 
allowed the party to establish a tradition ofBacthism within families and to ensure that 
the children of Iraq's political elite would support the regime. It would not reflect well if 
the Bacth proved itself so inept or unpopular that the children of its members did not want 
to join. For the same reasons, the Bacth tried to appeal to the sons and daughters of 
citizens who won awards and received special benefits, including the children of martyrs 
and "Friends of the President." The martyrs' children, however, also had the potential to 
turn on the Bacth for sending their fathers into two hopeless wars under terrible 
170. 025-5-5: 476-97. 
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conditions and without the command and control freedom to win the war. The same 
applied to the children ofPOWs in Iran and those MIA, both of which the Bacth also 
targeted. Additionally, the :Bacth emphasized recruiting the children of tribal notables, 
and, particularly in the 1990s when the Ba0 th tried to turn the increasing influence of 
Islam on society to its own benefit~ the party suggested drafting into its ranks men of 
religion and their families.1 : 1 
As seen from the previous paragraph, Hussein and the Bacth placed special 
emphasis on recruiting youth (al-shabab ), which Hussein ordered should be the largest 
demographic captured by the party: 
The leadership ofthe party takes a great interest in the youth, and the students especially, 
for the sake of their education and proper preparation and the development of their 
abilities in the patriotic (al-wataniyya), J}ationalist (al-qawmiyya), educational, and 
scientific fields because it considers them the tools capable of achieving the [party's] 
future aspirations (emphasis added) and carrying out the [the party's] central goals in the 
process of building ( al-binifl).172 
This focus occurs time and again in the BRCC, usually accompanied by Hussein's 
famous dictum: "we recruit the youth to secure the future" (naksib al-shabab li-na~man 
al-mustaqba/).173 As this slogan indicates, the Ba0 th saw Iraqi youth, like young people 
everywhere, as the "the source of vibrancy and continuity in evyry society" because 
"society in general begins with the youth."174 The party considered young minds as 
171. See, e.g., 025-1-7:34. 
172. 073-3-4: 76. The phrase "proper preparation" (aPicdad al-salfm) has the connotation of 
proper ideological preparation. 




tabulae rasae which it could mold in a Bacthist shape. I~ contrast, the Bacth thought it 
more difficult to influence Iraqis with memories of the pre-Bacthist era who had been 
exposed to other avenues of thought and were already set in their ways. As an internal 
1984 party report stated, "New recruitment should devote itself to the youth before 
anybody else because the youth have the ability to adapt according to what the party 
wants. As for those who are advanced in age, whatever the means .of education (tarbiya), 
they will remain elements who are not in accord with the [party's] aspirations."175 
Recruiting youth into the party, therefore, would ensure the Bacth's maintenance of 
power by creating true believers out of the generation that grew up in the Bacthist State. 
These children would then act as "the source of radiation within the family" to spread 
Bacthist propaganda, monitor their relatives, and eventually raise their own future 
Bacthists.176 It would also regenerate the party cadres, which, as Table 2 in Appendix 1 
shows, trended older by the late 1990s. 
Statistics in the BRCC demonstrate that the party's Bacthification efforts amongst 
students and teachers combined with relaxed admission standards and other forms of · 
favoritism shown to Bacthists and their children (see Chapter Five) had a positive effect 
from the Bacth's point ofview.177 The numbers of students who joined the party-the 
175. 023-2-8: 25. 
176. "Dirosa l;lawl '{.iihirat al-mashi," mas~iil tantfmiit baghdiid-al-ra~iifa ~am'fn sirr qiyiidat al-
furc ~ua maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qufr, Nov. 11, 1996, 046-5-4: 90. " 
177. Another factor suggested in the documents but not explicitly found for this study was the 
requirement for students to join the party in order to be accepted into certain faculties or receive their 
degrees, just as teachers had to. 
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real prize and focus of the Ba0 thification of schools and teachers-was much higher than 
in the general population throughout Hussein's tenure, although the Ba0th's success rate 
varied widely in different schools and universities at different times. In 1984, statistics ,., 
show that fifty-four percent of students at Mustansiriyya University were Ba0thists, as 
were a similar percentage (fifty-five) in a division that included the faculties oflslamic 
law, law and politics, and administration and economics at the University of Baghdad.178 
Three divisions of university students from engineering and other technical fields in 2001 
contained Ba0 thists to the tune oftwenty-eight, thirty, and sixty-one percent.179 In one 
school division in Baghdad in 1990, the number of students and teachers reached ninety-
five percent. 180 All of these statistics are far above the just under seven to almost sixteen 
percent of the general population that was in the Ba0 th Party at any one time between 
1986 and 2002, as shown Table 1 in Appendix 1. Of course, it is impossible to determine 
whether or not students joined the party primarily because Bacthification convinced them 
to believe in it or simply out of self-interest. As a 1986 southern bureau report lamented, 
"The phenomenon of joining the party out of personal interest ( al- 3 intimi13 al-ma~lalft) 
178. "Qarar," ~amfn sirr maktab tanf.fm baghdad ~na qiyadatforc al-rashfd, Oct. 15, 1984, 098-5-
3:367-75. 
179. "~ Isti~dath firqa," cucjii qiyadat qup- a!-ciraq mas~iil tanf.fmat baghdad al-ra~afa ~ita maktab 
~amanat sirr al-qup-, June 12, 2001, 044-2-4: 9-13. 
180. "Qarar," ~amfn sirr maktab tanf.fm baghdad ~ua qiyadatforc al-rashfd, Feb. 12, 1990, 134-
4-3: 162-4. 
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remains, especially amongst the ranks of students who covet the acquisition of some 
academic places."181 
Conclusion 
As the previous quote indicates, while Saddam Hussein and the Bacth Party might 
have wanted to turn their citizens into true Bacthist believers, regardless of whether this 
occurred or not, the system they set up was designed to make it in the interest of Iraqis to 
join the party, the PMOs, or simply exhibit their loyalty. From the top of the Bacthist 
State where Hussein gathered the reigns of power into his hands down to individuals in 
society, Hussein employed the party to organize the state, social institutions, and 
individuals so that the environments they worked, learned, prayed, and lived in 
corresponded to the regime's rhetoric. Especially by the end of the Bacth's rule, the 
organizational structure ofBacthist State and society consequently came to resemble and 
buttress its political and ideological priorities. 
Nowhere was this more apparent than in the legal realm. The many rules and 
internal directives mentioned above that required certain posts to be held by Bacthists, 
stipulated the qualifications for acceptance into academies, regulated the behavior of 
party members, controlled the shaykhs of tribes, and tied the Bacth Party-the political 
branch of government and Hussein's organ of meta-control-inextricably together with 
the rest of state and society enshrined the primacy of the political at every level of Iraqis' 
181. "Mumarasat al-mas~iiliyyafi al-mawqic aPadna," J:zizb al-bacth al-carabl aPishtirakf-
qiyadatmaktab al-shumal, 029-2-3: 93. 
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lives. Indeed, despite Hussein and the Bacth's compulsion to justify all of their actions 
on a legal basis, political considerations always governed the Bacthist State above the 
legislation that they themselves enacted, and Hussein frequently ignored the law, issuing 
decrees that had the same force. Ensuring the enforcement of these considerations was 
the Bacth Party's main responsibility. In a state with no legally binding or institutional 
checks and balances on the political branch, anything could become political. As a result, 
the party could intervene anywhere at any time and extend itself into the civil and private 
spheres of society. Only when political considerations were absent or virtually nil-
usually in the mundane affairs of everyday administration and bureaucratic practice, or in 
the technical details of policy execution-did the rule of law hold. But it never took 
precedence. 
Just as the party's basic aims were equivalent to those defmed by the state 
constitution, so too did the content oflaw in Hussein's Iraq reflect the monopoly that he 
and the party held over its legislation, execution, and adjudication. There was no clear 
dividing line, therefore, between J?Olitics and law. Mirroring the relationship between the 
party and state (indeed as a result of their relationship within the institutional context of 
Bacthist Iraq) the two were not equivalent but did overlap to a large degree. It is thus 
possible to say that the rule of law did not exist in Iraq under Hussein. As Ernst Fraenkel 
observed in relation to Nazi Germany, "[The] repudiation of the principle of the 
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inviolability oflaw (its actual as well as its potential abrogation) raises the general 
question of the significance oflaw."182 
Due to the absence of the rule of law, the significance of the institutional structure 
and inner-workings of the Bacthist State and the social institutions it org~zed might also 
be questioned since they did not rest on any firm legal foundations that political 
considerations could not change at a moment's notice. For this reason, Arendt argued 
that totalitarian states exhibit a "shapeless" structure because the ends always justify the 
means. Consequently, nothing is impermissible, be it the use of violence, the violation or 
suspension of law, or the constant reorganization of state or social institutions so long as 
-~ 
the state's political aim is achieved. While the Bacthist State was not a formless mass, 
the internal structures and responsibilities of its relatively stable larger institutions did 
shift on a regular basis according to political necessities, and it reorganized social 
institutions along the same lines. Arendt was right in a way, therefore, that totalitarian 
states-the Bacthist State among them-have a "direction" more than a fixed structure. 183 
The Bacth Party's main responsibility was to direct state and society; the important thing 
was never that state departments, social institutions, or individuals performed their 
activities competently or efficiently but that state and society "organized" as a whole 
achieved their Leader's desired result. 
182. Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship. Trans. E.A. 
Shils (New York: Oxford University press, 1941), 107. 
183. Arendt, 395-403. 
CHAPTER 5: Terror and Enticement 





Loyalty was the ultimate criterion for how the Ba0 thist State treated its citizens. It 
is true that state sponsored violence and paranoia bred by ubiquitous informers and the 
security services produced a "Republic of Fear" in Iraq. The threat ofviolence always 
existed to anybody who showed themselves disloyal or infringed upon Hussein's power, 
but the Bacthist State did not randomly dispense terror in order to instill fear, even if the 
Ba0th's monopoly over authority allowed it to do so arbitrarily. The Ba0 thist State only 
targeted a person if it considered him a "traitor" (khii:Jin), a "criminal" (mujrim), an 
"enemy" (cadu), or a "saboteur" (mukharrib): a member of an opposition group, a 
lawbreaker, or a foreign "agent" who threatened national security and honor. The fear of 
violence derived from the necessity to take care not to do or say anything that could 
possibly be perceived by Hussein or the Ba0 th as disloyal. Many innocents died in 
Bacthist Iraq and the Bacthist State meted out collective punishment against entire towns 
or areas from which attacks on the regime or revolts emanated. But no evidence was 
found in the BRCC for this study that either Hussein or any organ of the Ba0 thist State 
ever targeted Iraqis indiscriminately as a strategy designed to induce obedience. The 
Bacth always claimed to govern on behalf of the people in the name of Arab nationalism 
and Iraqi patriotism, and, in an oft repeated quotation, Hussein said that "Iraq is the 
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country of all and protecting its security and sovereignty is everybody's responsibility."1 
The people, in other words, had an obligation to the Ba0thist State too, and the state used 
violence on the people's behalf. It would have been the height of hypocrisy, therefore, 
for Hussein and the Ba0 th to make it a policy to terrorize the very people whose welfare 
and progress they claimed lay at the center of their mission and whom they enlisted in 
their endeavor. Although outside observers might claim that was indeed the case, that is 
not how Hussein and the Ba0 th saw it. They used violence under the moral authority, and 
based upon the historical necessity, of"unity, freedom, and socialism," the principles of 
which were codified in public laws and internal directives. From their point of view, they 
did not target their supporters. 
On the contrary, the BRCC shows that although Hussein employed terror as one 
tool in his arsenal of control in order to root out internal plots, eliminate opponents, and 
deter crime, the Republic of Fear was also a Republic of Rewards and Dependence. 
Complementing its violence and surveillance, Hussein and the Ba0th created an extensive 
regime of medals, awards, honors, and statuses that entitled their holders to fmancial, 
professional, academic, social, and other benefits. Iraqis won these rewards by 
demonstrating their allegiance to the Bacthist Trinity. They thus served as enticements to 
support the regime. If an Iraqi's fealty ever wavered the Bacth would withdraw his perks 
and might mete out physical punishment. As long as an Iraqi remained loyal, however, 
he expected recompense for his service. This reciprocal relationship constituted the basic 
1. This phrase occurs many times in the BRCC. See, e.g., Mudfr cam maktab ~ amanat sirr al-qup-
~ila al-rafiq na~ib ~amzn sirr qiyadat qup- al-ciraq, 123-4-7: 220. 
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agreement between the Ba0 th Party and society. The Ba0 th took care of its supporters 
and, in turn, they sustained it. Hussein ruled not merely through terror but also via 
enticement. He offered his citizens a stark choice designed to induce their consent: 
support me and prosper or, at least, live a normal life; oppose me and face the 
consequences. Once an Iraqi pulled a trigger on Hussein's behalf or accepted his bribes, 
he became complicit in the Ba0 thist order, offering another incentive to sustain it. 
Hussein's system of terror and enticement, or al-tarhzb wa-1-targhzb as Iraqis 
called it, worked particularly well because the consequences of a citizen's actions 
extended to their families, for better or worse. Individuals and families consequently had 
motivation to police one another so that neither would suffer for the other's 
transgressions and to ensure that all prospered. At stake was not just their physical or 
economic well-being but also their dignity and self-worth because within the Ba0 thist 
system a person or family's honor-frequently defended to the death in Iraqi society-
depended first and foremost on the extent of their loyalty to the nation, the leader, and the 
party. When required to choose, Hussein expected Iraqis to forsake their kin, co-
religionists, or tribal members in favor of this Ba0 thist Trinity. The choice that Iraqis 
faced was analogous to a person with a gangrenous limb who must sever his arm or leg 
so that the infection does not spread to the rest of his body. This is why enticements were 
equally as critical as terror. If the choice had been simply between "murder and murder," 
as Hannah Arendt characterized the predicament of people stuck within totalitarian 
systems of terror, "making the decisions of conscience absolutely questionable and 
222 
equivocal," then it is doubtful that so many fathers would have turned in their sons.2 
Terror and enticement succeeded to a large degree because the Ba0 th offered its citizens 
an un-equivocal choice: between killing or turning in individuals to save the entire 
family. If the families did not disown their members, not only might more family 
members die or be tortured than one or two deserters or opposition party members, but 
the entire extended family would thereafter fall under heightened suspicion and have 
black marks in their files. This would leave them all dishonored but also disadvantaged 
in school, at work, and in any type of interaction with the Ba0 thist State. Terror and 
enticement reinforced the moral universe that Husseini Ba0 thism created. 
The Means and Purposes of Terror 
In the history of totalitarian regimes, Hussein's Iraq does not rank among the most 
prolific killers of its citizens, although the full extent of its murder is still unknown. In 
its range of methods and willingness to use them, however, its terror was first rate. The 
files looked at for this study did not mention torture explicitly, but its existence has been 
detailed elsewhere, and the archive does document confessions of guilt, some of which 
probably occurred as a result of coercion.3 Otherwise, the BRCC cites executions, 
2. Arendt, 452. 
3. For stories of torture and the conditions within prisons under the Bacth see: Amir Hayder, "A 
Personal Testimony," in The Iraqi Marshlands: a Human and Environmental Study, ed. Emma Nicholson 
and Peter Clark (London: Politico's, 2002), 307-13; An Iraqi Mother and Sue ad Khairi, "Bacth terror-Two 
Personal Accounts," in Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction, Committee Against Repression and for 
Democratic Rights in Iraq (CARDRI) (London: Zed Books, 1986), 108-119; chapter three, "Omar: Inside a 
Baghdad Prison," in Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising and the Arab World 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1993), 105-34; cAbd al-Qahhar, 104-5; and Qasim al-Buraysim, al-Sharara wa-
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killings, prison sentences, the destruction ofhomes, ethnic cleansing and deportation 
within and outside of the country, the withholding of social and economic services, and 
the d~struction of environments critical to Iraqis' livelihoods. The security services and 
the Ba0 th Party also regularly monitored potential security threats through human and 
technological means, recruiting a large number of informants to spy on their friends, 
colleagues, neighbors, and kin. All of these measures, or simply the threat of them, were 
used against individuals, their families, and certain regions or segments of the population 
collectively. Why did the Ba0thist State use them? What purposes did they serve? 
The most clear cut use ofterror occurred in instances when Hussein and the Bacth 
Party could not threaten, convince, cajole, or buy off Iraqis into supporting them, or when 
Hussein felt a loyalist had acquired too much of a personal power base. The Ba0 thist 
State did not trust individuals, social groups, or political movements that did not 
~xplicitly back it, and especially if they voiced public opposition or used violence 
themselves against the Ba0 thist State, it sought to eliminate them. This was the basic 
reason behind the Ba0th's violence: to remove disloyal elements who threatened the 
maintenance of the regime, its capacity to carry out its initiatives, and the population's 
sense of security. 
1-Ramad: Shahada Hayya can "Intifada! al-Shacb al-clraqi wa-cAdhab al-Muntafidinfi Sujun al-
Ridwaniyya (Beirut: Dar al-Kunuz al-0 Adabiyya, 2004). . 
For an example of a confession see: ''"~khbiir al-macliimiit al-"uwwlii," al-mul;taqqiq, Jan. 1986, 
035-4-6: 86-7. This document details the case of seven men who supposedly were part of an Iranian 
backed opposition group and who, according to the confessions of three of the men, were planning to 
assassinate a divisional Ba0 th Party member. All seven men were Ba0thists. 
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The Bacthist State also used violence as a deterrent against future acts of 
opposition and crime, and as an incentive for resistance fighters and criminals to reform 
themselves and become loyal citizens. Indeed, it offered a stark choice between the 
outcomes for enemies or lawbreakers who forced the Bacth to hunt them down and 
committed repeated crimes versus those who turned themselves in quickly. The 
regulations for army deserters, for example, required that those who remained at large for 
more than a year or deserted for a second time be executed. Deserters for the first time 
and for less than a year were sent back to their units for disciplining.4 To drive home the 
message, the Bacth often made examples out of individuals or groups of deserters. In 
1987, the Baghdad bureau reported to Hussein that it had recently executed fifty-nine 
deserters who qualified for the death penalty in front of other runaways arrested for their 
first offenses as a means to prevent recidivism. 5 Similarly, when crime spiked, in 
addition to killing or otherwise dealing with crimes already committed, the Bacth evinced 
a tendency to impose harsh penalties to restore order, even for what normally did not 
constitute severe offenses. During the Gulf War, the Party Secretariat instructed its 
organizations that if they found taxi drivers exploiting wartime conditions to extort high 
4. "Mutabacat al-haribfn min al-khidma al-caskariyya," ~amfn sirr a!- cam li-l-qiyada al-cama li-l-
quwat al-musalla~a ~ila maktab ~amanat sirr al-qu{r, Dec. 4, 1987,027-1-1:229-31. 
5. ~Amfn sirr maktab tan;r.fm baghdad ~ua sayyidf al-ra~rs al-qa~id--~aft.uhu allah wa-racak, June 
20, 1987, 027-1-1: 234-43. 
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fares from their riders, they should execute them and hang their bodies publicly for three 
days with signs detailing their crime "in order for us to deter others."6 
Additionally, Hussein and the Bacth used terror against their enemies' families 
with the aim of convincing them to inform on their relatives and to turn themselves in so 
as to spare their families punishment. When a party detachment in 2000 could not catch 
a deserter who fled to the marshes, for example, it destroyed his house. When that did 
not bring him in, the party arrested his father, his wife, and his children, which finally 
persuaded him to submit himself to the authorities. 7 To present a lesson to other security 
service personnel in 1986, the Bacth executed a man in the General Intelligence 
Directorate (GID) for failing to inform on his uncle and cousins who were Dacwa party 
members. 8 These cases, of course, not only served as effective means to capture 
criminals and root out potential resistance party sympathizers from sensitive state 
agencies but were also deterrents designed to make prospective offenders and their 
relatives think twice before committing a crime or hiding their family members' 
transgressions. Extending terror to families widened its desired effect by inducing the 
population to police itself. 
6. "cAqd nadawiit," mudfr ciim maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~ilii al-makiitib al-/:tizbiyya kiifa, Feb. 
7, 1991, 024-5-2: 226. 
7. "Macliimat," ~amfn sirr qiyadatfurc al-na~iriyya ~ila maktab ~amanat sirr al-qutr, July 3, 2000, 
049-5-7: 69. 
8. "~Jjaba," mudfr jihaz al-mukhabariit ~ilii al-qiyada al-qutriyyalmaktab ~amanat sirr al-qutr, 
Jan. 7, 1986, 038-4-1: 565-6. 
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For all of these same reasons, the Ba0 th also conducted terror against groups of 
people within Iraqi society that it failed to Ba0 thize for one reason or another. The 
genocide and deportations of the Kurds was one case of this (see below). Another was 
the Ba0 th's policy toward the marshes in the southeastern part of the country. Due to the 
difficult terrain in the marshes, their proximity to Iran, and the proliferation of hiding 
places for opposition fighters and criminals, the Ba0 th took blunt measures against the 
entire area. In 1986, the head of the party's southern bureau reported to the Party 
Secretariat that government forces had shelled the .marshes for three days and constructed 
an economic blockade whereby they allowed no foodstuffs or fuel in and cut the 
electricity.9 The following year, the southern bureau wrote in a letter to Hussein that it 
had a plan in place to "prepare and purify" (tan'{.'fm wa-tathzr) the shoulders of the Tigris 
and Euphrates as well as to continue the desiccation of their surrounding marshes in order 
to "help control them and increase the agricultural lands it is possible to benefit from."10 
The state's benefit, however, destroyed the environment in which the "Marsh Arabs," 
who were not opponents of the regime or criminals, lived and depended on for their 
9. "al-Hiiribiin wa-1-mutakhallifiin fi manii{iq aP ahwiir," ~ amln sirr qiyiidat maktab tanf_'lm al-
juniib ~ilii maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qu{r, June 7, 1986, 052-1-3: 48-9. 
10. ~Amln sirr qiyiidat maktab tanf_'lm al-juniib ~ilii al-sayyid ra~ls al-qii~id, May 20, 1987, 038-5-
2:542-3. 
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livelihoods.11 "To cleanse" (tan:r.if) was another euphemism the Bacth used for 
campaigns designed to rid a town or region of any traces of opposition. 12 
The constant surveillance Iraqis found themselves subject to added to the effect of 
the above tactics and led to paranoia and self-censorship. In fact, the BRCC 
demonstrates that the Ba cth Party acted as a de facto fifth security and intelligence 
agency. With its cell-like structure that spread into every village and neighborhood in the 
country, its personnel ar;1d organizational implants in the state (see Chapter Five), and its 
connection to the professional and mass organizations (also Chapter Five), the Ba0 th 
Party had a built-in intelligence gathering apparatus. Party organizations kept extensive 
files on their members but also non-Bacthists who lived within their designated purviews. 
Records of the tasks carried out by local Ba0 thist officials show that they met on a regular 
basis with notables and regular citizens from all parts of government and society. The 
head of the Maysan and Wasit bureau in 1997, for example, listed a month's worth of 
activities as including meetings at various organizational levels in the party, with tribal 
leaders and shaykhs, local government officials, private citizens and heads of households, 
the local Office of Students and Youth, and units ofthe Saddam's Fedayeenmilitia. He 
also attended local security committee meetings and a public march in al-Kut on the 
11. Tripp, 264-5. 
12. See, e.g., a plan ''to cleanse" the town ofal-0Amara: "lfamla," mudir cam maktab 'amiinat sirr 
al-qutr 'ilii al-rafiq cabd al-ghanf 0abd al-ghufor cufjii al-qiyiida al-qutyiyya 'amfn sirr maktab tan'{.fm al-
juniib al-mul}taram, Dec. 17, 1988,038-5-2: 595. 
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national occasion of the "Day of the People" (yawm al-shacb). 13 Party officials and 
organizations immersed themselves in the life of the regions in which they operated. 
Frequently, especially at the division and cell levels, their memberships were made up 
entirely of area residents. The Bacth Party was perfectly situated, therefore, to keep its 
ear to the ground and gather information about every aspect of state and society. As a 
result, the party served as a major source of information for the president's office and the 
four official security and intelligence services. 
The BRCC reveals that the Ba0 th Party had a complicated relationship with the 
security services. On the one hand, as noted, all of the services' officers were Ba0 thists 
and the two shared information extensively. The security services frequently presented 
the Bacth Party with lists of individuals it wanted information about, and the Bacth 
usually cooperated. The services and party sat on local "security committees" together 
and warned each other of threats from opposition groups. They coordinated surveillance 
of government institutions, social groups, individuals, and places, and even carried out 
joint operations. Often, the security services asked the party to arrest suspects for them 
and to escort them to their offices for interrogation. Even though the party and the 
services were clearly separate institutions, they overlapped in the areas of personnel, 
operations, and jurisdiction, and saw themselves as part of the same general team with the 
similar goal of protecting the regime. 14 
13. "Nishiitiit," cur;lii qiyiidat quty al-ciriiq mas'iil tan'{.'fmiit maysiin wa-wiisit 'ilii maktab 'amiinat 
sirr al-quty, 008-4-6: 36-8. 
14. There are many whole boxfiles and individual documents in the BRCC detailing the 
relationship between the party and the various security services. See, e.g., "Macliimiit," jihiiz al-'amn al-
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On the other hand, the Bacth Party and security services sometimes clashed. As 
noted, even though all security and intelligence officers were Ba0 thists, each agency had 
its own esprit de corps. The party and agencies all spied and informed on each other. In 
performing their duties, all of them operated outside the law and thus the only checks on 
their behavior came from reports by one about another.15 Indeed, out of all Bacthist State 
institutions the party and the security and intelligence services were the most powerful. 
One former head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) insists that, other than 
Hussein's family, the security services were above every other state institution, including 
the party. 16 Evidence from the BRCC indicates that they were certainly the most ruthless 
and feared institutions in the Ba0 thist State, responsible for most of the violence, torture, 
and detainment meted out against the populace. Compared to the Ba0 th Party, however, 
the security services did not possess as large an organizational apparatus; thus their need 
to frequently ask the party for information. Nor did they keep regular tabs on as many 
other institutions and subjects; the scope ofthe Ba0 th Party's activities eclipsed those of 
the security services. The security services, moreov~r, were not expressly political 
bodies. They enforced Hussein's decisions, protected _him and his coterie, and carried out 
khii~~ ~ilii maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qu{r, Oct. 28, 2002, 038-1-2: 186; "Mac!Umiit," mudfr ciim maktab 
~amiinat sirr al-qu{r ~ilii mudfriyyat al-'amn al-ciima, Dec. 12, 1994, 005-4-2: 148; "~llqiic qubr;l," mudfr 
jihiiz aPamn al-khii~~ ~ilii ~amiinat sirr al-qu{r, June 16, 1999, 029-2-1: 44. 
15. See, e.g., "Muqtara~," wazfr al-diikhiliyya ~ilii maktab "amiinat sirr al-qu{r, June 2, 1993, 
147-4-3: 529; "Shakwii," mudfr jihiiz al-'amn al-khii~~ 'ilii maktab 'amiinat sirr al-qu{r, Dec. 20, 1999, 
029-2-1: 50-1. 
16. Al-Samarra"i, 361. 
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surveillance, assassinations, sabotage, and other operations, but they were not part of the 
fourth, political branch of government. 
Other than the wiretaps, bugs, and tailing of high regime officials and people 
marked as suspicious, surveillance of the general population by the Bacth Party and the 
security services took two general forms. The party and security services themselves sent 
agents to spy on mosques, markets, town squares, and other public spaces. The BRCC 
makes reference, for example, to "the commissioned spies" (al-cuyiln al-mukallafa) sent 
by the party to listen to and report about a Friday prayer sermon given by a preacher in 
Baghdad that had been drawing especially large crowds. 17 Whether through the party or 
security services, another document mentions a "local watchman" (murliqib baladiyya) 
who stumbled on anti-Saddam graffiti written on a wall during his normal rounds. 18 
Furthermore, in 1986 the General Security Directorate wrote to the RCC's National 
Security Council (majlis al- 3 amn al-qawml) suggesting that two women employed as the 
"deputy security officials" assigned to the al-Mustansiriyya and central al-Rashid markets 
in Baghdad be fired because oftheir flagging commitment to the Bacth Party. 19 
17. "Maclumat," mas~Ullajnat al-maktab (al-lajna al-~amliniyyafi maktab tanf."im baghdad) ~ua 
qiyadat maktab tanf."im baghdad, Jan. 27, 1986, 035-2-3: 99. 
18. "Maczumat," ~am"in sirr maktab tan?:"im al-furat ~ua maktab ~amanat sirr al-qufr, Sept. 12, 
1990, 047-1-7: 67-8. 
19. "Musaciday mas~ulay ~amn," mudfr aPamn al-e am ~ila majlis qiyadat al-thawra-majlis al-
~amn al-qawm"i-maktab al-sikritariyya, Oct. 19, 1986, 026-1-3: 65. 
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The population monitored itself too because the Bacth Party obligated its 
members to report anti-regime comments or criminal activity; otherwise it punished 
them. The party demoted a man who worked in the Central Workers Office in 1991, for 
instance, for failing to turn in another Ba0 thist who made pro-Iranian and anti-regime 
comments at a party meeting. 20 In a twist on this kind of case, a partisan being 
investigated for allegedly criticizing the regime's personal status law denied the charges, 
using the imperative for Bacthists to inform the party about inappropriate comments as a 
defense. "First of all," he asked, "if the decisions [of the party] had really been criticized, 
shouldn't it have been incumbent upon comrades [name withheld] and [name withheld] 
to take the initiative to inform about it? Second, if the facts have been confirmed then 
why weren't these two comrades punished for covering up the criticism?"21 
Iraqis informed on their fellows for other reasons also. One Kurdish informant 
complained in a petition to Hussein that despite providing the GID with a lot of good 
information, they mistreated him and did not compensate him properly.22 Financial 
reasons constituted one impetus for spying. People informed out of malice, using the 
skeletons they knew about from other Iraqis' closets to settle scores. A lawyer with a 
grudge against a recently elected National Assembly member, for example, told the party 
that the member had previously deserted from the army and been expelled from the party 
20. "Taqrlr mughlaq," mudlr cam maktab ~amanat sirr al-qutr ~ua ri~asat al-jumhiiriyya/sikritlr 
al-jumhiiriyya li-1-shu"iin al-~izbiyya, Jan. 14, 1991, 024-5-2: 133. 
21. Mudlr ~am maktab ~amanat sirr al-qutr ~na al-rafiq ~amln sirr al-qutr al-mu~taram, 034-2-1: 
150-1. 
22. Citizen petition to Saddam Hussein, 050-5-2: 130-2. 
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in the 1970s. The National Assembly member returned to public life under an assumed 
name and forged identity, however, and eluded the party censors who vetted the 
candidates.Z3 As shown below, families also frequently turned in individual members 
who ran afoul of the regime in order to save their collective reputations, lives, and 
ben~fits. The large number of Iraqis who cooperated with the regime, often taking the 
initiative to inform, illustrates the degree to which its overall system of control convinced 
and compelled people to support it for their own individual reasons. 
There are no statistics in the BRCC that provide an indication of how many Iraqis 
during Hussein's presidency had a relative executed, disappeared, or imprisoned, 
underwent torture themselves, or were subject to surveillance. The number of 
memoranda, reports, petitions, and other correspondence that reference these types of 
cases, however, along with people who became involved in an affair that drew in the 
Bacth Party or the security services is immense. Their collective weight suggests that 
even if an Iraqi lived a "normal" life in Iraq and never personally suffered, he likely had 
some kind of brush with the political arms of the state and knew (or knew of) somebody 
affected in one of the above ways. Without a doubt, he heard rumors about them. 24 The 
23. [Name withheld] to al-sayyid al-ra"fs majlis al-watanfj'i baghdad al-mu~taram, 021-1-2: 169. 
The letter contains no date but comes from a boxfile from 1996. 
24. The Ba0 th Party tracked rumors assiduously and kept large files of reports about them. There 
was an official form for reporting rumors that asked for the text of the rumor, the medium in which it 
circulated, the date of its circulation, the opinion of the security official (al-mas"iil al-"amanl) in the area 
about it, and the opinion of the person who reported the rumor about whether or not it was true. For an 
example of a form see: ""Istimiirat ra.f al-shii"ica," April18, 1993, 005-3-3: 9. Many ofthe reported 
rumors dealt with things the security services supposedly either did or were plkning to do. See, e.g., a 
number of rumors reported by the party's Najafbranch in 1993: ""lshacat," mudir cam maktab "amiinat sirr 
a/-qutr "ilii ri"iisat al-jumhiiriyya/maktab sikritiiriyyat majlis al-"amn al-qawmi, April24, 1993, 005-3-3: I. 
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violent and secretive arms of Hussein's Iraq did not touch every citizen; but they did not 
have to in order to instill fear of them in the populace. Fear might not have been the 
primary purpose behind Ba0 thist terror, but it served as a useful consequence of the threat 
of violence and surveillance that underlay all interactions between the Bacthist State and 
society.· 
A fmal purpose of terror was to tie its perpetrators and the populace at large to the 
regime by making them complicit in it. Chapter Three detailed the most egregious case 
of this when upon his assumption of the presidency Hussein forced Bacth Party Regional 
Command members to kill their comrades. Wa:fiq al-Samarraci, a former head of military 
intelligence until his defection in the early 1990s, claimed that his former organization 
used the same tactic on its officers. According to him, it regularly bussed them into the 
desert where large holes )lad been dug before their arrival. They were then given 
Kalashnikovs and told to wait for another bus, this one containing men blindfolded with 
their hands tied. The men were led into the hole and the officers were told to open fir~. 
When they fmished, they covered the dead bodies with dirt in mass graves. Describing 
the regime's intent behind these types of acts, Samara0 i explained that: 
Saddam worked assiduously throughout his rule to generalize criminality, spread terror, 
and implicate (tawrzt) others. Frequently, Bacthists were executed at the hands of 
Bacthists in front of groups ofBacthists in order to spread fear and terror, on the one 
hand, and implicate those who carried it out on the other because if they did not carry out 
the order others would carry it out against them and the people who they wanted to 
execute in the first place!25 
Other boxfiles besides 005-3-3 that contain rumors include: 148-4-5, 162-2-2, 087-5-3, 133-5-7, and 040-4-
2. 
25. Al-Samarra~i, 193-4. Al-Samarra~i claims to have heard about and witnessed these mass 
executions but never participated. 
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Trapped between the choice of murder or suicide, those who chose the former could take 
comfort only in the Bacth's contention that the people they killed were indeed traitors and 
h?-d to be eliminated for the sake of national security. They killed on behalf of the people 
taking cover under the moral universe that Husseini Bacthism provided. If Hussein's 
government ever fell, however, and removed the moral, political, and, as argued below, 
legal alibis they killed under, they could become the criminals legitimately subject to 
punishment and revenge. Consequently, they had a strong incentive to prolong the 
regime in order to save themselves. To a lesser extent, this same dynamic held amongst 
the general population, which had to buy into the Bacthist system to prove their loyalty 
and gain access to the state benefits and opportunities required to prosper or live a normal 
life. As a result, regardless of their motives or degree of separation from the Bacthist 
State's actual acts of terror, they supported a regime that performed these acts and thus 
tacitly countenanced them. 
The Targets and Justifications of Terror 
The Bacthist State's targets of terror were those groups and individuals which it 
perceived threatened its security and the sources of its legitimacy: internal plotters and 
"weak" regime members, resistance movements, foreign countries, and criminals. Except 
for the United States and a span of two to three weeks after it defeated Iraq in the Gulf 
War of 1990-1991 when the entire country outside of Baghdad revolted, norie of these 
four categories of security threats succeeded by themselves in truly challenging the 
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Bacth's hold on power. The BRCC files give the impression, however, that their 
combined attacks and effects at times put the Bacthist State under siege and significantly 
damaged the public's feelings of personal and fmancial security. The archive contains 
hundreds if not thousands of reports from all years in the BRCC of assassination attempts 
and killings of party and state officials; assaults on Bacthist State buildings and economic 
infrastructure; cases of smuggling that amounted to billions of dinars of currency, 
materials, and resources leaving the country; thefts; forgery; corruption; and extortion?6 
When an individual decided to work for the Bacthist State he became a representative of 
it and thus a target for anti-regime acts, as did one mukhtiir and security service agent 
from Basra killed by "saboteur elements" in 1995.27 Armed Bacth Party security 
detachments (mafo.riz, sing. ma.fraza) that acted as parallel police forces saw many 
members "martyred" or injured in the line of duty.28 The deterioration in living 
conditions during the Iran-Iraq War and particularly throughout the embargo years, 
26. See, e.g., Petition from a citizen [name withheld] to Saddam Hussein, Aug. 27,2001, 038-2-8: 
305; Mudfr cam maktab "amana! sirr al-qu{r "ila al-rafiq na"ib "amfn sirr al-qup- al-mu!Jtaram, Jan. 12, 
1988, 039-2-2: 182; Qiyadatfurc al-ta"mfm "ila maktab "amana! sirr al-qup-, Dec. 20, 1994, 029-1-3: 559-
60; "Tan'{.fm wa-gawabi! IJirlisat mawaqif al-sayaratfi al-shawaric az-cama," wazfr al-dakhiliyya "ila 
wizarat az-cadl, May 22, 1996, 062-3-5: 573; "al-Muwatin [name withheld]," mudfr al-"istikhblirlit al-
caskariyya az-cama "ila ri"lisat al-jumhuriyya- al-sikritfr, Oct. 8, 1998, 030-3-3: 72-3. Boxfile 051-4-4 
labeled as relating to correspondence with the president's office (dfwan al-ri"asa) from 1995 contains many 
reports about anti-regime attacks on the security forces, the police, the party, and the army. No systematic 
effort was undertaken to determine exactly which time periods between 1979 and 2003 contained more of 
these types of incidents than others, but the heaviest concentration appeared to occur in the 1990s. 
Exploiting criminal statistics for further study is an area of potentially fruitful further rese~rch. 
27. "lfiidith "ightiyiil," mas"ul tan'{.7m al-ba:jra wa-dhl qlir "ila al-sayyid muriifiq al-sayyid al-ra"7s 
al-qii"id (IJaftuhu allah), Nov. 6, 1995, 036-4-7: 79. 
28. See, e.g., a petition from a woman to Saddam Hussein explaining how her husband was 
martyred while looking for deserters in a party detachment: Aug. 27, 1999, 036-3-5: 131. In another 
petition to Hussein, a man explained how he was hit over the head with the butt of a rifle and cut with a 
knife while searching for army deserters: Oct. 23, 1999, 029-2-2: 266-7. 
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caused increased cases of beggary and brain drain, which the regime tried to stop.29 
Hussein and the Bacth Party's ideological indoctrination, enticements, and organizational 
controls never ensured complete loyalty amongst individuals or every sector of the 
populace; within some areas of society it rarely did. In instances when these mechanisms 
pr:oved insufficient, the Bacthist State used force to maintain control. 
Internal coup or assassination attempts constituted the most dangerous type of 
threat to Hussein and the Bacth. Hussein's highly concentrated power and place as the 
keystone of the regime with few robust political institutions meant that the most efficient 
way for anybody to bring the Bacthist State down was to target him personally. As a 
result, to avoid the precedents set by Hussein's predecessors and the Bacth itself in taking 
power, the Bacth's first priority once it took over was to neuter the army's coup potential 
through Bacthification and, under Hussein's direction, to build up the security and 
intelligence services and the Bacth Party to monitor the military and police each other. 
This extensive security apparatus proved justified as Hussein and the Bacth faced a series 
of plots and inner schisms throughout the party's tenure that threatened the lives of top 
officials and the maintenance of the regime. Although the BRCC does not provide 
significant new information about the already well-known internal threats that plagued 
29. For an example of concerns about brain drain see: "'?.Cihirat al-safr kharij al-qutr," mudlr cam 
maktab 'amana! sirr al-qutr 'ila mudlriyyat al-'amn al-cama, Oct. 4, 1994, 043-4-7: 232. For a report on 
beggary see: Waz'ir al-dakhiliyya 'ila arwan al-ri'asa, Aug. 23,2001, 028-5-7: 468-9. 
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the Bacth throughout its rule, it shows in detail how the security services and party 
worked together to root out these conspiracies. 30 
. 
Reports of uncovered plots within the archive confirm that conspirators infiltrated 
the highest levels ofBacthist State institutions despite the extensive background checks 
the Bacth conducted for officials working in security positions and their feeder 
academies. A party report from 1998, for example, details how the party received 
information from the GID about a soldier in the Republican Guard (RG) who was the son 
of a Bacthist sectional member. The soldier, the report said, was part of a conspiratorial 
network within the RG that sought to assassinate Hussein. His maternal uncle, 
meanwhile, worked on the staff inside Hussein's home. The family connections between 
these three people created the potential forth~ RC conspiracy to spread into the party 
and, perhaps most dangerously, Hussein's personal core of servants. As a result, the GID 
had the RG member under surveillance and wanted the party to know about the case so 
that it could take necessary precautions as well.31 This case shows that Hussein had go~d 
reason to develop multiple and overlapping security agencies, the Bacth included, and it 
illustrates one instance in which they worked individually and as a unit to protect him. 
This, of course, was always their primary duty, and the fact that Hussein and the Bacth 
30. For some of the internal threats previously reported see Ofra Bengio, "Iraq," in Middle East 
Contemporary Survey, Volume 7, 1982-83, ed. Haim Shaked, Colin Legum, and Daniel Dishon (New York: 
Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1985), 564-5; Marr, 270-1; Baram, Building Toward Crisis, 7-36. 
31. "Macliimiit," mas~iil al-tan'{.lmiit ~ua maktab camiinat sirr qufr al-ciriiq, March 16, 1998, 129-
3-7: 555. 
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Party never succumbed to internal intrigue justified, from their perspective, the emphasis 
they placed on internal security. 
The Bacth punished severely members who exhibited cowardice or a lack of 
commitment in the face of danger to the party. This proved a problem in 1991 especially 
when many Bacthists did not report for duty to defend party and government buildings, 
leaving their comrades who did to be "martyred."32 Some even joined the uprisings. It 
must have been a shock to Hussein when his supposedly most loyal, ideologically 
committed institution melted in the face of the rebels. While the party granted regular 
Iraqis amnesty for their actions once the government recaptured control over the country, 
none of the amnesty decrees from 1991 found for this study mentioned al-takhadhul, or 
"weakness" in one's duties, as a pardonable offense. Instead, the BRCC records the 
execution of one party member from Basra who "fled from confronting the agent 
elements (al-:Janli~ir al-cam'fla)."33 A rumor reported by the party in 1999 claimed that 
c Ali Hasan al-Majid, an RCC member and the infamous commander who oversaw the 
genocide of the Kurds, had put 260 Bacthists to death in Basra and c Amara "for 
accusations of weakness ( al-takhadhul) and not performing their duties" during unrest in 
1999 ?4 Whether or not the rumor was true, it had to have some basis in its circulators' 
perceptions of the possible for it to gain traction. The Bacth emphasized internal 
32. See, e.g., the story of a woman whose husband was supposedly martyred during the fighting in 
1991: petition from a citizen to Saddam Hussein, May 10, 1991, 039-1-6: 296. 
33. 024-5-2: 96. 
34. "~ IshiYatiin," mudfr cam maktab ~ amiinat sirr al-qutr ~ua rr Cis at al-jumhiiriyya I maktab 
sikritiiriyat majlis aPamn al-qawml, May 8, 1999,087-5-3:206. 
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discipline precisely to forestall these types of lapses in allegiance, which damaged its 
attempt to present a united front to Iraqi society and the rest of the world as completely 
supportive of Hussein's regime. Accordingly, it used the execution of the Basra man as 
an example to other Bacthists of a "just punishment (qi~ii~an ciidilan) and an admonition 
to other weak ones (mutakhiidhilzn)."35 
Besides plots and "weakness" within the upper-echelons of the regime and the 
Bacth Party, Hussein sought to eliminate all traces of resistance within society at-large. 
The BRCC shows that acts or public proclamations of opposition occurred for reasons as 
varied as those for supporting the Bacth, be they ideological; out of revenge or anguish 
after losing a loved one; as a paid agent on behalf of a foreign power; to protect or 
advance individual, familial, tribal, religious, or national honor" and interests; to 
ameliorate the pressures of life in the Ba cthist system; or simply to exert a degree of self-
autonomy and personal initiative which the Bacth otherwise tried to destroy in its 
citizens. The exact causes of enmity mixed in different proportions on an individual 
basis, and the BRCC records many cases of isolated acts of resistance. Organized 
movements or anti-regime political parties carried out most opposition activities, 
however, and while the Ba cth investigated each incident with the intent of punishing the 
perpetrators, it focused primarily on these groups. 
Who were the opposition movements which most threatened the Bacth? The 
Bacth focused primarily on four mairi parties: the Iraqi Communist Party, the Islamic 
35. 024-5-2: 96. 
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Dacwa Party (I;Jzb al-dacwa al-:Jislamiyya), and the two main Kurdish parties, the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union ofKurdistan (PUK), which 
split off from the KDP in 1975.36 A number of other smaller groups mainly of the 
Islamist (both Sunni and Shici) and Kurdish varieties appear in the documents, but 
statistics the party kept on each show they had only token memberships. 37 A chart of 
"political movements" with numbers collected from all five party bureaus in 1986 and 
1987 shows the "Agent Communist Party" (al-f:tizb al-shuyiYf al-cam'fl) with between 
3,600 and 3,900 members, the KDP with almost 5,000, and the Dacwa with almost 2,200. 
In contrast, the "Muslim Brothers and other [Islamic] political groups" had only seventy-
seven adherents and the pan-Arab and Nasserist movements sixteen.38 The presence of 
Islamist parties other than the Da cwa rose in the 1990s enough to concern the Ba cth, but 
they never occupied the same level of anxiety as the four main opposition parties did. 
The existence ·of resistance movements throughout Hussein's presidency demonstrates 
that the Bacth never succeeded entirely in "purifying" the country of opposition, but the 
numbers of regime opponents recorded in regular reports show the Bacth weakened them 
36. Marr, 171-2. 
37. A DMI report from 1986, for example, claimed that the agency had uncovered a new group 
called The Organization of the Awaited Imam Mahdi (muna-aamat aPimiim mahdl al-munta'{.ar), named 
after the twelfth Shici Imam who supposedly went into occultation in 873 A.D. The group was supposedly 
funded and armed by Iran and came into the country to conduct "sabotage" operations. The report contains 
an organizational map of the group listing thirty-two total members. "Kashftan'{.fm muclidl," mudlr al-
3istikhbarlit al-caskariyya al-e lima 3ilii ri3lisat al-jumhiiriyya-al-sikritfr, May 22, 1986,026-1-3: 272-8. 
For a representative list of smaller opposition parties in addition to the four main ones see "Nishlitlit al-
J:wraklit al-muclidiyya," 3amfn sirr qiyiidat maktab tan'{.fm al-shumlil 3illi maktab 3amlinat sirr al-qu{r, Aug. 
13, 1990, 030-5-5: 1-38. 
38. "Jurd al-l;taraklit al-siylisiyya li-cumiim al-qu{r," 132-2-6: 390-7. The table does not list the 
PUK for some reason. 
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so significantly that they never came close to gaining a critical mass of support to pose an 
existential threat. 
Of the four opposition parties, the Bacth succeeded in most thoroughly 
neutralizing the Communist Party. A security report from the al-Qadisiyya province in 
1986 claimed that the communists were psychologically beaten, their members suffering 
from "a condition of despair, hesitation, and a lack of trust in their leadership."39 When 
the BRCC mentions Communist Party actions they are usually isolated affairs-
assassination attempts of mid-level officials or acts of economic sabotage-carried out by 
individuals or small cells that do not appear to be in good contact with other groups. 40 
With no significant foreign backers or natural places of refuge like the Kurdish parties 
had in the mountainous north and the Dacwa in the marshes ofthe south, the Bacth 
atomized the communists to the point of relative insignificance.41 
The Bacth Party was perhaps most paranoid about the Shici Dacwa Party. It is the 
only political movement specifically named, for example, on a 1999 form found in a 
military bureau file for prospective Bacth Party members. The form includes an oath the 
applicant had to sign promising under pain of death that he had never had any connection 
39. "al-Taqr'fr al-'aman'f li-shahr tishr'fn al-'awwal/1986 al-khii~~ bi-mul;iija'{.at al-qiidisiyya," 
039-3-7: 132. 
40. See, e.g., "Macliimiit," "am'fn sirr qiyiidat maktab tan'{.'fm al-wasa{ "ilii maktab 'amiinat sirr al-
qu{r, June 10, 1985,001-5-1:30. 
41. 'l;'he BRCC does record limited contacts between the Communist Party and Syria in boxfile 
031-4-1, pp. 65, 132, 143,222-3. The communists also had a presence in the north, and the same report 
that claims they were psychologically beaten also says the party took Iran's side in the Iran-Iraq War (039-
3-7: 132), both of which suggest links to Iran or Iran at least allowing them to pass through its territory to 
arrive in the north. 
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with the Dacwa.42 The Bacth's paranoia about the Dacwa stemmed from its record of 
assassination attempts against Hussein, its attacks against Iraqi government installations 
at home and abroad, and the fact that it was an expressly Iraqi Shici organization with a 
significant historical following amongst religious Shica dating back to its founding in the 
late 1950s.43 The Dacwa received Iranian backing and sanctuary after the Iran-Iraq War 
started, but unlike other Shici opposition movements created or sustained by Iran, the 
Dacwa did not want to unite with Iran in a pan-Shici state; nor did it necessarily agree 
with Ayatollah Khomeini' s notion of "rule of the jurist" ( wiliiyat al-faqih )-the 
ideological foundation upon which the Islamic Republic rested. It also preached an 
inclusive Iraqi-Islamic nationalism that equated allegiance to both Sunni and Shici Islam 
with Iraqi patriotism.44 The Dacwa, therefore, competed directly with the Bacth from 
within both Iraqi society's majority sectarian and ethnic groups-the Shica and Arabs, 
42. 026-4-4: 66. 
43. Most Shica in Iraq outside of the Najafand Karbala area, where two ofShici Islam's most 
famous shrines rest and where millions of Shicis from around the world make pilgrimages every year, are 
relatively secular and place more emphasis on their Arabness and tribal identities than their religion. 
Nakash, The Shicis of Iraq, 138. 
44. The Dacwa was responsible for a series of assassinations of top Bacthist officials and 
ideologues in the late 1970s and a number of terrorist attacks against Iraqi government installations in Iraq 
and abroad in the 1980s. They also famously tried to assassinate SaddamHussein in Dujayl in 1982 (and 
again in Mosul in 1987), after which Hussein's forces responded with a massacre of residents; Hussein was 
ultimately sentenced to death and was hanged for these murders on December 30, 2006. For more about 
the origins and early activities of the Dacwa see: Amatzia Baram, "The Radical Shicite Opposition 
Movements in Iraq," in Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East. ed. Emmanuel Sivan and 
Menachem Friedman (Albany, NY: State University ofNew York Press, 1990), 104-5; Amatzia Baram, 
"The Impact ofKhomeini's Revolution on the Radical Shi'i Movement of Iraq," The Iranian Revolution 
and the Muslim World. ed. David Menashri (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 132; Yithak Nakash, "The 
Nature ofShi'ism in Iraq," Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues: State, Religion and Social Movements in Iraq. 
ed. Faleh Abdul-Jabar (London: Saqi Books, 2002), 31-2; Jabar, The Shi 'ite Movement in Iraq, 75-142, 
201-215. 
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respectively-· for Iraqi hearts and minds. As a result, the Bacth feared that the Dacwa 
could exploit its local knowledge and organic roots to turn the Shici masses, which during 
the Iran-Iraq War comprised "the large majority" of the military's rank-and-file infantry, 
against it.45 As a 1986 security report from al-Qadisiyya province warned: 
The [Dacwa] party and its elements focus on exploiting the subject of the Iraq-Iran War 
and the mistaken religious practices (i.e. popular Shici rites, see Chapter Four) to work on 
the simple citizens and recruit them. They similarly stir up the families of those executed 
and sentenced among them in order to recruit them or at least alter their loyalty (taghy'fr 
wilcnhim, emphasis added) and use them to broadcast opposition rumors. They also try 
to stir up discord (jitna) and sectarianism (al-!ii"iflJlYa) within the public.46 
For a regime that, although nominally non-sectarian, was in fact led mostly by Sunnis 
who tried to play down sectarian divisions in society and focus on Arab and Iraqi notions 
of identity, the Dacwa's message represented a grave threat. Out of all of its enemies, the 
Bacth offered perhaps the least amount of leniency to current or former Dacwa members. 
In 1979, an RCC resolution made any past or present member of the Dacwa subject to the 
death penalty, and during the late 1970s and 1980s the Bacth killed hundreds ofDacwa 
associates, driving the organization into the shadows and out of the country, significantly 
decreasing its potential danger.47 
While the Dacwa presented a clear cut case of an enemy, the Bacth at various 
times allied with and clashed with both the KDP and PUK, which were the most · 
organized and capable opposition groups. In general, the Bacth walked a fine line with 
45. Nakash, The Shris of Iraq, 138. 
46. 039-3-7: 132. 
47. Jabar, The Shi'ite Movement, 228-31; Baram, "The Impact ofKhomeini's Revolution," 142; 
Wiley, 55, 62-3. 
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the Kurds. Its constitution recognized them as one of two official "nationalities" but 
simultaneously claimed Iraq as part of the Arab nation.48 In negotiations that began in 
1969 between the Kurds and the new Ba0 thist government, the Ba0 th officially 
recognized Kurdish national and cultural rights and set up a pathway for the Kurds to 
attain local autonomy. Yet it refused to concede access to oil, its revenues, or the 
responsibility for defending Iraq's borders, and talks broke down. In 1974, the Ba0 th 
unilaterally established the. "autonomous region" in the three provinces of Suleimaniyya, 
Erbil, and Dohuk governed by its own elected assembly and executive council.. The 
region was really only semi-autonomous, however, as its borders excluded the oil fields, 
and Baghdad appointed the head of the executive council and could dismiss him and 
dissolve parliament whenever it wished.49 
Mirroring the Kurds' ambiguous legal situation, the Bacth differentiated between 
"our Kurdish people" and the KDP and PUK., which it painted as traitorous groups 
controlled by foreign powers, referring to the KDP as the "band of the offspring of 
treachery" (zumrat salflf al-khiylina) and the PUK. as the "band of Iranian agents" 
(zumrat 0umalli:J :Jfrlin ). 50 These words of accommodation were not entirely hollow. 
Many Kurds participated in Ba0 thist State institutions and the Ba0 th's pro-regime militia, 
the National Defense Regiments Ca.fwlij al-difoc al-watanl); some, like one ofSaddam 
48. Al-Jumhuriyya al-0Iraqiyya. Wizarat al-"l0 lam. al-Dustur al-Mu'aqqatwa-Tacadilatuhu, 2nd 
ed. (Baghdad: Dar al-Huriyya li-l-Taba0 a, 1976), 6. 
49. Marr, 157; Tripp, 192-4. 
50. "Nishii{iit al-l:zarakiit al-muciidiyya," 'amzn sirr qiyiidat maktab tan'{.'im al-shumiil'ilii maktab 
'amiinat sirr al-qu{r, Aug. 13, 1990, 030-5-5: 2-5. 
245 
Hussein's closest associates, Taha Yasin Ramadan al-Jazrawi, even assimilated. The 
Bacth too extended investment and infrastructure projects to the Kurdish areas in the 
second half of the 1970s. 
Nevertheless, on the whole, the BRCC demonstrates that the Kurds did not 
support the Bacth's policies and the Bacth treated Kurdistan as hostile territory. Due to 
national and cultural differences (especially linguistic) as well as the northern region's 
relative backwardness from the developmental and educational standpoints, the 
population did not absorb party propaganda to the same extent as the rest of the country.51 
The Bacth did not establish the same kind of organizational and bureaucratic control as it 
did in the remainder oflraq, and the Bacth's system of rewards and benefits (see the 
"Enticements" section below) did not reach the same number of Kurds as it did Arabs. 
This was partly the result of the Bacth Party's inability to fmd members who wanted and 
were qualified to work in the Kurdish territories. Few Bacthists spoke Kurdish well, and 
the party had to offer a series of incentives for its members to agree to be transferred to 
the north and, if they desired, remain there for an extended period. These included 
shorter than normal assignment times with offers of free housing and cars, accelerated 
party promotions, and bonuses for signing up for, and fmishing, service. During the Iran-
Iraq War, working in the autonomous region fulfilled a Bacthist's obligation to 
participate in the Popular Army and, if he died on duty, the state considered him a martyr 
in Saddam's Qadisiyya with all of the benefits for the member's family that accompanied 
51. For propaganda to be effective the people targeted by it must be able to read it and understand 
it. Linz, 71. 
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that distinction. 52 Along with the KDP and PUK's regular attacks on and efforts to take 
over northern oil and state infrastructure, the Kurdish territories' difficult terrain, and the 
Kurds' solid ties with Iran from 1980 onwards, the Bacth failed to establish totalitarian 
control in the Kurdish regions. As a result, though the Bacth always maintained that the 
Kurds' general opposition to its rule stemmed from their "subjection to a campaign 
(camaliyya) of psychological and intellectual sabotage" by the Kurdish opposition "to the 
extent that [the campaign] expunged any traces of feelings ofbelonging to the (Arab) 
nation and its sacred earth," fundamental differences over identity, land, and resources 
constituted the real reasons. 53 Due to all of the above, Hussein did not trust the Kurds. 
The BRCC gives the impression that the Bacthist State's presence in the Kurdish 
territories-consisting of the autonomous region and parts of the provinces ofDiyala, 
Ninewa, and al-Ta :>mim (Kirkuk)-was more like an occupying force instead of an 
authority with legitimacy amidst the people it controlled. Throughout Hussein's tenure, 
Bacthist and government installations came under repeated attack, and the Kurds 
regularly assassinated, kidnapped, and threatened their personnel. 54 In 1986, a memo 
circulating within the party's central Organization Committee showed that from about 
52. "Qariir," mudlr cam maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qu{r ~ua al-qiyiidiit al-ra~siyyafi al-qu{r kiifa, 
Apri127, 1980, 024-1-7: 605-6; "MuqtaraiJ,iit," ra~rs azwiin al-ri'iisa ~ua maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qu.tr, 
Apri19, 1987, 072-1-5: 98-101. 
53.031-3-5: 12; ''Nishii{iit al-IJ,arakiit al-muciidiyya," ~am'fn sirr qiyiidat maktab tan'(,'fm al-shumiil 
~ua maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qu{r, Aug. 13, 1990, 030-5-5: 3-5. 
54. See, e.g., "Macliimiit," mudlr ~ amiinat sirr al-qu{r ~ua ri~ as at al-jumhiiriyya- al-sikrit'fr, Sept. 
3, 1991, 021-2-5: 50-2; "Macliimiit," mudlr ~ amiinat sirr al-qu{r ~ua ri' as at al-jumhiiriyya- al-sikrit'fr, 
Aug. 12, 1991, 021-2-5: 109; "Macliimiit," maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qu{r ~ua mudlr maktab tan'(,'fm al-
shumiil, Sept. 15, 1991, 038-4-5: 56-7. 
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1980 until1986 of the 1,694 Bacthists assigned to work in the "northern region" almost 
thirty-percent (503) "had been martyred at the hands of saboteurs," a euphemism for 
members of the opposition. 55 Whenever the central government's control slackened or 
disappeared, demonstrations or acts of opposition broke out, and the KDP and PUK 
began to take over government buildings and Bacth Party headquarters to begin to try to 
establish their own authority. 56 According to a DMI report, one such demonstration 
organized by the PUK in 1991 consisted of thirty people in al-Kalakjust east ofMosul 
chanting slogans against the Bacth Party and Hussein while Kurdish children affixed 
papers to Arab houses urging them to leave the town. 57 
For the above reasons, the Bacthist State used a grea,ter proportion of terror than 
enticement to maintain control in the Kurdish territories, and it took more collective 
measures against the population instead of individual arrests and killings. Hussein 
associated the level of security a particular area in the Kurdish regions enjoyed with its 
ethnic composition, and the Bacth Party kept statistics about the ethnic makeup of its 
population in Kurdish areas where it recorded the numbers of Arabs, Kurds, ~d 
Turkmen who lived there. 58 It did not keep statistics about ethnicity in other parts of the 
country. This led to a strategic policy of Arabization (tacrrb) of critical Kurdish areas in 
55. Sikritlr al-lajna al-tan'{.lmiyya ~ilii al-rafiq mas~iil al-lajna al-tantfmiyya, July 16, 1986, 029-
2-3:209. 
56. 029-2-3: 209. 
57. "Macliimiit," mudiriyyat aPistikhbiiriit al-caskariyya al-ciimalghurfat al-macliimiit al-
mushtarika, Sept. 22, 1991, 038-4-5: 13. 
58. See, e.g., "Dirasat shatr jure al-ta~mlm," qiyadatfurc al-ta~mlm, 027-1-4: 44-51. 
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which the Bacthist State deported (tarl;'il) Kurds and replaced them with Arabs, primarily 
around the oil fields and along the border with Iran. 59 In 1988, for example, most likely 
as part of its larger al-Anfal campaign of genocide and ethnic cleansing, the regime began 
a project to clear the Kifri district in Diyala province of Kurds and to transfer its 
administrative center to a majority Arab location "in view of the large number of 
incidents in the center of the Kifri district and the unstable security situation as a result of 
its geographic location, which aids the saboteurs in their infiltration through the chains of 
mountains and valleys, and because it is located in a narrow pass far from the main 
road."60 Accordingly, the head of the president's office sent instructions to c Ali Hasan 
al-Majid, a member ofHussein's inner circle and secretary of the Ba0 th's northern bureau 
at the time, "for the percentage of Arabs in the administrative units [of a series of 
fourteen Kurdish villages] and the housing complexes (mujamacat) connected to them to 
not be less than 80% of the total population." The instructions then laid out specific steps 
to Arabize the area, directing al-Majid "to carry out the operation of deporting the Kurds 
from the [administrative] units in a calm and gradual manner." This was to be done by 
"deporting the bad and disloyal families directly," "transferring [Kurdish] state workers 
59. The phrase "the Arabization ofKurdistan" shows up, for example, in a letter from the 
Democratic National Union ofKurdistan (aPitil;iid al-qawm'f al-dlmuqriit'f al-kiirdistiinl), a smaller 
Kurdish party, in 2002 addressed to Arab tribes the Bacth resettled in the north, encouraging them not to 
remain pawns in "the conspiracy of the Arabization ofKurdistan," and to go back to their prior homes. The 
letter, written in the run-up to the American invasion in 2003 when the Kurds expected to capture the north, 
contained the not so subtle hint that if the Arab tribes did not return that fact "would reflect in a negative 
fashion on the future of relations between the Kurds and the Arabs." "Nashariit," mas~uz tan:r.lm'f n'fnawii 
~ilii maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qufr, March 17, 2002, 006-4-1: 595-6. 
60. "Diriisa wiiqic qu(ia~ kijr'f," mudlr maktab tan:r.'fm al-wasat ~na maktab ~ amiinat sirr al-qufr, 
Feb. 27, 1988, 025-2-2: 205. 
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to other areas in the autonomous region, or to the Arab depth (al-cumq al-carabl) 
according to their wishes," and then transferring Arab families into the formerly majority 
Kurdish villages. As incentives for the Arab newcomers,, the instructions ordered al-
Majid to give each family a free piece of land on which to live, an advance payment from 
the Real Estate Bank, and a grant of either 5,000 or 3,000 ID depending on where they 
lived. The instructions further dictated that the Arabs should be employed either in the 
state, the socialist or private sectors, on agricultural land, or in industrial programs set up 
and supported by the state. 61 
Illustrating the link between ethnicity and security in the Bacth's mind, after the 
central government reg~ined control of the city ofKhaniqin following the 1991 uprisings, 
the Ba0_th's Diyala branch suggested returning and rebuilding the houses of the Arabs 
who lived there beforehand and had been expelled by the Kurds during the insurrection. 
The branch's report explained that "The return of the Arabs to their previous villages will 
constitute an addition to the armed forces and will return the city to its previous condition 
with an Arab majority, which will calm the security situation for the better and deny 
opportunities for enemies." The report also suggested arming the Arab tribes who 
returned to the area. 62 This was a common tactic in the north where the Ba cth resettled a 
61. "Qu{lii' kufr'l," ra'fs dfwan al-ri' as a 'ila al-rafiq call lJ,asan al-majfd- 'am'fn sirr maktab 
tan7-'fm al-shumlil al-mulJ,taram, June 22, 1988, 024-2-2: 189-93. 
62. "Dirlisa 'an khliniq'fn," qiylidatfurc diylilii, July 13, 1992, 119-2-7: 507-8. 
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number of Arab tribes and gave them weapons to maintain order on the state's behalf and 
to protect oil wells. 63 
In addition to Arabization, the Bacth used a variety of means to weed out, deter, 
and monitor Kurdish opposition elements. Hussein's forces eliminated Kurdish homes 
and entire villages Cizalat al-duwar, :Jizlilat al-qurli) in order to "purify" them ofKDP 
and PUK members. A 1992 party study also advocated expelling the opposition 
members' families.64 The BRCC contains tens of files with detailed information 
provided in the form of intelligence reports about Kurdish opposition activities and 
foreign countries in the north. The Ba0th maintained rigorous surveillance of the Kurdish 
regions, even after some of them fell out of their control, and they could have only 
received the types of updated information they did if they had placed agents and 
cultivated intelligence sources inside the Kurdish parties, including their leaderships. Not 
only in the Kurdish but also the communist case, the BRCC contains a report from a GID 
and General Security Directorate agent explicitly tasked with infiltrating (al-taghalghal) 
the party.65 Overall, the Ba0 th's various intelligence services had excellent information 
about opposition groups, which was a major factor in its largely successful campaigns 
against them.66 Finally, with regard to the most infamous case of the Ba0 th's terror 
63. See, e.g., "Muqtara/:l," mudlr maktab ~ amiinat sirr al-qu{r ~na al-rafiq wazir al-diikhiliyya, 
Nov. 5, 1991, 059-4-6: 356. 
64. "Diriisa," mudlr cam maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr ~na dlwiin al-ri~iisa, Nov. 7, 1992, 089-1-3: 
33. 
65. "Taqrir," May 18, 1986, 042-2-7: 375-6. 
66. See, e.g., boxfiles 026-2-2 and 006-4-1. 
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against the Kurds, between 1987 and 1988 al-Majid used chemical weapons and 
indiscriminately rounded up and shot men, women, and children of all ages as part of a 
campaign of genocide to end Kurdish resistance during the latter part of the Iran-Iraq 
War. No evidence of the genocide was found for this study in the BRCC, but it has been 
documented extensively elsewhere and could easily exist in a document about the 
northern territories that I did not read. 67 
Hussein and the ~acth also took exceptional interest in unorganized, isolated acts 
of resistance. These actions, which did not directly threaten the regime's existence, could 
nevertheless turn into something greater if the Bacth did not respond. As the Polish 
intellectual Leszek Kolakowski has argued, and Charles Kurzman's study of the 1979 
Iranian Revolution has shown, non-democratic regimes exist in large part on their ability 
to make their subjects and those outside of the regime believe that they cannot possibly 
be overthrown.68 They do this by, over time, eliminating all other alternatives to their 
rule, giving the population something to lose if they fall, and maintaining the willingness 
to use violence when opposition arises. Ultimately, the people, and often outsiders too, 
become convinced that resistance is futile, and the mental barrier to conceiving the 
overthrow of their autocratic rulers becomes a closely guarded asset of the regimes. If 
left in front of Iraqis' eyes too long, graffiti reading "Death to Saddam- Death to 
Saddam- Wake up 0' Iraqis!" as the party found written on a wall in a public square in 
67. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 268; Tripp, 244-5. The name ofthe genocidal 
campaign was aPAnfol. 
68. LeszekKolakowski, "Hope and Hopelessness," Survey 17 (Summer 1971): 51; Charles 
Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 1-11. 
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al-Ramadi in 1991, could become a self-fulfilling prophecy-proof that the regime will 
no longer paint over such messages and that if a different person writes a similar phrase 
on another wall the idea could spread and multiply, eventually coalescing in an organized 
movement.69 Similarly, the Bacth banned the families ofthose it killed from carrying out 
burial rites, mourning rituals, or from publicizing their relatives' deaths. It did this 
because, as shown below, families were supposed to condemn their criminal members 
instead of grieving over them but also so that the public rituals would not create 
opportunities for public displays of dissatisfaction with the regime that might coalesce 
into larger protests. 70 The BRCC contains reports of many such reminders that sparks of 
alternative thinking and impetuses for dissent remained in Iraq. Aware of its dangers as 
the seeds of revolution, whenever the party found opposition pamphlets it worked quickly 
to stop their circulation and punish their distributors; it tried not only to eliminate 
. 
enemies but to erase the memories oftheir existence.71 
The Bacthist State explained away the continued presence of domestic opposition 
by depicting resistance groups as "agents" of foreign countries, usually a reference to 
Iran. Just as the Bacth tacked on adjectives such as "eternal" and "glorious" to its war 
efforts, the BRCC' s authors always refer to the four main opposition groups as "The 
69. "Manshiir wa-shicarat mucadiyya," mudlr cam maktab ~amanat sirr al-qutr ~ila ri~asat al-
jumhiiriyya - al-sikritfr - mudlriyyat al-~ amn al-cam, June 4, 1991, 021-2-5: 159; "al-Shic arat al-maktiiba 
caza al-jidranfi sa~at aPi~tifolatfi al-ramadl," 021-2-5: 159. 
70. Mudlr cam maktab ~amana! sirr al-qutr ~ila al-rafiq na~ib ~amln sirr qiyadat qutr al-ciraq al-
mu~taram, July 2, 1995, 089-3-6: 775. 
71. For a case of pamphlets see: "Shicarat mucadiyya," ~amln sirr qiyadat maktab tan'{.lm al-juniib 
~ila maktab ~amana! sirr al-qutr, Dec. 11, 1986, 022-1-5: 64-77. 
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Agent Communist Party," "The Agent Da0 wa Party," and the titles mentioned above 
given to the KDP and PUK. The Ba0 th called the Islamic Action Organization 
(munauamat al-camal al-:Jislaml), a Shici resistance group, the "Persian Action 
Organization" (munauamat al-camal al-forisl).72 These titles were partially justified as 
Iran supported all of these groups to varying degrees at one time or another. Most of 
them, however, had their roots in Iraq and consisted almost entirely of Iraqi members 
who did not want to live abroad but rather under different political conditions within their 
native country; they were homegrown Iraqi opposition. Ba0 thist ideology did not leave 
room for the possibility that real Arabs and Iraqis might want to resist the Ba0 th's 
~ssion, the essence of which was to advance Arab and Iraqi welfare, as this would mean 
its program was deficient. That could not be because the Bacthist message derived from 
historical truth. Therefore, the Ba0 th took great pains to imprint in the public's mind the 
idea that nobody who joined one of these groups could possibly be a patriotic Iraqi. The 
elimination of the opposition was consequently justified because killing a Da0 wa or KDP 
member was equivalent to executing a traitor or shooting an Iranian soldier in battle. 
The Bacth perceived Iran as its number one foreign enemy and depicted Iranians 
as inherently hostile toward Arabs and Iraq. Hussein and the Ba0 th used this line of 
reasoning to galvanize support for and legitimize its Iran-Iraq War effort by drawing a 
distinction between Iran's claim to fight on behalf oflslam and Muslims and Iraq's 
position as the "Eastern Flank of the Arab World," the front line of Arab defenses against 
72. 030-5-5: 1-38. 
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the onrushing Persian hordes. This characterization of the enemy contributed to the 
Ba0 th's false claim that Iran initiated their war. A 1986 set of directives sent from. the 
southern bureau to its branches, for example, directed the branches to carry out a 
mobilization and propaganda campaign in which they would explain to the public "the 
history of Iran and its malice (l:dqd) toward the Arabs since ancient times." The people 
should not worry, however, since "the forces of evil and shucftbiyya (a historical term 
used to refer to Iranians who supposedly hated Arabs) could not achieve anything against 
our people in the past."73 
The Ba0th Party's depictions of Iranians as heretics and anti-Arab bigots provided 
cover for the Ba0 th's deportations of thousands oflraqis "oflranian origin" in the 
1980s.74 The secondary literature has portrayed these deportations (tasfir) as really anti-
Shi0 i acts whereby the Ba0 th herded tens if not hundreds of thousands of the southern 
Shi0 a population over the border to Iran en masse. There is a lot of outside evidence to 
prove that despite the regime's non-sectarian claims, its Sunni rulers did harbor anti-Shici 
73. "Tawfihiit," 3 amfn sirr maktab tan'{.fm al-junub 3 ilii qiyiidiit al-furuc al-tiibi"a li-1-maktab, Dec. 
13, 1986, 022-1-5: 149-50. As Roy Mottahedeh has shown, the shucubiY.Ya were not a political group, but 
"primarily a literary controversy" whose advocates staked an intellectual claim to a place for non-Arab 
culture in Islamic history. Yet, as far back as the 'Abbasid era, Arabs used the term to charge Persian 
scribes with corrupting the government from within. Roy P. Mottahedeh, "The Shu0ubiyah Controversy 
and the Social History of Early Islamic Iran," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 7 (April 
1976), 161-82. For more on the shucubiyya issue see Davis, 184-8; Makiya, Republic of Fear, 216-20; 
Fouad Ajami, ·The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 
157; and Nakash, The Shi'is of Iraq, 47, 113. 
74. Pursuant to Interior Ministry directive 2884, on AprillO, 1980, the Ba'th d~clared, "All 
Iranians in the country, as well as those who do not have Iraqi citizenship and those whose naturalization 
applications are being processed, shall be deported." Ali Babakhan, "The Deportation ofShi0 is During the 
Iran-Iraq War: Causes and Consequences, in Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues : State, Religion and Social 
Movements in Iraq, ed. Faleh Abdul-Jabar (London: Saqi, 2002), 200. 
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feelings themselves, and it is possible that was indeed the case. 75 That is not the picture 
that the BRCC paints however. In line with Hussein and the Ba0th's general religious 
policies, none of the BRCC records about the deportation of "Iranians" contains the 
words "Shici" or "Shi0 a." They do not suggest, moreover, that the Bacth randomly 
loaded Shica onto trucks and threw them over the border. The process, whatever the 
character of the actual execution, was documented and planned, and conformed to the 
general picture of how the Bacth treated its enemies versus its supporters. This included 
meting out collective punishment or rewards to families for the acts of their individual 
members. The Bacth Party and security services both drew up lists of"Iranians" labeled 
for deportation and lists of those they did not want to expel. People or families on the 
deportation lists had negative marks registered against them, much like the students not 
allowed into military or teaching academies (see Chapter Four). Iraqis the regime 
deemed "disloyal" (ghayr muwiill) with "negative stances" (mawiiqif salbiyya) against 
the party or who somehow evinced support for "the racist Persian enemy" (al-cadil al-
foris'f al- cun~url) were deported, like the case of a woman in 1982 who reportedly said 
during a blood drive that she would prefer "to donate poison to the Iraqi army." The 
regime deported families of criminals and deserters also. In contrast, the individuals and 
families on the non-deportation lists were labeled as "loyal" (muwiill), often with notes 
stating that they had relatives who were martyrs or had volunteered for the army and had 
75. See, e.g., Babakhan, "The Deportation ofShicis," 186-7, 193, 195, 198-200; Isam al-Khafaji, 
''Not Quite an Arab Prussia: Revisiting Some Myths on Iraqi Exceptionalism," in Iraq: The Human Cost of 
History, ed. Tareq Y. Ismael and William W. Haddad (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 223-6; Hasan al-
e Ala wei, al-Shica wa-1-Dawla al-Qawmiyya fi al-clraq, 1914-1990. (London: Dar al-Zura, 1990), 12, 46-7. 
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not committed any crimes, shown hatred toward the party, or evinced support for Iran. In 
other words, they had records similar to citizens who received the kinds of official 
rewards described below. 76 While an Iraqi citizen's "Iranian origin" might have made 
him guilty until proven innocent in the Bacth's eyes, it did not automatically require his 
deportation, especially if he exhibited his allegiance to the Bacthist Trinity. Even if"of 
Iranian origin" was in fact a euphemism for "Shici," the organized character of the 
deportations, and the reasons for doing so, or not, suggest that the loyalty of Shica was 
the Bacth's primary concern-not their sectarian status. The assertion that Hussein's 
rank-and-file Shici soldiers did not defect to Iran during its war with Iraq because of their 
patriotism and Arab loyalties is thus only partially correct 77 The larger reason they 
reported to their units and fought was because if they did not, they and their families 
would be deported, punished, and lose the benefits connected to any state awards or 
statuses they had won. 
The Bacth tied Iran to its other foreign enemies in a vast conspiracy designed to 
produce a sense of solidarity between Iraqis in the face of external threats and to justify 
terror against their "agents" in Iraq. Official regime statements tied Iran to America, 
76. "Tas.ftr "friiniyyfn," :Jamfn sirr qiyiidat maktab tan?-im al-juniib, March 22, 1982, 028-1-1: 445-
59; "Tas.ftr :Jfriiniyyfn," :Jam in sirr qiyiidat jure wiisit :Jilii maktab :J amiinat sirr al-qufr, July 31, 1983, 028-
1-1: 419-24; "Tas.ftr :Jfriiniyyfn," mudir cam maktab :Jamiinat sirr al-qutr :Jilii qiyiidatfurc wiisif, Sept. 25, 
1983, 028-1-1: 412-13; "Tas.ftr al-cawii:Jil aPfriiniyya aPa#," :Jamfn sirr qiyiidatfurc wiisi! :Jilii maktab 
:Jamiinat sirr al-qufr, Dec. 13, 1984, 028-1-1: 371-86; "Tas.ftr cawii:Jil," :Jamfn sirr qiyiidat maktab tan?-im 
al-juniib :Jilii maktab :Jamiinat sirr al-qufr, July 25, 1986, 022-1-5: 257-8. 
77. See, e.g., Yitzhak Nakash, "The Shi'ites and the Future of Iraq," Foreign Affairs 82 
(July/August 2003), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58994/yitzhak-nakash/the-shiites-and-the-
future-of-iraq?page=show [accessed on Feb. 29,2012]. 
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Israel, the Kurds, Syria, and Iraqi resistance groups, sometimes all at the same time. 78 All 
of these countries and movements colluded, according to the Ba0 th. Like all good 
propaganda, these claims contained kernels of truth and played off of popular 
prejudices. 79 Primarily Iran but also sometimes Syria in fact supported the opposition 
groups, and a degree of racism against non-Arabs that preceded the Ba0 th existed in Iraqi 
society, especially amongst Sunnis. Exposed in 1986, the Iran-Contra affair gave 
credence to tp.e American-Zionist-Iranian connection. Given Israel's bombing of Iraq's 
Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1982 and its conflicts with the Palestinians and its Arab 
neighbors, Hussein did not have to try hard to tap into anti-Israel and anti-Semitic 
feelings within the population. Alone amongst Arab states, moreover, Syria allied with 
Iran, providing evidence of its Alawite leaders' sectarianism (Alawis are a Shi0 i offshoot) 
and disloyalty to pan-Arabism. 
Nevertheless, the degree of paranoia depicted in the BRCC is not warranted based 
upon the often tenuous connections between these groups and the abilities of foreign 
countries to conduct operations inside Iraq. It is unlikely, for example, that "external 
entities" (jihlit khlirijiyya) were behind the profusion of narcotic pills in the 0Abi Ghrayb 
area of Baghdad in 2001, as a party report suggested.80 Neither did "worldwide Zionism" 
78. See, e.g., 022-1-5: 149-50. 
79. Overy, 212-14. 
80. "?.iihirat ~idkhiil al-l;tubiib al-mukhaddira ~ilii ~aqsiim aPi#ii/:l al-~ijtimiicijeabi ghrayb 
diriisafi tashkhi~ al-~asbiib wa taw~if al-muciilajiit," 038-2-8: 69-75. Interestingly, this is almost exactly 
the same argument that Muammar al-Quddafi used to explain the protests that enveloped his regime during 
the Arab Spring in 2011. "Gaddafi says protesters are on hallucinogenic drugs," Reu(ers, Feb. 24, 2011, 
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(al-~ihyiiniyya al-clilamiyya) have anything to do with the "opposition slogans" (shiclirlit 
muclidiyya) written on an enclosure in the fme arts college in Baghdad, as a Bacthist 
interpreted the phrases "BLACK SABBATH", "M. Halen SC (OZZY)" and "HEAVY 
METAL" to mean. In fact, of course, these were graffiti written by a rock-and-rollloving 
student. "Ozzy" did not refer to the Israeli sub-machine gun, the Uzi, but was the lead 
singer in the band, Black Sabbath, the name of which had nothing to do with the Jewish 
day of rest, as the Ba0 thist who reported the graffiti reasoned.81 That Bacthists 
interpreted these phenomena as elements of foreign conspiracies proves that party 
members absorbed the regime's propaganda and that the tactic of ascribing negative 
phenomena within society to external forces succeeded. It also explains why the Ba0 th 
sometimes detained and tortured or killed innocent civilians in a seemingly arbitrary and 
random fashion; the Republic of Fear paradigm held to a certain extent. Once the Bacth 
diagnosed the source of the graffiti as part of a Zionist plot, equivalent to the real 
opposition slogan from above, "Death to Saddam," it became imperative to fmd the 
"agent student" before he could act again. The party and security services could not close 
their files without arresting and punishing somebody for the matter as proof they had 
resolved it since the only consequences that could accrue to them might come from the 
' 
dissatisfaction of their superiors. The regime leadership had a track record of punishing 
http://www .reuters.com/article/20 11 /02/24/us-libya-protests-gaddafi-idUSTRE71 N4NI20 11 0224 [accessed 
on 28 Jan., 2012]. 
81. "Macliimiit," mas'iil tan?:imiit baghdad 'ilii maktab 'amiinat sirr al-qup-, Aug. 2, 1992, 104-4-
1: 112-119. 
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Ba0thist State officials whom it believed did not mete out sufficiently severe penalties.82 
The Ba0 thist system contained institutionalized impetuses for terror along with 
ideological excuses for them. 
In addition to obviously political offenses, the Bacthjustified the use of terror 
against Iraqis who committed "crimes that violate honor" (jarlf1im mukhilla bi-l-shar.f), a 
legal category of misdeeds distinct from regular infractions. These included deserting or 
dodging military service ( al-hurub wa-l-takhalluj), leaving the country without 
permission, leaving but not returning after one's allotted time, quitting a government post 
without permission, stealing state property or resources, embezzlement of government 
funds, forgery, and giving or accepting bribes.83 All of these offenses effectively 
constituted internal sabotage, which impaired the Bacth's ability to carry out its moral, 
political mission. They were thus tantamount to crimes against the state. Using this kind 
of reasoning, the Party Secretariat explained to its branch leaderships in 1993 that a rise 
in prostitution under the UN embargo was not just due to economic hardship but was also 
the result of foreign conspiracies. Catching the prostitutes thus constituted a national as 
well as a moral obligation. Similarly, because desertion decreased the military's 
manpower and evinced disloyalty to the country, it was a negative phenomenon 
82. See, e.g., the case ofcAli Hasan al-Majid who expelled from the party a group of five 
Bacthists on a committee that suggested leniency in punishing a military deserter: "Biyiin ra31," 3 am'in sirr 
maktab tan:r.lm al-shumiil 3i/ii diw{in al-ri3iisa-sikrit'ir al-sayyid ra3'is al-jumhiiriyya lil-shu3iin al-l;izbiyya, 
Aug. 9, 1989, 029-5-6: 85-8. 
83. 035-3-4: 1; 113-4-5: 4; RCC Decision No. 267, Law No. 21, 1992, "Tacdil qiiniin al-cawsima 
wa-1-canwii{, Oct. 15, 1992, 113-4-5: 302; "3lctibiir jar'imat al-huriib min al-khidma al-caskariyya min al-
jarii3im al-mukhilla bi-1-sharf, http://iraqilaws.doral-aliraq.net/?p=7477 [accessed on Jan. 5, 2012]. 
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"nationally, morally, and legally" (wataniyyan wa :Jakhliiqiyyan wa qiini1niyyan).84 The 
regime likewise prescribed execution for the aforementioned extortionist taxi drivers 
during the Gulf War because they proved themselves "traitor[s] to the nation and agent[s] 
for the foreigner."85 These types of crimes made the Ba0 thist State look weak, as if it 
could not police or provide for its employees or citizens, respectively, and did not elicit 
their respect or allegiance. Just as with homosexual activity or rape in Iraqi society (both 
crimes), the criminal does not necessarily violate his own honor. Instead, because he is 
seen as a powerful actor, he infringes upon the dignity of the weaker victim. The honor 
violated in cases of"crimes that violate honor" was the Ba0 thist State's, giving it both a 
reason and an obligation to avenge itself against those who brought shame upon it. 86 
The Bacth transferred this same logic and the responsibility to uphold the honor of 
the Ba0 thist Trinity to its citizens. In 1984, a long-time full Bacth Party member 
personally turned in his nephews for joining the Da0 wa Party. In doing so, the report 
detailing the affair remarked that the man said his nephews' treason made him feel like 
"his party loyalty (l:dzbiyyatahu) was lacking, and that the subject of his nephews brought 
shame (car) upon him." "I hope that his party loyalty is stronger than his familial 
allegiance eamal :Jan taki1n l:dzbiyyatuhu :Jaqwii min qariibatihi)," Hussein reportedly 
84. "Liqii"iit," mudir cam maktab "amiinat sirr al-qutr "ilii qiyiidiit al-furii.c al-l;izbiyya, Dec. 21, 
1993, 123-4-7:421-7. 
85. 024-5-2: 226. 
86. Ali Wardi, Understanding Iraq: Society, Culture, and Personality (Lewiston, NY: Edwin 
Mellen Press, 2008), 21, 100. 
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said when hearing about the incident.87 The word this account used for shame, car, is the 
same as that employed in a 1982letter from c Ali Hasan al-Majid, then the Party 
Secretariat's director, to Hussein, in which al-Majid described a husband who returned 
from the warfront to find his wife having an affair. Feeling disrespected, the husband and 
his wife's father killed her, "washing the shame" (ghaslan li-Z-car) from their reputations. 
The husband then turned himself in, admitting the crime. "[The husband] mentions in his 
report," al-Majid wrote to Hussein, "that he became, in the end, imprisoned for no sin 
except the defense of his honor, which was defamed from behind while he was fighting in 
the battle of honor and nobility, defending the freedoms oflraq." Clearly agreeing with 
this sentiment, al-Majid suggested to Hussein that the man be "included in your kindness 
for his bravery, for daring to sever the corrupt element of society. Releasing him will be 
a disciplinary lesson for everyone who lets himself be seduced-tackling his wife's 
perfidy is defending the honor and soil of this dear nation." "Yes," Hussein replied, "he 
is pardoned. Release him. "88 
Examples l~e these, and the instances of fathers killing their sons detailed in the 
introduction to this study, illustrate that people will die or kill to protect their honor. 
Honor relates to self-worth which is to a large degree related to how society perceives an 
individual. In Iraq, as elsewhere, honor is a powerful social force. One of the most 
important keys to Hussein's ability to imbue loyalty to his regime was his refashioning of 
87. "Taqrfr," mudfr ciim maktab 3 amiinat sirr al-qutr 3 ilii rr iisat al-jumhiiriyya I sikritfr al-sayyid 
al-jumhiiriyya li-l-shu3 iin al-IJ,izbiyya, Dec. 15, 1984, 025-1-2: 42. 
88. Memorandum to Hussein from calfiJ,asan majld mudfr ciim maktab 3 amiinat sirr al-qu{r, Dec. 
25, 1982, 030-4-2: 342-3. 
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the rules ofhonor so that an individual's personal and familial self-respect was tied up 
with the Ba0 thist Trinity, making a treasonous nephew equivalent to a wife's perfidy and 
an individual's own disobedience-all were, essentially, "crimes that violate honor." 
As the existence of a legal category of "crimes that violate honor" indicates, the 
· Bacthist State used the cover oflegality to validate its terror, enshrining the difference 
between its enemies and supporters in law. Almost every report of the regime's use of 
violence in the BRCC is accompanied by a reference to a law (usually in the form of an 
RCC decision), regulation, or internal directive. 89 If law countenanced terror the Ba0 thist 
State's employment of it was warranted as simply the enforcement oflegitimately 
enacted legislation on behalf of the people. In the Ba0th's mind, the ends didn't merely 
justify the means, the means were justified. This, combined with the v~ally 
unrestrained power Hussein and the Ba0 th Party enjoyed, and their contention that they 
acted with moral authority, was another reason why the regime's utilization of terror 
devolved into cruelty. Not only were there no physical or ethical barriers against the 
Ba0 thist State's use ofterror, the regime was legally obligated to mete it out. The 
perpetrators ofBa0 thist terror were not just following orders and thus subject to the 
ethical requirement to resist unjust or immoral instructions, they were enforcing the law 
and could by this reasoning send criminals "to receive their just punishments" (li-yanalu 
jazlf)ihim al-clidil), as the BRCC's authors refer to the sentences the Ba0 thist State 
89. See, e.g., 038-4-1: 565-6. 
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handed out.90 Indeed, even when the fmal result was scripted, the Bacth still insisted on 
. 
going through the motions of a legal process. The Bacth paraded political criminals 
before the "Court of the Revolution" {ma~kamat al-.thawra), and the military and security 
services had their own justice systems to prosecute deviant employees. Notice that in all 
of the cases presented in this study where family members killed their kin, the killers 
were first arrested before they were pardoned. That was because killing or murder in and 
of itself was not a permitted act in Hussein's Iraq, but killing or murder for the right 
political purposes was. The criminal justice system apprehended these men, but in the 
process of adjudicating their cases it acquitted them because political considerations 
always sat above the law. 
Enticements 
During Hussein's tenure, Iraqis became increasingly dependent on the state for 
their welfare. When Hussein took over in 1979, the country was at the height of an 
unprecedented economic expansion following the nationalization of its oil industry in, 
1972 and subsequent price rises as a result of the Arab oil embargo. Production capacity 
had increased from 1.3 million barrels per day in 1965 to 3.7 million in 1979.91 Since oil 
exports represented the vast majority of economic output from 1968, when the Bacth took 
power, to 1982, Iraq's gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 1.06 to 5.37 billion 
90. Versions of this phrase are ubiquitous in the BRCC. See, e.g., its use in a petition to Hussein 
in 1996,021-1-2: 187-8. 
91. Exxon Background Series, "Middle East Oil and Gas," December 1984, 12. 
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Iraqi Dinars (ID).92 This allowed the government to fund "a fairly generous distributive 
state welfare system at the same time as supporting the capitalisation of private and 
public enterprises."93 Incomes rose sharply, access to education improved, and medical 
services and consumer goods became more widely available. The size of the middle and 
working classes increased, as did a group of nouveau-riche who enriched themselves on 
state contracts.94 Although the private sector accounted for almost forty percent of GDP 
in 1982, it-and, indirectly, its workers-relied almost entirely on government contracts 
for its income.95 The number of people employed directly by the state grew as well, 
increasing from 392,954 in 1972 to 662,656 in 1978.96 Overall, Iraqis' standard of living 
improved. The ultimate source of their newfound well-being was precarious, however, 
since the state was responsible for such a high proportion of the economy and oil 
comprised the majority of the state's income.97 
Hussein's decision to invade Iran in 1980 marked the beginning of the end for 
Iraq's economiq expansion. Iran destroyed Iraq's oil exporting and refining infrastructure 
in the south and closed the. Persian Gulf to Iraqi exports. Siding with Iran, Syria cut off 
its pipeline from Iraq, leaving only Iraq's Kirkuk line through Turkey open. Oil exports 
92. See table 7.10 in Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958,232. 
93. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 230. 
94. Marr, 161-8. 
95. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 243. 
96. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 248. 
97. Marr, 162-8. The state accounted for eighty percent of domestic production and eighty-nine 
percent of foreign trade in 1977, up from thirty-one and forty-one percent, respectively, in 1968. 
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in 1983 dropped to around one million barrels per day, reducing revenues to a third of 
prewar levels. 98 While Iraq increased production by the end of the war to 2.1 million 
barrels per day, this was offset by a decline in oil prices in 1986.99 At first, the regime 
continued to finance development but had to cut back and start an austerity program once 
its foreign reserves depleted.100 By the end of the war, Iraq had a foreign debt that 
amounted to at least $70 billion.101 To make up for lost oil revenue, starting in the mid-
1980s, the state began a "privatization" campaign, leasing and selling off state land and 
resources. An ever thinning but increasingly rich class made up of Hussein's fellow 
Tikritis and tribe members, relatives, and close associates benefited from preferential 
access to these deals. The deals constituted the ultimate "enticements," creating webs of 
patronage amongst the political and economic elite that produced "networks of 
complicity and dependence which would reinforce the position of those in power."102 
In general, however, the decline in Iraq's fmancial situation decreased the money 
available for its welfare system at a time when millions of Iraqis, almost entirely men, 
were involved in the war effort and not the productive economy. This freqvently left 
families without their bread winners who sometimes did not come back from the front at 
all, having been killed or capture~. Of those that did return, many sustained debilitating 
98. Exxon Background Series, 12. 
99. Marr, 204-5. 
100. Marr, 203. 
101. Marr, 205. 
102. Quote from Tripp, 197-9; Marr, 208-9. 
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injuries that did not permit them to work or continue their education. Inflation bit into 
incomes and savings, both of which were further depleted by the government's 
expectation that patriotic citizens donate to the war effort. These problems grew 
increasingly severe after the 1991 Gulf War and subsequent UN sanctions produced more 
destruction, debt, and casualties, in addition to reducing Iraq's oil exports to a trickle. 
Throughout the 1990s, severe inflation and food and medical shortages caused further 
deterioration in the quality of life for average Iraqis and decimated the middle classes that 
arose in the 1970s.103 As a result, the population became ever more dependent on 
government handouts to take care of the· necessities of daily life. 
The relationship between the government and its citizens did not go only one way 
however. Hussein depended on his citizens for manpower and to otherwise support the 
regime. This occurred at a time when the legitimacy that the party gained through its 
economic improvements in the 1970s had deteriorated, and the death and destruction 
from the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars fell most heavily on ordinary citizens. The large 
number of deserters and attacks against Bacth Party headquarters and security 
detachments indicated a considerable amount of resentment toward the Ba0 thist State on 
behalf of the populace. In addition to the punishments meted out to those who did not 
show up for military service, or who joined an opposition party, Hussein needed ways to 
encourage Iraqis to follow his rules. He also had to show Iraqis that he would take care 
103. Abbas Alnasrawi, "Iraq: Economic Sanctions and Consequences, 1990-2000," Third World 
Quarterly 22 (April2001): 205-18; Denis J. Halliday, "The Impact of the UN Sanctions on the People of 
Iraq," Journal of Palestine Studies 28 (Winter 1999): 29-37. 
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of those who sacrificed themselves for the Bacthist Trinity beyond simply paying lip 
. service to their loyalty. In order to both manipulate and placate the population, therefore, 
the Bacthist State under Hussein tied the receipt of government benefits to service to the 
country, which it recognized by conferring awards, special statuses, and other official 
honors on their recipients. Obtaining and keeping these prizes became a key to survival 
and, if one was lucky, prosperity for oneself and one's family. In contrast, stepping over 
the Bacth's red lines led to loss of benefits for both. This twin mechanism of carrot and 
stick for individuals combined with tying the consequences of personal action to 
communal welfare proved an effective means of social control. 
One of the most common sources of benefits came from having a family member 
who died during military, party, or other service declared a "martyr" (shahfd) and 
included in the pension rolls. Being a martyr did not happen automatically after 
somebody' s death. The state had to designate the person as such and provide a certificate 
to the family. In 1999, for example, a woman petitioned Hussein to name her husband a 
martyr, claiming that he was killed on a party mission looking for deserters in 1984. He 
never received a martyr's pension, however, and the retirement fund she received as a 
teacher amounted to only 175 ID. Still, she worked hard, raised her three sons and 
daughters by themselves, and sent them all to advanced schooling. Yet now, because of 
inflation as a result of the international embargo against Iraq, her pension did not even 
pay for the school supplies for one of her children. Consequently, she asked Hussein to 
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officially designate her husband a martyr so that she could receiv~ his martyr's pension. 
The BRCC does not contain the answer that she received from the government.104 
For those who did survive their patriotic duties, a plethora of medals, badges, 
honors, and other awards awaited. It is probably not a coincidence that in 1982, the same 
year that the Iran-Iraq War turned against Iraq, the regime revamped the law dealing with 
four of the most common and prestigious state honors-the Rajidayn, Revolution, and 
Saddam's Qlidisiyya medals, as well as the Badge of Honor (nawt al-shujlica). The new 
"Medal and Badge Law" (qliniln al-:Jawsima wa-l-canwlit) invalidated all previous 
regulations concerning these awards and stipulated that they be dispensed by Republican 
Decree (marsi1mjumhi1rl). Recipients wore them during holidays and other official 
occasions. When a recipient died the person's eldest son carried it, and his or her spouse 
and children continued to enjoy the associated benefits. 105 
The Rafidayn Medal (wislim al-rafidayn) and Badge of Honor provide perfect 
examples ofthe types offmancial, professional, academic, medical, and other benefits 
associated with Ba0 thist State honors. The Rafidayn was awarded to those "who perform 
a general and venerable service to the Iraqi republic, or to the units of the armed forces 
that carry out honorable operations during active maneuvers, or war, and similarly to 
foreigners in appreciation of their stature."106 The medal came in military and civilian 
versions and had five degrees depending on a person's military rank. A medal of the first 
104. Citizen petition to Saddam Hussein. Aug. 27, 1999, 036-3-5: 131. 
105. Law no. 95, The Medal and Badge Law, Oct. 6, 1982, 026-2-7: 229-46. 
106. 026-2-7: 229-46. 
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degree carried a free 10,000 ID life insurance policy, the value of which the president's 
office could raise. The recipient's children gained entrance into military and civilian 
universities, colleges, and institutes. Additionally, the recipient, his spouse, and his 
children received free perks, including medical treatment at home and abroad if a health 
committee approved the need for travel; five dunams of agricultural land; membership in 
all state clubs; invitations to national celebrations; priority on the list for state housing if 
the recipient did not already own a residence; and, once per-year, first-class tickets for 
himself, his wife, and his children on Iraqi Airways. The lower degrees received the 
same benefits but with reduced award amounts. In 2001, families with three or more 
martyrs in the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars were automatically awarded the Rafidayn 
Medal.107 The Revolution and Saddam's Qadisiyya medals received benefits according 
to the same schedule as the Rafidayn, with slight variations.108 For its part, the Badge of 
Honor was awarded to "military personnel and civilians who show extraordinary bravery 
or carry out a heroic, honorable action, or who take pains to perform their obligation and 
service to the army and the nation during war, active maneuvers, or military clashes." 
Badge of Honor recipients were afforded preference in their appointment to government 
107. 026-2-7: 229-46; Republican Decree No. 285, Sept. 15, 2001, 038-2-8: 62. 
108. The Revolution Medal (wisiim al-thawra) was given ''to those who participated actively in 
the outbreak of the great July 17-30 revolution." The Saddam's Qiidisiyya Medal (wisiim qiidisiyyat 
~addiim) went ''to military personnel and civilians who carried out venerable operations in service to the 
battles entered into by the country on the regional and national levels during the Iran-Iraq War." 026-2-7: 
229-46. 
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positions, at least a 5,000 ID life insurance policy, and a free car exempt from customs 
duties.109 
Multiple honors brought even more benefits than the sum total of one's individual 
rewards. A 1994 RCC decision increased the salaries ofthe holders of one kind of award 
if they received a second. 110 Similarly, Iraqis who won two Badges of Honor and an 
Order of the Party (shlirat al-J:tizb, explained below), or two Orders of the Mother of All 
Battles (shlirat :Jumm al-maclirik) were named "Friends ofthe al-sayyidPresidentLeader, 
Saddam Hussein (God keep him)" [a~diqli' al-sayyid al-ra:Jfs al-qli:Jid ~addlim f:tusayn 
(/:tafiuhu alllih)] .111 The BRCC contains photocopies of identification cards given to the 
"Friends of the President" by the Ministry of Interior. On the back, a card found in a 
boxfile from 1999lists their benefits as: 
1. The addition offive points onto the final grade point averages of the Friend, his wife, and 
his children for acceptance into schools, institutes, and universities during wartime and 
for five years subsequently. 
2. The acceptance of the Friend's sons into military institutes and colleges regardless of the 
grade point average and age requirements during wartime and for five years 
subsequently. 
3. The honor of meeting His Eminence (siyylidatuhu, Hussein) at least one time per year. 
109. 026-2-7: 229-46. 
110. RCC decision no. 101, Aug. 1, 1994. 004-1-4: 46-9. Those who had served the state for at 
least fifteen years and already had a Revolution Medal of the first degree, the title of"Hero of the 
Qadisiyya" (batal al-qiidisiyya), or "Hero of the Mother of All Battles" (batal 3 umm al-maciirik), and then 
were given the Order of the Party and designated a "Friend of the President," saw their paychecks rise 350 
percent. If the Revolution Medal was of the second degree, they increased 200 percent. If the honoree had 
served for less than fifteen years, their salaries rose either 300 or 150 percent, respectively. The same pay 
rises held if the person was just honored as a "Friend of the President." If they only received the Order of 
the Party, their paychecks increased 200 and fifty percent, respectively. The same decision increased the 
salaries of those just with an Order of the Party and who were "Friends of the President'' by 100 and fifty 
percent, respectively. 
111. Mudfr cam maktab 3 amlin at sirr al-qu{r 3 illi al-raflq nli3 ib 3 am'fn sirr qiyadat qu{r a!-cirliq al-
mu~taram, May 7, 1996, 117-4-5: 695. 
4. The same reimbursement for holidays and official occasions that is· granted to the 
members of the president's office. 
5. Having preference over the remainder oftheir fellow citizens with regard to meeting 
officials. 
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6. The right for himself and his family to personally communicate with the head of the 
president's office, its secretary, the director general ofthe party, the secretary of the 
Defense Ministry, and other important officials in order to request meetings with them, or 
for similar requests. 
7. To receive two summer and two winter suits per year as a present from the President of 
the Republic.112 . 
Friends of the President also received salary increases in addition to preferential political 
access.U3 
Aside from official honors that carried continuing benefits, the Bacthist State (and 
often Hussein personally) gave out one-time awards to Iraqis for specific acts ofloyalty 
or in recognition oflong records of exemplary service. The most common award of this 
nature was a commendation (shukr wa taqdfr), which the regime placed in a citizen or 
Bacthist's file, sometimes accompanied by a fmancial award. 114 Citizens frequently 
referenced their commendations as proof of their loyalty when asking for a favor from the 
party or state, or if they fell afoul of the law. Even Bacthists who ostensibly guaranteed 
their fidelity through their membership in the party felt the need to document their 
achievements. The BRCC contains many letters from Bacthists to party offices asking 
for confirmation of their commendations or their participation in a particular battle, the 
Popular Army, a mandatory drill session, one of the national occasions, or even the 
112. 002-2-3: 733-4. 
113.004-1-4:46-9. 
114. See, e.g., "Shuler wa taqdir," al-muqi'ific li-mucata~im li-1-jaysh.al-shacb'i ~ua al-muqi'i!il 
[name withheld], Feb. 16, 1984, 001-5-4: 542. 
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"Saddam's Cubs" (ashbal saggiim) youth group.115 The party ga~e out certificates for all 
of these services to each of its members and included copies in their files. Receiving 
official confirmation for these acts either ensured them access to an award or was useful 
to have on record if they ever needed to petition for assistance. 
The Bacthist State also doled out rewards for extraordinary acts of unsolicited 
allegiance. As detailed in Chapter Three, out of the blue and on a regular basis, Hussein 
received oaths of allegiance written in their authors' blood. Iraqis, and especially 
Bacthists, also sent unsolicited "studies" about Ba0 thist doctrine or Hussein's sayings and 
writings. One such report arrived at the party's Office of Culture and Media written by 
hand with ink-drawn lines straightened with a ruler and borders colored in with crayons. 
Entitled, "The Leader, the Party, and the Revolution," Hussein's face adorned the cover. 
The office's director suggested to the Party Secretariat that it remunerate the author. 116 
A fmal way that an Iraqi might obtain benefits was by volunteering to participate 
in a government initiative. As Chapter Five showed, the Bacth gave out incentives such 
as free housing to Arabs willing to move to the north in order to shift the ethnic balance 
away from the Kurds. After the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Hussein decided to rebuild the 
Faw Peninsula, which the conflict utterly destroyed, as a sign oflraqi strength and to 
raise the population's spirits. Accordingly, he offered families willing to live there a free 
115. See, e.g., 041-3-7: 1-24. For copies of the certificates Bacthists received for participating in 
the yawm al-nakhwa drills, for "volunteering to liberate Palestine," and for graduating from Saddam's 
Cubs, respectively, see: 020-4-3: 177-79. 
116. "Bal;th," mudfr maktab al-thaqlifa wa-Piclam ~illi maktab ~amlinat sirr al-qu{r, June 21, 
1998, 054-2-6: 579. The actual report is in the same boxfile, pp. 586-604. 
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piece ofland, a loan, and a one-time payment of varying amounts. To receive these 
enticements, the family had to "be completely loyal (ma!:zsuma al-wilti:J) to the party, the 
revolution, and its principles." Nobody in the immediate family could have ever 
participated in an opposition group or been a foreign agent, and they could not have 
deserted or dodged army service. 117 
Being a Bacthist carried its own special status and opened the door to awards and 
benefits not available to the regular population. Hussein especially made sure that he 
took care oflong-tirne Bacthists and those injured in national service. The previously 
mentioned Order of the Party, for example, went to Bacthists who spent twenty-five years 
"struggling'' in the party ranks. It carried its own salary and access to perks such as 
favorable loans. The exact benefits associated with it changed over the years, but they 
always ranked among the best.118 Hussein also established the prestigious Organization 
of the Strugglers (muncq;;r.amat al-munligilfn), a Bacthist retirement association. To be 
eligible for the Organization of the Strugglers, a Bacthist's record had to be spotless. As 
a prerequisite, a member had to either spend twenty-five years in the party and amass an 
117. Quote from "Maclfnat al-]aw (maclfnat al-fada~ wa-bawwabat al-na:jr al-ca'{.fm), muclfr cam 
maktab ~amanat sirr al-qu{r ~ua al-maklitib al-tan'{.fmiyyafi al-qu{r klifa, June 18, 1989, 026-3-5: 30; 
"Maclfnat al-fow (maclfnat al-fada~ wa-bawwabat al-na(fr al-ca'{.fm), muclfr cam maktab ~amanat sirr al-
qu{r ~ua al-maklitib al-tan'{.fmiyyafi al-qu{r klifa, June 18, 1989,026-3-5:31-2. 
118. The text of the Order of the Party read: "In appreciation of the struggling role of comrade 
(name) who spent more than twenty-five struggling years in the ranks of the Arab Socialist Bacth Party for 
the sake of achieving the goals of the outstanding Arab nation: unity, freedom, and socialism. In 
appreciation for his struggling journey, the Regional Command presents him with the Order of the Party on 
(date)." Photocopies of the Order of the Party can be found throughout the BRCC, including in boxfile 183-
4-1: 92. The Order of the Party was originally given to people who had spent twenty-five continuous years 
in the party, but this was changed in 1984 to be twenty-five total years. See the letter from Sadda!n 
Hussein to the members ofthe RC, July 28, 1984, 029-1-6: 2-13. 
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exemplary record, have been a member of a branch command, or have held a higher 
position. Nobody could enroll who ever worked for another faction of the party, left the 
Bacth for more than four months, studied outside the country and failed to keep in touch, 
or was convicted of a felony or misdemeanor and then rejoined the party. The only 
exceptions to these rules were those included by order of the party secretary (Hussein) or 
the Regional Command (RC) for "those who exhibited heroism and courage in the battle 
of Sad dam's Glorious Qiidisiyya, or those who showed exceptional qualities ( mawiiqif 
mutamayyiza) in service to the party and the revolution."119 This last caveat allowed 
Hussein to include not only those who clearly qualified under the regulations but also 
Bacthists such as army generals or top party officials that he wanted to purge peacefully 
from their positions of power, giving them a secure retirement to blunt the dishonor of 
their removal. 120 
Bacthists of all membership levels received preferential access into military and 
teaching academies and higher education. In 1983, Hussein ordered that Bacthist 
applicants to the teaching academies receive fifteen to twenty points added to their 
averages so they could better contest the remaining forty percent of spots for which 
119. "Qarlir," mudfr cam maktab ~amlinat sirr al-qufr ~illi al-maklitib al-tanrJmiyyafi al-qufr 
klifa, May 14, 1985, 158-3-2: 537-8. 
120. Additionally, in 1984 the Ba0th set up the Organization of Senior Citizens and the Ill 
(munaf.?_amat kiblir al-sinn wa-1-mar(lii) which served members regardless of title or party rank who could 
no longer work because they had reached retirement age, acquired a debilitating disease, or been wounded 
fighting against the "racist Persian enemy," in a military drill, or as part of the Popular Army. Members of 
the organization received a free piece ofland to live on if they needed it. Former government employees in 
the organization continued to enjoy salary promotions up to the maximum allowable for their position, and 
private sector workers received a salary of 120-150 ID per month. "Qariir," mudlr ciim maktab ~ amiinat 
sirr al-qufr ~ua al-rafiq nii~ib ~ amln sirr al-qufr al-mu1;ttaram wa-rafiq cu~il al-qiyiida al-qufriyya al-
mu1;ttaram, Jan. 19, 1984, 088-2-4: 7-8. 
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independents were eligible at that time.121 In a speech in 1979, he mandated that all 
children of RCC members should be accepted into any college or institute they liked 
regardless of the general criteria for acceptance. Meanwhile, the children ofRC 
members and members employed in the Secretariat's office and branch administrations 
had ten points added to their averages "for purposes of acceptance and competition with 
their peers in the institutes, colleges, and schools of higher education." This was reduced 
to five points in 1997, probably due to the public perception-correct, as it turned out-
that high rru¥ng officials benefited from perks while the population floundered under 
terrible economic conditions. 122 
Carrying honors or records of exceptional service provided an extra boost to 
Ba0 thist applicants and their children. In addition to the perks listed above for "Friends 
of the President," holding an Order of the Party, participating in the Popular Army or the 
Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars, having a father or brother martyred or wounded in battle, turning 
in a member of an opposition party or an army deserter, or volunteering for the Saddam's 
Fedayeen militia all officially gave Bacthists preference over party members without 
these distinctions and over independents.123 Exceptionally, independents ·with these types 
121. "a1-Muwafaq ca1a qubii1 a1-tztlab," sikritlr a1-sayyid ra'ls a1-jumhiiriyya li-1-shu'iin a1-
/:lizbiyya 'ila ri'asat alWan ri'asat a1-jumhiiriyya, Oct. 11, 1983, 027-5-2: 439. 
122. "Qubiil 'awl ad al-sada 'actj.a' majlis qiyadat al-th(JlA,•ra wa 'act;l.a' al-qiyada al-qup-iyya," 
ra'ls alWan a1-ri'asa 'ila wizarat a1-taclim a1-caliwa-1-baJ:tth a1-ci1mlla1-maktab a1-kha~~. Oct. 23, 1984, 
113-3-3: 10; Mudlr cam maktab 'amanat sirr a1-qup- 'ila al-rafoq 'actj.a' al-qiyada a1-qup-iyya a1-
muJ:ttarama, June 9, 1980, 003-1-1: 482; "Qubii1 "abna' a1-sada 'act;l.a' majlis qiyadat a1-thawra wa 'actj.a' 
qiyadat qup- a1-ciraq," mudlr cam maktab 'amanat sirr a1-qutr 'ila a1-rafoq 'actj.a' qiyadat qup- a1-ciraq al-
mu/:ltaramln, Sept. 22, 1997,113- 3-3: 1. 
123. 027-5-2: 39; "Qa'ima bi-'asmfl' a1-tu1flb a1-murashsha/:lln li-1-qubiilfi kulliyat al-shurta al-
dawra (52) Zi-cam 1998," 019-1-5: 147-245; Mudlr qism al-dawrat a1-caskariyya 'i1a a1-rafiq a1-munat;l.il 
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of honors received preference too, especially in the Kurdish territories where 
Ba0thification proved less successful. 124 Loyalists, therefore, mainly Bacthist but not 
always, enjoyed professional and academic advantages above and beyond the rest of the 
population. 
Bacthists could also benefit from free housing. Members employed full-time by 
the party often lived in Ba0 thist owned apartments, especially those serving away from 
their hometowns and in remote areas. The party helped its less fortunate members by 
giving them free land on which to build houses. In 1985, Hussein ordered that plots of 
party or state owned land should be given to Ba0 thists who did not own a home or their 
own land, had put in at least twenty-five years of service (and were thus eligible for ah 
Order of the Party), or were at least section members. The First Deputy Prime Minister at 
the time, Taha Y asin Ramadan, then suggested that the Ba0 thist State should also give 
them a favorable loan since many of the people included in these categories had limited 
means with which to build a house. 125 
In Hussein's Iraq, therefore, citizens who received official recognition for their or 
their family members' efforts or sacrifices on behalf of the Bacthist State could expect to 
lead a decent life; Ba0 thists benefited even more. In difficult economic times some Iraqis 
curjii qiyiidat qu{r al-ciriiqlal-mushrifcaza qism al-dawriit al-caskariyya al-mul;ztaram, Oct. 25, 1997, 014-
5-4:20. 
124. See, e.g., Mudlr qism t:;ll-dawriit alcaskariyya ~ilii al-raftq curjii qiyiidat qu{r al-ciriiq al-
mushrifcalii qism al-dawriit al-caskariyya al-mul;ztaram, Dec. 13, 1992, 066-4-1: 44-5. 
125. Taha ylisfn ramaq.an al-na~ib al-~ awwalli-ra~fs al-wuzara~ ~ua sayyidi al-ra~fs al-qa~id al-
mul;ztaram, May25, 1985,087-1-1:3-5. 
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with exemplary records of service and even full party members suffered. Overall, 
however, winning as many awards, honors, and statuses (including party membership) as 
possible afforded Iraqis with, at least, a social safety net. At best, rewards opened the 
doors to economic security and prosperity, housing assistance, superior medical care, 
luxury goods, professional and educational opportunity, the possibility to travel, 
privileged access to top regime officials, and leisure for themselves and their families. 
Put simply, the longer an Iraqi's record ofloyal service the better he and his family lived. 
In contrast, citizens with only a martyr's pension or, worse, no special awards at all, 
could fmd it difficult to make ends meet. 126 
The rewards and benefits doled out by the Bacthist State thus served as a 
nationwide system of patronage from the top of the regime to the bottom. At the highest 
levels, since medals came in different degrees~ some of which could only be won by 
high-ranking officials, Hussein used the system of awards and benefits as a cover for 
funneling largesse to the people he depended on the most and who held positions of 
power tha~ could potentially pose a threat: his political inner-circle and the top military 
brass, many of whom were his relatives. Instead of showing obvious favoritism, which 
might (and in the 1990s did) provoke popular discontent, Hussein simply gave them 
medals.127 In this spirit, Hussein created The Order of the Leadership (shlirat al-qiylida) 
126. See, e.g., the story of a party branch leader who claimed that his father died defending a local 
Bacth Party headquarters building during the 1991 uprising but claims that his family can nonetheless not 
make ends meet: 044-4-6: 98. 
127. Only the President of the Republic and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Hussein), 
the deputy Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary of Defense, or the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could 
receive the Rafidayn Medal of the first degree, for example. The second degree was reserved for the aid to 
r 
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in 1986, given only to RCC and RC members.128 Salary raises of up to 300 percent given 
to Iraqis with at least two awards or honors in 1994 allowed Hussein to keep loyal and 
longtime supporters on a firm fmancial footing during tough economic times when most 
Iraqis struggled to afford daily necessities.129 Having categories of people with the same 
awards or combinations thereof also made handing out patronage more efficient, as 
.Hussein could raise salaries or increase benefits for ·an the holders of a particular honor at 
once. Outside of the elite, even if an Iraqi hated Hussein's regime, the receipt of a medal 
gave him a stake in perpetuating the system in order to hold onto its concomitant benefits. 
Since the perks associated with the Bacthist State's awards touched on so many 
aspects of life critical to an honoree and his family's welfare, they provided extra 
incentives to perform the acts of fealty that could result in receiving them. As a soldier or 
officer involved in one of the Bacth's bloody wars, a life insurance policy for his family 
was no small thing. Not only did a medal help an Iraqi's children get into good schools 
that would lead to well paying, secure jobs and the prestige of a degree, but if he did not 
have an award they would have to compete against other students whose fathers (or, 
rarer, mothers) did, leaving them disadvantaged. The BRCC contains numerous requests 
from citizens who petitioned Hussein or other high party and state officials for 
the Joint Chiefs, the commander of a military corps, the Inspector General of the Armed Forces, the 
General Secretary of the Defense Department, the commanders of the Air Force and Navy, or a lieutenant 
generallfarfq). The third and fourth degrees went to slightly lower ranking officers and officials. 026-2-7: 
229-46. 
128. "Shiirat al-qiyiida," Law no. 23, Feb. 18, 1986, http://www.iraq-
ild.org/LoadLawBook.aspx?SP=REF&SC=091220054959474& Year=1986&PageNum=1 [accessed Feb. 
27, 2012]. 
129. RCC decision no. 101, Aug. 1, 1994, 004-1-4: 46-9. 
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permission to travel abroad for medical treatment in which the petitioners mention their 
awards and statuses in order to convince the officials to allow them to go and, possibly, 
pay for their or their family member's treatment. Hussein granted many of these requests 
(see Chapter Four). The tacit agreement between the Bacthist State and society that in 
exchange for the latter's loyalty and service the former would see to its citizens' welfare 
was a fundamental pillar of the Husseini Bacthist regime and constituted a critical reason 
for why it survived in power for so long. Evidence for this comes not only in the sheer 
number of awards dispensed (173,823 just by the military during the Iran-Iraq War), but 
also the sense of entitlement and veiled outrage of petitioners who wrote to the Bacthist 
State when they did not receive the benefits due to them connected to the medals or 
statuses that they or their family members held. 130 
The Withdrawal of Privileges 
The twin tactics of terror and enticement each worked on their own, but when 
used in tandem they were particularly effective. This can be seen in the way the regime 
took benefits away from criminals and their family members. Just as expressions of 
loyalty and service elicited official rewards and opportunities for Iraqis and their families, 
130. This number comes from a report by the Bacth's military bureau which reported that 173,823 
people had been honored during this time. Among them, 2,675 were declared "Friends of the President," 
88,049 were promoted to a higher rank, 44,979 Badges of Honor were dispensed, 2,568 people received a 
car, money, watch, or other gifts, and 10,028 were given commendations (kitab shukr). It is not clear if 
these numbers comprised just Ba0thists or not. "Majmal nishiit al-maktab az-caskarf min 1/111988 li-
ghiiyat 31/1211988," 023-4-4: 263-6. There are hundreds of petitions in the BRCC requesting missing 
benefits for one reason or another. See, e.g., the case of a man whose son was hurt as a result of an 
American bombing raid but did not receive any honors as the other injured children did. Citizen petition to 
Hussein, Aug. 9, 2001,028-5-7:204. 
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crimes against the Ba0 thist State that called the allegiance of the perpetrators into 
question could result in loss of benefits for both. A series of laws and regulations found 
in the BRCC, both public and internal, detail a developed legal regime for removing 
awards and honors from individuals and how that affected their relatives depending on 
the "degree" of relation. The four awards listed above from the 1982 Medal and Badge 
Law, for example, could be taken away in the event of "deviation from the principles of 
the July 17-30 revolution."131 Likewise, an internal Ba0th Party regulation stated that "In 
the case of the expulsion of a member from the party for reasons related to the security of 
the nation and the party, economic sabotage, or an absence ofloyalty (cadam al-willf1), 
all of the benefits that he has obtained are withdrawn." This contrasted with an expulsion 
from the party simply for disciplinary reasons, in which case the member could retain his 
or her benefits. 132 
The regulation quoted above provides insight into the types of infractions that 
could lead the Ba0 thist State to withdraw an award winner's advantages. As mentioned 
above, almost any crime in Hussein's Iraq-including "crimes that violate honor" --could 
be interpreted as affecting "national security" or exhibiting "an absence ofloyalty." Most 
notably, the political offenses toward which the Bacth meted out terror qualified under 
these terms such as activity in an opposition group, conspiring against the state and the 
party (al-ta:Jammur), or exhibiting "weakness" in one's Ba0 thist duties. A Ba0 thist in the 
131. 026-2-7: 229-46 
132. "al-cUqilbiit," sikritlr al-sayyid al-ra3 1s al-jumhilriyya li-1-shuciln al-l;tizbiyya 3 ila rrasat 
azwan al-ri3 asa, Nov. 20, 1984, 035-3-4: I. 
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Kurdish territories, for instance, had the gall to write "no" on his ballot card for the 
plebiscite on Hussein in 1996. For his "disgraceful stance" (li-mawqifihi al-mushayyin) 
and "behavior that contradicts the principles of our great party and its eternal message," 
the party expelled him and took away all three ofhis Badges ofHonor. 133 It is unclear 
whether or not the man in question lived in an area controlled by the Bacthist State at this 
time since central government authority no longer held sway over much of the Kurdish 
territories. Nevertheless, if he did, or if Hussein's forces ever reclaimed the area in which 
he lived, his act of civil disobedience would have cost him and his family dearly given 
that possessing three Badges of Honor would have entitled him to "Friends of the 
President" status. 
Of course, the perpetrators of a transgression had more to worry about than losing 
their benefits. Unless an individual had connections in the regime or was lucky enough 
to be pardoned in one of Hussein's general amnesties, he would probably also lose his 
life, his freedom, be tortured, or otherwise physically punished. 134 The calculus for 
political criminals was relatively straightforward. Unless the Ba0 thist State thought it 
could rehabilitate or use the individual in some way, it eliminated or otherwise 
neutralized him. 
133. '"lstirdiid al-~awsima wa-1-~anwii!," mudir ciim maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qupr ~ilii alWiin al-
ri~iisa, Feb. 15, 1996, 113-4-5: 527. 
134. In 1988, e.g., after the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War, Hussein pardoned all military 
deserters and political criminals so long as they turned themselves in within one month for Iraqis inside the 
country and three months for those outside of it. RCC Decision no. 860, Nov. 30, 1988, 021-5-6: 46. 
Every few years, Hussein proclaimed a similar amnesty if the sheer number of people who had committed 
crimes against the state reached large proportions, making it difficult to prosecute them and affecting the 
ability of the party and state to take in or retain new members and employees. 
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As a result, the largest impact of withdrawn benefits fell onto the relatives of 
political criminals. On the one hand, the calculus for families was simple too. The 
benefits for most of the medals, badges, and statuses mentioned above either provided 
income to the winner's household or explicitly included advantages for his wife and 
children. If they had a medal withdrawn the family members also lost their legally 
stipulated perks. On the other hand, the issue was more complicated. Depending on the 
severity of the perpetrator's crime, the "effect" or "influence" (ta 3 thlr) his punishment 
had on his family member, the degree of relation between him and the family member, 
and the family member's record of loyal service, the member could also have his 
political, professional, academic, and economic opportunity curtailed. 
Relatives of political criminals, either at-large or apprehended and convicted, had 
the most restrictions placed on their freedom beyond the regular surveillance and 
harassment described above. Regulations from 1979 for family members of both 
Ba0 thists and non-members who spied against the country, participated in an opposition 
political movement, or sabotaged the party in some fashion, could not join the Bacth 
Party or were expelled from it for a probationary period. This meant that they lost the 
benefits and advantages associated with party membership and, in line with the principle 
of"balance" between government and Ba0thist posts, could have their state employment 
adversely affected too. 135 They could not be accepted into any of the military, security 
and intelligence academies or other institutes reserved for party members and 
135. 025-1-7: 46; 003-1-1: 419-26. See note 19 in Chapter Four for more about the principle of 
"balance" between party and state posts. 
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exceptionally loyal independents (see Chapter Four). They were not eligible to study 
abroad. And they could not work in the Media and Cultural Foundation, as pilots, or in 
the offices of the Party Secretariat, the RCC secretariat, the Presidency of the Republic, 
' 
or the prime minister. Strangely, any female relatives could also not work as fashion 
models outside of the country. These rules applied automatically to the wife and any 
brothers and sisters, children, or fraternal nephews of the criminal. If he was executed, 
his grandchildren, sororal nephews, and uncles might also fall under the regulations if the 
execution had an emotional affect on them as determined by a party assessment.136 In 
other words, did the family member condemn his relative or mourn him and show signs 
of a grudge against the Ba0 th? 
The Ba0 th frequently transferred or retired relatives of executed political criminals 
who worked in politically sensitive jobs. Relations of the first degree (parents and 
children) employed in the upper levels of the state or party, the military, one of the 
security and intelligence services, the police, the teaching corps, the Atomic Energy 
Agency, the National Computer Center (al-markaz al-qawm'fli-l-/Jlisiblit al-3 iliktruniyya), 
or the ministries of defense, interior, or foreign affairs were almost always moved out of 
those institutions or to un-sensitive positions within them. The Bacth had increasing 
discretion for relatives of the second (grandparents and siblings), third (uncles, aunts, 
nephews, and nieces on both sides), and fourth degrees (maternal and paternal cousins), 
136. Mudir cam maktab 'amiinat sirr al-qutr 'ilii al-qiyiidiit al-ra'asiyyafi al-qutr kiifa, Aug. 13, 
1979, 003-1-1: 288-90. 
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and in cases where the perpetrator received a lighter sentence such as imprisonment.137 
The BRCC contains hundreds if not thousands of these regulations playing themselves 
out in practice. One boxfile from the Euphrates Bureau in 1984 contains the stories of a 
teacher and police officer whom the Bacth fired because their brothers were executed for 
being Dacwa members.138 In the same year, the Bacth retired a woman because her 
brother's execution affected her severely.139 Conversely, even though the assessment of 
an elementary school teacher from Baghdad in 1985 did not show effects from her 
brother's death, it recommended transferring her anyway to a post outside of education 
for "precautionary purposes."140 Illustrating how the party did not always apply the rules 
for family members dogmatically but rather on a case-by-case basis, when the Bacthist 
State executed the brother of an official in the Directorate of Nationality and Civil Affairs 
(mudfriyyat al-jinsiyya wa-l-aJ:twiil al-madaniyya) for his membership in the Dacwa, the 
137. "al-J)awabi! al-kha~~a bi-kay.fl)l)lat al-tacamul maca 'aqribii' al-mujrim'fn al-ma~kiim'fn min 
cana#r ~izb al-dacwa al-cam'fl," mudir cam maktab 'amanat sirr al-qufr 'ila al-qiyadat al-racasiyyafi al-
qufr kafa, July 15, 1981, 041-1-5: 467; "al-J)awabi! al-kha~~a bi-kayfl)l)lat al-tacamul maca 'aqriba' al-
mujrim'fn al-ma~kiim'fn min cana#r al-'a~ab al-mucadiya," racfs alWan al-ri'asa 'ila wizarat al-difoc-
maktab al-waz'fr et. al., June 10, 1987, 047-1-7: 420-2; Mudir cam maktab 'amanat sirr al-qufr 'ila al-
maktab al-caskar'f qiyadat al-foriic al-~izbiyya kafa, May 28, 1994, 042-5-5: 203-6; "Darajat al-qaraba," 
041-1-5:441. This last document, which defines levels ofrelation, was found inside a boxfile from 1990. 
The same regulations, frequently carbon copies appended to an assessment of the relative of a political 
criminal, were also discovered as far back as 1982 (001-5-1: 271), although their origin likely preceded that 
date. 
138. ""lkhraj min silk al-taclfm," amfn sirr maktab tan?:fm al-forat 'ila maktab 'amanat sirr al-
qufr, Dec. 25, 1983, 021-1-5: 510; '"lkhraj min silk al-shurfa," mudir cam maktab 'amanat sirr al-qutr 'ila 
wizarat al-dakhiliyya/al-maktab al-kha~~' April19, 1984, 021-1-5: 532. 
139. ""l~alat 0 ala al-taqa0 ud," mudir cam maktab 'amanat sirr al-qufr 'ila alWan al-ri'asa, Dec. 
19, 1984, 001-5-1: 614. 
140. ""lkhriij min silk al-taczrm," mudir cam maktab 'amana! sirr al-qufr 'ila alWan al-ri'asa, 
Feb. 9, 1985, 024-1-6: 498. 
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director of the Party Secretariat wrote to Hussein asking that he be brought back from 
retirement to resume his post. The man duly returned to work.141 In an analogous case, a 
former teacher moved into the Bacquba local administration in 1988 was allowed to 
return to her original job even though her husband remained in jail for being a 
communist.142 
Even if no official regulation prohibited an Iraqi from taking a job or being 
accepted into an academy, black marks about a relative in his file could lead to the same 
result. A boxfile containing forms of information about applicants to the police 
preparatory school C'icdtidiyat al-shurta) in 2002 categorized forty-one rejected students 
as having "un-encouraging information" registered against them. Among them, a few 
had relatives who participated in the post-Gulf War uprisings. Other relations were 
members of, or had been executed for, joining opposition parties. One had a family 
member imprisoned for forging official documents. Another's stole a car and killed its 
driver, a non-political crime that resulted in the relative's execution. A suspicious or 
incomplete family background was also problematic. The Bacth denied an applicant 
simply for having uncles who lived in Erbil in the Kurdish territories. The negative noted 
against another applicant stated that "his reputation and that of his family is not good." 
The Bacth rejected somebody else because it did not have enough information to justify 
his acceptance. The party also looked askance at Bacthists who did not exhibit sufficient 
141. cAlr Hasan majrd mudrr cam maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qutr to Saddam Hussein, 030-4-2: 363. 
From a boxfile dated 1983. 
142. "Biyan ra~r," ~amrn sirr maktab tan:r.rm al-furat ~ua maktab ~amanat sirr al-qu{r, Dec. 6, 
1988, 038-5-2: 215-16. 
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commitment or ardor in carrying out their party activities. The forms describe a few 
applicants as "uncommitted" (ghayr multazim) or not having participated in national 
events such as the military drills undertaken onyawm al-nakhwa. 143 
Relatives of political criminals could mitigate the severity of their own 
punishments or reverse them altogether under at least one of two conditions: by turning a 
family member in or exposing the crime and supporting the subsequent punishment, or by 
highlighting their own records ofloyal service.144 Often, the BRCC shows, relatives did 
both in order to protect themselves and the rest of their family, loudly proclaiming their 
allegiance while conspicuously rushing to perform an act of fealty. 145 In an effort to 
escape suspicion, the nephew of a minister purged during Hussein's assumption of the 
·presidency in 1979 sent a letter to the Ba0 th extolling the party, promising to die for its 
principles, and denouncing his uncle as a "criminal." A party report attached to the letter 
143. "QiFima bi-"asmii" al-tuliib al-murashshalJ,'fn li-1-qubiilfi"icadiidiyat al-shurta al-dawra (47) 
li-ciim 2002," 020-4-3: 2-9. These forty-one were picked out of a summary list of all of the nominees for 
acceptance into the police academy. 
144. 042-5-5: 203-6. 
145. This did not always help, especially in the cases of first degree relatives of executed political 
criminals. Especially as the years went on, however, and the party and state ranks suffered from too many 
disqualifications on account of family members' indiscretions, the Bacth focused more on a relative's 
record ofloyalty instead of his relative's crimes. A set of 1994 regulations about how to deal with the 
relatives of political criminals stated that "It should be taken into consideration in an evaluation if a family 
has produced a martyr or their sons have risked their lives Cistabsala) and have been honored, regardless of 
the type (of honor), even if one of the family's sons showed a treasonous or oppositionist stance. I.e. 
employ the case of martyrdom and heroism and ignore the case of treachery and criminality. 
"Similarly, in the case of a tribe, do not measure the tribe by the number of criminals or the cases 
of treason and opposition in it, but rather measure it by the number of martyrs, heroes, and honorees, lest 
enemies exploit that for their own interests." 042-5-5: 204. 
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described the nephew as previously close to the minister, but he did not attend the wake 
or burial so as to prove his Bacthist mettle.146 
In less high profile cases, the families of criminals often pretended that their 
deviant members did not exist in order to forestall collective punishment, prove their 
loyalty, and retain their honor. When a Bacthist found out in 1981 that his son had been 
arrested for joining the Da0 wa Party, he quickly volunteered for the Popular Army, as 
told in a memorandum passed to members of the RC: 
Enclosed is the report of the fighter [name withheld], commander of a company in the 
section of al-Tiiz ... who urgently requests to participate in the battlefront, keeping in mind 
that his youngest son has a relationship with the agent (cam'il) Dacwa party and is 
presently interned in the security directorate of ~alah al-Din province. 
Please bring this subject to the attention of the comrade Secretary of the Country 
(Hussein), with the knowledge that we support accepting the volunteering of his father 
and not taking any party measures against the father in light of his volunteering and 
behavior.147 
A letter from the father accompanied the memorandum in which he went on at length 
about what an honor it was to serve in the war effort without ever mentioning his son. 148 
In another instance, when two male members of a non-Ba0 thist family fled to Romania 
before the Iran-Iraq War, the government designated them as deserters from the army. 
Subsequently, when the young daughter of one of the men inquired about her father, her 
mother always shushed her quickly and told any non-family members who heard the 
146. al-Rafiq [name withheld] ~ua sayyidl al-ra'zs al-jumhiiriyya al-rafiq al-qli'id al-muniirJ.il 
~addam husayn, Aug. 24, 1979,003-1-1: 295-9; Mudlr al-~idiira al-dhatiyya 'ila al-rafiq mudlr cam 
maktab 'amlinat sirr al-qutr al-muJ:ttaram, Sept. 12, 1980, 003-1-1: 281. 
147. "Tatawwiic muqatil," Tahayasin ramagan al-qa~id al-cam li-l-jaysh al-shacbi~ila al-qiyada 
al-qutriyya- maktab ~amanat sirr al-qutr, Dec. 4, 1981, 034-2-1: 12. 
148. "Taqrir," al-muqatil [name withheld] 'ila al-rafiq qa~id al-jaysh al-shacbi li-man{aqat ~ala/:l 
al-dln bi-wasata al-rafiq 'amar qa{i" aPiqtidar li-1-jaysh al-shacbz, Nov. 28, 1981, 034-2-1: 13. 
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question that her daughter was psychotic and did not know what she was saying. 149 
Terror and enticement worked so well that some families erased the memories of their 
members in order to retain what they still had. 
Conclusion 
Terror and enticement worked in tandem to separate the Iraqi population into two 
categories of people: enemies and loyalists. Enemies consisted of opposition internal to 
the regime and the Bacth Party, collective and individual resistance, and political 
criminals. The BRCC shows that although Hussein and the Bacth succeeded in largely 
destroying existential threats to their regime, they also created their own opposition. This 
occurred due to their wide definition of enemies, the ~conomic and human toll caused by 
the decisions to fight two destructive wars, and the severe penalties that accrued not just 
to individuals but entire families or groups of Iraqis whom Hussein and the Bacth 
mistrusted for both sober and paranoid reasons. The Bacth explained away resistance to 
its rule by labeling opponents and criminals as "foreign" elements. As threats to the 
party's ideological mission and Hussein's more practical attempt to construct an 
environment that would engender popular support, these elements had no place in 
Bacthist Iraq. The Bacth regime consequently used violence-morally and legally 
justified-to eliminate them. 
149. "Macliimlit," mucliwin mudfr cam maktab ~amanat sirr al-qutr ~ilajihiiz al-mukhabarlit, Sept. 
30, 1989,001-5-4: 366-7. 
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At the same time, in order to build a loyal foundation on which to base its future 
in the space "cleansed" of its enemies, Hussein and the Bacth used enticements to elicit 
support. Enticements were official rewards and statuses that came with associated 
benefits. Holding them, or not, often meant the difference between poverty, making ends 
meet, and prosperity for oneself and one's family. For those who did not have honors, 
the prospect of winning them served as a useful impetus for allegiance. For those who 
did, the prospect of losing what they had gained represented not just a potential financial, 
professional, or academic loss but an emotional and moral one as well. For an Iraqi to 
gain and retain benefits for himself and his family, he often had to sell out a relative, his 
religion, his tribe, or merely to parrot slogans which he knew to be false. To then 
forsake the Bacthist Trinity after signaling his complicity in it would be an admission of 
his own guilt and a blow to his honor. It would bring shame upon him. By tapping into 
this basic desire for an individual to uphold his own and his family's dignity, and by 
tying that dignity to its regime, the Bacth bound its population's fate to its own through 
the multi-tiered dynamic that terror and enticement created. 
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CONCLUSION 
This study began by asking why fathers during Saddam Hussein's presidency in 
Iraq, from 1979 to 2003, would kill their sons to uphold their personal honor, that of their 
families, and of Hussein himself, the Bacth Party, and the Iraqi and Arab nations-the 
Ba0 thist Trinity. These types of incidents represented extreme examples ofloyalty, but at 
lesser levels they occurred on a daily basis. No matter how powerful, no single human 
can rule alone. The Bacthist State's institutions of tyranny-the security services, police, 
Ba0 th Party, and the military-required hundreds of thousands (and during the Iran-Iraq 
and Gulf wars, millions) of officers, volunteers, and conscripts to carry out its wars and 
domestic terrorism. Each year, thousands of young people applied for admission into the 
Ba0 th's security, police, and military academies. These applicants knew well the secret 
police's penchant for unwarranted arrests, frequent use of torture, and murder, often after 
"disappearing" their victims. Yet they still applied. State institutions and their vast 
bureaucracies needed qualified officials and technocrats. Schools required teachers. The 
streets had to be swept, and the Ba0th found an ample supply of willing mukhtfirs to keep 
an eye on their neighbors. Finally, of course, the Bacth Party itself needed members. All 
of these people, even if they did not kill or carry out oppression themselves, worked for 
the system that did, thereby either explicitly or tacitly affirming it. As Richard Overy has 
noted about Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia, "If repression is to work, a substantial 
section of society must identify with or even approve its activities. "1 
1. Overy, 208. 
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But did Iraqis whose behavior indicated that they supported the regime really 
"identify with" or "approve" of the Ba0 thist State's activities? While many Ba0 thists 
went to meetings, the BRCC also reports that many members skipped them, "shirked 
their duties" (al-tasarrub), exhibited "weakness" (al-takhlidhul), and evinced lax 
discipline. Lower level party organizations did not respond to requests for information in 
the stipulated time and handled secret party correspondence carelessly. Monetary and 
accounting irregularities occurred because Ba0 thists stole from party coffers. 
Recruitment frequently did not go well, which meant that either Ba0 thists did not try hard 
to convince people to join the party, that people did not want to join, or both. Partisans 
and supporters often showed themselves uncommitted. Party reports regularly bemoaned 
the substandard "cultural" levels of party members.2 Ba0thists took part in "mistaken" or 
"un-natural" religious practices contrary to the orders of the party.3 After the Iran-Iraq 
War, soldiers left the party in the hundreds ofthousands.4 When the 1991 uprisings 
broke out, few party members reported to their posts to defend Ba0thist and government 
installations.5 In 1995, the regime had to pay its top officials to attend national 
2. "Diriisa," mudir cam maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qup- ~na cu#i al-lajna al-tan'{.lmiyya al-mulJ,taram, 
Oct. 25, 1990, 076-2-4: 39-57; "~Jjtimiic," maktab ~amiinat sirr al-qup- ~na qiyiidiit al-furiic al-/Jizbiyya 
kiifa, al-maktab az-caskarl, Jan. 4, 1993,004-1-4: 162-3; 034-2-1: 146-7; 029-2-3: 95; "al-Taqrlr al-
khatiimlli-dawrat aPijtimiiciit al-thaqiifiyya al-markaziyya al-riibica li-ciim 1987/86," maktab al-thaqiifa 
wa-Picliim, 037-3-5: 26-39; "Madinat al-kiija," sikritlr ra~ls al-jumhiiriyya ~na maktab ~amiinat sirr al-
qu.tr, May 25, 1986, 231-2. 
3. "Muniisabat casharat mulJarram," ~amln sirr qiyiidat maktab tan'{.lm al-juniib ~na maktab 
~amiinat sirr al-qutr, Nov. 22, 1983, 023-4-7: 566. 
4. 104-3-1:276-7. 
5. This can be seen in many party reports from the 1991 uprisings, including 024-5-2: 96 .. 
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occasions. 6 As Chapter Five showed, many criminal activities took place, as did 
assassinations and attempts on the lives ofBacthist and state officials. These types of 
crimes occurred so often, as did desertion, that the regime had to promulgate frequent 
amnesties (at least eight from 1980 to 1999).7 Indeed, the mere existence of widespread 
desertion during the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars shows that many Iraqis did not buy the 
regime's line that the wars were "glorious" or "eternal." Judged by their actions, a 
significant number of Iraqis did not approve of Hussein and his regime's activities, 
Bacthists included. The overall picture that the BRCC paints, in other words, is not one 
of consistent and overridingly faithful allegiance but of often grudging support and, 
occasionally, outright disloyalty, insubordination, and betrayal. 
Yet, the system worked. Saddam Hussein and his clos_est confidants remained in 
power from 1968 to 2003, twenty-four of those years with Hussein as president. Fathers 
killed their sons for desertion as did tribal shaykhs their tribesmen for criminal activity. 
Bacthists turned in their nephews for membership in opposition movements. Friends 
6. "~ lkriimiyyiit al-muniisabiit al-diniyya wa-1-wa{aniyya," mudir ciim maktab ~ amiinat sirr al-qu{r 
~ua al-maktab a/-c askar'f qiyiidiit al-furiic al-/:zizbiyya, July 4, 1995, 171-3-1: 64. 
7. Ofra Bengio, "Iraq," in Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume Five 1980-81, ed. Bairn 
Shaked, Colin Legum, and Daniel Dishon (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc, 1982), 585; RCC 
Decision No. 860, Nov. 30, 1988, 021-5-6: 46; RCC Decision No. 770, Dec. 2, 1989, 029-4-2: 97; 
"Iraq President Extends Amnesty for Kurds" BBC Summary ofWorld Broadcasts, May .14, 1990; "~Amr," 
mudfr clim maktab ~amlinat sirr al-qutr ~ua al-rafiq ~amfn sirr maktab tan:r.fm al-furlit al-mu~taram, July 1, 
1991, 039-1-6: 267; Mudfr clim maktab ~amlinat sirr al-qu{r ~ua al-rafiq nli~ib ~amfn sirr qiylidat qu{r al-
cirliq, July 4, 1993, 120-4-1: 389; Mudfr aPistikhblirlit al-caskariyya al-clima ~ua maktab ~amlinat sirr al-
qu{r, July 22,2000, 029-1-3: 153, references an amnesty from July 22, 1995; "Maclilmlit," mucliwin mudfr 
maktab ~amlinat sirr al-qu{r ~ua qiylidatfurc al-ba~ra, July 29, 2001, 157-3-2: 261, references a general 
amnesty offered on Oct. 20, 1999. 
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reported their fellows for comments made in con:fidance. Iraqis composed oaths of 
allegiance to Hussein signed in their own blood. Bacthists who wanted to move up in the 
party wrote essays about Hussein's words and the glory of the July 17-30 revolution. 
Iraqis voted in plebiscites. Poets wrote odes glorifying Hussein. 8 Why? 
In a telling internal study from 1992 entitled, "The Reality of the Unions, 
Federations, and Mass Organizations during the Most Recent Period," the official in 
charge of the Middle Euphrates bureau reported that after "the Command" issued a 
decree giving people "the right to choose to join a union," Iraqis left the PMOs in droves. 
The official claimed that the PMOs in his region had become "skeletons without masses." 
This occurred, he said, because the PMOs suffered from two problems: (1) the "freedom 
to join," and (2) the PMOs' isolation from the masses because few people remained·who 
wanted to participate in them.9 As soon as the Ba0 th gave Iraqis freedom to choose, they 
decided to leave the organizations that the Ba0 th had required them to join in order to 
practice their professions or keep their jobs as laborers or peasants. 
The Bacthist system worked because it was based upon many different 
overlapping controls like the requirement to join the PMOs. Each rule, stricture, or 
incentive (positive or negative) took away an aspect of an Iraqi's freedom and made 
living the life each individual wanted to carry on conditional upon his active support for 
8. 040-3-1: 601-4. This document is a proposal sent by a poet to erect murals of poetry as a 
present to Hussein. He included original poems in the proposal praising Hussein as well. 
9. "Diriisa," mas3 iil tan:r.fmiit al-furiit al-3 awsat 3 ilii maktab 3 amiinat sirr al-qu{r, March 8, 1992, 
120-2- 3: 321-3. It is not clear whether the official was referring to the Revolutionary Command Council 
or the Bacth's Regional Command. 
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the Bacthist order. Some of these controls coerced support, some elicited it. Together 
they targeted every aspect oflife in Ba0 thist Iraq. On the individual level, the controls 
effected whom an Iraqi could marry, defmed his personal and familial sense of honor and 
self-worth, and connected an Iraqi's behavior to that of his family, making it imperative 
for all to remain loyal. They made his religious faith equivalent, or subordinated, to 
Ba0 thist faith. They turned the shaykh at the head of his tribe into a Bacthist and placed 
the party at the head of his clan. They even berated the Kurds for not showing allegiance 
to the Arab nation. In civil and public life, to practice one's profession, to succeed in 
school, or to engage in a sport or hobby required joining a Bacthist association. 
Government officials and employees in levels of power were all either Bacthists or 
carefully vetted independents. The bureaucracies and businesses where Iraqis worked 
had open and secret Ba0 thist control officers. Making an offhanded, anti-regime 
comment to a friend in high school or during a blood drive could mean arrest for oneself 
or one's family. Like the BRCC's literary styles and conventions, and the rituals and 
manifold pictures of everyday life they describe, every interaction that an Iraqi had on a 
daily basis occurred within the context of living in a Bacthized environment. As a result, 
all of his deeds, words, and relationships could, at any time, take on a political character. 
Not just violence but the entire system of controls that Hussein installed created 
complicity. When Iraqis participated in rituals, parroted slogans, or answered questions 
. on a test in which they did not believe, they gave credence to the Ba 0 thist system. 
Although they could make suggestions, critique government policy, and protest the 
decisions of their superiors, the petitions sent to Hussein show that they could only do so 
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after praising him, the revolution, and the country profusely. In order to assert their 
rights, they first had to affirm the system. To become the shaykh of a tribe or clan, a 
person had to join the party, participate in the Bacth's wars, police his tribesmen, and 
convince them to support the regime. At the crucial moment, he had to demonstrate that 
his primary allegiance lay ~th the Ba0 thist Trinity, not his tribe. Not every Iraqi 
engaged in terror, but in order to be labeled a supporter instead of an enemy, everybody 
had to back the Bacth's use of violence and torture--or at least pretend that it did not 
exist. During years of war or sanctions (all but two years during Hussein's presidency), 
many Iraqis depended on the state for their welfare. To provide for their families and 
ensure their individual and collective futures, Iraqis accepted the Ba0 th's enticements. 
Hussein and the Bacth designed their system of control so as to give Iraqis unequivocal 
choices to commit acts that they would not have carried out otherwise. 
Ba0 thification as a whole provided a moral and legal excuse for Iraqis to comply 
with Hussein and the party's demands. Ideology asserted the moral authority ofHusseini 
Ba0 thism, finding in its reading of history a moral imperative to establish the Arab and 
Iraqi nations led by the Ba0 th with Saddam Hussein as Iraqi president and Secretary of 
the party. The way that Hussein and the Ba0 th organized state and society provided a 
cover for complicity. The many forms that Iraqis had to fill out, the bureaucratic rules 
they had to follow, and the laws they had to obey were all based upon Hussein's decrees 
and the political considerations of his regime. The wide definition and politicization of 
"crimes that violate honor" as offenses that traduced the ethical mission ofBa0thism 
provided a legal rational for violence. To win awards and retain their associated benefits 
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Iraqis had to obtain official certificates and maintain notations in their files. The Bacthist 
State enshrined the benefits associated with these rewards in law, meaning that not only 
did Iraqis expect them as part of a tacit bargain with the authorities, but they could claim 
a legal right to their honors as well. 
All of the controls helped to bridge the gap between the Ba0th's ideological 
claims to build a utopia and the reality that Iraqis lived. All assisted in justifying and 
rationalizing the minority rule of Hussein's homogenous ruling elite over Iraq's 
heterogeneous population while simultaneous claiming that his government served 
everyone. In order to institutionalize this state of affairs, the entire energy of the system 
was devoted to transforming Iraqi society into Bacthist society and the Iraqi people into 
Ba0thists through ideological indoctrination, the re-organization and reorientation of 
governmental and social establishments, and through the positive and negative incentives 
of terror and enticement. This study has analyzed these four controls in isolation, but in 
reality they all exerted their own pressures at once. When faced with these constant 
pressures, some Iraqis fled the country. Others joined opposition groups. Most, 
however, succumbed at some level to the strictures placed on their thoughts and 
behaviors. The environment that Hussein and the Ba0 th created continually tested the 
loyalties of Iraqis. Hussein and the Bacth hoped that the longer it stood in place and the 
more vigorously they asserted its existence and legitimacy, the more ingrained it would 
become as the behaviors they forced Iraqis to take on, and the symbols they made them 
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pledge allegiance to, became the normal state of affairs. 10 In this way, the Ba0th Party's 
original assertions of authority and legitimacy would find their ways into Iraqis' 
consciousnesses, in the process manifesting and simultaneously justifying themselves in 
expressions of popular support. The Bacthification of Iraq worked, in other words, 
because Hussein and the party pursued a total strategy and executed it well. 
The Ba0 th's totalitarianism was not preordained but resulted from a choice by its 
leadership to make and pursue a total claim on the population. Historical circumstance, 
Bacthist ideology, and Hussein's personal proclivities made this choice possible. Hussein 
and the Bacth instituted their controls with a bitter memory of their 1963 experience and 
as products of Iraq's zero-sum political culture of violence. Like the monarchy, Qasim, 
and the c Arifs before them, the Bacth constituted a minority ruling Sunni elite that desired 
to maintain its exclusive rule over Iraq's heterogeneous population. Many Bacthists, like 
al-Majmaci, imagined a brighter future based on social justice, freedom from 
imperialism, and the ability of the Arabs to advance to a higher level of civilization. But 
c Aflaq's total philosophy and its moral imperative turned into the justification for 
totalitarianism in the hands of Saddam Hussein. Hussein studied the biography of Joseph 
Stalin while in exile in Egypt, supposedly claiming before the Ba0 th's 1968 coup that 
"When we take over the government I'll turn this country into a Stalinist state." After he 
10. As Gaetano Mosca wrote: "When there is a more or less masked antagonism between a 
doctrine, or a creed, that aspires to universality, and the sentiments and traditions that support the 
particularism of a state, what is really essential is that those sentiments and traditions should be really 
vigorous, that they should also be bound up with many material interests and that a considerable portion of 
the ruling class should be strongly imbued with them and should propagate and keep them alive in the 
masses. If, in addition, this element in the ruling class is soundly organized, it can resist all the religious or 
doctrinary currents that are exerting an influence in the society that it rules." Mosca, 80. 
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assumed the presidency, he declared that "We are now in our Stalinist era."11 He did not 
study Nikita Khrushchev, and it is doubtful that he admired Mikhail Gorbachev. With no 
natural personal or institutional legitimacy, Hussein gained power through the 
conspiratorial and paranoid medium of the Ba0 th Party's security services. He turned 
Iraq not just into the Ba0 thist State but a police state, and Bacthist ideology gave him a 
moral and logical excuse to rationalize and build the Stalinist style dictatorship he 
desired. 
What can the Ba0 thist case teach about totalitarianism in general? It is hoped that 
a future study will more definitively flesh out the general,.characteristics of the Ba0 th's 
totalitarianism in comparison with other commonly recognized totalitarian regimes. The 
insight here is that totalitarianism is a strategy chosen and designed to overcome the 
historical predicament of a revolutionary, populist, ideological movement that takes 
power and then must justify its exclusive ~e at least partially by proving its popu1ar 
credentials. In this way, the historical circumstances from which it emanates and its 
utopian vision align to suggest a course of action that requires transforming, or 
reorganizing, state and society in their totality so that the reality of life corresponds to the 
movement's stated ideals. In this definition, ideology and organization are essential, but 
attaining the power and resources to coerce and elicit consent for the process of 
11. Coughlin, 47-8; Aburish, 67; The Guardian, Aprilll, 1980, quoted in O:fra Bengio, "Iraq," in 
Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume 4, 1979-80, ed. Haim Shaked, Colin Legum, and Daniel 
Dishon (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc, 1981), 505. 
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transformation is also critical. Terror and enticement thus have greater or lesser roles to 
play depending on the historical circumstances. 
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APPENDIX 1: Party Membership 
The Bacth kept internal statistics about its membership at the local and national 
levels, some of which survive in the BRCC. With regard to the former, there are many 
statistics on individual party organizations and their corresponding geographic areas 
within regular status reports and records of fusing and splitting up organizations (al-shatr 
wa-l-3 istil:zdiith). These provide snapshots of the party's reach in particular areas at 
specific times, but the information is uneven and provides no context with which to put 
the numbers into perspective. Even when multiple years of data exist on a single 
organization it is difficult to draw conclusions because the party constantly fused and 
split up its organizations and changed their borders. It is never clear, therefore, if one is 
comparing apples to apples. 1 The most that can be said based upon available statistics is 
that the percentage of the population in the party within civilian, non-student 
organizations ranged widely from a low of 0.4% in two respective divisions within the 
Ta0 amim branch in 1991, to 25% within a division in the Basra branch in 2001. Within 
that range, most party organizations reported a percentage of the population between two 
to twelve percent. The party's personnel strength changed, therefore, from area to area 
and time to time, but it is impossible based upon the BRCC' s incomplete information 
1. For local organization statistics see boxfiles: 150-2-5; 118-2-6; 088-3-1; 080-3-6; 077-2-3; 098-
5-3; 169-4-6; 134-4-3; 158-2-1; 133-2-7; 062-4-7; 165-1-7; 027-1-4; 043-1-4; 182-4-2; 044-2-4; 087-4-3; 
044-2-4. 
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between geographic regions and even within bureaus, branches, and sections to draw 
~e:finitive conclusions about which areas these were in different years. 2 
Nationwide statistics provide more opportunity for comparison because they have 
a common denominator. Table 1 shows how many total people throughout the country 
were in the Bacth Party for the four years of statistics found in the BRCC, broken down 
by membership level. To her credit, the 1986 numbers correspond closely to those 
reported by Christine Moss Helms in 1984 (1.5 million total members) based upon 
research from the early 1980s.3 They differ little on an absolute basis from the 1997 
statistics, although it is difficult to conclude for sure whether or not they dipped in the 
early 1990s and came back to that level or if they merely decreased slightly during the 
period. Based upon evidence from the BRCC, the former possibility seems more likely. 
The party lost members in the late 1980s and early 1990s when Hussein drew down his 
military forces and many Iraqis wanted a break from party work after the grueling Iran-
Iraq and Gulf War years. Tasked with so many duties at the battle and home fronts to 
. assist the military and state institutions straining under the impact of the wars, moreover, 
the Bacth Party could not devote as much time to internal affairs and recruitment.4 As a 
2. Nor does it necessary follow, for example, that the organizations from the Tikrit and Mosul 
areas, from which many of the regime's top leaders were drawn contained the highest percentage of 
members. It is possible that there is a pattern within the available data but this author is not a statistician or 
a demographer and has not attempted to analyze it completely. All that can be said here is that there is no 
readily apparent pattern. 
3. Helms, 87. 
4. See a study put together by the northern bureau in 1990 detailing reasons as to why so many 
partisans and supporters were retiring from the party: "Kayfiyyat al-taciimul maca aPan~iir wa-1-
mu'ayyadfn alladhTnayaflabiin al-'i/:tiila 'ilii al-taqiicud al-/:tizbT," al-rafiq [name withheld] 'ilii al-rafiq al-
sikritlr al-/:tizbT al-mu/:ttaram, Nov. 10, 1990, 104-3-1:297-8. 
302 
result, until Iraq began to break out of its sanctions straightjacket when it accepted UN 
resolution 986 in late 1996 (the "oil-for-food" program), party membership as a whole 
decreased both absolutely and relatively. In relation to population growth, the Bacth 
Party was a smaller percentage of the population in 1997 (6.8%) than in 1986 (10.1 %). 
This does not necessarily mean that the party's influence or role within the 
Bacthist State and society diminished over this period however. Rather, the Bacth Party's 
abilities seemed to decrease in conjunction with those of the Bacthist State as a whole. 
With fewer resources to dole out as largesse and Hussein repeatedly asking Bacthists in 
addition to ordinary citizens to donate higher parts of their salaries and accept fewer 
benefits during Iraq's iean economic years, there was less of an incentive to join or 
remain active in the party.5 While in the regime's upper echelons Hussein might have 
relied more on kin and tribal relations to sure up his innermost circle in tough times, as 
well as truly competent military officers instead of party apparatchiks to reverse the tide 
of the Iran-Iraq War, the BRCC gives no indication that the party ever lost its importance 
as the head of Hussein's total system of mental, organizational, social, and repressive 
control. As the table shows, even if the Bacth's total numbers fell between 1986 and 
1997, the number of full members rose by 310% and more than doubled as a percentage 
o.fthe population from 0.25% to 0.6%. Full members always assumed the vast majority 
5. See, e.g., a party memorandum about the Bacth's inability to pay its full-time employees 
salaries that kept up with inflation in 1993. As a result, many did not come in to work and the party had to 
hire temporary employees. Mudfr cam maktab 3 amiinat sirr al-qu,tr 3 i!ii al-raftq nii3 ib 3 am'in sirr qiyiidat 
qu{r al-ciriiq, May 20, 1993, 027-1-2: 29. 
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of party responsibilities and carried out most of its activities. Their numbers indicate the 
most zealous core ofBacthist support. 
The explosion in party population between 1997 and 2002 requires an 
explanation. It was most likely the result of two factors, one related to full members and 
the other to supporters, the latter of which accounted for over half the increase in total 
membership over this period. With regard to full members, beginning in 1997 Hussein 
began to place emphasis on the need to refresh the party's aging population. Table 2 
provides a breakdown by age of party members in leadership roles for that year. Its 
numbers correspond with Baram's conclusion that, by this time, many younger, lower-
level members, partisans, and supporters had become disgruntled for lack of opportunity 
to move up in the party. As a result, many younger Bacthists "won" internal party 
elections for organizat~onalleaderships, beating out their older comrades. 6 For their part, 
the number of supporters likely increased because joining the party became attractive 
again as the oil-for-food program ramped up and the Bacth Party had more resources to 
make good on its promises of perks that accrued to party members. The Bacth also 
probably simply placed more emphasis on recruitment and installed more regulations 
which made joining the Bacth Party compulsory to enroll in certain academic degree 
programs or hold government posts. 
6. Baram, Building Toward Crisi~, 43. 
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Table 1: Total Party Membership, available statistics7 
1986 1997 2001 200215 
Full members 40,385 (0.25% 125,198 (0.6%) 231,396 (0.9%) 558,993 (2.2%) 
( cu~il c ami!) of Iraq's pop.) 
Members in 20,347 22,732 172,699 No information 
training ( cu~il given 
mutadarrab) 
Nominees No information 15,752 26,395 24,627 
(murashshal;,)_ g1ven 
Partisans 589,004 427,374 914,478 1,117,222 
(na~rr) 
Supporters 987,708 924,510 1,769,862 2,318,229 
(mu:Jayyid) 
Total party 1,637,444 1,515,566 3,114,833 4,020,761 
population (10.1% of the (6.8%) (12.5%) (15.7%) 
pop.) 
Total Iraqi 16,159,000 22,207,000 24,938,000 25,578,000 
population 
- -Sources: "Majmal aPiJ:t~a'iyya al-cadadiyya li-l-makatib al-tan?.fmiyyaft al-qup- kaja li-shahr nfsan 
1986," 164-3-1: 87 (1986 data); 062-4-7: 159 (1997 data); 182-4-2: 66 (2001 data); 108-4-6: 19-24 (2002 
data). The population statistics are taken from World Bank numbers via Google's "Public Data Explorer": 
http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9 _ &met_y=sp _pop _totl&idim=country:IRQ& 
dl=en&hl=en&q=iraq+population+statistics [accessed Nov. 25, 20 11]. 
7. Only one year of national statistics for women were found for this study. In 2002, there were 
20,941 full members of all types, 35,261 members in training, 776 partisans, and 657,031 supporters. 
These statistics are included in the total membership numbers for 2002 in Table 1. June 15, 2002, 108-4-6: 
40-3. 
8. The 2002 numbers contradict Marr's contention, based upon statistics from Faleh Abd al-Jabbar 
("Iraq Mutates into a Society of Tribalism," Gulf News, Aug. 3, 2000) that "By 2003 [the Bacth Party] may 
have lost as much as 70 percent of its membership, weakening its capacity as an instrument of control and 
social engineering." Marr, 293. 
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Tb a le 2: Age of Party Members in Leadership Roles, 1997 
Age Secretaries of Members of Members of Members Full 
Branches Partv Offices Section of Division Members 
within the Leadershins Leadershins (not in 
Secretariat leadershin 
and Branch roles) 
Leaderships 
Under 1 (0.05%) 12 (0.08%) 3754 (3.5%) 
30 
30-35 1 (3%) 2 (0.5%) 15 (0.2%) 615 (4%) 16,108 (15%) 
36-40 3 (0.7%) 61 (3%) 1,757 18,651 (17%) 
(11%) 
41-45 32 (8%) 385 (18%) 4,688 28,433 (27%) 
(30%) 
46-50 8 (21%) 109 (26%) 734 (34%) 4,594 20,441 (19%) 
(29%) 
51-55 24 (62%) 190 (45%) 705 (33%) 3,033 13,687 (13%) 
(19%) 
56-60 6 (15%) 78 (18%) 200 (9%) 852 (5%) 4,337 (4%) 
61-65 9(2%) 28 (1%) 154 (1%) 1,422 (1%) 
Total 39 422 2,129 15,705 106,833 
Source: 062-4-7: 154-7. 
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APPENDIX 2: Military Bureau Party Organizations and Members 
Table 3: Party Organizations in the Military Bureau, available _years 
1984 1988 1990 2002 
Branches 5 11 11 Unavailable 
Sections 40 69 54 82 
Divisions 201 418 289 574 
Cells Unavailable Unavailable 1,767 7,873 (total 
. number of 
bureau 
organizations) 
- - -Sources: 098-5-3: 54-60; "Ma]ma1 mshaf a1-mqktab a1-caskan mm 111/1988/z-ghayat 31/12/1988," 023-4-
4: 263-6; "aP~fFiya a1-cadadiyya li-1-jihaz a1-/:tizbi li-1-fa# a1-thiinf min ciim 1990," 134-4-3: 36; 108-4-
6: 19-24. 
Table 4: Party Members in the Military Bureau, available years 
1986 1988 1990 2002 
Full Members 17,610 46,327 26,415 130,103 
(all levels) 
Members-in- 13,431 Not recorded Not recorded Not recorded 
Training 
Nominees Not recorded Unavailable 6,601 6,046 
Partisans 234,470 Unavailable 159,365 99,551 
Supporters 332,595 Unavailable 334,928 195,983 
Total 598,106 N/A 527,309 431,683 
Sources: 164-3-1: 87; 023-4-4: 263-6; 134-4-3: 36; 108-4-6: 19-24. 
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